**DISCIPLES OF THE XIN HAI REVOLUTION:**

**CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND MAO ZEDONG**

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On October 10, 1911, the Uprising in Wuchang in Hubei Province brought victory of the Xin Hai Revolution, or the Chinese Republican Revolution, in sight. Upon hearing the news, Chiang Kai-shek aborted his military training in Japan and rushed back to China. Within weeks, he joined a suicide squad to assault the provincial government of Zhejiang in Hangzhou and captured its Manchu governor, Zeng Yun. At the same time, the then 18-year-old Mao Zedong was so excited about the revolution that he dropped out of school and joined the army to fight the Manchu troops. Thus, the Xin Hai Revolution initiated Chiang and Mao to the Chinese political arena.

Thirteen years later, as China was mired in warlordism and intimidated by imperialist powers, Chiang and Mao crossed path for the first time in Canton, Guangdong Province. Chiang came to assume the post of Commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy of the Nationalist Party while Mao served as a delegate to the First National Congress of the Party, which at the time accepted Communists as its members. For the next three years, the two disciples of the Xin Hai Revolution shared membership in the same party and pursued the same goals espoused by the party: to eradicate warlordism and imperialism in China. But in 1927 the two aspirant leaders parted company. Mao started his rural revolution in the Jiangxi hills, and Chiang went on completing the Northern Expedition and becoming the leader of the Nationalist government in 1928. For the next half of a century, they contended for power through intermittent harsh battles while ruling—successively and separately—the continental and island parts of a country that ranked first in population in the world and third in territory.

This paper attempts to make a preliminary evaluation of the achievements and failures of the two Chinese leaders and an assessment of their contributions to China as an emerging superpower.

**ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES**

Chiang and Mao have been revered in China as great leaders by millions of people and vilified as arch villains by millions of others. Opinions about them in foreign countries have been similarly divided and have frequently changed. For decades, Chiang has been castigated by most Western scholars as an incompetent and corrupt dictator. Lloyd Eastman summed up the criticism of the Nationalist leader in his *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-*1949 (1984).On the other hand, Chiang was honored on *Time*’s cover ten times from 1927 to 1955 and has lately received an unexpected, overall favorable assessment of his career from an influential work, Jay Taylor’s *The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (2009)*.* Even more unexpectedly, scholars on the Chinese mainland have in the beginning decade of the 21st century started a reappraisal of Chiang’s political life and unmistakably emphasized his meritorious services to China.1

In his 1938-published *Red Star over China*, Edgar Snow brought Mao to the Western audience as a refreshing, vigorous, dedicated Chinese revolutionary leader. More than a decade later, however, Mao was perceived in the West as Stalin’s stooge. Then in 1971 he became an overnight sensation in American public media when Nixon sought reconciliation with China. In the same year, Karl W. Deutsch, one of the most eminent political scientists in Western academia, and his associates reported that in their statistical analysis of the 62 most influential social science breakthroughs in the world from 1900 to 1965, Mao was ranked as one of the three top contributors.2

Against this kind of popular and academic perception of the two Chinese leaders, it is difficult to assure fairness and objectivity in appraising their achievements and failures. What is emphasized in this author’s effort at such appraisal is to maintain a comparative perspective on the two Chinese leaders. Chiang and Mao will be contrasted to each other and, where appropriate, to leaders in Chinese historical times, and in foreign countries. The analysis below will proceed with a discussion on Chiang first, as he had assumed power eleven years before Mao.

**Achievements**

*Chiang: Known and Unknown Deeds*

Chiang’s successes in the Northern Expedition of 1926-1928 and in the Chinese-Japanese war of 1937-1945 are considered his greatest achievements. The Expedition represents the beginning of a transformation of China from a disunited to united country. China’s victory in the Chinese-Japanese war stopped the country’s century-long decline and elevated China to the status of a big power. Aside from these successes, however, are certain of Chiang’s deeds that have gone unrecognized, underrated, or unexplained. In 1918, at age of 31, he served as a junior officer in the Chen Jiongming army in Guangdong Province, commanding a few hundred men. In 1926, he rocketed to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, with his forces growing from 85,000 to 264,000 men within the year. In 1928, his army swelled to one million men as he, at 41, became Chairman of the Nanjing government. In ten years’ time he rose from an unknown quantity to the leader of the most populous nation of the world.

Chiang’s rapid rise in power has established a record difficult to match by other military leaders in China and elsewhere, in historical or contemporary times. Searching in the Chinese dynastic chronicles, one can identify two great generals with comparable achievements. One is Huo Qubing (140-117 BC) of the Western Han Dynasty. As a teenager, Huo joined his uncle Marshal of Rapid Cavalry Wei Qing’s expedition force against Xiongnu, a vast kingdom in today’s Outer Mongolia. He regularly drove deep into enemy territory with his fast-running horses and scored spectacular victories. Incredibly, in 121 BC when he was barely 20, Hou was also appointed a Marshal of Rapid Cavalry by the deeply-impressed Emperor Wu. He was twice awarded by the emperor with fiefdoms, totaling more than 10,000 households. He died in the battlefield in 117 BC when he was 24.3

Another great general was Li Shimin (599-649) of the Tang Dynasty. As a young man, he joined the forces of his father Li Yuan, a Governor General in north China during the last years of the Sui Dynasty (581-618), to topple that dynasty and to found the Tang. Like Huo, he fought battles with bravery and speedy movement; moreover, he scored victories with ruses and cunning tactics. After his father ascended the throne in 618, he went on to battle the remnant Sui generals to unify the country, quite similar to Chiang’s battle with the warlords more than a thousand years later. His military prowess was such that his father, Li Yuan, felt compelled to yield the crown to him in 626, when he was 27.4

In Western nations, few generals widely known to the Chinese matched Chiang’s relatively young age when reaching the pinnacle of their military careers. Dwight D. Eisenhower became Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe and North Africa in 1942, at 52. George Marshall was 59 in 1939 when appointed Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Bernard Montgomery gained fame in his North Africa campaign when he became commander of the British Eighth Army in 1942, at 55. All these generals were at least ten years older than Chiang when attaining the height of their military positions. Only George Washington was at a comparable age to Chiang when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army in 1775, at 43.

While these comparisons of career achievements of Chiang and other military personalities have not been noted in previously published works, one factor accounting for the rapid rise in Chiang’s career has not been adequately analyzed either. This refers to his strategic talents. “The essence of a commander,” Chiang observed, “is his strategic vision, not his bravery” (Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, hereafter, CKSD, 7/30/22). From 1914 to 1931 he worked out no less than 33 battle plans that enabled him to score many victories.5 Among these, one clearly demonstrated his unusual strategic vision. In 1917, prior to his enlistment in any army, he submitted to Sun Yat-sen “A Plan for Fighting the Northern Army.”6 What is most remarkable about this document is that when the Northern Expedition was carried out a decade later, it followed exactly the plan in every detail: assessment of strength and weakness of the northern army; assemblage of a southern army from units in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Hunan; charting battle routes from Canton northward to Wuhan, eastward to Nanjing and Shanghai, and northward to Beijing; and, most importantly, adoption of the principle of “*Yuan Jiao Jin Gong”* (Negotiate with the Enemy Afar, and Attack the Enemy Close by—a stratagem practiced in the Chinese War States Period, 475-221 BC).

Chiang’s strategic talents came to light in the Chinese-Japanese war as well. He initiated the Shanghai battle in August 1937 to implement his twin war strategy: “Trade space for time” and multi-nationalization of the conflict. It was this strategy that saved China from being conquered by Japan.7 But most books on Chiang failed to emphasize the long-term consequences of his strategic foresight.

To highlight Chiang’s strategic talents as a factor contributing to his military successes does not, of course, mean that he was invincible. Far from it. His military competence can be questioned on two grounds. During the Chinese-Japanese war he suffered reverses one after another throughout the eight-year conflict, giving away the eastern one-third of the nation’s land to his enemy. And, in the final days of the war, as the Nationalist army continued to lose ground to the Japanese, many American diplomats, officers, and journalists in China voiced strong criticism of Chiang’s conduct of the war.

Clearly this criticism has merit. But Chiang’s military setbacks have to be assessed in the context of the prevailing conflicts in the world in the 1930s and the 1940s. In 1937 when China was invaded by Japan, Britain and France faced a prospect of war with Germany. When the European war broke out two years later, Britain and France, which were among the world’s mightiest naval and land powers, soon succumbed to the blitzkrieg of Germany—a nation that had been for a decade and a half under British and French occupation. Britain beat an ignominious retreat at Dunkirk, and France, more ignominiously, totally capitulated. It is only reasonable to suggest that an assessment of Chiang’s military conduct in the Chinese-Japanese war be balanced against British and French leaders’ conduct in the European war.

Chiang’s military competence can be questioned on another ground. In the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s he lost nearly all major battles to the Communists. Many factors can be offered to explain his defeats. But from a strict military point of view, Chiang had long fought positional warfare against the warlords and the Japanese. Confronting Mao’s guerrilla warfare in the late 1920s as a complete novelty, he could neither devise an effective strategy against that warfare nor adopt guerrilla tactics to fight the Communists. To put it simply, the setting of the Nationalist-Communist war was not determined by Chiang but by Mao, who proved to be a superior strategist.

Returning to the subject of Chiang’s achievements in the Chinese-Japanese war, we may note that certain moves he took for the territorial consolidation of China have not received adequate public attention.8 During this war, he gained control of three vast belts of territories through an artful mixture of military and diplomatic ventures. These included the southern belt of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces; the frontier belt of Yunnan and Xinjiang provinces; and the inner belt of Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, and Xikang provinces. For decades since the beginning of the 20th century, the central authority of China remained largely absent from these provinces. By the end of the war, Chiang had re-established the national government’s preeminent military and administrative presence there. In addition, he had brought Manchuria and Taiwan to China’s fold. Altogether these territories accounted for two-thirds of the total area of China.

Beyond what he had achieved in the Chinese-Japanese war, Chiang can be credited for initiating certain positive political and economic developments. He was often criticized for practicing a one-party authoritarian rule, but he did set the foundation for democratic development in Taiwan. When he retreated to the island in 1949, he had every reason to create a military government to cope with the imminent threat of Communist invasion. Instead, he upheld in Taiwan the constitutional government structure that he had introduced two years previously on the mainland. More significantly, he started in 1950 a self-rule on the island at the provincial and local levels. Legislative assemblies and administrative heads of province, county, city, township, and village government—except governor—have all been regularly elected since. When opposition parties emerged in 1986, a large corps of democratic-oriented politicians came into being, exercising increasingly dominant influence at local and provincial levels as well as in the national government. In 2000 the dissident-formed Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) defeated the Nationalist Party in the national election and gained power.9 Several DPP leaders, including Chen Shui-bian and Lu Hsiu-lien, respectively president and vice president of the government in 2000-2008, were once Nationalist Party members, as widely reported in 2007. The DPP leaders as well as many other politicians undeniably benefited from the self-rule Chiang had introduced.

Chiang’s final achievement relates to his economic performance in Nanjing and in Taiwan. In the Nanjing period, China under Chiang’s stewardship achieved an impressive industrial growth rate of 8.4 percent. In Taiwan, Chiang maintained an even higher growth rate, at 9 percent.10 He shepherded the island to economic takeoff in the mid1960s and made it a Newly Industrialized Country in the mid1970s.

For several reasons, this author regards Chiang’s economic performance in Nanjing and Taiwan as the most striking of all of his achievements. Though he was much less experienced in managing the economy than conducting military and political affairs, he brought about an economic miracle not once, but twice. He achieved the stellar results because he knew how to lead men of competence to accomplish a goal he could not attain himself. That reflects his political craftsmanship in the highest order. And, it should be especially noted that whereas his achievements in the Northern Expedition and the Chinese-Japanese war pertain to his effort to redress the problems of *the past*, his developmental programs in Taiwan, which are duplicated in mainland China today to good effect, set the foundation of prosperity for his nation *in the future*.

*Mao: Personalization of Power*

In the early 1950s at the call of one person, more than one million Chinese soldiers successively marched to Korea to battle the world’s mightiest power. Nearly two decades later, over one million Red Guards worshiped this man in frenzy with slogans and songs. Between these years, hundreds of millions of Chinese, young and old, men and women, amassed in city streets and village grounds to pledge unswerving support for this man’s preferred policies. Never anywhere else in the world could one find so many people were so thoroughly ruled by one man as the Chinese under Mao from 1949 to 1976. In terms of personalization of power, Mao’s achievement is extraordinary, not very likely to be duplicated by others in the future.

Such personalization of power was considerably aided by a system of thoughts he developed over the years. As analyzed in Chapter Five, the components of his system of thoughts—from the theory of contradictions to the theory “On Practice,” to rural communism, to guerrilla warfare, and to the New Democracy—are logically consistent, largely his own creation, and fully applicable to Chinese realities of his time. It assured his ascendancy to power and his triumph over his rivals; it created an ideological appeal in the Third World to this day.

It may be noted in this connection that Chiang did not appear to have reached Mao’s intellectual height. Chiang wrote out a large number of essays, pronouncements, and books, but altogether they failed to form a system of thoughts rivaling Mao’s. Yet, conscious of his intellectual limitations, Chiang solicited others’ advice to make up for his deficiency. He diligently recruited advisers of various talents and solicited their opinions with an eagerness comparable to that of some of the most illustrious Chinese emperors, such as Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, Taizong of the Tang Dynasty, and Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty. While heading the Whampoa Military Academy in the mid1920s, he regularly consulted the Soviet advisers. In the 1930s he employed on his staff “Eight Great Secretaries,” who were first-rate scholars;11 he enlisted German marshals and generals to help him battle the Chinese Communists and, for a short while, the Japanese; he retained the Australian journalist William Donald as his personal aide; and he requested American government to appoint high-level counselors to him, such as Laughlin Currie, Owen Lattimore, Arthur Young, Joseph Stilwell, and Albert Wedemeyer. In Taiwan, he meshed the personnel of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group with his entire defense establishment; and he even secretly employed former German and Japanese military personnel to train his army.12 And he gave Taiwan’s technocrats a free hand to frame the island’s economic and financial policies and courted Chinese-American professors to lecture him on economic reforms. What he tried to do was to make others’ wisdom his.

In contrast, Mao acted in precisely the opposite way. With confidence in his intelligence sweeping across all fields of public concern—from literature to philosophy, from science to economics, from military strategy to the arts—he became the Supreme Leader of the land and acted as, not necessarily with a sense of self-indulgence, the Great Teacher of the People. Throughout his political life he employed no advisors, his secretaries not rising above the status of scribblers. By monopolizing the political truths, he made his wisdom others’. Herein lies the source of his achievements as well as failures.

Mao’s personalization of power also results from his military successes. In the Jiangxi years, his tens of thousands soldiers could break out from the repeated sieges of a Nationalist army at least ten times their size. A decade later, he could command in Yan’an and elsewhere an army rising to three-quarters of a million soldiers, who, in Mao’s graphic expressions, ate only millets and fought with nothing but rifles. Then in three short years, from 1947 to 1949, they could thoroughly decimate four and half million superiorly-equipped Nationalist soldiers. How Mao was able to win this civil war against such odds in such a short time is so stunning an event that many people are still groping for an answer today. Mao’s military performance in Jiangxi and Yan’an must be viewed as miraculous as Chiang’s economic performance in Nanjing and Taiwan. A man never trained in any military academy but learning his tricks in the bombed hills and ravaged rivers became one of the world’s foremost strategists. That was a claim Mao could rightfully make.

Mao’s military exploits sustained his bold, masterful diplomatic maneuvering in his last years of life to transform China as a nation leaning to the side of the Soviet Union to one leaning to the side of the United States. When he closed his eyes for the last time, he must have felt satisfied that his China, still one of the poorest nations in the world, ended up a major player in the strategic triangular power games. He successfully put into practice a foreign policy stratagem that Chinese leaders had been only talking about since the 1860s: “*Yi Yi Zhi Yi”* (Play one foreign power against another).

Mao’s final achievement is his success in building up the Communist Party as a vital instrument of governance. From the party’s First National Congress in 1921 to the Tenth National Congress in 1973, Mao, more than any other person, shaped the character and structure of the party. In these 52 years, the party members grew astronomically from 50 to 28 million. He infused them with his doctrines, established communication channels with them, disciplined them with rectification campaigns, and mobilized them to carry out his policies. He ended up making the party a gargantuan organ of strength, endurance, and resilience.

One can discern these characteristics of the party by seeing what happens to it today. With its membership continuing to grow, to over 73 million as of 2007, the party survived the death of Mao in 1976, the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, and the collapse of the world communist movement in 1991. As the world’s largest Communist party in, decidedly, non-Communist times, it has now shifted its mission from conducting revolution to making money. Cadres inured to political actions became as if overnight entrepreneurs skilled in manufacturing and commerce. Without them, China’s red-hot economic growth in the last three decades could not have taken place.

**Failures**

*Chiang: The Makeup of a Gargantuan Loss*

On December 10, 1949, within earshot of machine gun fire, Chiang with a small entourage of his closest aides, threaded through a path behind the Central Military Academy’s Chengdu campus to board a waiting plane. He left mainland China for the last time on a flight to Taiwan. On the following March 1, when he resumed the office of the presidency he had vacated a year earlier, he avowed to recover the mainland he had just lost. He kept that wish alive until his death a quarter of a century later. However, history registered that his loss was final, complete, and irrevocable. And the stake was extraordinarily high, something no less than the right to rule the most populous nation in the world.

What accounts for Chiang’s gargantuan loss? More than any other person, Chiang himself pondered this question from the last days of the civil war to the last years of his life. In March 1949, he enumerated in his diaries quite a few reasons for the impending disaster. Among these the more important ones were: Diplomatic mishaps; military defeats; the Nationalists’ factional split and organizational disarray; economic and financial collapses; political chaos resulting from the introduction of constitutional rule during the war; Chiang’s haughty mannerism; and lack of an effective propaganda program (CKSD, Month-end Review, March 31, 1949).13

Twenty-one years later, Chiang agonized in his sick bed for a lengthy review, again, of the reasons for his loss of the mainland (CKSD, 6/1-7/70). He specifically focused on foreign interference in the civil war. He blamed the Soviet Union for aiding the Chinese Communists to gain control of Manchuria. He criticized the United States for its faulty mediation effort, which, he claimed, contributed to the shift of military balance in favor of the Communists.

Chiang did not appear to place enough emphasis on embezzlement by high civilian officials and ranking military officers as a factor accounting for his loss. But the problem was very serious, which can be illustrated by two cases. In 1944, Chiang discovered that H.H. Kung, his brother-in-law who served over the years as financial minister, premier, and Governor of the Central Bank, had illegally traded on American-dollar based bonds and pocketed a profit of more than US$11,500,000. Upon Kung’s admission of guilt, Chiang merely asked him to resign as head of the Central Bank, meting out no other punishment (CKSD, 7/12-14, 18, 25/45).14 In 1949 Kung’s son, Lingkai, was involved in massive hoarding of commodities and illegal foreign trade operations in Shanghai in flagrant violation of the monetary reform regulations the government had just proclaimed (see CKSD, 8/1, 14, 16, 21/47; 10/9/48; 11/4, 5, 12/48). Yet, with Chiang’s permission, his wife, Soong May-ling, personally shielded Lingkai, her nephew, from criminal liability. The case, which understandably caused quite a public outrage, dealt a severe blow to the monetary reform then underway and imposed irreparable damage to Chiang’s reputation as an impartial leader.

In May 1944, General Tang Enbo, commander of a force of 300,000 troops in defense of western Henan Province against the Japanese army, incredibly lost the battle without much of a fight. In a diagnosis of the causes of the fiasco, Chiang unequivocally pointed out, “Tang could not put his mind to military affairs because he was taken up with smuggling and grafts” (CKSD, 5/4/44). Yet instead of punishing Tang for his misdeeds, Chiang continued to give Tang important assignments—as commander of forces in defense of Guizhou in the following year and of Shanghai in 1949.

Chiang never explained why he tolerated these high-profile cases of corruption. From reading his diaries and other sources of information, one sees that Chiang, who consistently led a frugal life, had frequently made it known that he would not countenance corruption; he ordered severe punishment—often, the death penalty—on the guilty parties reported to him. Yet his disciplinary acts occurred haphazardly, and the punished individuals were invariably of low ranks.15 He also claimed he lacked time to deal with corruption because he was occupied with more pressing business. What he did not realize was that his tolerance of corruption by others could be metamorphosed, as it indeed was, to his being a corrupted leader and his government a corrupted regime. Such an image, which was indelible in the mind of the people during the civil war, contrasted sharply to the public perception of the Mao-led Communist Party, which had not been known for any major case of embezzlement and grafts. The contrast caused many people to abandon their support of the Nationalists.

Of all of his failings as noted above, none appeared to be fatal to Chiang’s rule on the mainland, with one exception. Diplomatic setbacks, factional disputes, introduction of constitutional rule in chaotic times, economic and financial difficulties, haughty mannerism, and ineffective propaganda—all these conditions happened in varying degrees on the mainland since the Communist takeover. They have not undermined the Communist order. Even corruption might not be considered a decisive factor ruining the Nationalist rule. In today’s China, corruption is as serious and widespread a problem as it was in Chiang’s China—perhaps even more so. The Chinese National Audit Office reported in 2009 that government officials’ fraudulent use of public funds for the first 11 months of the year totaled a staggering US$35 billion!16 Yet this political disease has not adversely affected the endurance or vigor of the Communist regime.

Military defeats, it must be emphasized, were the single most important factor responsible for the demise of the Chiang regime on mainland China. He allowed many warlords to retain their troops virtually free from central control and never created a national force unified in purpose and loyalty, as Mao had in the case of the Red Army. He pitted positional warfare against Mao’s guerrilla warfare with patent ineffectiveness, and he failed glaringly to recognize the deep and extensive penetration of his army by the Communist massive spy network. These were the primary causes of his continuous battle defeats, driving him to Taiwan.

*Mao: Infallibility and Disasters*

Over the decades, Mao scored a string of victories over his rivals in both the Nationalist and Communist parties; he expounded on his ideological propositions with force and tenacity to assure a mass following; he trudged in treacherous diplomatic waters to win a place in the triangular power game; and he shaped the Communist Party to an instrument of governance entirely to his liking. He did not have to take pride in these phenomenal triumphs, for he considered them only natural to his political leadership.

His triumphs, together with the absence of voices within the Communist power hierarchy to restrain his excesses, spoiled him into believing he was an infallible and omnipotent leader. That he was in reality not so constitutes the single important reason for the many disasters he had caused.

The Korean War represents Mao’s first blunder in diplomacy and last major misadventure in war. He endorsed Kim Il-sung’s military adventure for foreign nations’ interests, not China’s. Kim attempted to use the war to rule the entire Korean peninsula. Stalin supported the war for a double objective: to assure Soviet access to the warm seaports on the peninsula and to sack American military strength in the emerging Cold War. By participating in the war, Mao delayed China’s effort to repair its economy ravaged by 12 years’ international and civil war and lost the opportunity to bring Taiwan under his rule. And he paid a horrendous cost, with 535,000 of his soldiers dead or wounded in the battlefield.17 He was never again to commit a mistake of this magnitude. This disaster was entirely of Mao’s own making. It was he who pledged unquestioned allegiance to Stalin by initiating the lean-to-the-Soviet-side foreign policy. It was he who insisted on Chinese participation in the war at a crucial Politburo meeting in October 1950.

Compared with the Korean War, Mao’s bombardments of Quemoy and other offshore islands in 1954 and 1958 were not as costly in terms of casualties. Still they created adverse consequences. The bombardments failed to realize Mao’s objective of preventing the United States from forming a military alliance with Nationalist China. Instead, they goaded America to conclude a mutual security treaty to defend the island and to enact the Formosa Resolution to protect the offshore islands. To this day, these islands, like Taiwan, are off military limits to the Communist forces. The bombardments also contributed to the Sino-Soviet split in which China’s failed attempt to obtain Soviet nuclear assistance figured as a prominent issue.

Mao’s decisions on the bombardments were, again, largely his own. In the 1958 bombardments specifically, he even did not consult any of his senior comrades when ordering the attack, and he kept Ye Fei, the field commander in charge of the bombardments, totally in the dark as to his purpose of the massive bombing.18 In the end, he let the bombardments taper off with, first, bombing on alternative days, then bombing with propaganda shells, and, finally, complete stoppage. He let his idiosyncrasies dictate his highly risky military adventures.

Compared with his military adventures, Mao’s misguided Great Leap Forward campaign produced a far greater catastrophe. With fanatical impetuosity, with a pupil’s knowledge about economics, and with relentless pressure on the populace, Mao wanted to convert a backward rural economy to a most industrialized one in 10 to 15 years. The failed adventure resulted in not only a sharp decline in agricultural and industrial output but also a human cost of unbelievable proportions. The conservatively estimated death toll of 30 million people is larger by far than the number of people killed in any rural rebellion in Chinese history, the Holocaust initiated by Hitler, the massacre by the infamous Pol Pot regime of Cambodia, or even the eight-year Chinese-Japanese war.

Such a government-sponsored campaign causing such a great number of civilian deaths is unprecedented in human history. Any leader in any nation creating this kind of catastrophe must feel severe pangs in his conscience and must be removed from power. But Mao dodged all his responsibility and could say so callously, as if he would not mind, that the Great Leap “will cause…at least… 50 million deaths.”19 In the 15 years following the Great Leap, he remained the indomitable Chinese leader, while all his critics toiled in labor camps or were persecuted to death.

In the cultural field, Mao had more than a share of atrocious misadventures. In the service for politics he consistently disregarded moral principles. In the Hundred Flower campaign and the Cultural Revolution, he drilled into the consciousness of millions upon millions of his countrymen that dishonesty could be preferred over honesty and deception over sincerity in the execution of public policy. Such a negative educational campaign contributes to a moral decline in post-Mao China. Beijing continues to deny the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the Communists falsely claim credit for winning the war against Japan. And it is all too familiar to note that business people rampantly pirate foreign intellectual properties and fraudulently manufacture toxic goods injurious to the health of consumers in China and elsewhere in the world.

Mao showed his ultimate disregard for morality with his contempt of human life. In the Suppression of the Counter-Revolution campaign of 1950-1953, he could set a death quota on the counter-revolutionaries, requiring 700,000 people to be executed.20 In his contention with foreign powers, he could say that he would not mind that a half of the globe’s population would perish in a nuclear war, because the other half would build a more brilliant Socialist world.21

The Mao-led Cultural Revolution inflicted irreparable damage to Chinese cultural heritage. Historical monuments and temples were defaced or destroyed, artifacts ransacked, and intellectual works burned—on a scale so massive that is beyond imagination or tabulation. Qin Shihuang’s cultural rampage more than two millennia ago earned him eternal condemnation by his countrymen. But he killed only some 460 scholars and burned books of an unknown quantity. Compared with what Mao destroyed in the Cultural Revolution, Qin Shihuang’s assault on Chinese culture was child’s play.

**An Overall Assessment**

Both Chiang and Mao had superlative achievements, which were significantly marred by their failures. How do we render an overall judgment on them? Insofar as Mao is concerned, the Chinese Communist Party declared in a resolution of 1981:

Comrade Mao Zedong…made gross mistakes during the “cultural revolution,” but, if we judge his activities as a whole, his contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his mistakes. His merits are primary and his errors secondary. He rendered indelible meritorious service in founding and building up our Party and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, in founding the People’s Republic of China....22

The resolution elaborated on Mao’s specific contributions and also identified Mao’s other errors. However, the party failed to explain why it regarded Mao’s “meritorious service” as outweighing his “gross mistakes.” Can any of Mao’s contributions make up for the death of 30 million people in the Great Leap or the ten years’ scourge of the Cultural Revolution? This resolution failed to render a balanced and impartial judgment on Mao.

This resolution, in fact, reveals unwittingly the Communist Party’s true position on Mao: *his meritorious service* *benefited the Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army, the People’s Republic, and Mao himself*. It left something unsaid: *his disastrous policies* *victimized millions upon millions of ordinary people and his arbitrarily targeted comrades.*

With respect to Chiang, the Nationalist Party did not adopt a resolution to assess his merits and mistakes. How does one assign weight to Chiang’s achievements versus his failures remains an open question. Yet it appears that *Chiang’s achievements in the Northern Expedition and the Chinese-Japanese war benefited the nation, as has been described previously. His failures harmed his party, his army, and himself, but he did not victimize the people in any way remotely approaching the scale of devastation that Mao wreaked on the Chinese.* His defeat at the hands of the Communists reduced the Nationalist Party and the Nationalist army to regional entities, never capable of challenging the continental power that his rival regime has become. And Chiang took the defeat especially hard personally; he regarded it a shame scorching his soul that he had to redress at all cost. When he realized in the last years of his life the impossibility of recovering the mainland, he languished in agony and disappointment, dying a man of eternal regret.

Given the two Chinese leaders’ triumphs and defeats, two more questions, of historical significance, are to be raised. How would they measure up to the status of the greatest Chinese emperors in the past? In his poem, “Snow,” Mao implicitly ranked himself above Qin Shihuang, Emperor Wu of the Han, Emperor Taizong of the Tang, and Genghis Khan of the Yuan. Were Mao and Chiang “the truly great heroes” of 20th century China? Perhaps the time elapsed since their deaths is not long enough for definitive answers. In this author’s opinion, however, Chiang and Mao were the only two leaders with sufficient political skills and military talents to best cope with the exigencies of their times. Both of them rose, through a process of elimination, above their contemporaries in the Nationalist and Communist power structures respectively. Both accomplished great deeds that none of their contemporaries was likely to emulate. Despite their enormous failures, they were the indispensible leaders of their country; they could not be substituted by others but only by each other.

**COMRADES FOR AN EMERGING SUPERPOWER**

**The Common Goals**

In 1925 when the dying Sun Yat-sen asked, in a testament, his *tong zhi* (comrades) to complete the revolution he had initiated, he was addressing to Chiang and Mao, among others. For they were both then officials of the Nationalist Party that Sun had founded and they shared the common goals the party’s revolution was supposed to realize. Hence, they were *tong zhi*. Their common goals were to eradicate warlordism and imperialism as the immediate objectives and to build a prosperous and strong China in the long run.

Two years later, however, Chiang and Mao parted ways. Chiang purged the Communists from the Nationalist Party, and Mao went to the Jiangxi hills to start his rural revolution. Comrades became enemies. In the next half of a century they fought battles against each other and governed their parts of China in different ways. After they departed from the scene, they turned out to be comrades again—if viewed posthumously. That is, they were in reality collaborators in the process of realizing their common goals—in the sequence of time. They took complementary measures successively to eradicate warlordism and imperialism; they laid down together the foundation for China to emerge as an economic and military superpower in the 21st century.

What Chiang achieved in the Northern Expedition in 1926-1928 signifies the beginning of the end of warlordism. Within the decade, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, Zhang Xueliang, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren, and Chen Jitang had either bowed out of politics or pledged allegiance to Chiang. After the outbreak of the Chinese-Japanese war, while the power of most of the remaining military chieftains sharply attenuated, Long Yun of Yunnan and Sheng Shicai of Xinjiang surrendered their territories to Chiang’s rule.

By the end of the war, military fiefdoms impregnable to the Nationalists’ administrative and financial control had virtually disappeared. Thus, Chiang completed the mission of eradicating warlordism and dramatically expanded his territorial domain. But his territorial gains only benefited the Communists, for he saved them from battling the warlords piecemeal when they won the civil war. “For the most part,” Robert E. Bedeski has observed, “the Communist victory was a matter of defeating a single government and its army rather than overcoming a series of entrenched regional militarists.”23

After establishing the People’s Republic, Mao continued Chiang’s drive for territorial consolidation when he took over Tibet in 1950. Mao then began to push China’s power to the full limits of the nation’s boundaries. He deployed forces in the remotest corners of Chinese land, from the Ussuri River in the northeast to the Himalayan mountains in the southwest, from the Tian Shan villages in the northwest to islands in South China Sea. In most of these places he also set up administrative and party apparatus tightly controlled by the central authorities in Beijing.

For the first time in almost a century, China had re-established its exclusive control of its territorial domain. This was a development that Chiang and Mao together made possible. Chiang contributed in its first stage, beginning in 1926, and Mao in the second stage, beginning 24 years later in 1950.

Chiang’s victory in the Chinese-Japanese war enabled him to realize another goal of the Sun revolution. He persuaded China’s allies, the United States and Britain —later, other foreign powers—to renounce their imperialist privileges in China by abolishing the unequal treaties. He ended once and for all foreign concessions in Chinese port cities, foreign consuls’ extraterritorial jurisdiction in Chinese lands, and foreign privileges in economic undertakings in China. When Mao took over China, he went beyond reaffirming the termination of unequal treaties; he unilaterally abolished any other treaties he deemed violating Chinese sovereignty. In addition, his intervention in the Korean War and involvement in the Vietnam War, his defiance of the Soviet Union and the United States in world politics, and his contribution to the emergence of the Washington-Moscow-Beijing strategic triangle fostered a strong sense of nationalism among the Chinese. His military and diplomatic ventures abroad allowed the Chinese to enjoy *psychological* *equality* with foreigners, as Chiang’s termination of the unequal treaties allowed China to enjoy *legal equality* with foreign nations.

 Chiang’s victory in the Chinese-Japanese war also earned China the status of Big Power—a Permanent Member of the Security Council of the United Nations, wielding the veto power. However, Chiang’s China was too weak and war-torn, as he had pointed out, to deserve such a status. Indeed, in the 25 years in which Chiang’s representatives were seated at the Security Council, from 1946 to 1971, they hardly exerted any influence on the issues before the Council. Elsewhere in the world, when conferences of foreign ministers of big powers were held to deliberate upon the emerging Cold War problems, Chiang’s representatives were not even invited.

The seating of Mao’s representatives at the United Nations in 1971 symbolized recognition by the international community of China as a truly big power. It was the only non-industrialized nation that possessed nuclear weapons in the 20th century; it maintained the world’s largest conventional army; and it exerted a preponderant influence in the Pacific Rim ranging from Korea to Indochina. President Nixon’s trip to Beijing in the following year reaffirmed the significance of these transformative phenomena. Chiang made China a big power in name; Mao made China a big power in reality.

**The Nationalist-Communist Symbiosis**

Though by no means intentional, Chiang’s fighting the Chinese-Japanese war contributed to the transfer of power from him to Mao. As James C. Hsiung has observed:

By the time the war was over,...China had lost some four million soldiers and an additional eighteen million civilians….Total wartime property losses were estimated to run in excess of U.S.$100 billion.

 On the other hand...the Communists’ Red Army had swelled to 1.3 million soldiers, supplemented by a militia of 2.2 million and supported by a population of 100 million….The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] itself boasted a membership of 1.2 million.24

Chiang’s war against Japan, concurred John W. Garver, “allowed his Communist rivals to expand their infrastructure, creating the basis for their subsequent victory over the Nationalists in the civil war.”25

The Nationalist-Communist symbiotic relations can be seen from another perspective—institutional continuity. As William C. Kirby has noted, the Nationalist “Party-State was an essential, if unacknowledged, foundation of the Communist Party-State, which inherited concepts, institutions, and policies that had been central to Chinese political life in the decades before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded.”26 This institutional continuity manifested itself in several ways. First, both the Nationalists and the Communists maintained the same political structure, based on the Leninist model. Second, this structure was heavily dominated by the military. And third, the Nationalist army—with its defeats and defections during the civil war—filled the People’s Liberation Army with millions of its soldiers and an inordinate amount of weapons.

**Mainland-Island Economic Linkage**

That Chiang and Mao became comrades posthumously can be viewed from a final perspective. As analyzed in the end section of the previous chapter, Mao’s successors have marched on the path to prosperity that Chiang had first charted. That path is marked by two features: the technocrats being in full charge of economic development and a complete set of policies to implement the principles of sectoral transformation and comparative advantages.

While the transformation of mainland’s political leadership and economic policies has made the economies of the mainland and Taiwan increasingly alike, a phenomenal growth of trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait cemented the two economies. In 1979, when the two sides resumed trading, cross-Strait export and import value registered at a mere US$78 million; in 2002 it reached US$ 40 billion—an astonishing 508-fold rise! In the latter year, value of export from Taiwan to the mainland accounted for as much as 30 percent of Taiwan’s total export value; and value of mainland’s import from Taiwan accounted for 13 percent of mainland’s total import value.27 Taiwan’s investment on the mainland also rose rapidly, from US$466 million (in actually delivered amount) in 1991 to US$3,970 million in 2002, an 8.5-fold increase. As of 2003, with its cumulative investment on the mainland at US$37 billion, Taiwan ranked as the mainland’s fourth largest external investor.28

Mainland’s investment in Taiwan was insignificant because of restrictions imposed by Taiwan’s government. But expansion in mutual investment and trade is expected to accelerate in consequence of recently-concluded agreements. In November 2008, the mainland and Taiwan agreed to establish direct services in air- and sea-transportation and postal services; and in June 2010 the two sides concluded the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement to promote free trade. Mainland China and Taiwan are thus economically intertwined even though they remain politically divided.

**Setting the Foundation of an Emerging Superpower**

At the inception of the 21st century, China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy (after that of the United States), the largest exporting country, the largest energy-consuming nation, and the largest foreign exchange reserve holder, the largest internet community, and the largest car market.29 By any measurement except for per capita income, China is the world’s newest super-economy.

China has been regarded for some time as a rapidly-growing military power. With decades’ rising military budget, China possesses the world’s largest conventional army undergoing rapid modernization. And in the field of nuclear force, China ranks third in the world, after the United States and Russia. It has a whole phalanx of weapons, including inter-continental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), intermediate-range ballistic missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.30

When Chiang and Mao died in the mid1970s, China had not possessed the traits of a super-economy, and its nuclear force was still in the infant stage of development. But Chiang and Mao were only the first generation leaders who exercised authority over the entire Chinese Republic.31 It was during their long tenure of service that they established several requisite preconditions for China to become a superpower.

First, they restored China as a united nation, not one divided into regions dominated by strong military men and foreign powers. A divided nation can never become a major power of the world, let alone a superpower.32

Second, they created a mammoth military force consisting of conventional and nuclear arms that is capable of preventing foreign invasion or foreign domination of Chinese territories, which China had suffered for a whole century beginning in 1839. An intimidated nation cannot be qualified as a superpower.

Third, they contributed to the creation of a market of continental proportions with massive flow of goods, services, labor, capital, and technology. Mao helped establish a national infrastructure to sustain the market; Chiang inspired the market to operate at maximal efficiency with his developmental experiences. A nation without such a market cannot give rise to a super-economy.

And fourth, they fostered a sense of confidence among the people in themselves—something the Chinese had missed for more than a century’s time. United in purpose, the Chinese are striving to realize the common goal of *Fu Guo Qian Bing* (prosperous nation and strong army) that Chinese leaders had first set in the 1860s.

Together Chiang and Mao have set the foundation for China to become a superpower.

**NOTES**

1Yang Tianshi of the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, in an effort at reappraisal of Chiang’s career, published two path-breaking volumes on the Nationalist leader: *Jiang Shi Mi Dang yu Jiang Jieshi Zhen Xiang* [*Secret Archives on Chiang and the True Story of Chiang Kai-shek*]; and *Zhao Xun Zhen Shi de Jiang Jieshi: Jiang Jieshi Ri Ji Jie Du* [*A Search for the Real Chiang Kai-shek: An Exposition of the Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*] (cited before)*.* Yang Kuisong, a historian at Beijing University, has made a dispassionate and lucid analysis of the political life of Mao and Chiang in a speech: “Mao Zedong yu Jiang Jieshi de Bi Jiao Yan Jiu” [A Comparative Study of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek] http://www. yangkuisong.net/ xsyj/000069.htm. Other scholarly appraisals on Chiang can be seen in the following publications: **Zhuang Chuanwei and Zhang Yongchun, *Mao Zedong yu Jiang Jieshi* [*Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek*],** Changchun, China: Changchun Chu Ban She, 1993; Chen Fuzhong, “Da Lu Xue Zhe Dui Guo Min Dang Kang Zhan Gong Ji di Song Yang”[Commendation by Mainland China’s Scholars of the Accomplishments of the Nationalist Party during the War of Resistance] *Zhuanji Wenxue* [*Biographic Literature*, a periodical published in Taiwan]*,* No. 492 (May 2003), pp. 125-30; Hui Xin, “Bai Nian Min Guo Ji Huai Jiang Jieshi Xian Sheng” [Commemoration of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek on the 100th Year of the Republic of China], *China News Digest, WWW.CND.Org,* April 2010; Wu Zhengrong, “Xiao Yi Mao Zedong yu Jiang Jieshi” [A Brief Commentary on Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek], http://www.peacehall.com/ news/gb/pubvp/2006/09/ 200609282140.shtml; Sun Wenguang, “Wo Men Ying Gai Dao Nian Jiang Jieshi” [We Should Commemorate Chiang Kai-shek], http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb pubvp/2008/04/200804062259. shtml; “Jiang Jieshi Bu Wei Ren Zhi de Qi Da Gong Xian” [Chiang Kai-shek’s Seven Unknown Major Contributions], http://www.peacehall. com/news/gb/pubvp/ 2007/12/200712111311.shtml.

Lately two international conferences held on mainland China provided a most comprehensive reexamination up to date of Chiang Kai-shek’s policies and leadership: “Political Change and Leadership of Nationalist China, 1911-1949,” sponsored by the Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing and the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Beijing, November 1-2, 2008; and “The Symposium of Re-Examination and Revaluation on the Republic of China Leadership,” sponsored by Department of History, Fudan University in Shanghai, and the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Shanghai, September 10-11, 2011.

2The other two top contributors were Max Weber and Mahatma Gandhi. Deutsch once served on the faculty of Harvard and European universities and as president of the American Political Science Association. His associates in the study were University Michigan Biophysicist John Platt and University of Frankfurt Political Scientist Dieter Senghass. Their findings appeared in *Science*, as cited in *Time,* March 29, 1971.

3Sima Qian, *Shi Ji* [*The Records of History*], Vol. 111, “Wei Jiang Jun Biao Qi Lie Zhuan” [Biography of Marshal of Rapid Cavalry Wei.]

4Liu Xiang, ed., *Jiu Tang Shu* [*History of the Tang Dynasty, The Old Version*], Vol. 2, “Ban Ji” [Biographies of Emperors], No. 2; Oyang Xiu and Song Qi, eds., *Xin Tang Shu* [*History of the Tang Dynasty, The New Version*], Vol. 2, “Ban Ji” [Biographies of Emperors], No. 2.

5**See** Li Yong and Zhang Zhongtian, *Jiang Jieshi Nian Pu* **[*Chronology of Chiang Kai-shek*] (**Beijing: Zhonggong Dang Shi Chu Ban She, 1995), pp26ff; and Mao Sicheng, ed*., Minguo Shiwunian Yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi Xiansheng* [*Mr. Chiang Kai-shek prior to 1926*] (Hong Kong: Longmen Shudian, 1965; reprint of the 1936 edition), *passim*.

6Ibid., 41-44, 50-52.

7See Ma Zhendu, “Zhong Guo de Kang Ri Zhan Lue” [“ChineseWar Strategies against Japan”] in Yang Tianshi and Zhan Yunhu, eds., *Zhan Lue yu Li Ci Zhan Yi* [*Strategies and Military Campaigns*] (Beijing: She Hui Ke Xue Wen Xian Chu Ban She, 2009), pp.76-77, 162-63; **Hans J. Van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945* (**London: Routledge, 2003),pp. 196-99; Hsi-sheng Ch’i, *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45* (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c1982), pp. 41-42; and **Jonathan Fenby, *Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), pp. 296-97.**

8To his knowledge, this author was the first writer to analyze on this subject, in a paper titled, “Chiang Kai-shek’s Wartime Diplomacy: Bargaining Strategies and Internal Dynamics,” Conference on Political Change and Leadership of Nationalist China, 1911-1949, November 1-2, 2008, Beijing, China, p. 93.

9For a full description of the transition of Taiwan’s political system from a one-party authoritarian regime to a plural-party competitive polity, see Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

10See Paul H. Tai, Chapter 12, “Seeking Wealth,” in a book manuscript he authored that is tentatively titled *Chiang and Mao: Founding Fathers of an Emerging Superpower.*

11They included Luo Gonghua, Xu Qingyu, Gao Chuanzhu, He Fangli, Fu Rui, Xu Daolin, Zhang Yiding, and Li Yujiu. They studied abroad; three in Japan, one each in Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, and the United States. Some of them served on the faculty of leading Chinese universities. Ju Yiqiao, *Gen Sui Jiang Jieshi Shi Er Nian* [*Serving under Chiang Kai-shek for Twelve Years*] (Changsha: Hunan Ren Min Chu Ban She, 1988), pp. 20-21.

12See Wang Yuqi, “Chiang Wei-kuo Jiang Jun yu ‘Ming De Xiao Zhu’” [General Chiang Wei-kuo and ‘Ming De Group’], *Zhuanji Wenxue*, No. 460 (September 2000), pp. 65-69. For a full documentation on Chiang’s Chinese and foreign advisers, see **Wen Hao, ed., *Jiang Jieshi de Zhi Nang Gao Can* [*Chiang Kai-shek’s Confidants and High Counselors*]**, Beijing: Zhong Guo Wen Shi Chu Ban She, 2004; and Fang Ke, ed., *Jiang Jieshi* ***he Ta de Gao Ji Mu Liao* [*Chiang Kai-shek and His High-Rank Staffers*],**Zhengzhou, China: Henan Ren Min Chu Ban She, 2000.

13Yang Tianshi has commented on Chiang’s self-diagnosis of failures in Yang Tianshi, “Jiang Jieshi ‘Fan Xing Shi San Tiao: Shan Zi Du Da Wei Da Bing’” [Chiang Kai-shek’s Thirteen Points of Self-Reflection: Arrogance as the Major Fault], http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1011/3/4/6/101134602.html? coluid= 0&kindid=0&docid=101134602&mdate=1113103320.

 14For a full exposition of this case, see Yang Tianshi, “Jiang Jieshi Cha Chu H.H. Kung Deng Ren de Mei Jin Gong Zhai Wu Bi An” [Chiang Kai-shek’s Investigation of the Case of Embezzlement by H.H. Kung and Others], *Zhuanji Wenxue*, No. 552 (May 2008), pp. 4-16.

15He Chengxun, Superintendent of Department of Military Justice from 1942 to 1945, recorded in his diaries numerous corruption cases. Whenever a case was brought to his attention, Chiang almost invariably ordered execution, even for minor offenses. Yet many cases were not reported to him, and many known culprits escaped punishment. See He Chengxun, *He Chengxun Jiang Jun Zhan Shi Ri Ji* [*General He Chengxun’s Wartime Diaries*], Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chu Ban She, [1986].

16*The New York Times*, December 28, 2009.

17Xiaobing Li, ***A History of the Modern Chinese Army* (**Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, c2007), p.111; and Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian Zhan Zheng* [*Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War*] ([Guangzhou]: Guangdong Ren Min Chu Ban She, 2003), pp. 358-59.

18Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 175-78.

19Cited inhttp://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%A4%A7%E8%B7%83% E8%BF%9B.

20Yang Kuisong, “Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries,” *China Quarterly,* No. 193 (March 2008), 108.

21Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1998), p. 230.

22Adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981.

23Robert E. Bedeski, “China’s Wartime State,” in **James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945* (**Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, c1992), p. 48.

24James C. Hsiung, “The War and After: World Politics in Historical Context,” in ibid., pp.295-96.

25John W. Garver, “China’s Wartime Diplomacy,” in Hsiung and Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory*, p. 28.

26William C. Kirby, “The Chinese Party-State under Dictatorship and Democracy on the Mainland and Taiwan,” in William C. Kirby, ed., *Realms of Freedom in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 113.

27Li Baoming*,* ***Liang An Jing Ji Guan Xi 20 Nian: Tu Po yu Fa Zhan Li Cheng de Shi Zheng Fen Xi* [*Twenty Years’ Cross-Strait Economic Relations: An Empirical Analysis of Their Breakthrough and Development*] (**Beijing: Ren Min Chu Ban She, 2007), p. 72; and Zhu Zhengming and Sun Mingde, eds., *Zhong Guo Jing Ji Kai Shi Ju, Liang An Guan Xi Chuang Xin Ji* [*New Opportunities for the World and Taiwan Rising from Chinese Economic Development*] (Taipei: Taiwan Jing Ji Yan Jiu Yuan, [2005]), pp., 407, 410.

28 Li, ***Twenty Years’ Cross-Strait Economic Relations*, pp. 58-59; and Peter Drysdale and Xinpeng Xu, “Taiwan’s Role in the Economic Architecture of East Asia and the Pacific” in Julian Chang and Steven M. Goldstein, eds., *Economic Reform and Cross-Strait Relations: Taiwan and China in the WTO* (** Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, c2007), **p. 153.**

29See David Barboza, “China Overtakes Japan to Become No. 2 Global Economic Power,” *The New York Times,* August 16, 2010, Section B, pp. 1, 3.

30See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2007*, pp. 332-33, 346-50; **Richard D. Fisher Jr., *China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach*,** Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008; You Ji, *The Armed Forces of China,* London: I.B. Tauris, 1999. For details on Chinese nuclear weapon inventory as of 2008, see “Nuclear Force Guide,” Http://www.fas.org/nuke/ guide/summary.htm.

31Since the 1911 Revolution that created the Chinese Republic, all the government leaders prior to Chiang and Mao had a short tenure of service and exercised authority in only part of China. These included Sun Yat-sen, who served as Provisional President of the Republic for three months; Yuan Shikai, head of the northern government; and several warlords taking turns to control the regime in Beijing.

32Of course, the mainland and Taiwan have been ruled by two separate governments since1949. But the fact that Taiwan is part of China has been recognized by Chiang and Mao and by the international community. Even the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan has repeatedly affirmed that the Republic of China governs the island.