**Strangers on the Island: Ethnopartisanship and Taiwanese Immigration Attitudes**

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**Abstract**

In many East Asian countries, immigration has not yet become a highly partisan issue. Taiwan represents an exception to this general rule, however, with a strong correlation between Mainlander/native Taiwanese ethnicity and Pan-Blue or Pan-Green partisanship. Our study therefore tests two major theories of Taiwanese attitudes towards foreign brides and foreign  
 workers: ethno-partisanship (Chen and Yu) and economic self-interest (Downs, Mayda). Regression analysis of the Taiwan Social Image Survey 2002, Taiwan Social Image Survey 2006, and Taiwan Social Change Survey 2008 indicates that Taiwanese immigration attitudes  
primarily reflect respondents' ethnicity and related unification views. Economic self-interest found little confirmation in the data however. We conclude that immigration policy, like almost every political issue in Taiwan, is largely determined by the ethno-partisan/unification-independence divide.

The issue of immigration in democracies is often highly contentious and divisive in which partisanship is easy to observe. Party preference can sometimes readily communicate an individual’s specific attitude toward immigration because those stances have been strongly declared by a particular party. The other East Asian states of Japan and South Korea are democratic and have immigration flowing into both countries, but strong sentiments of immigration based along partisan lines have not yet been observed. In Taiwan, however, there are observed differences in public opinion on immigration, yet it is not clear how those opinions are divided. Taiwan’s strong ethno-partisanship factors make it an interesting case study that will benefit the entire field of public opinion and immigration as well as shed light onto Taiwanese social politics. Ethno-partisanship affects the entire landscape of domestic politics in Taiwan, but there is only one English study that determines if these factors shape immigration attitudes. This study attempts to identify influencing factors of Taiwan immigration attitudes by using three social surveys. The results support theories of ethno-partisanship and education as a determining factor, but disprove the labor market competition model and economic self-interest theory. This study establishes that ethno-partisanship is most responsible for forming immigration attitudes in Taiwan.

***IMMIGRATION IN TAIWAN***

Immigration in Taiwan usually falls under two types of migration: labor and marriage. Foreign workers and foreign spouses have dominated the migration channels in Taiwan since its democratization in the 1980s. These two particular immigrant groups are unique to Taiwan because they address a specific need throughout the country. Without foreign workers and foreign brides, Taiwan would have labor deficiency and a lower birth rate than it currently faces. These immigrants are vital to Taiwan’s functioning as an advanced democracy and to its future development.

Those who come to work in Taiwan usually take up a low-skilled, labor intensive job or become caretakers and domestic maids for Taiwan’s middle class. As democracy expanded and the economy boomed in the 1980s, Taiwan shifted from a labor surplus to a labor deficient economy. Taiwan was in need of low-skilled jobs and began recruiting South East Asians and Mainland Chinese. These new immigrants helped bolster the growing Taiwanese economy, but local Taiwanese and native Aborigines lost their 3D jobs (dangerous, dirty, and demanding) to the cheaper and more flexible foreign workers. The yuánzhùmín [Aborigine] community was hit especially hard, fostering xenophobia towards immigrants and increasing tension between the Han and the Aborigines. The Han are often employers of Aborigines but are more apt to choose foreign workers over the indigenous peoples as employees (Chu 2000: 1035, 1037, 1042). The Han are immigrants from Mainland China who have migrated to Taiwan from the 1940s and later. Currently, the majority of foreign workers in Taiwan are from the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Men typically occupy labor positions in manufacturing, construction, and fishing industries while women are usually factory workers, maids, and caretakers of children, the disabled, the chronically ill, and the elderly (Chang 2009: 6). Foreign caretakers and domestic workers from South East Asia constitute about one third of all foreigner workers (Loveband, 2006), placing immigrants in a particularly close space to Taiwanese citizens.

Since the 1980s, Taiwanese men struggling to find a spouse in Taiwan have looked beyond Taiwan’s borders for wives. Men from disadvantaged backgrounds have been having difficulty finding wives since democratization fostered economic independence for women, allowing them more opportunities than marrying poor Taiwanese men. Men that are affected by this phenomenon tend to be low income, poorly educated, and have low socio-economic status. The solution to this scarcity of brides is for men to marry women from Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, or China. Foreign brides now constitute 1.8 percent of Taiwanese population (Chen and Yu 2005: 68) and demand for foreign wives is highest in areas where farmers and low-skilled manufacturer workers live (Tseng 2010). Women from these countries often see Taiwanese marriage as a method of improving their economic conditions, but the language burden has proved to be a problem that has isolated foreign wives (Kuo and Hsu 2010: 70-71). The government has attempted to address the linguistic barrier that many foreign wives face by providing literacy education. Despite the efforts, foreign wives still face stigmatization that prevent them from adapting into Taiwanese society.

These immigrants occupy roles in Taiwan that can no longer be sufficiently filled by Taiwanese citizens. While their presence is welcomed and appreciated by some, other Taiwanese citizens are not so supportive of these immigrants. Those Taiwanese citizens who have been negatively affected by the presence foreign workers or brides are especially susceptible to hostile attitudes towards immigrants.

***IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES IN TAIWAN***

There currently exists only three published studies on immigration attitudes in Taiwan. These studies have provided the much needed foundations of public opinion in Taiwan and have given insights into what is driving the national sentiments. These studies have shown that Taiwan tends to foster negative immigration attitudes that seem to be based off ethnicity and national identity.

Chen and Yu produced one of the first studies on immigration attitudes in Taiwan by focusing on foreign brides from China and Vietnam. Rather than finding economic self-interest as the influencing factor, the study found that ethno-partisanship has effects on attitudes. The 2004 phone survey found that ethnicity, national identity, and party support had significant effects on attitudes toward Chinese bride policies. Attitudes towards policies for Southeast Asia bride were also determined by ethnicity and national identity. The study disproved economic concerns as a primary cause of immigration attitudes in Taiwan. Instead, it found that immigration attitudes, like so many other domestic political issues in Taiwan, are shaped by ethno-partisanship (Chen and Yu 2005).

While Chen and Yu were able to distinguish several influencing factors toward immigration attitudes, Yoo-Jean Song has identified found that the Taiwanese “seem to have negative feelings toward immigrants without solid grounds or objective standards” (Song 2008: 8). Taiwanese respondents are more opposed to immigration as compared respondents in Japan and Korea. The relatively high 74.5% who oppose immigration in Taiwan might be due to the high amount of foreign brides who immigrate to Taiwan, along with the country’s long history of labor immigration. This overwhelmingly negative sentiment could be based on an assumption that an increase in immigration leads to an increase in crime, or that immigration will have a negative effect on the economy. The findings that manual workers have negative attitudes while office workers have positive attitudes might suggest that Taiwanese base immigration attitude off economic factors.

The most recent study was published in June 2011 by Tsai who also found that marriage immigration attitudes are determined by ethno-partisan factors. Tsai specifically focused on marriage immigration attitudes and did not study attitudes towards foreign workers, using the Taiwan Social Change Survey from 2004 as her only survey to study. Her results found that Chinese marriage immigrants face the most negative attitudes in Taiwan, while those marriage immigrants from wealthy countries face the most positive attitudes. Specifically, respondents were most resistant to foreign brides gaining citizenship. The strongest influential factor of these attitudes was ethnicity; those of the *Minnanren* [Fukienese] group prove to have the most significance among the other ethnic groups (Tsai 2011). This study is essential to understanding the influence of ethnicity, but there are key differences in our study that are not reflected in Tsai’s study. These differences include using three surveys to analyze rather than one, identifying attitudes in relation to foreign workers and brides rather than just brides, and identifying the immigration attitudes of Aborigines. Our study is essential to further understanding ethno-partisan factors in Taiwanese immigration attitudes.

In addition to surveying the literature of Taiwanese immigration studies, this study will fit in well with immigration studies of East Asia. Studies of public opinion on immigration in East Asia are limited because immigration is not yet an established problem. Both Korea and Japan do not harbor strikingly negative attitudes towards immigrants, but there are some dominant attitudes in the countries. Korea is reluctant to become a multicultural state but expressed opposition to more restrictive immigration policies. Japan is interested in keeping immigration numbers the same, even though almost half of Japanese respondents believe immigrants increase crime (Seol and Skrentny 2009). These attitudes indicate that immigration has not yet become a highly polarized issue in the other East Asian countries as it has in Taiwan.

Currently, Taiwan is a thriving democracy but it is still relatively young, thus parties and ethnic groups do not have clear and well established positions on various political issues. The most important issue in Taiwan is the question of whether Taiwan should unite with China or declare its independence. By examining the political and social landscape within the context of the independence position, it reveals that certain groups harbor specific opinions on the independence issue. This highly contentious issue is the most important politician question in Taiwan and draws strong, divisive lines among the ethnicities.

***ETHNIC POLITICS***

Democratization in Taiwan occurred most directly from the Chinese Kuomintang[KMT] government when elections were first held. Elections began so that the KMT could appear legitimate and to become more connected at the local level, providing the platform for citizens to criticize the KMT and fight for further democratization (Rigger 1999). Similarly, economic developments set up by the government increased the democratic sentiment among the Taiwanese (Gold 1986). Institutional changes and developments, especially the revision of the constitution and the creation of the new National Assembly, created the opportunity necessary for Taiwan to engage in democracy. In fact, democracy begins and is able to continue thriving if the government and people respect and utilize the democratic institutions (Chao and Myers 1998). The citizens of Taiwan did just that, launching Taiwan to become a fully democracy in the 1980s.

There are currently four main parties in Taiwan that form two separate political affiliation groups, ultimately divided along the independence position. The Pan-Green coalition is comprised of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) to advocate for political independence. The Pan-Blue coalition attempts to unify with China and consists of the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the People’s First Party (PFP). The most widely supported parties are the DPP and the KMT. The PFP is more pro-unification than the KMT, while the DPP is considered to be the strongest voice for unification. The independence position of these parties is incredibly important because it is the most important political issue in Taiwan and is often divided along the four ethnic groups in Taiwan (Hsiesh 2005: 19,22).

Wàishěngrén [Mainlanders], the strongest supporters for unification, are the Chinese who settled in Taiwan after the war in 1945 when the Nationalists began to rule China. They filled high-ranking position in government, the military, and education and also considered themselves to culturally superior. Currently, they mostly live in cities and do not support democratization as much as the Taiwanese because it weakens their relative power (Roy 2003:7).The KMT tends to resonate particularly with the Mainlanders because of its unification claims that the Han Chinese have had cultural influence on Taiwan for much of history. The Mainlanders are one of the most prominent groups in Taiwan but are often at odds with the other strongly present ethnic group.

*Minnanren* [Fukienese], the strongest supporters of independence, have coined “Taiwanese identity” in reference to their particular cultural and ethnic characteristics. This group is part of the larger group, [*bĕndìrén*](http://hktv.cc/cd/hanyupinyin/?q=bendiren) [Native Taiwanese]. The Fukiense have set themselves as separate and different from the Mainland Chinese, asserting that they are a “mixed race.” The claim asserts that the Fukienese are a result of the mixing of local Taiwanese wives and original migrants from the Fujian territory in Mainland China. According to the DPP and many Fukienese, Taiwan should be independent because this mixing of races sets it distinctly apart from Chinese (Copper 2009:74). The Fukienese benefited the most from democratization with an increase in socioeconomic status, launching the group to be the most dominate ethnic group in Taiwanese business and political activity (Copper 2009: 74). They still hold that dominance, currently constituting about 70% of the Taiwanese population and are very active with the DPP.

Despite having a separate identity from the Fukienese, the Kèjiāren [Hakka] are often considered to be part of the “Taiwanese identity” and the *bĕndìrén* group. In reality, they have embraced their minority group status, pressing their identity and distinct culture apart from the other ethnic groups (Copper 2003: 79). Originally from Mongolia, the Hakka are “tough, assertive, and clannish” (Roy 2009: 5), but have done well economically and politically. They currently make up 10-15% of Taiwan’s population, dominating the industries such as railroad workers, police workers, and commercial fishing. Their political influence is best summarized through Lee Teng-hui, the president in 1988 who pushed the Six-Year Development Plan that would place Taiwan into the position of one of the 20 wealthiest nations (Brown 2004: 54). Because the Hakka are considered to be part of the Taiwanese ethnicity group, they usually support pro-independence positions but do not favor a particular party.

Labeled as “barbarians” when the Mainlanders first arrived in Taiwan, the *Yuanzhumin* [Aborigines] are the indigenous peoples of Taiwan. Aborigines have historically had ill relations with Mainlanders, dating back to the Aborigines losing their farmland to the Mainlanders and the Mainlanders having “an overall regard of the Aborigines as a primitive race” (Roy 2009: 3). This historical past has shaped the Aborigines into a group that advocates their uniqueness (Copper 2009:71). Most Aborigines live in the countryside in the central mountains and the east coast areas along with poverty, alcoholism, and low education. The Aborigines have a low birth rate and only constitute about 2% of Taiwan’s population. The literature on Aborigines is very limited and any further information on Aborigines is speculation.

Ethnic groups in Taiwan value strong identities that set the groups apart from one another and intensely advocate for their side of the independence position. Ethno-partisanship effects have been established with such groups as the Mainlanders, for unification, and the Fukienese, for independence. It is with these understandings of the current situation in Taiwan that several theories of public opinion on immigration will be tested.

***IMMIGRATION ATTITUDE THEORIES***

Along with ethno-partisanship, several other immigration theories will be reviewed in order to establish the potential factors that Taiwanese citizens could base their attitudes off of. These theories are ethno-partisanship, education, economic self-interest, and the fiscal burden model.

***Ethno-partisanship***

Chen, Yu, and Tsai have already established that ethno-partisanship has significant effects on immigration attitudes, but it is a theory that is being disputed in Taiwan. Ethno-partisanship argues that political issues are driven by ethnicity and party preference. While the DPP promoted a Taiwanese identity that encouraged a pro-independent and anti-PRC attitude, this sentiment is not holding with younger generations. Even though there is increasing identification as Taiwanese and a decrease in support for unification, being Taiwanese does not necessarily mean one will support independence (Rigger 2006: viii, 57-58). Additionally, ethnic identification is becoming less important due to economic growth advancement and the political delinking between Taiwan and PRC (Copper 2009:76). However, additional literature on Taiwan suggests otherwise. Struggles in Taiwan are among political and ethnic groups because individuals are motivated to protect and advance their own interests (Roy 2009:7). Ethnic groups in Taiwan still carry strong identities and political opinions, particularly the Mainlanders. Due to the highly divisive nature of the independence question, this study will determine whether ethno-partisanship has an effect on forming immigration opinions.

***Economic concerns***

The literature on economic considerations in forming immigration attitudes is incredibly vast and veers off to many different theories. Economic self-interest argues that individuals will base their immigration opinion off what will benefit themselves the most (Downs 1957); this is the foundation theory that many economic theories stem from. More calculable theories of economics are labor market competition model and the fiscal burden model. Labor market competition argues that individuals will be opposed to immigration if an immigrant has the same skill level of a citizen because the immigrant could be a potential threat to that citizen’s job. However, studies have found that high income and low income citizens, highly skilled and low-skilled citizens all prefer high-skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). The fiscal burden model argues that immigration attitudes are formed based on the anticipated public services cost of immigration. There have been findings that highly skilled citizens oppose low skilled immigration because it will be more likely to cause financial strain on public services (Mayda and Facchini 2009). This study will determine whether these economic factors influence Taiwanese immigration attitudes.

***Education***

In several studies done in different countries, education has been found to significantly increase support for all types of immigrants. Scholars debate why education has this effect, but the main arguments are that education changes perceptions or that education is tied with economic factors.Rather than focusing on economic factors, education changes cultural values and beliefs; educated individuals are less racist and believe immigration generates benefits for the society (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Educated individuals have support for all different skill levels of immigration. Others think that education is significant because it is positively correlated with skill, which is correlated with income, so educated natives are less likely to favor skilled labor due to labor market competition (Mayda and Facchini 2009). This study will test to determine whether education has a consistent positive or negative effect on immigration attitudes in Taiwan.

***DATA AND METHODS***

In order to tests these hypotheses, the Taiwan Social Image Survey (TSIS) and the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) datasets were used from three different years. TSIS, based out of Academia Sinica, is conducted through the phone with Taiwan residents ages 18 or older and completed 1,209 cases in the 2002 study and 1,223 completed cases between May 18 and June 16, 2006. The respondents were chosen through random sampling to represent the Taiwanese population. TSCS, also based out of Academia Sinicia, consists of face-to-face interviews with Taiwanese citizens 18 years or older. The 2008 survey has 2,067 completed cases. These surveys were selected because each asks various questions on immigration and includes variables in which all the theories will be tested.

There were a number of independent variables used to determine the significance on immigration attitudes. Basic demographic variables were used (gender, age based on four levels, monthly income between based on 13 levels, education based on 8 levels, urban, unemployed, single) as well as variables that are more specific to Taiwan such as region (Northern blue or Southern green region), ethnicity (Hakka, Fukienese, Aborigine, or Mainlander), and party preference (Pan-Blue or Pan-Green). Taiwan is regionally divided by majority political party preference; north of Taichung usually votes for the Pan-Blue coalition, while the south of Taichung usually votes for Pan-Green coalition. Ethnicity was determined by using the father’s ethnicity because all surveys asked ethnicities of both parents but not of the individual. Only one survey contained questions on the independence position, TSIS 2002. Many independent variables were made into dummy variables to test the significance with immigration attitudes, so there are several variables that will not show significance in the study because they are the default categories: Fukienese, Pan-Blue coalition support, Northern blue region, and unification position.

The two dependent variables used from the 2002 survey consisted of support for Mainland brides and support for foreign brides. The former variable is a variable coded from responses of two questions asked. One was originally an ordinal variable that asked specifically in the survey (“Do you think Mainlander brides are good or bad for Taiwanese society?”) and the other was a binary variable (“Would you support a good friend if he wanted to marry a Mainland bride?”). Similarly, the variable showing support for foreign brides was transformed from an ordinal variable asking about feelings related to foreign brides (“Do you think foreign brides are good or bad for Taiwanese society?”). It is important to note that this is one of the datasets that contains questions on independence; “If declaring independence does not lead to war, should Taiwan declare independence?” and “If the two sides [China and Taiwan] make considerable economic, social, and political developments, should the two sides be unified?” Additionally, those individuals who are unemployed cannot be confidentially indicated with this survey because there is not direct question asking if a respondent is unemployed.

The second TSIS survey in 2006 does not include questions on independence positions. Additional independent variables include religion (Christian or no religion). The dependent variable is coded from two foreign worker policy questions: “should foreign workers be able to choose their own residence or should their residence be centrally managed by the government?” and “after seven years, should foreign workers be allowed to apply for permanent citizenship?” These ordinal variables were coded to determine a respondents’ attitude on foreign workers.

The last survey, TSCS 2008, also does not ask a question on independence position, nor does it ask a respondents’ party preference. The ethno-partisanship theory can be tested, however, because it identifies ethnicity. There are four dependent variables that are measured; “should foreign workers in Taiwan increase,” “should Mainland brides in Taiwan increase,” “should foreign brides in Taiwan increase,” and a marriage immigrant policy preference question. The latter question was coded into a binary variable indicating that a respondent supports policies that help immigrants by using these questions; “the government should help marriage immigrants find jobs,” “the government should give marriage immigrants information on employment,” and “the government should provide job for marriage immigrants.”

All the dependent variables in this study were binary variables. Logistic regression was used at the 95% confidence interval with the odds ratio to identify the probability of an independent variable having favorable attitudes toward immigrants. Graphs are used to show the regression details and will aid in analyzing the findings. Each test was done first one with extraneous and economic variables (Model 1) and then a separate test that included ethno-partisan factors (Model 2). All detailed information on the statistics is included in the appendix for reference.

***FINDINGS***

\*\*\*FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE\*\*\*\*

The primary goal of this study was to determine the significance – if any – that ethno-partisanship has on forming immigration attitudes. The 2002 survey found that the respondent’s position on independence and whether or not they were Mainlanders were the most significant ethno-partisan factors. Mainlanders (odds ratio=2.104, p=.002) had the most likelihood in feeling that foreign brides benefited Taiwan. Education (OR=1.139, p=.024) also proved to be significant, as did single respondents (OR=1.621, p=.04). The only negative significant variable was women (OR=.679, p=.027), who also exhibited negative attitudes for Mainland brides (OR=.732, p=.012). Education (OR=1.167, p=.000) and Mainlanders (OR=1.472, p=.05) both have positive significance towards Mainland brides, with Mainlanders having the highest odds ratios and the only ethnic group to have significance. Independence support had positive effects (OR=1.32, p=.034), even though it was expected that those with this position would be more resistant to additional Chinese influence. It is important to note that the questions asked in this survey inquire on personal opinions of the respondents and not policy questions, which could help explain why those with who support independence have favorable attitudes for Mainland brides. While several ethno-partisan variables and education proved to be significant, no economic variables had an impact.

\*\*\*FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE\*\*\*\*

Even though this survey does not ask questions on independence position, it reveals strong ethno-partisan effects on foreign worker attitudes. Similar to previous findings, Mainlanders (OR=2.002, p=.009) have the strongest likelihood to support pro-foreign workers policies while Hakkas had the least (OR=.256, p=.024). This could be due to Hakkas being affected by foreign workers because both groups hold jobs in low skilled labor, upholding the labor market competition theory. Education again proved to be significant (OR=1.235, p=.002), as did those with no religion (OR=1.785, p=.014). It is important to note that Pan-Green support had no significant effects, indicating that ethnicity could be more important than party preference. As with the previous study, no economic variables proved significant.

\*\*\*FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE\*\*\*

The last survey from 2008 distinguishes Aborigines as having the only significant attitudes towards foreign brides increasing in Taiwan (OR=3.289, p=.009), while women (OR=.689, p=.010) and age (OR=.779, p=.037) do not support foreign brides coming into Taiwan. The most surprising find from this study is that Aborigines (OR=3.148, p=.026) are more likely to favor more Mainland brides coming than Mainlanders are (OR=2.328, p=.000). While there is no known data for Aborigines marrying Mainlanders, this finding could suggest that the anger that Aborigines once harbored against Mainlanders may no longer be relevant in ethnic-relations. It may also suggest that Aborigines have overly positive attitudes about all foreign brides, including Mainland brides. Once again, women have a negative attitude towards Mainland brides (OR=.494, p=.000). Economic variables have finally proved to be significant with the income variable supporting increase in foreign workers, with both income (OR=1.128, p=.000) and the unemployed (OR=1.684, p=.023) having positive effects. Like the previous study, Mainlanders (OR=1.459, p=.043) and education (OR=1.435, p=.000) still support foreign workers. Other positive influencing factors include urban settings (OR=1.495, p=.004), but women (OR=.65, p=.001) and those living in the south (OR=.68, p=.009) tend to have negative attitudes towards workers. The final variable that has been measured is support for pro-marriage immigrant policies. Aborigines have again exhibited an unexpected negative significance by not being likely to support such helpful policies to marriage immigrants (OR=.387, p=.017). Despite the previous findings of support for both foreign brides and Mainland brides, these findings exhibit that Aborigines are receptive to foreign brides but do not want them working. The only significant positive variable was education. Those living in the south (OR=.716, p=.009), age (OR=.779, p=.0090, and women (OR=.642, p=.000) all had negative attitudes toward foreign brides policies.

\*\*\*FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE\*\*\*

***CONCLUSION***

This study has revealed that ethno-partisanship has the most significance in forming immigration attitudes in Taiwan, while education also tends to foster favorable attitudes. It upholds the ethno-partisanship theory presented by Chen, Yu and Tsai, as well as the education theory that Hainmueller and Hiscox found in their study. It finds support for the theory of labor market competition model, but not the fiscal burden theory or the economic self-interest theory.

Ethnicity has been the most consistent and prevalent factor in these studies. In particular, Mainlanders have exhibited significance for almost every variable (there were only two total variables in which Mainlanders did not show significance: support for increase in foreign brides and support for pro-marriage immigrant policies). Because Mainlanders held significance for the most variables, it suggests that Mainlanders base political opinion off ethnicity more strongly than the other ethnic groups in Taiwan. Aborigines showed the most positive significance out of any independent variable in the study with support for increase in foreign brides and Mainland brides, but exhibited negative sentiments towards pro-marriage immigrant policies. It could be inferred that Aborigines are highly interested in foreign brides (including Mainland brides) or that they are marrying foreign brides. Since the marriage immigrant policies all focus on helping brides become employed, Aborigines are indicating that they do not want foreign brides to receive such assistance. Since literature on Aborigines is limited, this is highly speculative and presents a question of the relationship between foreign brides and Aborigines. The third ethnic group, Hakka, showed significance only once when indicating negative sentiment towards foreign workers. This is probably due to the fact that many foreign workers end up working in similar industries that the Hakka dominates. From this study, it appears that ethnicity is the strongest factor in determining immigration attitudes even over independence position or party preference.

One of the important findings in this study is that political parties and the independence position are not more significant than ethnicities. Pan-Green party support was never found to be significant, but the independence position did show significance for one out of two variables it was tested for. The independence position had support for Mainland brides, but not foreign brides. One would have expected the independence position to have positive significance for foreign brides, but not for Mainland brides. Perhaps the anti-Mainland sentiment formally held by older independence supporters is fading out (Rigger 2006), but it is evident that political issues and the independence question do not trump ethnicity.

The other theories examined also reveal active influencing factors in Taiwan. The theory that education fosters positive attitudes towards all types of immigration has been consistently upheld in every study. There was only one variable that education did not hold enough significance, but every other instance was positive. It supports the view that education fosters cultural diversity rather than the economic theory of fiscal burden. The economic theories of labor market competition and fiscal burden have been disproven by this study. According to the labor market competition model, income is positively correlated with positive attitudes on immigration, but income only shows significance for foreign workers. This result also disproves the fiscal burden model. The effects of unemployment also disprove the economic self-interest theories because it is only significant for supporting the increase of foreign workers in Taiwan. While these theories have been upheld in numerous studies across countries, economic concerns do not appear to be a strong factor in forming immigration attitudes in Taiwan. There were other significant variables that occurred quite frequently in the study. Women overwhelming exhibited negative sentiments toward all immigrants. While gender is an extraneous variable, it could have some bearing in Taiwan because of the increasing number of foreign brides. Women in this study could feel threatened by other immigrant women as they fill spots as wives, workers, and caretakers.

This study reveals that ethno-partisanship does indeed have significant effects on immigration attitudes. While foreign workers and foreign brides continue to take up residence in Taiwan, the political battles of the country unfold around them to determine whether Taiwan is to become its own country or stay with China. As the battle in domestic politics wages on, it is still uncertain which political side these immigrants will choose or be recruited to. Taiwanese citizens should be aware of the political capacity these immigrants contain as they could add additional influence to either independence or unification.

Figure 1

Levels of support for immigration

Figure 2:

Taiwan Social Image Survey 2002

\*Note: only statistically significant variables shown

Figure 3:

Taiwan Social Image Survey 2006

\*Note: only statistically significant variables shown.

Figure 4:

Taiwan Social Change Survey 2008

\*Note: only statistically significant variables shown

***Statistical Appendix***

Table 1

Levels of support for dependent variables

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Yes |
| ***Taiwan Social Change Survey 2002*** |  |
| Pro-foreign bride | 44.09 |
| Pro- Mainland bride | 37.3 |
|  |  |
| ***Taiwan Social Image Survey 2006*** |  |
| Pro-foreign worker | 85.04 |
|  |  |
| ***Taiwan Social Change Survey 2008*** |  |
| Pro-marriage immigrant policies | 81.92 |
| Pro-increase in foreign brides | 11.97 |
| Pro-increase in Mainland brides | 7.22 |
| Pro-increase in foreign workers | 16.58 |

Table 2:

Logistic Regression Odds Ratios of Support for Foreign Brides and Mainland Brides

Taiwan Social Image Survey 2002

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictors | Model 1  OR | b | Model 2  OR | b | Model 3  OR | b | Model 4  OR | b |
|  | Pro-foreign brides |  |  |  | Pro-Mainland bride |  |  |  |
| Ethno-partisan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independence support |  |  | 1.25 | .224 |  |  | 1.314\* | .273 |  |
| Pan-Green support |  |  | 1.04 | .037 |  |  | 1.058 | .056 |  |
| Mainlander |  |  | 2.104\*\* | .744 |  |  | 1.489\* | .398 |  |
| Hakka |  |  | 1.03 | .026 |  |  | .806 | -.215 |  |
| Aborigine |  |  | 1.784 | .579 |  |  | 1.162 | .151 |  |
| Economic |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income | .974 | -.026 | .975 | -.026 | 1.016 | .016 | 1.015 | .015 |  |
| Confidence in economy | 1.078 | .075 | 1.074 | .071 | 1.033 | .033 | 1.008 | .008 |  |
| Concerned about losing job | 1.076 | .073 | 1.067 | .065 | 1.066 | .064 | 1.067 | .065 |  |
| Demographic |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 1.145 | .135 | 1.095 | .09 | 1.016 | .016 | 1.011 | .011 |  |
| Woman | .691\* | -.369 | .679\* | -.387 | .735\* | -.308 | .732\* | -.312 |  |
| Single | 1.59\* | .464 | 1.62\* | .483 | 1.243 | .218 | 1.272 | .24 |  |
| Education | 1.173\*\* | .159 | 1.14\* | .13 | 1.179\*\*\* | .164 | 1.166\*\*\* | .154 |  |
| Urban | 1.144 | .135 | 1.085 | .081 | .951 | -.051 | .91 | -.094 |  |
| Southern green region | .899 | -.107 | .928 | -.074 | 1.26 | .231 | 1.223 | .202 |  |
| Log Likelihood | -476.14 |  |  |  |  | -774.016 |  |  |  |
| Pseudo R-square | .0266 |  |  | .037 |  |  | .031 |  |  |
| Number of cases | 1209 |  |  | 1209 |  |  | 1209 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Table 3

Logistic Regression Odds Ratios of Pro-Foreign Worker Attitudes

Taiwan Social Image Survey 2006

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictors | Model 1  OR | b | Model 2  OR | b |
| Ethno-partisan |  |  |  |  |
| Pan-Green support |  |  | .655 | -.423 |
| Mainlander |  |  | 2.00\*\* | .694\*\* |
| Hakka |  |  | .255\* | -1.366\* |
| Aborigine |  |  | 1.797 | .586 |
| Economic |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | .731 | -.314 | .653 | -.426 |
| Income | 1.01 | .01 | 1.02 | .015 |
| Cultural |  |  |  |  |
| Christian | 1.28 | .25 | 1.09 | .085 |
| No religion | 1.98\*\* | .681\*\* | 1.79\* | .584\* |
| Demographic |  |  |  |  |
| Age | .794\* | -.16\* | .826 | -.192 |
| Woman | .809 | -.469 | .64\* | -.446\* |
| Single | 1.35 | .302 | 1.41 | .346 |
| Education | 1.24\*\* | .215\*\* | 1.22\*\* | .199\*\* |
| Urban | 1.381 | .323 | 1.24 | .217 |
| Southern green region | .667 | -.405 | .684 | -.38 |
| Log Likelihood | -304.655 |  |  |  |
| Pseudo R-square | .072 |  |  | .101 |
| Number of cases | 1223 |  |  | 1223 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Table 4

Logistic Regression Odds Ratios of Supportive Attitudes toward Increase in Foreign Brides

Taiwan Social Image Survey 2008

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictors | Model 1  OR | b | Model 2  OR | b |
| Ethno-partisan |  |  |  |  |
| Mainlander |  |  | 1.283 | .249 |
| Hakka |  |  | 1.357 | .305 |
| Aborigine |  |  | 3.289\*\* | 1.191\*\* |
| Economic |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | .806 | -.216 | .808 | -.214 |
| Income | 1.018 | .018 | 1.019 | .019 |
| Demographic |  |  |  |  |
| Age | .788\* | -.238\* | .779\* | -.25\* |
| Woman | .697\* | -.36\* | .689\*\* | -.372\*\* |
| Single | 1.15 | .14 | 1.143 | .134 |
| Education | 1.247\*\*\* | .221\*\*\* | 1.253 | .225\*\*\* |
| Urban | 1.135 | .126 | 1.168 | .155 |
| Southern green region | .843 | -.17 | .92 | -.084 |
| Log Likelihood | -706.131 |  |  | -702.183 |
| Pseudo R-square | .066 |  |  | .071 |
| Number of cases | 2063 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Table 5

Logistic Regression Odds Ratios of Supportive Attitudes toward Increase in Mainland Brides

Taiwan Social Image Survey 2008

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictors | Model 1  OR | b | Model 2  OR | b |
| Ethno-partisan |  |  |  |  |
| Mainlander |  |  | 2.328\*\*\* | .845\*\*\* |
| Hakka |  |  | 1.408 | .342 |
| Aborigine |  |  | 3.148\* | 1.147\* |
| Economic |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | 1.373 | .317 | 1.384 | .325 |
| Income | 1.06 | .058 | 1.061 | .059 |
| Demographic |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 1.223 | .201 | 1.147 | .137 |
| Woman | .512\*\*\* | -.67\*\*\* | .494\*\*\* | -.706\*\*\* |
| Single | 1.226 | .204 | 1.220 | .199 |
| Education | 1.102 | .097 | 1.083 | .08 |
| Urban | 1.162 | .151 | 1.205 | .187 |
| Southern green region | .852 | -.16 | 1.000 | .000 |
| Log Likelihood | -520.374 |  |  | -512.777 |
| Pseudo R-square | .027 |  |  | .0416 |
| Number of cases | 2063 |  |  | 2063 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Table 6

Logistic Regression Odds Ratios of Supportive Attitudes toward Increase in Foreign Workers

Taiwan Social Image Survey 2008

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictors | Model 1  OR | b | Model 2  OR | b |
| Ethno-partisan |  |  |  |  |
| Mainlander |  |  | 1.459\* | .378\* |
| Hakka |  |  | 1.055 | .054 |
| Aborigine |  |  | .88 | -.128 |
| Economic |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | 1.674\* | .515\* | 1.684\* | .521\* |
| Income | 1.128\*\*\* | .121\*\*\* | 1.128\*\*\* | .121\*\*\* |
| Demographic |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 1.106 | .101 | 1.075 | .073 |
| Woman | .663\*\* | -.411\*\* | .65\*\* | -.431\*\*\* |
| Single | 1.509\* | .411\* | 1.528\*\* | .424\*\* |
| Education | 1.449\*\*\* | .371\*\*\* | 1.436\*\*\* | .362\*\*\* |
| Urban | 1.496\*\* | .403\*\* | 1.495\*\* | .402\*\* |
| Southern green region | .656\*\* | -.422\* | .68\*\* | -.386\*\* |
| Log Likelihood | -797.245 |  |  | -795.216 |
| Pseudo R-square | .1396 |  |  | .142 |
| Number of cases | 2063 |  |  | 2063 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Table 7

Logistic Regression Odds Ratios of Positive Attitudes toward Pro-Marriage Immigrant Policies

Taiwan Social Image Survey 2008

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictors | Model 1  OR | b | Model 2  OR | b |
| Ethno-partisan |  |  |  |  |
| Mainlander |  |  | 1.128 | .12 |
| Hakka |  |  | 1.096 | .091 |
| Aborigine |  |  | .397\* | -.923 |
| Economic |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | 1.059 | .057 | 1.05 | .049 |
| Income | 1.077 | .074 | 1.072 | .07 |
| Demographic |  |  |  |  |
| Age | .79\* | -.235\* | .779\*\* | -.249\*\* |
| Woman | .652\*\*\* | -.427\*\*\* | .642\*\*\* | -.443\*\*\* |
| Single | .803 | -.219 | .807 | -.215 |
| Education | 1.309\*\*\* | .269\*\*\* | 1.296\*\*\* | .259\*\*\* |
| Urban | 1.032 | .032 | 1.01 | .013 |
| Southern green region | .723\*\* | -.324\*\* | .716\*\* | -.335\*\* |
| Log Likelihood | -881.81 |  |  | -878.718 |
| Pseudo R-square | .096 |  |  | .0987 |
| Number of cases | 2063 |  |  | 2063 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

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