From Reform to Revolution:

Rebalancing the Root Causes of the 1911 Revolution

**American Association for Chinese Studies, Oct. 14-16, 2011**

**2011 Annual Conference, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

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**Introduction:**

 Without the 1911 Revolution, there can be no new China. The 1911 Revolution is simply that important. It blew away a 2132-year old imperial system of government, and opened the door for new forms of political organization. The end products have not always been pretty to behold. We may not even be happy with what we’ve got today despite all the accomplishments on the economic front. But what we do have can arguably be seen as something much better than the China of 1910. Thus, as we commemorate this pivotal event, it is appropriate that we should also re-evaluate the root causes of this path-breaking revolution. The more we understand where the 1911 Revolution had come from, the better off we will be in assessing the path of modern China.

 It is safe to say that the labours of Sun Yat-sen and the work of the Tongmenghui were to create a republican government from the ashes of the Qing dynasty. Their commitment to the cause of republicanism cannot be questioned. The fact that they so quickly yielded to the demands of Yuan Shikai is often seen as ploy to avoid a civil war, particularly a long, bloody one that would not only tear China apart but also expose the new China to further imperialist inroads. These are certainly legitimate concerns. It could also be suggested that the revolutionaries, realistic about the weakness of their military power, recognized that they could not win an armed contest with Yuan, and therefore, with the best interest of the revolution and the fledgling republic in mind, came to a quick accommodation with Yuan. What happened in the next several years is familiar to all. The questions that arise from this familiar picture are, first, what brought down the Manchu Dynasty so rapidly and, second, why was it so hard for the new Republic to firmly establish itself in its wake? In fact, one could even ask what was the relationship between these two momentous events? Did the one necessarily lead to the other?

 These are very large questions. Many scholars have, in one way or another, tried to tackle them before me. Several of them are participants in this conference. Therefore, as one who has spent most his scholarly life on the pre-1895 history of the Qing, I approach these questions with a great deal of trepidation and humility. But I do want to gain a better understanding of these pivotal events, and I want to take this opportunity to try out some of my ideas and to raise more questions. I would certainly love to gain further insights from this conference in order to move forward.

 My American students have often remarked to me that the history of modern China is a sad story. Indeed, the Qing dynasty since 1839 suffered regular and frequent losses in all its foreign wars, and the government, desperately trying to strengthen itself, appeared to have taken the wrong turn after each defeat. One cannot contest the accuracy of this general description of the late Qing. The issues we need to explore further, however, are how much the Qing polity had been transformed in the last fifty or seventy years of the dynasty, how much social forces have been created or unleashed either by the direct intervention of the government or simply by socio-economic changes beyond its control, and how much did these changes have a bearing on the fall of the Qing or the rise of the Republic.

 Revolutions are carried out by people, people driven to the cause of radical change by economic or political forces, and people empowered by ideas and promises of a better future. Who were the likely leading players in a 1911 revolution, if it were still an open question? The following categories might make some sense. First, given the fact that the initial drive in the search for wealth and power since the early 1860s was centred around defence modernization, we should look at those who recognized the need for technological and scientific modernization, and were frustrated by the failings of the Qing government to provide either the leadership or the funding for it. It was in this area of defence modernization, too, that we saw the first modern government schools in China, some of whose students eventually deepened their knowledge, not just in their fields of study, but in a broader sense, by having had the privilege to study in the West on government funds.

 Second, as it was realized that defence modernization alone could not flourish without a commensurate amount of development in other economic spheres, the government began to engage in a wider range of industrial and commercial enterprises. By the end of the nineteenth century, private entrepreneurs began to carry the banner of modern manufacturing and commerce into provinces far from the coastal region. These were potentially the harbingers of progressive ideas. Did they play a role in the 1911 Revolution or the run up to it?

 Third, there was the treaty-port Chinese community, people from all walks of life who came into contacts with the outside world enough to have acquired a different outlook on China and its place in the modern world. Could they become a force to be reckoned with by the opening decade of the twentieth century? In this context, we should assess the general impact of the Westerners in China as well, in particular the role of the missionaries.

 Fourth, clearly, we need to study the Chinese government and its officials. The conservatism and the political myopia of the Qing court certainly did their part in provoking and fanning the flames of anti-Manchuism. But what role should we assign those reform-minded officials who, ever since the 1860s, have been changing the tone of the political discourse, and whose actions have produced results more far-reaching than they had ever intended? Up to 1898, by far the largest number of youths sent abroad to study went under government auspices. Even after that date, the government continued to send them abroad, notably to Japan. Their role in political agitation has been widely recognized. And as we talk about defence modernization and the role of the government, we must also examine the part played by the military, the New Army in particular. To what extent then should the Qing government or its officials take credit for precipitating its own demise or the rise of the Republic?

 Last but not least, there were the ubiquitous gentry. In what ways had the gentry begun to transmogrify even before the abolition of the civil service examination system in 1905, and how much more it did after that? And, of course, what part did they play in the Qing-Republican transition?

 The above-mentioned categories are not mutually exclusive. In fact, there could be broad areas of overlap. The distinctions are made for the sake of analytical clarity.

 For the purposes of this Conference, and in the interest of time, I shall limit my analysis to only two of the groups: the military and the students, arguably the more if not the most important of the lot.

**The Military, Militarization, and Military Culture**

 What made the military a potentially revolutionary force? The very fact that the 1911 Revolution was precipitated by an incident involving the New Army elements certain begs the question. China’s modern military had its origins in the era of “Self-strengthening”. It began as early as mid-1864 when Li Hongzhang detached 1,300 of his Anhui Army troops to be trained by Charles Gordon at the Fenghuangshan 鳳凰山camp, some forty-five kilometers outside Shanghai. With fifteen foreign staff members and two or three of Li’s best officers, this was to be China’s Aldershot. Unfortunately, Gordon left only after a few months, and his successors enjoyed neither the prestige of Gordon nor the trust of the Chinese. Corruption, pitching the Chinese men against their officers, opium smoking and general lack of discipline probably led to the programme’s termination after nine years and a cost of nearly 1.3 million taels.[[1]](#endnote-1)

 The training of naval officers had a much greater success. Begun in 1866 at the Mawei Naval Academy of the Fuzhou Navy Yard, the programme, under the direction of Prosper Giquel, the French Director, and Shen Baozhen, the Chinese Director-General, churned out naval cadets and marine engineers at a respectable rate. A number of them were then sent abroad for further studies and practical training on board British warships or in French naval dockyards. But insufficient fund and the absence of a centralized naval organization blocked the further development of this programme into a national naval force.[[2]](#endnote-2)

 As a matter if fact, these early programmes were never intended to be the seed of a modern army or navy on a national scale. There was neither the understanding for such a force, and thus the vision for its creation, nor the will and the funds to make it happen even had there been a recognition of such a necessity. It will take a few more national crises, i.e., defeats in foreign wars, to drive home the need for a higher level of military training and organization.

 The next landmarks, then, came in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The first modern-drilled army was the Pacification Army (*Dingwujun* 定武軍) raised while the war was still in progress by an official, Hu Yufen 胡燏棻, at a garrison just outside Tianjin. Created at the suggestion of a German military expert, von Hanneken, then in Chinese employ, the army was placed under the newly formed Bureau for the Supervision of Military Affairs (*Duban junwuchu*督辦軍務處) headed by Prince Gong and Prince Qing. When Hu was appointed to another post in late 1895, this army of ten battalions of about 5,000 men was place under Yuan Shikai’s command. Yuan quickly increased its size to 7,000 strong and renamed it the Newly Created Army (*Xinjian lujun*新建陸軍), but it remained under the Bureau’s control.[[3]](#endnote-3)

 Regrettably, this modest example of placing a modern-trained army under central government control was not followed when Zhang Zhidong proposed a Self-strengthening Army (*Ziqiangjun*) at Nanjing, where he was acting governor-general. It was to be trained by thirty-five German officers with a projected roster of 5,000-10,000 troops. The numbers were reduced to less than 3,000 for lack of resources. In any event, within months Zhang returned to his old post at Wuchang as Hu-Guang governor-general, and his project was handed over to Liu Kunyi.[[4]](#endnote-4) Nonetheless, Yuan’s Newly Created Army and Zhang’s Self-strengthening Army were the first, truly modern trained armies in China.[[5]](#endnote-5)

 The lack of a modern officer corps posed a serious problem from the beginning. In Zhang’s Self-strengthening Army, some Germans had to double up as commanding officers. Friction soon arose and this increased Zhang’s resolve to establish his own military schools. Earlier, in Nanjing, he had set up the Jiangning Army School in 1895, admitting 150 cadets, aged between 13 and 20, for a three-year course in military science. Upon his return to Wuchang the next year, he founded a similar school. The recruits were to come from military and civil examination degree holders, from *shengyuan* up, or else from the scions of official and gentry families. The Hubei Military Preparatory School 湖北武備學堂, as it was called, opened in December 1896 with German, Japanese and Chinese instructors. The cadets studied weaponry, mathematics, surveying, military history, army engineering, battle formation, and the use of various weapons. In its first seven years, the school graduated 218 cadets, plus another 100 sent abroad to study, and sent down a whopping 82! Some of the successful graduates became officers in the future Hubei New Army 湖北洋操隊 (*yangcaodui*).[[6]](#endnote-6)

 Meanwhile, Zhang continued to build up a modern army in Hubei, beginning with the 1,000-strong bodyguard. Training was placed under a German expert, with Chinese graduates from the military schools in Tianjin and Canton as his assistants. By 1902, this “Hubei Modern-drilled Army” had grown into a force of 7,600 men.[[7]](#endnote-7)

 By this time, too, Zhang’s efforts, as well as those of others, were caught up in a flurry of imperial edicts calling for the formation of a modern army. The lesson of the capture of Beijing by the eight foreign powers and the humiliating flight of the imperial court to Xi’an could not be ignored. To save the dynasty and her own skin, Cixi now called for reforms. In late August and early September 1901, edict after edict called for the abolition of the traditional military examinations, clearing the way for the establishment of military schools throughout the empire. Army units were to be divided into standing armies (*changbeijun* 常備軍), first and second call reserves (*xubeijun* 續備軍 and *houbeijun* 後備軍), and gendarmeries (*xunjingjun*巡警軍).[[8]](#endnote-8)

 The building of a modern army progressed with unexpected pace. In north China, some 50,200 men had undergone modern training by 1902. Yuan Shikai’s Right Division of 7,850 men was mainly deployed in the protection of the capital area, while the Left Division was garrisoned not far off. The Self-strengthening Army had also been transferred to Baoding. In Hubei, as noted, Zhang Zhidong had already brought his modern-drilled army to more than 7,600 men, trained variously as infantry, cavalry, artillery, and army engineers. The Hubei Military Preparatory School now enrolled 120 students, while a school for non-commissioned officers – the Hubei Jiangbian Xuetang 湖北將弁學堂 – was created in1901 with 100 students selected from the ranks of literate junior officers. It had a Japanese lieutenant-colonel as director, with three captains, two sergeant-majors, all Japanese, and two translators as his assistants. The three-year curriculum included military systems, strategy, topography, surveying, drafting, and so forth. It was apparently successful enough to attract junior officials from such other provinces as Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi.[[9]](#endnote-9)

 Officers training and military education were at the core of Zhang’s thinking. His 1902 plan called for literacy among at least half of those entering the Hubei Modern-drilled Army, so that they could be subjected to additional education in the rank. Prospective recruits had to pass a written examination based on local affairs and Confucian ethics. Basic sanitation in the barracks and personal etiquette on the part of the soldiers were requirements on top of the usual military drill. Officers of all ranks must personally participate in directing drills, and were not permitted to wear the long gowns of the scholars or to review the troops sitting down![[10]](#endnote-10) To train these junior officers, Zhang also established, in 1902, a military middle school for graduates of upper elementary schools in the 15-24 age group. The four-year course of study encompassed foreign languages, history, geography, mathematics, physics, chemistry, drawing, as well as military training. Most of the instructors were Chinese graduates of Japanese military schools, although there were as well three Japanese instructors. Graduates will serve for half a year in the New Army before appointment as junior officers or entering higher-level military academies. In 1906 Zhang followed with the creation of a military elementary school for the training of the truly entry-level officers. The first two classes of 1,290 men were selected from the rank of the New Army. The instructors came from Germany, Japan, but mostly from Chinese graduates of Japanese as well as Chinese military schools and academies. To top it all, Zhang was most energetic in sending students to study abroad. Of the first batch of Chinese students sent to study in Japanese military schools, 11 out of 39 were from Hubei, and 17 of the 25 in the second batch similarly hailed from Zhang’s province.[[11]](#endnote-11)

 Back at the Imperial Capital, steps were being taken to form a modern army. A Commission for Army Organization was established in December 1903 to formulate policies regarding the organization of the army, the training and duties of its officers, standardization of equipment, logistics, medical services, classes of troops, pension, and the like. By the autumn of 1905, six divisions of the northern army had been formed, marking the beginning of the Chinese New Army. The provincial armies were then incorporated into this new structure as divisions or brigades in the New Army. In 1906 the Court called for an army of thirty-six divisions in ten years. Each division was to have a compliment of 12,500 men. This target was then shortened to six years but, by 1912, only fourteen divisions plus some 20 brigades had been formed, totaling 190,000 troops. Most of them were stationed around the metropolitan area (five divisions and several brigades), the Northeast (Manchuria, three divisions and a few brigades), and the mid- and lower-Yangzi, with three divisions and seven mixed brigades garrisoned at Wuchang, Changsha, Nanchang, Jiujiang, Anqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou. The remaining forces were scattered around the country, at Fuzhou, Chengdu, Xi’an, Lanzhou, Urumqi, Yili, Guangzhou, Guilin, Guiyang, Rehe, and in Yunan and Tibet.[[12]](#endnote-12)

 Morale and a sense of purpose, hitherto notable for their absence in China’s traditional military, were to be inculcated into the mind of the new soldier. To accomplish this, there was first the attempt to recruit men with good social backgrounds and literacy, to raise the prestige of the new army and the self-image of the new soldier. What Zhang Zhidong did was perhaps an exception, and if it was not at first one hundred percent successful, his example was broadly imitated, and it pointed the way to the future. As noted, officials from other provinces sent their men to be trained in his military schools. And graduates of the Hubei military academy travelled elsewhere to share their knowledge and experience. What Yuan Shikai did in the north was similarly successful, leading to a recommendation from the Imperial Court that other provinces send their military men to Tianjin and Wuchang to observe and learn.[[13]](#endnote-13)

 Both Yuan and Zhang wanted to nurture in their troops a sense of loyalty and patriotism. As early as 1898, if not before, Zhang was thinking of a modern military that would adopt as its central responsibility to “protect the race, Confucian values, and the state” (*baozhong, baojiao, baoguo*保種, 保教, 保國). As he put it, to preserve the race, one must first protect the teachings of Confucius, and to preserve the latter, one must first protect the state. What was best to protect the state but a strong army?[[14]](#endnote-14) Yuan Shikai, on the other hand, tried to motivate his troops by instilling in them a sense of shame – the shame of being humiliated, bullied, plundered, and overrun by foreigners – and a burning desire for revenge.[[15]](#endnote-15) Upon the founding of the New Army, Zhang had an army song (*junge* 軍歌) distributed among his troops. Part of the lyrics run as follows:

 The benevolence and blessings of the Great Qing run deep for more than ten reigns

 The sage emperors one after another as Shun followed Yao

 The laws are benign and the taxes light

 Han, Tang, Yuan and Ming, none can measure up

 Countless benevolent policies, loving people and nurturing the scholars

 Our ancestors, our fathers, recipients of kindnesses generation after generation

 Not to mention the high material rewards and wellbeing of the common soldier

 We are nurtured a thousand days just to be of service in a single moment…

 To protect the state, we must rely on crack troops

 To protect the race, we must our compatriots unite

 To protect the state and the race, we must defend Confucian teachings

 Sage scholars and students armed with swords and wielding spears

 Hubei army and commanders, renowned since ancient times

 The nobles and the ministers soar into the skies

 The sages above ensure forever the Way

 Loyalty and filial piety are the fundaments; from these heroes made[[16]](#endnote-16)



What then are the revolutionary potentials of such an army? On the eve of the 1911 Revolution, about 190,000 men have been trained and organized under the New Army. They were indeed the new men in arms. A good proportion of them were educated, and imbued with a sense of purpose and patriotism. Being literate meant that they were open to influences other than those Yuan Shikai or Zhang Zhidong would like them to embrace. Feng Yuxiang recalled the occasion in 1908 when he was given by his Platoon Leader two books to read: *The Three Massacres of Jiading* and *The Ten Day Massacre of Yangzhou*. His eyes opened, he abandoned the loyalty embodied in *The Family Letters of Zeng Guofan*. He found other “hot-blooded officers” who deeply hated the Manchus. A few of them organized a group to discuss issues and encouraged each other to work for the overthrow of the Qing.[[17]](#endnote-17)

 Such “study groups” certainly had revolutionary potentials. Thanks to the penetrating work by the revolutionaries, many enlisted men and junior officers in Hubei’s New Army joined such subversive organizations disguised as “Literary Society” (*wenxueshe* 文學社) or “Progressive Society” (*gongjinhui* 共進會). It was said that in Hubei’s 8th Division and the 21st Mixed Brigade, nearly 2,000 of their 15,000 men were fully committed to the revolutionary cause, and another 4,000 were sympathizers. Only a thousand were said to have been hostile to the revolution, whereas the rest were undecided.[[18]](#endnote-18) Thus, even though the Wuchang Uprising of 10 October 1911 was precipitated by an accident, the fact that such an accident should have happened in Wuchang was perhaps not that accidental!

 Because the New Army had created large concentrations of young and increasingly educated men, it had inadvertently provided a fertile ground for subversive organizations. If Feng Yuxiang’s experience was shared by many, we should not forget that the New Army and the many new, modern-drilled units that had sprung up since 1898, did contribute to making military service more respectable. Rising nationalism, itself a much larger force than the élan of the New Army, drew many a young man to a military career. Chiang Kaishek, despite a strong neo-Confucian upbringing, went to Japan on his own with the view to attending a military school.[[19]](#endnote-19) A recruitment office at Wuchang netted twelve *lingsheng* and twenty-four *xiucai* out of 96 successful applicants in 1905.[[20]](#endnote-20) Could this have been the effect of rising nationalism, or the rising appeal of a military career, especially in the light of the abolition of the traditional civil service examinations? Whatever the motive of these traditional degree holders, they contributed to the overall trend of a better educated, better trained, and better informed military.

 The New Army was China’s first “national” army. Though not under a central command, its organization provided for a high degree of uniformity in structure across the empire. A brigade in Yuan’s New Army is the same as a brigade in the Hubei Army. Increasingly, the training of the commissioned officers across the provinces began to share a common experience. There was transferability and lateral movement of people. Tianjin, Baoding, and Wuchang attracted aspiring cadets to their military schools, and some of their graduates, other than those who had originally hailed from other provinces, often were invited to different corners of the empire to help train and form New Army units. Some of them carried with them ideas not friendly to the increasingly unpopular Qing.[[21]](#endnote-21)

 Finally, communication had improved in the opening decade of the twentieth century. The Jing-Han Railway linking Beijing and Hankou had been completed in 1905. The ease with which the revolutionary fire was able to spread downstream from Wuchang in the closing months of 1911 could in part be attributed to steamship navigation on the Yangzi. It can be argued that what helped the revolutionaries also helped the government forces. On the other hand, the infrastructure such as it was in 1911 was not strong enough for the organization of a truly centralized army, but it worked well enough for those intent on dismantling the empire.

**The Students**

Service in the army is a career, the higher the rank, the more likely it is to have had a long career behind it. Even for the enlisted men, service entails a commitment of years. Under normal circumstances in the late Qing, the men remained in the same unit and were garrisoned in the same place for extended periods of time. The army thus provided a relatively stable environment in which political activists could conduct their political work as well as associational activities, secret or otherwise. Students, by their very nature, are transient. One studies to become something else. In the last decade of the Qing, thousands of them went abroad to study, mainly to Japan. They were more likely to come into contact with new ideas – foreign ideas – and meet fellow students from other provinces in significant numbers to make a difference to their associational activities. In Japan, they were much freer to pursue their political interests but, at the same time, to put these interests into practice, they would eventually have to return to China. We can therefore be sure that the students would play different roles from those of the army in the run-up to and during the course of the 1911 Revolution.

 In general, students are expected to perform one or a combination of several roles. At an impressionable age (and most of them were), they were likely to imbibe new and even foreign ideas. Whatever career they might pursue afterwards, they were likely to become the seminal figure in their community or place of work. There were those who were so devoted to their ideas that they became political agitators. They organized revolutionary cells, and plotted against the state. Others took to the pen. Many, swept up by the patriotic sentiments of the time, studied in military schools, and their revolutionary role became part of the army’s.

 In studying the relationship between the students and the 1911 Revolution, our primary focus tends to be on the students who went to Japan, especially those in the era of the New Policies (*xinzheng* 新政), 1901-1911. They were the high-profile group, and deservedly so. Next come those who studied in the modern schools that were springing up in China, as their mixed curricula “automatically” linked them to more progressive ideas and political activities. But, and this is an important argument, that these students could not have even become the students that they were without a much longer history of educational transformation, one going back to the 1860s. It was in the Self-strengthening era, 1861-1895, that new schools emerged and students were sent abroad to study under the aegis of the government. Combined with the efforts of the Western missionaries, a new, though still incipient trend emerged, making it less outlandish for families to send their young ones to non-traditional schools and overseas. Without such a trend, there would not have been a Sun Yat-sen.

 In the next paragraphs I shall briefly recall the modern government schools that appeared in the pre-1898 era to ascertain the kind of modern students that they produced. The general story of the first modern government schools is well known.[[22]](#endnote-22) It begins with the language and translations schools like the Beijing Tongwenguan 同文館(1861), the Shanghai Tongwenguan (1864, later reorganized as the Guang Fangyanguan 廣方言館), and the similarly name institution at Guangzhou (Canton). Leading officials of the Self-strengthening movement then quickly turned their attention to technical education, which answered their urgent defence needs. Here, the Naval Academy attached to the Fuzhou Navy Yard (1866) set the trend and established a model. Soon afterwards, the Guang Fangyanguan of the Jiangnan Arsenal was expanded to include a technical school (Gongyi xuetang 工藝學堂), offering instruction in mathematics and technical drawings, though both in scope and depth of training, it was conducted on a much more modest scale than at Fuzhou.[[23]](#endnote-23) The Naval Academy at Fuzhou churned out 504 graduates in the 46 years before the 1911 Revolution, with some 90% of them before 1898.[[24]](#endnote-24)

 Once the Chinese were convinced that they could master the technology to have their own telegraph lines free of foreign domination, telegraphy schools sprang up. The first to appear was the one at Fuzhou in 1876, followed by the Tianjin Telegraph School in 1880, and a third one in Shanghai three years later. In the short seven-year period of 1876-1883, the Fuzhou school graduated 548 students, whereas the Tianjin school recruited 40-50 students the first year, and was unable to produce enough graduates to satisfy demands in the years that followed. The Shanghai school, enrolling 20 students in the first year, quickly became the biggest of the three to meet mounting demands, although numbers are not immediately available.[[25]](#endnote-25)

 In 1878 we see another type of technical school established. This was the 廣州西學館 School of Western Learning attached to the Guangzhou Arsenal, which had a far broader curriculum than the telegraph schools. Its first class of 50 students spent half the day in the school and the other half on the shop floor. Still, when Zhang Zhidong became the governor-general of Liang-Guang, he thought the curriculum too restricted, and made some revisions in 1884. Five years later (1889), he established a new School for Western Technology, also at Guangzhou, for the study of mining, electricity, chemistry, botany, and international law “for self-strengthening and diplomacy”! Enrollment was set at 150.[[26]](#endnote-26)

 A school for the study of mathematics was founded in Jilin in 1883. It was separate from the Jilin Arsenal, but was managed by the same personnel. It enrolled 30-plus Manchu and Chinese students.[[27]](#endnote-27)

 The period between the Sino-French War and the Sino-Japanese War (1885-1894) saw the establishment of seven additional technical schools. In 1887 Liu Mingquan founded the Taiwan School for Western Studies 台灣西學堂. It opened with 20 students, who were to spend the first year studying a foreign language before specializing in drafting, surveying, manufacturing, and so forth. Zhang Zhidong was responsible for creating three schools at Wuchang: The Language and Commerce School (1891), a School for Chemistry in the Hanyang Iron and Steel Plant (1891), and the Self-Strengthening School (1893). The last offered courses in English, French, German, and Russian, each with 30 students, and also mathematics, science and commerce. The School for Mathematics was absorbed into the Self-Strengthening School in 1896.[[28]](#endnote-28)

 The other three schools founded in this period include the School for Western Medicine, created by Li Hongzhang at Tianjin in 1893, the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company’s School of Navigation at Shanghai, and the Sino-Western School at Tianjin, both established by Sheng Xuanhai.[[29]](#endnote-29) The Tianjin Medical School was closely tied to the naval hospitals at Tianjin, Weihai, and Lushun (Port Arthur).

 During the twenty-one year period from 1874-1894, nine military and naval schools were also created. They were:

Gunnery School at the Jiangnan Arsenal (1874)

Beiyang Naval Academy (Tianjin, 1881): its five-year curriculum was much richer than that offered at the Fuzhou Navy Yard Academy.

Beiyang Military Preparatory School (Tianjin, 1885)

Guangzhou Torpedo School (1886)

Guangzhou Naval and Army School (1887): apart from its original students, numbering around 38, this school also took 20-37 “transfer” students from Fuzhou and Tianjin who, having had some basic training in various fields, would go through a shorter, 2-year curriculum at Guangzhou.

Weihai Naval Academy (1889): 30 students.

Nanyang Naval Academy (Nanjing, 1890): It had 60 students each in the navigation and engine-room divisions. This school also took over the existing Jiangnan Torpedo School, which had 20 students each year in a five-year course of study.

Lushun Torpedo School (1890), 23 students

Jiangnan Army School (Nanjing, 1894).[[30]](#endnote-30)

 To have schools with a fixed curriculum, specific time slots for the study of well-defined subjects, and a pre-determined length of study prior to graduation was new to the Chinese in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the thirty-some years prior to the Sino-Japanese War, students were trained in languages and mathematics, branching out into science, technology, albeit closely tied to the defence industry, and then to military affairs, medicine, and international law. Though the quality of the training and the accomplishments of the students were spotty at best, they nonetheless belonged to a new group of educated Chinese youth. They have had contact with the outside world. Many had European or American instructors. At a minimum, they were exposed to Western learning, and Chinese instructors who had studied with foreigners in China or abroad. They were truly students, as we understand the term. They studied in classes, and many of them lived on campus. They generally belonged to the same age group. Unlike the traditional scholars who studied in isolation or in small private schools, and met their fellow scholars only at the time of the civil service examinations, these modern students spent time together on a daily basis, from which camaraderie emerged. After graduation, they were not entitled to special privileges, which the *shengyuan* 生員 degree-holders enjoyed. They had a separate identity. From the foregoing account, there must have been at least a couple of thousand, perhaps even three thousand or more Chinese who had undergone this “student experience” before 1894.[[31]](#endnote-31) Their number is small, but to some extent, their concentrated presence in port cities and defence establishments would render them more influential as a group than otherwise.

 It should be remembered, too, that these students were pioneers – the first generations of young men enrolled in these schools at a time when most self-respecting Chinese (or Manchus) would not have done so. Only towards the end of the century, when the Chinese had become more at home with the ideas of *yangwu*, and after more setbacks and humiliations at the hand of the foreigners, that studying in these novel institutions – increasingly being perceived as patriotic – became more appealing. In this sense the students of the Self-strengthening era were a breakthrough generation.

 What also made these students more influential in the long run was the fact that many of them had had the opportunity to study abroad. Previously, it was the labouring classes which braved the oceans to spend extended periods of time half-way across the world in search for a better life. The young boys who went to the United States and the somewhat older, but still young men who went to Europe to study in the 1870s were truly trail blazers.

 Prior to the end of the century, hundreds of Chinese students had gone abroad to study. Apart from a handful who went to the United States under the wings of missionaries, the Qing government was responsible for the bulk of these students. The idea of sending students for advanced or further studies had been part of the plan when the Fuzhou Naval Academy was first conceived. But the first cohort that went abroad came from a different provenance. As a result of Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang’s effort, under advice from Rong Hong (Yung Wing), 120 young boys were packed off in batches of 30 over four years (1872-1875) to study in the New England region of the United States. Those who managed to enter college – more than forty of them – experienced the benefits of an American traditional liberal arts or the more modern science and engineering education.[[32]](#endnote-32)

 On the suggestion of Shen Baozhen, the director-general of the Fuzhou Navy Yard and Academy, plans were made in 1873 to send Fuzhou graduates to further studies in Europe. The first batch of students, 38 in all, finally left in 1877, having been delayed first by the Japanese invasion of Taiwan (1874) and then the dispute with Britain over the Margary Affair (1876). They studied navigation, battle formation, gunnery, torpedo, marine engineering, mining, and a few also chemistry, and international law in a three-year course of study.[[33]](#endnote-33) These were followed by a second batch of 10 in 1881. A third group of 29 students, joined by 5 from the Tianjin Naval Academy, left for France and Britain in 1886. Apart from naval matters and science, some also studied international law. At least eleven of them stayed for five years, while the rest three.[[34]](#endnote-34) A final batch of seven students went to France in 1897-1900, several of whom studied railway and bridge construction.[[35]](#endnote-35) In addition, between 1899 and 1911, seven went to Japan, Britain, and Belgium, where they remained from one to six years to study military affairs, navigation, torpedo, naval strategy, gunnery, and astronomy.[[36]](#endnote-36) Among the students from Fuzhou, the subjects of study were limited largely to naval affairs, mining and international law, although a few did venture into other areas of academic investigation. Yan Fu is perhaps the most outstanding of them all. Upon his return to China, he almost single-handedly introduced to China the ideas of social Darwinism, and contributed to the increasingly lively and important discussion on liberty and popular rights, despite Yan’s anti-revolutionary biases.[[37]](#endnote-37)

 Be that as it may, by the late 1880s or early 1890s, the initiative had shifted to the Beiyang Naval Academy at Tianjin, where Li Hongzhang’s decision was paramount. But, thanks to the rancorous departure of Captain William M. Lang from Li’s fleet, which so soured Sino-British relations that no students were sent to Britain until 1904. After that, and until 1909, Li sent 44 students from the Beiyang school to Britain in four batches. The rise of Japan as a naval power following its victory over the Russians in 1905 led to a sudden surge of Chinese naval students there. In the three-year period of 1906-1909, Li sent 98 students across the Yellow Sea.[[38]](#endnote-38) But by this time, studying abroad had undergone a dramatic change. We shall return to this later.

 The government schools of the Self-strengthening era were pivotal in changing the character of education in China; they were the foundation of the country’s modern education. Be that as it may, two other aspects of modern education before the close of the nineteenth century should be examined, albeit briefly. First, there were the missionary schools, the very first modern schools in China. Their initial impact, however, was small despite their large numbers,[[39]](#endnote-39) appealing as they did mainly to pupils from the lower social strata and were limited largely to elementary education. A changed strategy from the mid-1860s, which combined a more secular curriculum and a deliberate appeal to children from the wealthier and more educated families, both broadened the appeal of missionary schools and their impact. By 1889, the Protestants had 1,086 schools enrolling 16,838 students. Of these, 114 were secondary schools. The Roman Catholics, on the other hand, had 633 schools with 10,917 students in 1892.[[40]](#endnote-40) It is worth noting that a small but significant number of recruits into the government schools as well as the Chinese Education Mission to the United States mentioned above had come from missionary schools.

 Second, in the reform movement leading to the Hundred Days’ Reforms of 1898, Qing officials and reformers throughout the empire, in response to the defeat of the Sino-Japanese War, established no less than 150 modern schools: 3 in 1895, 14 in 1896, 17 in 1897, 14 in the first half of 1898, and a staggering 106 in the 103 days of reform from June to September. They enrolled a total of 10,000 students.[[41]](#endnote-41) Unlike the older government schools, these new institutions were not attached to a specific defence or foreign relations establishment. They were thus freer in designing their curriculum, generally with a healthy mix of Chinese and Western subjects. In consequence, their students were not as career-minded. They entered these schools for the intrinsic value of a modern education and as part of a broader drive towards China’s modernization. Even those schools that had abolished the traditional student stipends had no trouble attracting students. These were the young men more likely than those from the other types of schools to become politically active either as students or later on in life.

 All told, some 50,000 students were attending modern schools of one kind or another around the year 1900. The Protestants accounted for just over 20,000, the Roman Catholics some 18,000, and the Chinese (central government, provincial, and private combined), some 10,000.[[42]](#endnote-42) It would be erroneous to think that anywhere near this number would be potential social or political activists. Most graduates of the older government schools would be satisfied with a career as officers in the armed services or as instructors or engineers in one of the naval or army academies or arsenals. Yet others might find a calling working for China’s foreign affairs. This was their contribution to China’s modernization. And if they failed to save the state that provided them with new careers and job opportunities, they took no active part in its demise or the creation of a new political order. Of the 120 youths who studied in the United States from 1872-1881, only one was involved in the revolutionary movement, having taken part in the Independence Army (*Zili jun* 自立軍) uprising at Hankou in 1900![[43]](#endnote-43) Of the much larger numbers who studied in missionary schools, most of them would not have entered middle school. As noted, in 1889 only about 10% of the Protestant schools were in secondary education, catering to less than 10% of the 21,000 students. This might give us some idea as to how many would have been old enough and educated enough to have been caught up in the republican cause.

 In the several decades before 1895, the missionary schools, the government schools and, in increasing numbers, the private ones had contributed significantly in introducing modern education in China. They made the study of modern subjects respectable, and increasingly made them accessible and appealing to a broader spectrum of Chinese. In addition to laying the foundation of modern education, they further blazed the trail of overseas studies. It was in this latter connection that the strongest connections were made between students and the 1911 Revolution. Just how many of these students took advantage of the new opportunities overseas after 1900?

 Study abroad took a sharp upward turn even before the Boxer Protocol brought the crisis to a close. There was a sudden surge in student numbers, with private students outnumbering those under government sponsorship. Japan was now the country of choice. The proven record of Japanese success, the country’s proximity to China, and the perceived cultural and linguistic similarities between the two countries greatly enhanced Japan’s appeal to young Chinese. For the officials bent on sending students to Japan, there was the added attraction of lower costs. The changed climate can be seen in the fact that, only a few years earlier, in 1898, at the height of the reform movement, the Qing government, aiming at a contingent of 200 students to go to Japan, could not find more than 56 takers.[[44]](#endnote-44) After 1900, the reverse was true. The rise in interest is staggering:[[45]](#endnote-45)

1. 13
2. 9
3. 18
4. 202
5. –
6. 280
7. 500
8. 1,000
9. 1,300
10. 8,000
11. 8,000
12. 7,000
13. 4,000
14. 4,000
15. –
16. –

We cannot enter into a detailed analysis of these students. Still, a number of observations could be made about them. First, they hailed from a vast number of provinces in China.[[46]](#endnote-46) Second, they came from vastly different educational backgrounds. Some had graduated from the best modern schools in China, while others had only had experienced a one-teacher *sishu* 私塾 private school. Still others had already mastered the Japanese language upon arrival, but there were also many who did not read a single word of Japanese. For the latter, special preparatory schools had to be set up.[[47]](#endnote-47) There was also a high degree of mobility. The same student could cross the Yellow Sea several times, while others would stay for several years at a time. Worthy of note is that by far the largest majority studied teachers’ training and law, compared to the relatively smaller number in military studies. Take for example the year 1904, of the 1,300, only 200 were in military schools, and the rest studied more humanistic subjects.[[48]](#endnote-48) Still others pursued highly individual objectives. Lu Xun went to Sendai with a view to study medicine. He Luhao of Chongqing, on the other hand, wanted to learn a trade or a skill, and returned to China to found a glass factory.[[49]](#endnote-49)

 More importantly, these students were not tabula rasa educationally or politically. Thanks to the rising nationalism and the mounting frustration with the Qing government, student activism had been on the rise since 1895. For instance, in 1901, six students of the Nanyang Gongxue 南洋公學left for Japan in protest against the school’s dismissal of student activists. In the following year, a number of students withdrew from the Guangdong Daxuetang 廣東大學堂 to protest the principal’s banning their reading the *Xinwen congbao* 新民叢報, and transferred to schools in Japan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere.[[50]](#endnote-50) Even the mighty Zhang Zhidong had to make concessions to students as when a batch of Hunanese students refused to kowtow before him as they passed through Wuchang en route to Japan. The awkward, ten-day impasse was finally broken when the students agreed to bow before him. In return, Zhang gave them a dinner reception in the Western style, but only under extremely tight security.[[51]](#endnote-51)

 The above examples are but the tip of the iceberg. With a history of protest behind them, Chinese students in Japan, now far from the long arm of Qing law, enjoyed the freedom to learn, discuss, and organize, which they did with a vengeance. Their revolutionary activities in Japan have been well documented and need not detain us. What is worth noting here is that they, for the first time, enjoyed the ability to work with fellow students from other provinces, giving their activities and organizations a “national” quality. With their new ideas, they were also able to see their own country with a different perspective. Upon their return, they brought with them ideas, publications, and their organization, with which they infiltrated schools and the New Army.[[52]](#endnote-52)

**Some Observations**

In 1911, the revolutionary potentials of the New Army were great. Their emergence coincided with the other reforms, especially those in education, which sent so many young men and women to study in Japan. Many of those who study in Japanese military academies returned in time to teach in China’s modern army schools. That some of them should carry with them revolutionary ideas calls for no surprise. Other students who embraced the revolutionary cause also returned to China and infiltrated the military. As noted, the unprecedented concentration of young men in the New Army provided fertile grounds for the missionaries of revolutionary change, and nowhere was this as favorable to them as Hubei.

 But something was amiss. Even in Wuchang, where it all began, there were confusion and strong signs of poor co-ordination. A proclamation by the “Hubei General of the People’s Army” intent on overthrowing the Manchu government and restoring “the rights of the Han people” declared he was restoring the “Wuchang Dynasty”, whereas several other leaders called theirs the “Huang Dynasty”, dating the year 1911 as year 4609 from the time of the legendary Yellow Emperor. While all were anti-Manchu and pro-Han, few mentioned Sun Yat-sen or made allusions to a new government for the people based on liberty and equality.[[53]](#endnote-53) Feng Yuxiang’s above-mentioned account also reveals similar omissions. Zou Rong’s *Revolutionary Army*, which called for a republic in no uncertain terms, seems not to have reached very far or deep into the consciousness of the New Army. Different flags were flown as a symbol of the revolution. Shanghai and parts of north China favoured the five-coloured banner with horizontal bars of red, yellow, blue, white, and black, representing the five major ethnic groups, the Han, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Hui, and the Tibetans.[[54]](#endnote-54) In Wuchang, it was an ensign with eighteen yellow stars, each representing a province, while the “White Sun in a Blue Sky” designed by Lu Haodong was flown by revolutionaries in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou.[[55]](#endnote-55)

 There was commonality, but not enough of it, and the absence of ideological understanding or commitment is troubling. The new Republic, even before Yuan Shikai muddied the revolution, was plagued by differences in ideological understanding. The five-coloured banner was adopted as the new national flag against Sun Yat-sen’s wishes, who thought the horizontal bars impart too much a sense of hierarchy, with the Han towering over the others,[[56]](#endnote-56) realistic though that might have been. Then, as if to pacify the group(s) from Wuhan, the ensign of the eighteen yellow stars became the flag of the Republican Army. The “White Sun in a Blue Sky” had to wait till the Northern Expedition and the Nanjing Government to have its day in the sun!

 There were no national institutions of any kind that would facilitate the flow of ideas. The New Army, again, provided the best environment for revolutionary discourse, at least in areas where there was a concentration of several divisions. This would immediately limit the possibilities largely to the northern army in the metropolitan area, and the three divisions plus around Wuhan. Nor was there a truly serviceable network of roads and railways for a more closely-knit revolutionary movement to develop.

 To look at the situation across the empire, one can say that there had been significant improvements in the ways new ideas could be generated and propagated, particularly since the reform movement of the 1890s. Study societies, magazines and newspapers, reinforced by missionary publications and their various educational endeavours, undoubtedly contributed to the spread of revolutionary ideas. In the debate about civil society in China, the lacklustre history of democratic development has been attributed to the absence of horizontal integration of society free of government interference.[[57]](#endnote-57) We may be asking too much of China in the late Qing period. Traditional China is notorious for it absence of associations outside of the family and locality. Native-place associations, clans and lineages, and surname associations were typical. Even guilds and religious institutions could have strong locational characteristics. Secret societies were perhaps the only ones that traversed provincial boundaries, even though they were still regional in character. Large-scale movements, such as the anti-missionary riots on the Yangzi in the 1890s or the queue-cutting scare of the 1870s were probably aided in their sudden outbursts by secret societies. But can we regard secret societies as institutions in the public sphere, a part of civil society?

 Perhaps nothing bears witness to the difficulties in organizing a revolution on Chinese soil more than the famous Anyuan uprising of 1906.[[58]](#endnote-58) Two years earlier, several students who had returned from Japan founded the Revive China Society 華興會at Changsha. Their leaders were Huang Xing, Chen Tianhua, and Song Jiaoren – truly household names of the 1911 Revolution. Huang believed that the best chances of success for the revolution would be the seizure of a province, then, using it as a base, link up with revolutionary movements in other provinces. In 1904, he saw potentials in the vast concentration of some 10,000 disgruntled coalminers at Anyuan. He plotted with a certain Ma Fuyi 馬福益, leader of the Elder Brothers’ Society, who, a former miner himself, wielded influence over thousands of the mine workers. The plot failed as the authorities got wind of it. Ma was captured and executed the following year while trying to revive his scheme. Meanwhile, Huang Xing, who had returned to Japan, dispatched two operatives from the newly formed United League 同盟會 to plot with the new leaders of the Elder Brothers’ Society. The timing was ripe as the region was reeling from the ravages of floods, the price of rice sky-rocketed, while the workers had become even more restless as they were forced to switch from an 8-hour shift to one of 12 hours. Ten to thirteen thousand men were organized into a three-pronged attack, one to seize the Anyuan Mines, turning it into a base area, while the other two will attack Changsha and Nanchang. They carried banners with “geming” 革命written on them.[[59]](#endnote-59) They called themselves the “Revolutionary Vanguards of the Southern Troops of the Chinese Republican Army” 中華共和軍南軍革命先鋒隊.[[60]](#endnote-60) A proclamation was issued professing adherence to the Three People’s Principles. But not all rebel groups were ready to march behind the republican banner, as some preferred the more traditional goal of restoring the monarchy to the Han.[[61]](#endnote-61) In any event, the government responded with speed and strength, cutting off the rebel groups from one another, smothering the efforts of some as the rump was forced to fight a losing battle.[[62]](#endnote-62)

 Thus ended the most promising revolutionary uprising in the run-up to the 1911 Revolution. The Anyuan uprising had many of the ingredients for a successful coup, but there were ideological differences, the revolutionaries were not always in sync with the secret societies, and the Qing, when still able, was quick to respond.

 The 1911 Revolution lasted only 83 days, from 10 October to the following January 1st. In this short span of time, a multitude of anti-Manchu interest groups surfaced and took advantage of the mounting fury against the Qing court, each wanting to take China down a different path. There was no time for the revolutionaries to debate or sort out their differences. Unlike Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary career after the Second Revolution of 1913 or, even more so, the twenty-eight-year Communist revolution from 1921 to 1949, which had long periods in which intra-party differences could have been aired or thrashed out, and oppositions dismissed or eliminated. The life of the party, the solidarity among its leaders, and the ideological commitment were all given time to congeal. This was not the case with the 1911 Revolution. Only the students in Japan enjoyed the sort of political “open space” where competing ideas could be thrashed out. It was these students and the several revolutionary professionals like Sun Yat-sen that gave us the illusion of a sharply focused republican movement. But the very moment these revolutionary operatives landed in China, their activities became highly restricted. Until the final months of the Qing dynasty, when much larger forces were at work, most republican activities were stifled or readily suppressed. And then, when all these anti-Manchu forces finally converged, the dynastic house came tumbling down, all too quickly for the good of the revolutionaries. They did not have the luxury of time!

1. **Notes**

 Richard J. Smith, “Foreign Training and China’s self-strengthening: the case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873”, Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976), 195-223. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. David Pong, Shen Pao-chen and China's Modernization in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 225-240, 273-284. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Edmund S.K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: The New Army and its Role in the Revolution of 1911 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1981). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Zhang proposed the Self-Strengthening Army in July 1895 and left Nanjing the following January. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Xie Fang 謝放, Zhongti Xiyong zhi meng: Zhang Zhidong zhuan 中體西用之夢﹕張之洞傳 (The Dream of Chinese Learning as Principle and Western Learning for Practical Application: A Biography of Zhang Zhidong) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1995), 140-142. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, pp. 143-144. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Fung, Military Dimension, p. 13; Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, p. 146. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Fung, Military Dimension, p. 14. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, p. 150; Fung, Military Dimension, p. 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, p. 148. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, pp. 150-151; Fung, Military Dimension, p. 25. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Fung, Military Dimension, pp. 20-21. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, pp. 147,152. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, p. 137. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Fung, Military Dimension, p. 15. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, pp. 151-152. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Fen Yuxiang, Wode shenghuo (My Life), excepted in Pei-kai Cheng and Michael Lestz, eds., The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection (New York: Norton, 1999), p. 197. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, pp. 152-153. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Jay Tailor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA., 2009), pp. 12-16. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, p. 153. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. On this last point, see Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, p. 153. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. The earliest of these schools have been studied by Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961). [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Xia Dongyuan 夏東元, Yangwu yundong shi 洋務運動史 (A history of the Western matters movement) (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue Chubanshe, 1992), p. 86. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Zheng Jianshun 鄭劍順, “Lun Qingmo Fujian chuanzheng xuetang” 論清末福建船政學堂 (On the Fuzhou Navy Yard School in the Late Qing), Xiamen daxue xuebao, zhexue shehui kexue ban, 1985 zengban 廈門大學學報 哲學社會科學版 No. 82, 1985增版, p. 102. Fujian chuanzheng xuexiao xiaozhi福建船政學校校志 , edited by Fujian chuanzheng xuexiao xiaozhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 福建船政學校校志編纂委員會 (Xiamen: Lujiang Chubanshe, 1996), gives the number of graduates at 542. See pp. 117-118. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi, pp. 424-426, 435. On the Fuzhou Telegraph School, see Fujian chuanzheng xuexiao xiaozhi, p. 118. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi, pp. 426-427, 435. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi, p. 428. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi, pp. 428-429, 435. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi, pp. 429-430, 434, 435. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi, pp. 430-434, 435. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Sang Bing桑兵, WanQing xuetang xuesheng yu shehui bianqian 晚清学堂学生与社会变迁 (Students and social change in the Late Qing period) (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2007). Sang gives the figure of 2,000. My own estimate is higher. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Edward J.M. Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Education Mission to the United States, 1872-81 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), pp. 1-30. On college curricula, see pp. 115-123. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi, pp. 418-420. The official number was 30, plus three staff members who also entered colleges in France. These 33 were then joined by 5 graduates from the Apprentice School, making up a total of 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Shen Yan沈岩, Chuanzheng xuetang 船政學堂 (The [Fuzhou] Navy Yard School) (Beijing: Kexue Chubanshe, 2007), pp. 147-148, 156-158. Fujian chuanzheng xuexiao xiaozhi, p. 187. According to Xia Dongyuan, this group had 30 students, 11 of whom came from the Tianjin Naval Academy. Xia, Yangwu yundong shi, pp. 420-423. Xia is probably erroneous. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Shen Yan, Chuanzheng xuetang, pp. 148, 158-159. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Shen Yan, Chuanzheng xuetang, pp. 148, 159-160. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964). See also Shen Yan, Chuanzheng xuetang, pp. 151-152. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Wang Jiajian 王家儉, Zhongguo jindai haijunshi lunji 中國近代海軍史論集 (Essays on the history of the navy in modern China) (Taibei: Wenshizhe Chubanshe, 1984), p. 49. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. There were 350 Protestant schools with 5,975 students in 1876, and 558 Catholic schools with 9,013 students in south China in 1877-1878. See Sang Bing, WanQing xuetang, p. 33. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Sang Bing, WanQing xuetang, pp. 33-34. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Sang Bing, WanQing xuetang, pp. 36-37. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Sang Bing, WanQing xuetang, p. 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Rhoads, Stepping Forth, p. 212. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, p. 213. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Reynolds, China, 1898-1912, p. 48. Reynolds produces three sets of figures, based respectively on the works of Saneto Keishu, Futami Takeshi and Sato Hisako, and Li Xisuo. The first two sets are fairly comparable. Li’s however, gives a much high number for 1906 (12,000) and 1907 (10,000). [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Shu Xincheng 舒新城, Jindai Zhongguo liuxueshi 近代中國留學史(Shanghai: Xinhua shuju , 1933), p. 51. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Reynolds, China, 1898-1912, pp. 49-50. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Shu, Jindai Zhongguo liuxueshi, pp. 52-53. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. He Luhao 何鹿蒿, “Luhao bolichang sishinian de huigu” 鹿蒿玻璃廠四十年的回顧 [Looking back at the forty years of Luhao Glass Factory] in Chongqing gongshang shiliao, di er ji 重慶工商史料, 第二輯 [Historical materials on industry and commerce in Chongqing, No. 2] (Chongqing, 1983), pp. 16-31. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Sang Bing, WanQing xuetang, pp. 67-68. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, p. 215. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Xie Fang, Zhongti Xiyong, pp. 215-216. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Cheng and Lestz, Documentary Collection, pp. 206-209. None of the seven proclamations here mentioned a republic. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Taylor, Generalissimo, p. 23. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. “Flag of the Republic of China”, Wikipedia, ttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag\_of\_the\_Republic\_of\_China, accessed on 18 April 2011, 4:24 a.m. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. For a lively debate on civil society in China, see the special volume of *Modern China* devoted to the topic with contributions by Frederic Wakeman, Jr., William T. Rowe, Mary Backus Rankin, Richard Madsen, Heath B. Chamberlain, and Philip C. Huang (Vol. 19, No. 2, April 1993). [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. I first explored the nature of the Anyuan uprising some ten years ago, but mainly from the perspective of a workers’ movement. Clearly, the Anyuan incident is more complex than this. David Pong, “Industrial Relations on the Eve of the 1911 Revolution,” [in Chinese: “Xinhai geming qianxi de gonye laozi guanxi” 辛亥革命前夕的工業勞資關係] in Lin Qiyan, Li Jinqiang, and Bao Chaolin, eds., There is a will, there is a way: Sun Yat-sen, 1911 Revolution, and Modern China 有志竟成 – 孫中山, 辛亥革命與近代中國 (Hong Kong, 2005), vol. 2, 274-303. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. North-China Herald, 14 December 1906. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Yang Song and Deng Liqun 楊松, 鄧力群, Zhongguo jindaishi ziliao xuanji 中國近代史資料選輯 [Selected materials on the modern history of China] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1979), pp. 574-576. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Joseph W. Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 62-63. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
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