# Democracy at Work: Political Participation in Taiwan

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## Introduction

With the return of the Kuomintang (KMT) to power in 2008, Taiwan met the "two-turnover" test for democratic transitions (Huntington 1991). However, much was made of the initial push for democratization over twenty-five years ago, when Chiang Ching-kuo loosened the restrictions on the ability of opposition parties to compete in elections. In between, the implementation of democratic institutions and processes has moved in fits and starts. Most notably, the opposition gained control of the Executive Yuan in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took office. Recently, there was a comprehensive reform of the election process that culminated in the installation of a mixed-member electoral system.

Voters have gone to the polls to support candidates at high rates; turnout was routinely above 70 percent for presidential elections. Though Taiwan was working gradually toward establishing a fully functioning democratic system, its citizens were quick to participate in the fundamental act of democratic citizenship. The ascension of the KMT in 2008, then, was less a necessary step toward regime consolidation and more a validation of the support for democracy.

However, as Lijphart (1999), Dahl (2000), and Putnam (2000), among others, note, democratic citizenship requires more than attendance at the voting precinct on election day. Citizens must be actively engaged in the political process. They must understand the issues and make informed decisions about the choices available to them. In short, democratic citizens must engage the government across a multitude of channels on a regular basis.

In this paper, we investigate if the citizens of this democratic regime do more than just vote. Using Asian barometer data, we assess the number of different ways in which Taiwan's citizens do participate, as well as the causes for the frequency of participation. In doing so, we hope to not only determine the health of democracy on the island, but glean insight into the long-term future of a relatively new regime.

**Background and Review**

As Taiwan democratized in the 1990s, it faced a number of issues that threatened the transition. The KMT had held power for several decades and stifled open competition, not only in the political arena (i.e. *tangwai)*, but also in the media and within civil society at large. This provided a challenge for leaders opening society to democratic reforms. How can a government instill democratic values and practices in a society that was not re-introducing the system, but starting, largely, from scratch? With other concerns present, such as the mobilization of mainland Chinese forces along the Taiwan Strait to signal disapproval of the new system, reformers faced a number of obstacles in creating an open and competitive democratic system (Chu 1996).

That is not to say that civil society did not exist in pre-democratic Taiwan. Social groups agitated for representation despite the fact that opposition groups were not formally recognized (Tien 1989; Pei 1998). Farmers' associations, irrigation associations and trade unions were all active in attempting to lobby for their members' interests. However, these groups were also heavily government funded and subject to restrictions on organization and mobilization, i.e. the prevention of union strikes despite the permission granted to unions to do so in the constitution (Tien 1989: 50).

Many of the structures and processes in place prior to democratic reforms have continued on under the new system. For example, the *li/lin,* neighborhood/block, system was the means by which individuals could address grievances to the government, though the state garnered information and a measure of control over their citizens (Read 2009). These organizations, fostered by the state, provided a measure of accountability made that much more effective by the introduction of elections. The elected leader of the *li*, the *lizhang,* is elected by her neighborhood and can address grievances upward to the government. There have even been instances of these leaders working with their peers to mobilize other *li* into protests as conditions warrant (135). These associations organize social gatherings and festivals, with high levels of participation. Roughly 60% of citizens in Taipei could identify their *lizhang* and examples abound of the coordination efforts to respond to emergencies or neighborhood issues made easier by the *li* system.

With these networks in place, it should be a natural progression for democratic processes to take hold. As social capital scholars have long noted, social networks have long provided cooperation and participation in both non-democracies (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2007) and democracies (Levi 1997; Putnam 2000). This assumption leads to the guiding question of this piece: do individuals in a new democracy regularly participate in the political process?

Taiwan proves to be a unique case for study from amongst its Asian neighbors. As findings from the 2001/2003 and 2006 Asian barometer surveys demonstrate, its leaders often face some of the more stinging criticisms of job performance. Respondents also note how they consistently lack meaningful trust in political actors

and institutions. At the same time, these respondents do not accept authoritarianism as a meaningful alternative. There is limited desire for regime change, despite the general animosity toward the government. Why, then, do Taiwan's citizens support democracy when they report their country as having widespread corruption and poor government performance?

In a general sense, it appears that older citizens typically participate much more often than their younger counterparts (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). However, individuals in democracies often require incentives to justify the time and expense of participation (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). In Taiwan, the limited belief in efficacy, or the ability of the average citizen to impact the behavior of the government, illustrates how little incentive voters had to engage the political process. More than 60% of respondents did not believe they could participate in the political process, and roughly the same amount confirmed that the government was run by a small elite far removed from the reach of regular individuals (Chang and Chu 2008).

In fact, peering past the high levels of turnout reveals a disconcerting picture of accountability in Taiwan. Citizens may participate in the political system motivated by different assumptions. Some might believe that the government is open to competing political interests and functions better as a result. Others might participate, despite noting the limits on the meaningfulness of their voices in the political process. However, the most popular group, however, does not participate in the process. These citizens perceive the limits on accessibility and are discouraged as a result. This "exit efficacy" has serious repercussions on democratic support; depending on ideological bent, those

closed off from the system appear to be more ambivalent about the regime and their roles within it (Shih 2003).

In addition, corruption is believed by citizens to be a regular part of the political process in Taiwan. Individuals reported high levels of corruption at both the national and local levels, though only a quarter of respondents reported witnessing an act of graft. No doubt, this was a reflection of the number of cases brought to light in the late 1990s and early 2000s, under a more transparent democratic regime. Citizens certainly witnessed the prosecution of high-level officials, culminating in the prosecution of former President Chen. Thus, the perception of corruption seems to be even more widespread than actual corruption.

There are consequences for even the belief in the existence of corruption. Prior work further illustrates the deleterious effect of corruption on trust in democratic institutions (Chang and Chu 2003). Respondents in Taiwan consistently reported higher instances of perceived and actual corruption than the citizens of other Asian countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines. It would not require much imagination to suggest that this widespread corruption may further limit the desire of individuals to participate in the political process.

Trust in institutions, too, conditions behavior. Not only is trust (or the lack thereof) a notable consequence of institutional performance, but also it can impact perceptions of regime fairness and accessibility. In this way, trust in various governmental actors may say much about whether respondents participate in government, or even believe it is worth their while.

Rose, et al (2003) note the decided lack of trust among citizens towards the political actors in Taiwan. Using data from 2001/2002, they confirm that respondents from Taiwan consistently score domestic political actors with the lowest marks for trust. Institutions in Taiwan, such as the Army (58% trust "a lot or a great a deal"; 67% mean across Asia) and Police (16%; 35%) score highly but are still well below the average levels of trust for those same institutions in other states across Asia. This same trend hold for the much less popular institutions in Taiwan, like the Parliament (19%; 43%) and Political Parties (16%; 35%).

We may take two important points from these findings. First, there is a general lack of trust across society in Taiwan for actors relative to the rest of Asia. Second, the actors that participate most openly in the political process are not trusted by the overwhelming majority of Taiwan's population. Though this may be a function of a contentious political atmosphere, there may be other reasons for this lack of trust beyond like perceptions of corruption and regime performance.

Much can be made of the dangers of ascribing cultural causes of political behavior (Pye 1985; Huntington 1991), but there is evidence that attitudes play a strong role in how individuals interact with their government in Taiwan. Taiwan's citizens report strong fealty to established leadership. Yet, there appears to be a general disdain for certain examples of hierarchy. There is little support, relative to other Asian countries, for the use of elders as arbiters of dispute; 37 percent agree that elders should provide this function, compared to a pan-Asian average of 64 percent (Nathan 2007 Table 3a). In addition, respondents from Taiwan typically are among the most likely to disagree

with statements comparing government leaders to heads of families or suggesting governments should moderate public debate.

Additionally, the long history of one-party rule may have consequences for whether citizens engage the political system. Having held power without major challenge since 1949, the KMT had an infrastructure of networks and constituency services in place that gave it an advantage over its main competitor, the DPP (Rigger 1999; Chang and Chu 2008: 88). Perhaps, this allowed the KMT to mobilize voters more easily and encourage participation, but a similar argument could be made that the money politics and corruption long decried by citizens remained long after the implementation of a, supposedly, more transparent system.

Thus, we are left with multiple causal mechanisms to explain participation in Taiwan. These range from government performance and trust in institutions to beliefs in efficacy and cultural values. Even economic evaluations, both specific to Taiwan (97) and in general (Lewis-Beck 1988), may drive democratic participation. Determining why individuals participate in the political process is less discovering one theoretical motivation for participation and more assessing how these factors work in tandem to explain why citizens engage the political process as much, or as little, as they do.

**Data and Analysis**

To conduct our analyses, we use Asian barometer data collected during a second wave of interviews in 2006. These surveys were administered as part of a larger project to gather information about states across Asia, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Thailand, and mainland China, among others. Both the Wave 1 (2001-2004)

and Wave 2 (2005-2008) data have been released for public consumption, while interviewers are currently gathering the data from Wave 3.

To identify our models of participation, we consider a number of general explanations. First, we include measures for income satisfaction, education, age, gender, and party preference in our models. We anticipate that different segments of society (more educated, older, more financially secure) are more likely to participate in the political process than other citizens.

Second, we also include measures of government performance to determine if this influences participation. While respondents to the Asian barometer were asked a number of questions, we select two: whether the army should come in to govern the country, and whether respondents thought the previous election was fair. In both cases, those that responded that the army should not govern or that the last election was fair should be more likely to participate. Further, we test for the effects of corruption by the national government, to see assess if improper behavior dissuades participation.

Third, we insert variables related to feelings of efficacy and interest. If respondents do not feel that they can understand politics, nor believe they have the ability to participate or hold the government accountable between elections, they should be less likely to turn out to vote and participate in general. More generally, those respondents that do not show as much interest in the political process should also be less likely to get involved in politics.

Fourth, we test for the effects of trust on participation. If individuals have more trust in government, we argue that they are, subsequently, more likely to participate. While Asian barometer respondents are asked about their level of trust in a number of

different institutions, we identify our model with indicators of trust in the Executive and Legislature. These should best test how the actions of the main actors in government influence the behavior of citizens.

We turn first to a discussion of election turnout in Taiwan. Voter participation in elections tends to be very high on the island, especially during Presidential races.[1] Respondents to the Asian barometer poll reflect this high-level of participation (Table 1). Almost 90% of respondents claimed to have voted in the last election, as of 2006. Most likely, this was due to the number of people who did vote in the 2004 Presidential election, as well as those who voted in the legislative election and, perhaps, those who felt embarrassed admitting they had not voted at all. Though the vagueness of the question makes assessing the motivations of respondents difficult, we believe this illustrates the importance voters place on elections, in general, in Taiwan.

-Table 1 about here-

To further analyze why voters turn out to vote, we conduct a simple logistic regression. As noted earlier, we include a number of factors to explain turnout, such as demographic characteristics, evaluations of the government, views on efficacy and interest, and trust in institutions. We present the results in Table 2.

-Table 2 about here-

[1] Turnout for elections for the Legislative Yuan and for other ballot initiatives in 2004 and 2008 were markedly lower than those for the President.

Most notably, many of our hypothesized factors have no significant effect on voter turnout in Taiwan.[2] The only noteworthy variables are demographic in nature; income satisfaction, age, and party preference are all significant. However, when we calculate the predicted probabilities for turnout, the only variable that has a meaningful effect is age (Table 3). The other variables offer only minimal explanations for why voters turn out.

-Table 3 about here-

Younger respondents are much less likely to vote than older respondents. This is often true across many democracies, as younger voters are not as experienced and have less interaction with democratic processes. By contrast, almost all respondents middle-aged and older reported that they showed up to the polls.

Unfortunately, we argue that many more factors should be present in the decision to participate. Given the high level of self-reported turnout, there is simply not much variation to explain. Our finding about age is a prime example of the problem. While younger respondents vote at lower rates than older respondents, they still do turnout at high levels. We look, then, to other indicators of participation to determined why individuals become involved in the political process.

We consider a number of variables to measure participation, beyond whether someone voted in the most recent election. These indicators range in breadth and depth, from whether the respondent follows politics or discusses it with their family to an

[2] This was also true when we included evaluations of government economic performance in earlier iterations of our model.

additive index of the number of activities in which s/he had recently participated.[3] All are ordinal variables, having a ranked scale of participation. This necessitates an ordered logistic regression analysis, to account for multiple categories of the dependent variable (Long 2005).

Our first analysis is of the most basic question: “How often do you follow news about politics and government?” Respondents were given five options, ranging from “practically never” to “everyday.” In addition, we conduct the same analysis for another, basic measure of participation: “When you get together with your family members or friends, how often do you discuss political matters?” Here, respondents only had to choose from three categories, “never,” “occasionally,” and “frequently.” We proceeded to identify both models similarly to the one to explain turnout and present our results in Table 4.

-Table 4 about here-

We first notice the continued importance of demographic variables in explaining these indicators of participation. In addition, we note the importance of some of the government evaluation measures in predicting how often a respondent discusses politics with his family and friends. Both the measure marking how much one agrees with the notion that the army should run the country and the assessment of the fairness of the previous election were significant in this respect.

[3] Please see the appendix for full question wording and response options.

Also, we find that trust, specifically in the legislature, has a significant effect on discussing politics with family members and friends. While trust in institutions was previously noted as important to the support for democracy, we remain surprised that it is trust in the Legislative Yuan, not the Executive Yuan, that leads to more discussion. This may be a result of the contentious nature of politics in the legislature, as respondents may me dissuaded from discussing politics because of the lack of faith in their elected representatives.

Finally, we note the importance of political interest in explaining these indicators of participation. We include this variable to simply capture awareness of the political process. However, we note that this measure is highly significant across both models. we further assess the effects of this variable later in the section.

To unpack the meaning of this finding, and to further elaborate upon the importance of these other variables, we estimate the predicted probabilities for the significant factors in both models. In table 5, we list the most noteworthy results from our estimate of the model to determine how often individuals follow politics. In order to present our data in the most intelligible light possible, we only list the predicted probabilities for the “everyday” category.

-Table 5 about here-

Most notably, we can see how important age, yet again, and interest are in determining participation in the political process. The likelihood of following news about politics everyday increases from 33 percent for the youngest age category (18-29) to

almost 60 percent for the oldest age category (65 and older). In addition, those that are not very interested in politics are only 34 percent likely to follow news about politics everyday. That increases to almost 60 percent for those that are at least somewhat interested in politics.

For our model to predict the discussion of politics with family and friends (Table 6), we find similar results with regard to interest in politics. Those respondents who are not very interested in politics are 73 percent likely to discuss politics at least occasionally. This jumps to 92 percent for those respondents who are somewhat or very interested in politics.

-Table 6 about here-

We also find a strong relationship between education and discussion. Those respondents with no formal education were only 58 percent likely to discuss politics occasionally or frequently. This jumps to 67 percent for those that have completed primary school, 82 percent for those that have completed secondary school, and 88 percent for those who have completed their University degree. In addition to education, we find evidence of the influence of favor for military rule as a significant predictor of the frequency of discussion. Those who strongly agree that the army should govern the state were only 52 percent likely to discuss politics at occasionally with family and friends, compared to 88 percent for those who strongly disagreed. This may be reflective of a general belief in democracy; those who believe in open discussion are individuals predisposed to support democratic values, while those who favor martial law

are also hesitant to openly discuss political matters. This is an interesting finding, and one that may warrant further study in the future.

These results are noteworthy, in that many factors explain these basic conceptions of participation. Few, though, explain a great deal of the variation in these measures of turnout and participation. In fact, these variables do not give us a means to understand how thoughts and preferences translate into action on the ground. To test this, we look at questions that ask respondents to note if they have participated in a certain activity (such as attending a rally). This should give us a better sense of what motivates individuals into action in Taiwan.

Unfortunately, not many respondents have answered that they have engaged in many of activities asked about. To remedy the problem of limited variation, we create an additive index of participation. We simply add the number of times a respondent indicates that they have participated in the activity asked about. We, thus, create an ordinal scale of participation (Table 7).

-Table 7 about here-

Activities asked about include whether respondents have attended a rally, persuaded others to vote a certain way, contacted a government official, contacted an elected official, or engaged in some other activities to help a party or candidate running for office. Theoretically, we do admit some difficulty in distinguishing a meaningful difference between, say, three and four activities. Consequently, we focus on the zero category, as these are the people who are participating least in the political process.

We include the results for the ordered logistic regression alongside our models for following and discussing politics in Table 4. At first glance, we noted the continued importance of demographic characteristics, such as age, in predicting how often an individual participated in the activities mentioned above. We also note the importance of interest in politics. For these and other significant independent variables, we calculate the predicted probabilities of not engaging in any activities, i.e. when the participation index equals zero (Table 8).

-Table 8 about here-

The youngest respondents are 14 percent more likely than the oldest respondents to not engage in any of the participation activities included in the index. Likewise, respondents who are not at all or not very interested in politics are 67 percent likely to engage in zero activities. Respondents who are somewhat or very interested are only 47 percent likely to say they have not engaged in any of the listed activities.

In addition to these variables, we see more meaningful effects of the variables pertaining to political efficacy. Those that do not believe they have the ability to participate in government are 17 percent more likely to not engage in any activities than those that do believe they can participate. Respondents that strongly agree with the statement that they cannot hold government responsible between elections are also 17 percent more likely to say they have not participated than those who strongly disagree with that statement. There is a more modest five percent difference in extremes for

those who say they cannot understand the political system, though we do not report the probabilities for this.

Party membership, too, seems to have a strong effect on whether individuals participate. DPP members are 20 percent less likely to say they have not engaged in any activities than non-members. For KMT members, this is a bit less pronounced; 63 percent of non-KMT members have not participated in the listed activities, dropping to 54 percent for KMT members. It appears, then, that there is a modest difference between the parties, as KMT members are about 10 points more likely to have participated in zero activities than DPP members.

What conclusions can we draw from this set of results. First, it appears that there are certain segments of the population that participate at different rates than others. Notably, older respondents follow politics and participate in activities much more often than younger respondents. More educated respondents are more likely to discuss politics with their family friends, most likely because they associate with other highly educated members of the population. Satisfaction with personal income matters, too, though not to the same magnitude as these other demographic characteristics.

Second, a number of different government evaluation measures influence participation. Individuals who accede to military rule are much less likely to discuss politics with family and friends. Those who believe the previous election was not free and fair are also less likely to discuss politics; they also will not participate in as many activities as those who do believe in the fairness of the last election.

Third, efficacy matters a great deal in predicting who attends rallies, urges others to vote, and contacts officials. Those who neither understand government and politics,

nor believe that they have the ability to participate, are much less likely to participate in these activities. This relationship holds, to a great degree, for those who do not believe they can hold the government responsible for its actions in between elections.

Finally, it appears that interest in politics matters a great deal across all measures of participation. Those who claim to be at least somewhat interested in politics are more likely to follow and discuss politics. In addition, those respondents who are interested in politics are much more likely to score highly on our index. This is simple to understand; respondents who are inclined toward politics are naturally going to be more likely to participate. However, this leads to broad question: What conditions an "interest" in politics?

Since this is such a basic, perhaps nebulous, concept, we consider a number of explanations. Interest may be related to demographics, as is participation. Older respondents may have more interest because they are more familiar with the system. More educated respondents may be more interested because they learn how to understand the nuances of the political system through literacy and learning.

We also consider that much of political interest might be conditioned by a number of cultural preferences and evaluations of democracy. Individuals who believe that society is worse off when there are too many "different ways of thinking" may be less interested in a political system, democracy, that permits and encourages this. Those who observe a great deal of corruption may be less likely to espouse an interest in government. Those who do not support democracy, or do not think Taiwan is very democratic, may, too, not be particularly interested in the politics.

In addition, we consider the possibility that economic evaluations and perceptions of trust condition interest. Those that are worse off economically, or that believe less in the trustworthiness of democratic institutions, may be less likely to voice an interest in government and politics. However, we also entertain an opposing hypothesis, that those who are worse off and less trusting might actually be more interested in politics because of a heightened sense of skepticism.

To test the specifics of these potential relationships, we run several models to determine which factors matter most (Table 9). Model one simply includes demographic information while models two, three, and four test for the effects of culture and government performance, economic performance, and trust, respectively. We combine the most significant variables into a final model in our main model, model five.

-Table 9 about here-

As before, demographic characteristics and party preference matter a great deal. We expected that older respondents, those with higher levels of education, and those more satisfied with their income would be more likely to have interest in the political system. We are proven correct. This is best illustrated through the calculation of predicted probabilities (Table 10). Income satisfaction leads to a 10 percent swing in interest, though we do not include it in the table. Education and age have much more noticeable effects on interest; there is a 40 percent increase in the likelihood of being interested in the political system from the lowest to the highest education group, as well as an almost 30 percent swing from the youngest to the oldest age group. We illustrate

the dramatic effect of education in Figure 1. There are also similar swings in party identification and interest; party members tend to be about 10 percent more likely to say they are interested than non-party members.

-Table 10 about here-

-Figure 1 about here-

We also note the significance of the indicator for the belief that when society has too many different ways of thinking, it becomes chaotic. Those that strongly agree that too many different thoughts are a problem are only 23 percent likely to say they are interested, while those who strongly disagree are 54 percent likely to voice interest (Figure 2). This most likely reflects expectation that those who are comfortable with discord are more likely to have a stake in the open, often contentious, democratic system. Those who remain hostile to competing viewpoints are more likely to be dissuaded from investing themselves in the political system.

-Figure 2 about here-

There are similar, though less dramatic, relationships between economic/ democratic preference and trust in political parties. Those who believe that economic development is more important than democracy are 10 percent less likely to be interested in the political system than those who support democracy over economic development (Figure 3). Respondents who do not trust political parties are 17 percent

less likely to be interested than those who invest a great deal of trust (Figure 4). In both cases, this is again reflective of support for the characteristics of the regime; those who support democracy (economic or democracy preference), the institutions of democracy (trust in political parties), or the values associated with democracy (too many different ways of thinking as chaos) are much more likely to be interested in government than those who are diametrically opposed in their opinions.

-Figure 3 about here-

-Figure 4 about here-

**Discussion**

In sum, we find support for a number of reasons to explain why respondents in Taiwan participate in the political process. While there are differences in activity depending on the measure of participation we use, we observe some consistencies. Demographics matters, as different segments of society display different levels of participation and interest. Trust matters, as faith in the nationally elected officials in the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan inspires more turnout. Trust in political parties seems to drum up interest. Finally, interest in politics appears to have a consistent effect on participation. After investigating the indicators that determine trust, we find that it is largely a result of demographic characteristics and the support, or lack thereof, for the various dimensions of democracy.

Ultimately, participation in Taiwan is determined by whether citizens believe their investment in the system is worth their time. In cases where the government performed poorly or limited the ability individuals to impact the policy-making process, individuals

are turned off from the political process. Observers can take heart, however. Older and more educated citizens tend to participate at much higher rates. This suggests that, as younger generations age and become more acclimated to the current regime, they will further engage the institutions of democracy in Taiwan.

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**Appendix A: Tables and Figures**

Table 1: Frequency of Turnout Reported by Respondents

| | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| No | 201 | 13 |
| Yes | 1311 | 87 |
| Total | 1512 | |

Note: Response to question, “Have you voted in the last election?”
Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 2: Logistic Regression of Turnout for Respondents to the Asiabarometer in Taiwan, 2006

| | (1) Turnout | |
|---|---|---|
| Income | -0.407** | (0.147) |
| Education | -0.150 | (0.078) |
| Age | 0.673*** | (0.100) |
| Sex | 0.277 | (0.193) |
| Religiosity | -0.007 | (0.041) |
| DPP | 1.149*** | (0.314) |
| KMT | 0.577** | (0.222) |
| Cannot hold government responsible | -0.151 | (0.177) |
| The Army should govern the country | -0.060 | (0.115) |
| Fairness of last election | -0.065 | (0.155) |
| National Government Corruption | 0.017 | (0.159) |
| Can't understand government | 0.204 | (0.210) |
| Interest in politics | 0.244 | (0.203) |
| Ability to participate | -0.148 | (0.147) |
| Trust in the EXECUTIVE | -0.060 | (0.154) |
| Trust in the LEGISLATURE | -0.100 | (0.148) |
| Constant | 2.943* | (1.429) |
| Log- likelihood | -365.961 | |
| Pseudo-Rsquared | 0.137 | |
| Observations | 1,054 | |

* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed, Dependent variable: Have you voted in the last election? Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 3: Predicted Probabilities for Turnout, using Age

| | | No | Yes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age | | | |
| | 18-29 | 25 | 75 |
| | 30-39 | 15 | 85 |
| | 40-49 | 8 | 92 |
| | 50-64 | 4 | 96 |
| | 65+ | 2 | 98 |

Note: Table entries are percentages. Predicted probabilities generated from Table 2
Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 4: Ordered Logistic Regression of Various Measures of Participation for Respondents to the Asiabarometer in Taiwan, 2006

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Follow Politics | | Discuss With Family | | Participation Index | |
| VARIABLES | coef | se | coef | se | coef | se |
| Income | -0.273** | (0.089) | -0.297** | (0.107) | -0.010 | (0.096) |
| Education | 0.046 | (0.038) | 0.212*** | (0.043) | 0.008 | (0.039) |
| Age | 0.260*** | (0.053) | 0.028 | (0.062) | 0.144** | (0.056) |
| Sex | -0.179 | (0.115) | 0.412** | (0.137) | -0.135 | (0.126) |
| Religiosity | -0.040 | (0.023) | 0.020 | (0.027) | -0.026 | (0.024) |
| DPP | 0.292 | (0.164) | 0.452* | (0.193) | 0.815*** | (0.178) |
| KMT | 0.301* | (0.136) | 0.278 | (0.163) | 0.396** | (0.152) |
| Cannot hold government responsible | 0.032 | (0.090) | 0.149 | (0.107) | 0.233* | (0.098) |
| The Army should govern the country | 0.123 | (0.104) | 0.625*** | (0.127) | -0.010 | (0.111) |
| Fairness of last election | 0.056 | (0.069) | 0.211** | (0.081) | 0.197** | (0.076) |
| National Government Corruption | -0.111 | (0.091) | 0.033 | (0.106) | 0.080 | (0.098) |
| Can't understand government | -0.155 | (0.097) | -0.260* | (0.118) | -0.072 | (0.106) |
| Interest in politics | 1.035*** | (0.124) | 1.461*** | (0.163) | 0.830*** | (0.130) |
| Ability to participate | -0.018 | (0.118) | 0.355* | (0.143) | 0.499*** | (0.130) |
| Trust in the EXECUTIVE | -0.127 | (0.090) | 0.106 | (0.105) | -0.112 | (0.095) |
| Trust in the LEGISLATURE | -0.051 | (0.086) | -0.313** | (0.102) | -0.207* | (0.092) |
| _cut1 | -1.847* | (0.828) | 2.726** | (0.962) | 1.924* | (0.873) |
| _cut2 | -1.181 | (0.826) | 7.148*** | (0.990) | 3.251*** | (0.877) |
| _cut3 | -0.129 | (0.825) | | | | |
| _cut4 | 0.548 | (0.825) | | | | |
| Log likelihood | -1502.484 | | -765.540 | | -993.876 | |
| Pseudo-Rsquared | 0.055 | | 0.170 | | 0.065 | |
| Observations | 1,108 | | 1,111 | | 1,111 | |

* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed, Dependent variable: Have you voted in the last election? Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 5: Predicted Probabilities for Respondents
Who Follow Politics Everyday

| | | Follow Politics Everyday |
|---|---|---|
| Satisfaction with Income | | |
| | Covers the needs well | 48 |
| | Covers the needs all right | 42 |
| | Does not cover the needs | 35 |
| | | |
| Age | | |
| | 18-29 | 33 |
| | 30-39 | 39 |
| | 40-49 | 45 |
| | 50-64 | 52 |
| | 65+ | 58 |
| | | |
| KMT | | |
| | Not member | 40 |
| | Member | 48 |
| | | |
| Interest | | |
| | Not at all/Not very interested | 34 |
| | Somewhat/Very Interested | 59 |

Note: Table entries are percentages. Predicted probabilities generated from Model 1 in Table 4

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 6: Predicted Probabilities for Frequency of Discussion of Politics with Family and Friends

| | | Never | Occasionally/ Frequently | | | | Never | Occasionally/ Frequently |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Satisfaction with Income | | | | | Cannot understand government | | | |
| | Covers the needs well | 14 | 86 | | | Strongly agree | 12 | 88 |
| | Covers the needs all right | 16 | 81 | | | Somewhat agree | 15 | 85 |
| | Does not cover the needs | 23 | 77 | | | Somewhat disagree | 18 | 82 |
| | | | | | | Strongly disagree | 23 | 77 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| | No formal education | 43 | 58 | | Interest | | | |
| | Incomplete primary | 38 | 62 | | | Not at all/Not very interested | 27 | 73 |
| | Complete primary | 33 | 67 | | | Somewhat/Very Interested | 8 | 92 |
| | Incomplete secondary | 21 | 79 | | | | | |
| | Complete secondary | 17 | 82 | | Trust in Parliament | | | |
| | Some University | 14 | 86 | | | None at all | 14 | 86 |
| | University education completed | 12 | 88 | | | Not very much | 18 | 82 |
| | Post-graduate degree | 10 | 90 | | | Quite a lot | 23 | 77 |
| | | | | | | A great deal | 29 | 71 |
| Army should come to govern | | | | | | | | |
| | Strongly agree | 47 | 52 | | | | | |
| | Somewhat agree | 32 | 67 | | | | | |
| | Somewhat disagree | 20 | 79 | | | | | |
| | Strongly disagree | 12 | 88 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Fairness of last election | | | | | | | | |
| | Completely free and fair | 23 | 77 | | | Free and fair with major problems | 16 | 84 |
| | Free and fair with minor problems | 19 | 80 | | | Not free and fair | 14 | 86 |

Note: Table entries are percentages. Predicted probabilities generated from Model 2 in Table 4

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 7: Participation by Number of Activities

| | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1002 | 63 |
| 1 | 342 | 22 |
| 2 or more | 242 | 15 |
| Total | 1587 | |

Note: Additive index of affirmative responses to whether the respondent has participated in the following activities in the last three years: attended a rally, persuaded others to vote a certain way, contacted government officials, contacted elected officials, participated in other activities to assist a party or candidate running for office.

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 8: Predicted Probabilities for the Likelihood of Not Participating in Political Activities

| | | No participation | | | | No participation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | | | | Interest | | |
| | 18-29 | 65 | | | Not at all/Not very interested | 67 |
| | 30-39 | 62 | | | Somewhat/Very Interested | 47 |
| | 40-49 | 58 | | | | |
| | 50-64 | 55 | | Ability to participate | | |
| | 65+ | 51 | | | Disagree | 65 |
| | | | | | Agree | 53 |
| DPP | | | | | | |
| | Not member | 64 | | Cannot hold government responsible | | |
| | Member | 44 | | | Strongly disagree | 69 |
| | | | | | Somewhat disagree | 64 |
| KMT | | | | | Somewhat agree | 58 |
| | Not member | 63 | | | Strongly agree | 52 |
| | Member | 54 | | | | |
| Fairness of last election | | | | Trust in Parliament | | |
| | Completely free and fair | 67 | | | None at all | 55 |
| | Free and fair with minor problems | 63 | | | Not very much | 60 |
| | Free and fair with major problems | 58 | | | Quite a lot | 65 |
| | Not free and fair | 53 | | | A great deal | 69 |

Note: Table entries are percentages. Predicted probabilities generated from Model 2 in Table 4

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 9: Logistic Regression of Political Interest for Respondents to the Asiabarometer in Taiwan, 2006

| | (1) Demographic Model | | (2) Attitudes and Perceptions Model | | (3) Economic Evaluation Model | | (4) Trust Model | | (5) Main Model | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VARIABLES | coef | se | coef | se | coef | se | coef | se | coef | se |
| Income | -0.239** | (0.090) | -0.196 | (0.103) | -0.174 | (0.107) | -0.202* | (0.099) | -0.235* | (0.104) |
| Education | 0.274*** | (0.033) | 0.197*** | (0.043) | 0.277*** | (0.040) | 0.240*** | (0.041) | 0.227*** | (0.043) |
| Age | 0.285*** | (0.052) | 0.325*** | (0.059) | 0.344*** | (0.058) | 0.291*** | (0.058) | 0.321*** | (0.059) |
| Sex | -0.442*** | (0.116) | -0.373** | (0.131) | -0.459*** | (0.128) | -0.286* | (0.129) | -0.294* | (0.134) |
| Religiosity | -0.012 | (0.022) | -0.025 | (0.026) | 0.000 | (0.026) | -0.020 | (0.025) | -0.013 | (0.026) |
| DPP | 0.526*** | (0.155) | 0.375* | (0.177) | 0.413* | (0.173) | 0.417* | (0.177) | 0.385* | (0.180) |
| KMT | 0.535*** | (0.131) | 0.375* | (0.147) | 0.462** | (0.146) | 0.332* | (0.149) | 0.404** | (0.152) |
| Too Many Views? | | | 0.409*** | (0.108) | | | | | 0.462*** | (0.108) |
| Satisfaction With Democaracy | | | 0.163 | (0.116) | | | | | | |
| How Democratic? | | | 0.124 | (0.105) | | | | | | |
| Want Democracy? | | | 0.022 | (0.041) | | | | | | |
| Economy or Democracy Preference | | | 0.124* | (0.060) | | | | | 0.135* | (0.060) |
| National Government Corruption | | | 0.003 | (0.105) | | | | | | |
| Government Does What is Right? | | | -0.080 | (0.128) | | | | | | |
| Government Does What is Best? | | | -0.024 | (0.130) | | | | | | |
| Macro-past | | | | | -0.078 | (0.063) | | | -0.115 | (0.065) |
| Macro-present | | | | | 0.151* | (0.073) | | | 0.069 | (0.075) |
| Macro-future | | | | | 0.149* | (0.071) | | | 0.145* | (0.067) |
| Pocket-past | | | | | -0.018 | (0.078) | | | | |
| Pocket-present | | | | | 0.131 | (0.093) | | | | |
| Pocketf-uture | | | | | 0.033 | (0.085) | | | | |
| Trust in the EXECUTIVE | | | | | | | -0.047 | (0.112) | | |
| Trust in the GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | -0.125 | (0.131) | | |
| Trust in PARTIES | | | | | | | 0.263* | (0.121) | 0.243* | (0.107) |
| Trust in the PARLIAMENT | | | | | | | -0.079 | (0.106) | | |
| Trust in the MILITARY | | | | | | | 0.062 | (0.106) | | |
| Trust in the POLICE | | | | | | | -0.086 | (0.104) | | |
| Trust in the ELECTION COMMISSION | | | | | | | 0.226* | (0.098) | 0.164 | (0.093) |
| Constant | -2.911*** | (0.427) | -4.239*** | (0.943) | -4.297*** | (0.662) | -3.075*** | (0.604) | -5.191*** | (0.692) |
| Log-likelihood | -879.783 | | -707.271 | | -734.426 | | -720.200 | | -684.855 | |
| Pseudo-Rsquared | 0.082 | | 0.076 | | 0.089 | | 0.063 | | 0.095 | |
| Observations | 1,509 | | 1,167 | | 1,241 | | 1,165 | | 1,153 | |

* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed, Dependent variable: How interested would you say you are in politics? Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

Table 10: Predicted Probabilities of Interest in Politics

| | | Not at all/ Not very interested | Somewhat/ Very interested | | | | Not at all/ Not very interested | Somewhat /Very interested |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education | | | | | Too many ways of thinking chaotic? | | | |
| | No formal education | 88 | 12 | | | Strongly agree | 77 | 23 |
| | Incomplete primary | 85 | 15 | | | Somewhat agree | 68 | 32 |
| | Complete primary | 82 | 18 | | | Somewhat disagree | 58 | 42 |
| | Incomplete secondary | 70 | 30 | | | Strongly disagree | 46 | 54 |
| | Complete secondary | 65 | 35 | | | | | |
| | Some University | 59 | 41 | | Economy or Democracy Preference | | | |
| | University education completed | 54 | 46 | | | Economic development is definitely more important | 69 | 31 |
| | Post-graduate degree | 48 | 52 | | | Economic development is somewhat more important | 66 | 34 |
| | | | | | | They are equally important | 62 | 38 |
| Age | | | | | | Democracy is somewhat more important | 59 | 41 |
| | 18-29 | 76 | 24 | | | Democracy is definitely more important | 56 | 44 |
| | 30-39 | 70 | 30 | | | | | |
| | 40-49 | 62 | 38 | | Trust in Political Parties | | | |
| | 50-64 | 55 | 45 | | | None | 70 | 30 |
| | 65+ | 47 | 53 | | | Not very much | 65 | 35 |
| | | | | | | Quite a lot | 59 | 41 |
| DPP | | | | | | A great deal | 53 | 47 |
| | Not member | 67 | 33 | | | | | |
| | Member | 58 | 42 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| KMT | Not member | 69 | 31 | | | | | |
| | Member | 59 | 41 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |

Note: Table entries are percentages. Predicted probabilities generated from Model 5 in Table 9

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

**Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Political Interest by Education Level**




Note: Predicted probabilities generated from Model 5 in Table 9.

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

**Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Political Interest, by Preference of Economic Development or Democr**




Note: Predicted probabilities generated from Model 5 in Table 9.

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

**Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Political Interest, by Levels of Trust in Political Parties**




Note: Predicted probabilities generated from Model 5 in Table 9.

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

**Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Political Interest, by View on Whether Too Many Ways of Thinking is C**




Note: Predicted probabilities generated from Model 5 in Table 9.

Source: Asiabarometer Data, 2006

**Appendix B: Question Wording**

| Variable name (2006) | Original name (2006) | Variable name (2002) | Label | Value labels |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *q001* | *q1* | *q001* | *How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?* | *1 Very bad*<br>*2 Bad*<br>*3 So so (not good nor bad)*<br>*4 Good*<br>*5 Very good*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| *q002* | *q2* | *q002* | *How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last years?* | *1 Much worse*<br>*2 A little worse*<br>*3 About the same*<br>*4 A little better*<br>*5 Much better*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| *q003* | *q3* | *q003* | *What do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition a few years from now?* | |
| *q004* | *q4* | *q004* | *As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?* | *1 Very bad*<br>*2 Bad*<br>*3 So so (not good nor bad)*<br>*4 Good*<br>*5 Very good*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| *q005* | *q5* | *q005* | *How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago?* | *1 Much worse now*<br>*2 A little worse now*<br>*3 About the same*<br>*4 A little better now*<br>*5 Much better now*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *q006* | *q6* | *q006* | *What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now?* | *1 Much worse*<br>*2 A little worse*<br>*3 About the same*<br>*4 A little better*<br>*5 Much better*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| *qII07* | *q7* | | *Trust in Prime Minister or president* | *1 None at all*<br>*2 Not Very Much Trust*<br>*3 Quite a Lot of Trust*<br>*4 A Great Deal of Trust*<br>*7 Do not understand the question*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| *q007* | *q8* | *q007* | *Trust in the Courts* | |
| *q008* | *q9* | *q008* | *Trust in the national government* | |
| *q009* | *q10* | *q009* | *Trust in Political parties* | |
| *q010* | *q11* | *q010* | *Trust in Parliament* | |
| *q011* | *q12* | *q011* | *Trust in Civil service* | |
| *q012* | *q13* | *q012* | *Trust in the military* | |
| *q013* | *q14* | *q013* | *Trust in the police* | |
| *q014* | *q15* | *q014* | *Trust in local government* | |
| *q015* | *q16* | *q015* | *Trust in newspaper* | |
| *q016* | *q17* | *q016* | *Trust in television* | |
| *q017* | *q18* | *q017* | *Trust in the election commission* | |
| *q018* | *q19* | *q018* | *Trust in NGOs* | |
| *q027* | *q38* | *q027* | *Have you voted in the last election?* | *0 Not applicable*<br>*1 No*<br>*2 Yes*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| *q029* | *q40* | *q029* | *Attend a campaign meeting or rally* | *0 Not applicable*<br>*1 No*<br>*2 Yes* |
| *q030* | *q41* | *q030* | *Try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party* | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *q031* | *q42* | *q031* | *Did you do anything else to help out or work for a party or candidate running in the election?* | *8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| qII43 | q43 | | On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election? | 0 Not applicable<br>1 Completely free and fair<br>2 Free and fair, but with minor problems<br>3 Free and fair, with major problems<br>4 Not free or fair<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| *q056* | *q49* | *q056* | *How interested would you say you are in politics?* | *1 Not at all interested*<br>*2 Not very interested*<br>*3 Somewhat interested*<br>*4 Very interested*<br>*7 No answer*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| *q057* | *q50* | *q057* | *How often do you follow news about politics and government?* | *2 Practically never*<br>*3 Not even once a week*<br>*4 Once or twice a week*<br>*5 Several times a week*<br>*6 Everyday*<br>*7 No answer*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| qII52 | q52 | | When you get together with your family members or friends, how often do you discuss political matters? | 1 Frequently<br>2 Occasionally<br>3 Never<br>7 No answer<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| q073 | q79 | q073 | Contacted government (administrative) official | 1 Once<br>2 More than once |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| q075 | q81 | q075 | Contacted elected officials or legislative representatives at any level | 3 Never<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| *q098* | *q93* | *q098* | *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?* | *1 Not at all satisfied*<br>*2 Not very satisfied*<br>*3 Fairly satisfied*<br>*4 Very satisfied*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |
| qII94 | q94 | | In your opinion how much of a democracy is [country]? | 1 A full democracy<br>2 A democracy, but with minor problems<br>3 A democracy, with major problems<br>4 Not a democracy<br>7 don't understand question<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 decline to answer |
| q101 | q97 | q101 | To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now? | 1 Complete Dictatorship<br>10 Complete Democracy<br>97 Do not understand the question<br>98 Can't choose<br>99 Decline to answer |
| qII106 | q106 | | Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions | 1 Strongly agree<br>2 Somewhat agree<br>3 Somewhat disagree<br>4 Strongly disagree<br>7 Do not understand the question<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| *q115* | *q118* | *q115* | *How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?* | *1 Almost everyone is corrupt*<br>*2 Most officials are corrupt*<br>*3 Not a lot of officials are corrupt*<br>*4 Hardly anyone is involved*<br>*8 Can't choose*<br>*9 Decline to answer* |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| q119 | q123 | q119 | If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important? | 1 Economic development is definitely more important<br>2 Economic development is somewhat more important<br>3 Democracy is somewhat more important<br>4 Democracy is definitely more important<br>5 They are both equally important<br>7 Do not understand the question<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| q123 | q126 | q123 | The army should come in to govern the country | 1 Strongly approve<br>2 Approve<br>3 Disapprove<br>4 Strongly Disapprove<br>7 Do not understand the question<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| q126 | q127 | q126 | I think I have the ability to participate in politics | 1 Strongly agree<br>2 Somewhat agree<br>3 Somewhat disagree<br>4 Strongly disagree<br>7 Do not understand the question<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| q127 | q128 | q127 | Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on | |
| q130 | q129 | q130 | Whatever its faults may be, our form of government is still the best for us | 1 Strongly agree<br>2 Somewhat agree<br>3 Somewhat disagree<br>4 Strongly disagree<br>7 Do not understand the question<br>8 Can't choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| qII131 | q131 | | Generally speaking, we can trust the local government officials to do the right things | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| q139 | q140 | q139 | If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic | 1 Strongly agree<br>2 Somewhat agree<br>3 Somewhat disagree<br>4 Strongly disagree<br>7 Do not understand the question<br>8 Can’t choose<br>9 Decline to answer |
| se002 | se2 | se002 | Gender | 1 Male<br>2 Female |
| se003a | se3a | se003a | Age | 97 No Answer<br>98 Don’t Know<br>99 Refused |
| se005 | se5 | se005 | Education | 1 No formal education<br>2 Incomplete primary/elementary<br>3 Complete primary/elementary<br>4 Incomplete secondary/high school: technical/vocational type<br>5 Complete secondary/high school: technical/vocational type<br>6 Incomplete secondary/high school<br>7 Complete secondary/high school<br>8 Some university education<br>9 University education completed<br>10 Post-graduate degree<br>11 Other<br>99 Decline to answer |
| se005a | se5a | se005a | Years of formal education | 90 Not applicable<br>97 No answer<br>98 Cannot choose<br>99 Decline to answer |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| se007 | se7 | se007 | Religiosity | 1 Several times a day<br>2 Once a day<br>3 Several times a week<br>4 Once a week<br>5 Several times a month<br>6 Once a month<br>7 Only during festivals (or several times a year)<br>8 Once a year<br>9 Less often<br>10 Practically never<br>11 No religion<br>98 Cannot choose<br>99 Decline to answer |
| seII9a | se9a | incomesatisfied | Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover tour needs? | 0 Not applicable<br>1 Covers the needs well, we can save<br>2 Covers the needs all right, without much difficulty<br>3 Does not cover the needs, there are difficulties<br>4 Does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties<br>7 Do not understand the question<br>8 Can’t choose<br>9 Decline to answer |

## Appendix C: Descriptive statistics

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| partindex | 1587 | .521109 | .744904 | 0 | 2 |
| turnout | 1512 | .8670635 | .3396184 | 0 | 1 |
| followpoliti | 1572 | 4.477099 | 1.549969 | 2 | 6 |
| discusswithf | 1583 | 1.738471 | .5884084 | 1 | 3 |
| incomesati~d | 1556 | 1.845758 | .6837489 | 1 | 3 |
| education | 1584 | 6.291035 | 2.383725 | 1 | 10 |
| agegroup2 | 1587 | 2.912413 | 1.357067 | 1 | 5 |
| female | 1587 | .4977946 | .5001527 | 0 | 1 |
| religiosity | 1556 | 6.939589 | 2.66118 | 1 | 10 |
| DPP | 1587 | .1978576 | .3985098 | 0 | 1 |
| KMT | 1587 | .352867 | .4780124 | 0 | 1 |
| cantholdgo~e | 1498 | 2.688919 | .6420138 | 1 | 4 |
| armygov | 1498 | 3.246328 | .5894331 | 1 | 4 |
| fairnessof~n | 1398 | 2.578684 | 1.091007 | 1 | 4 |
| natgovtcor~t | 1376 | 2.75436 | .6922815 | 1 | 4 |
| cantunders~d | 1542 | 2.843061 | .6208683 | 1 | 4 |
| interest2 | 1569 | .3269598 | .469252 | 0 | 1 |
| agreeABILI~2 | 1587 | .3988658 | .4898194 | 0 | 1 |
| trustEXEC | 1468 | 2.159401 | .7973628 | 1 | 4 |
| trustPARL | 1444 | 1.981994 | .7071224 | 1 | 4 |
| toomanyviews | 1530 | 2.25817 | .6300845 | 1 | 4 |
| democsatis~d | 1509 | 2.573227 | .6641434 | 1 | 4 |
| howdemoc | 1495 | 2.486957 | .7195378 | 1 | 4 |
| wantdemoc | 1436 | 8.142061 | 1.682668 | 1 | 10 |
| econordemoc | 1554 | 2.099743 | 1.085982 | 1 | 5 |
| natgovtcor~t | 1376 | 2.75436 | .6922815 | 1 | 4 |
| governmen~ht | 1483 | 2.148348 | .5758075 | 1 | 4 |
| governmen~st | 1441 | 2.682165 | .5479961 | 1 | 4 |
| macropast | 1557 | 2.354528 | 1.145658 | 1 | 5 |
| macropresent | 1570 | 2.529936 | .9961983 | 1 | 5 |
| macrofuture | 1386 | 2.845599 | 1.015034 | 1 | 5 |
| pocketpast | 1574 | 2.67662 | .9628839 | 1 | 5 |
| pocketpres~t | 1578 | 3.178707 | .838819 | 1 | 5 |
| pocketfuture | 1411 | 3.184975 | .8986678 | 1 | 5 |
| trustEXEC | 1468 | 2.159401 | .7973628 | 1 | 4 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| trustGOV | 1426 | 2.326788 | .6936892 | 1 | 4 |
| trustPARTY | 1412 | 1.984419 | .6573238 | 1 | 4 |
| trustPARL | 1444 | 1.981994 | .7071224 | 1 | 4 |
| trustMIL | 1409 | 2.631654 | .7258558 | 1 | 4 |
| trustPOLICE | 1513 | 2.47918 | .7235614 | 1 | 4 |
| trustELECT~M | 1424 | 2.554775 | .7449655 | 1 | **4** |