Sun Yat-Sen Thought, Centennial of the ROC,

And Development Models in Taiwan and Mainland China:

A Macro Analytical Framework

*Yu-Shan Wu*

Institute of Political Science

Academia Sinica

Abstract

It would do no justice to a review of the Republic of China’s centennial development if focus is cast exclusively on the ROC’ early period on the Chinese mainland, the authoritarian era in Taiwan, or the two decades after democratization. This article attempts to provide a broad overview of the century of the Republic by putting the ROC’s three developmental stages in a theoretical framework, pointing out the mechanisms of transitions, and capturing the grand trends in historical development. We observe three subjects: Sun Yat-sen’s Thoughts, the practice of the ROC, and the post-1949 development on mainland China. These three produce seven observation points on a two-dimensional map laid out by the axes of state political control and state economic control. Three political systems are identified on the political axis: liberal democracy, modernizing authoritarianism, and totalitarianism, as well as three property rights structures/economic systems on the economic axis: market capitalism, state capitalism, and state socialism, based on different levels of political and economic control by the state. This gives rise to nine institutional combinations against which the seven observation points can be located. When state political control matches economic control the institutional combination is most stable, followed by high political control cum low economic control. The least sustainable is when low political control is paired with high economic control. On the institutional map Sun Yet-sen’s Thoughts migrated from democratic state capitalism to authoritarian state capitalism, with the ultimate ideal point remaining unchanged. The ROC shifted from a limited form of authoritarian state capitalism (while on the mainland) to full authoritarian state capitalism (prior to democratization in Taiwan), and finally to democratic market capitalism (after democratization in Taiwan). The PRC transitioned from totalitarian state socialism under Mao Zedong to post-totalitarian state capitalism during post-Mao, and particularly during the post-Tiananmen period. Because high political control is paired with low economic control, this system demonstrated considerable institutional resilience, capable of overcoming the challenge posed by a series of politico-economic crises. Institutional isomorphism is found among Sun Yat-sen’s later thoughts, the ROC’s authoritarian stage, and contemporary China. The mainland has moved into Taiwan’s institutional past. Whether there would be further institutional convergence between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is determined by the relative rate of the rise of national capability compared with institutional change on the mainland.

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The Republic of China (ROC) is moving into the second century. Its one-hundred-year history is divided into two periods: the four decades on the Chinese mainland and the following sixty years in Taiwan. The Taiwan period is further divided by the watershed of democratization: forty years under authoritarian rule followed by two decades of democracy. A review of the century would not be complete if our focus is cast exclusively on the mainland period, on the authoritarian rule, or on nascent democracy. This paper attempts to provide a theoretical framework for an overview of the ROC’s centennial history, point out the mechanisms of transitions, and capture the grand trends in the country’s development.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Republic of China have been a counter force to the Kuomintang the ROC. The two rivals waxed and waned in opposite directions. Since 1921 the CCP constituted a major armed opposition in China, opposed to whatever regime in power. It was suppressed by the Nationalists for two decades. The tide was turned in 1949, with the Nationalist Government fleeing to Taiwan and the PRC regime established in Beijing, controlling the absolute bulk of the Chinese territory. Two stages can be discerned in post-1949 China. The first three decades were characterized by Mao Zedong’s continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship, followed by another thirty years of reform and open-door policy. As in the case of the ROC, a review of the PRC’s history cannot neglect either of the two main stages. The “Great Leap Forward” and “Cultural Revolution” are as much characteristic of the Chinese Communist rule as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and “China Model.” Both need to be fully recognized if one wants to grasp the dynamic and turbulent history of the People’s Republic.

Why is it necessary to involve the PRC when discussing the centennial development of the ROC? This is because the ROC has always set China as its stage, even when it is confined to Taiwan. The two sides are interlocked, although the relationship has been full of tension and conflict. More importantly in this paper, our analytical framework for the ROC can go a long way in shedding light on the mainland’s development, thus bringing greater depth into our understanding of both cases.

The centennial history of the ROC is turbulent, heavily constrained by the environment when it comes to fulfilling the ideals of its founding father Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It is true that there has always been a wide gap between Sun’s ideals and the reality. However, one cannot miss the deep impact that Sun’s doctrine leaves in the institutions and policies of the Republic. In the post -1949 mainland Sun is considered a predecessor of bourgeois democratic revolution, honored as the leader who led a movement that overthrew the Manchu Dynasty. This revolutionary stature is coupled with his later policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and incorporation of China’s nascent communist movement into the Kuomintang to give Sun a high standing. The founding father of the ROC is respected by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Interestingly, Sun’s ideas of state building easily lend themselves to an analysis in our framework, making them comparable to the practices of the ROC and the PRC.

 The practices of the two Chinas are not fixed, nor are Sun’s ideas immobile. They evolved with time and adapted to changing environment. Once we discern the locations of the three in our analytical framework and delineate their trajectories of development, their relationships become obvious. We can then gauge the possibility that the three converge towards a common institutional mix, suggesting Sun’s ideas may ultimately bring the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to a common ground.

*Analytical Framework*

China entered the modern age as an agrarian empire overwhelmed by Western imperialism and forced to respond as a late developer (Kopstein and Lichbach, 2005: 11). There are finite ways with which a late developer can respond to the challenge posed by the West. Some imitated the early developers. Some emphasized the role of the state to accelerate catch-up (Gerschenkron, 1962). These models of response can be differentiated in two respects: regime type and property rights structures (Wu Yu-Shan, 1996: 193). Three regime types are discernable: liberal democracy, modernizing authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. The major differences among the three are in the level of the state’s independence from society and the arbitrary power it wields. In both regards totalitarianism is higher than modernizing authoritarianism, which in turn is higher than democracy.[[1]](#footnote-1) On the front of property rights structure and economic system, we can also differentiate among three types: market capitalism, state capitalism, and state socialism. They differ mainly in the degree of state involvement in the economy: state socialism penetrates into the economy deeper than state capitalism, and state capitalism deeper than market capitalism.[[2]](#footnote-2) In an institutional framework laid out by three regime types and three property rights structures, we can pinpoint the institutional choices of various late developers.

Liberal democracy and totalitarianism are opposing extremes. The former is characterized by multiple independent parties competing in a fair environment with guarantees of civil liberties and political rights. The latter has only one omnipotent party that monopolizes power and exercises full control over the society. State power is concentrated indefinitely and extended indefinitely. Multi-party competition is non-existent. Modernizing authoritarianism lies between liberal democracy and totalitarianism. This regime type is multi-morphous, with power concentrated in a party, the military or royal family. Opposition parties may exist in form, but none is capable of challenging the incumbents. Political environment is highly regulated, rendering party competition meaningless. In sum, we may use whether there exist independent political actors, and whether they operate in a free political market as two criteria to differentiate among different regime types.

Independent actors and free market are only useful criteria against which economic systems can be classified. Under state socialism means of production are by and large owned by the state (public ownership), rendering a single economic actor. Economic bureaucrats are agents of the state. Their decisions on production, exchange and distribution are based state plan and directions issued by their superiors, not in pursuit of enterprise profit on a competitive market. Single actor and non-competitive behaviors characterize state socialism. On the opposite side, market capitalism sees means of production in the hands of private entrepreneurs and market performing the role of major coordinator and resource allocator with the help of price signals. There are multiple actors pursuing maximum profits in a free and highly competitive environment. Finally state capitalism like authoritarianism is an intermediate institutional form. Here means of production are mainly owned by private individuals. However firms are operating in a matrix of positive and negative incentives provided by the states, the purpose of which is to coordinate economic behaviors in pursuit of rapid growth in designated strategic industries.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The above regime types and property rights structures are ideal types. Hence one may find various middle or mixed systems in country practices. This however does not detract from the usefulness of our ideal types. For the purpose of clarifying concepts, we designate liberal democracy, modernizing authoritarianism and totalitarianism as regime type 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0; and market capitalism, state capitalism and state socialism as economic system 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0. The numbers correspond to state control. As a result, we can find nine institutional combinations and find empirical examples for most of them. The combinations are designated by coordinates. Hence maximum state control of both politics and economy is found in totalitarian state socialism (3.0, 3.0), while minimum state control in both political and economic realms is found in democratic market capitalism (1.0, 1.0). All the remaining seven institutional mixes are in between.[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Table 1 The Ideal Types of Late Developer’s Models**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Market Capitalism 1.0 | State Capitalism 2.0 | State Socialism 3.0 |
| Totalitarianism 3.0 | Totalitarian Market Capitalism(3.0, 1.0) n/a | Totalitarian State Capitalism\*(3.0, 2.0) | Totalitarian State Socialism(3.0, 3.0) |
| Modernizing Authoritarianism 2.0 | Authoritarian Market Capitalism\*(2.0, 1.0) | Authoritarian State Capitalism(2.0, 2.0) | Authoritarian State Socialism(2.0, 3.0)n/a |
| Liberal Democracy1.0 | Democratic Market Capitalism(1.0, 1.0) | Democratic State Capitalism\*(1.0, 2.0) | Democratic State Socialism(1.0, 3.0)n/a |

Among the various politico-economic combinations three are devoid of empirical cases. They include totalitarian market capitalism (3.0, 1.0), authoritarian state socialism (2.0, 3.0), and democratic state socialism (1.0, 3.0).[[5]](#footnote-5) State political control is closely linked to state economic control, so that it is hard to find cases of either the highest political control paired with the lowest economic control (totalitarian market capitalism) or the lowest political control coupled with the highest economic control (democratic state socialism). Furthermore the public ownership and planned economy characteristic of state socialism cannot be sustained by any regime type less dominant than totalitarianism; hence there is no empirical case of authoritarian state socialism. In Table 1 we put “n/a” in coordinates (2.0, 3.0).

Among the six institutional combinations with empirical cases, three have comparable state political and economic control. They are democratic market capitalism (1.0, 1.0), authoritarian state capitalism (2.0, 2.0), and totalitarian state socialism (3.0, 3.0) (shown in boxes in Table 1). The remaining three types are mixed cases, including authoritarian market capitalism (2.0, 1.0), totalitarian state capitalism (3.0, 2.0), and democratic state capitalism (1.0, 2.0) (with asterisks in Table 1).[[6]](#footnote-6)

We can look at some of the empirical cases. In the classical description of a totalitarian system by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (1956), the authors offer two cases: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Although both satisfy the requirements of the “totalitarian syndrome” of utopian ideology, supreme leader, omnipotent party, monopoly of means of coercion, state control of the economy, monopoly of political communications, and rule of terror, they are still different in other aspects. The Nazis were not socialists. They demanded state control but not public ownership of means of production. For Adolf Hitler private ownership was no sin and there was no need to abolish it. On the contrary, for the war machine of Germany to run smoothly, Hitler needed the cooperation of German cartels and capitalists. It is true that the German economy was on a war footing and put strictly under state plan. That however does not boil down to socialization of private enterprises. Hence Nazi Germany practiced totalitarian state capitalism (3.0, 2.0). The Soviet Union, on the other hand, typified totalitarian state socialism with its abolition of private property and launch of planned economy (3.0, 3.0) under Joseph Stalin. Prewar Japan is yet another type. Its economy followed the principles of state capitalism, with the state nurturing *zaibatsus* while not directly owning enterprises. However, the Japanese Emperor was not a totalitarian dictator a la Hitler or Stalin. The Emperor was greatly admired and dutifully followed by his subjects and yet the real power resided in the hands of his bureaucrats and particularly high military officers. The degree of power concentration and extension was lower than in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union. The prewar and wartime Japanese system was thus authoritarian state capitalism (2.0, 2.0).[[7]](#footnote-7) When the war ended, Japan was democratized under American occupation. The power of economic bureaucrats rose as their rivals in the military were purged and economic recovery became first priority of the nation. Favorable international environment and Washington’s strategic decisions also played an important role. As a result, Japan evolved into democratic state capitalism (1.0, 2.0), or “capitalist developmental state” following Chalmers Johnson’s famous characterization (1982), that ushered in Japan’s postwar economic miracle. This is the prototype of the East Asian model. However, Japan’s success led to domestic and international pressure that made the model unsustainable. The country gradually evolved toward democratic market capitalism (1.0, 1.0). The last empirical type is authoritarian market capitalism (2.0, 1.0). A famous example is Chile under General Augusto Pinochet who ruled the country after the coup that toppled the Marxist government of Salvador Allende. Pinochet followed the advice of the “Chicago Boys” and implemented neo-classical economic policies that enshrined private property rights and free market. The combination of authoritarian rule and conservative economic policies succeeded in reviving and upgrading the Chilean economy, albeit with great losses in human rights and democracy. Finally, post-war Hong Kong is yet another good example of authoritarian market capitalism with the British colonial rule and free market economy. All empirical cases of the institutional combinations are found in Table 2.

**Table 2 The Empirical Cases of Late Developer’s Models**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Market Capitalism 1.0 | State Capitalism 2.0 | State Socialism 3.0 |
| Totalitarianism 3.0 | Totalitarian Market Capitalismn/a | Totalitarian State Capitalism\****Nazi Germany*** | Totalitarian State Socialism***Soviet Union*** |
| Modernizing Authoritarianism 2.0 | Authoritarian Market Capitalism\****Chile, Hong Kong*** | Authoritarian State Capitalism***Pre-war Japan*** | Authoritarian State Socialismn/a |
| Liberal Democracy1.0 | Democratic Market Capitalism***Post-war Japan II*** | Democratic State Capitalism\****Post-war Japan I*** | Democratic State Socialismn/a |

We can find at this stage that there is correlation between state political and economic control. When both are high (totalitarian state socialism), median (authoritarian state capitalism), or low (democratic market capitalism) there are durable empirical cases. Higher political control can also be paired with lower economic control, as in the case of totalitarian state capitalism and authoritarian market capitalism. However, the cases of lower political control cum higher economic control are rarer. The reason is a certain degree of state political control is a necessary, and yet not sufficient condition of a comparable economic control. The fact that there is no case of totalitarian market capitalism is not merely empirical, but definitional, as totalitarianism is defined in terms of monopoly of the economy, among other things. Hence totalitarian market capitalism is a misnomer. Another institutional type that seems to contradict our general observation is democratic state capitalism typified by post-war Japan. However, when we find that Japan’s “1955 system” was in fact a soft authoritarian regime with the LDP exercising long-term political dominance and in alliance with the bureaucracy and the big business groups, then that system appears more compatible with our observation. We can show this by assigning “1.5” to the political coordinate of Japan’s post-war institution from the mid-1950’s to the 1970’s. The political system is thus shown to be closer to the economic system.[[8]](#footnote-8)

In the following discussion we will analyze Sun Yat-sen’s Thoughts, the ROC’s centennial development, and the PRC’s mainland experience in terms of the institutional typology for late developers. We will also explore into the possibility of cross-Strait institutional convergence in the future.

*Sun Yat-sen’s Thougths*

At the time when the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown and the Republic of China founded the new nation was faced with the urgent task of choosing its route toward modernization. The victory of the Western Allies in defeating the Central Powers seemed to suggest the supremacy of democratic market capitalism, a model exemplified by Great Britain and the U.S. However, the rise of Japan proved a more visible example of the appropriateness of authoritarian state capitalism for a late developer. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a challenge to Western institutions offered yet another model of development, that of totalitarian state socialism, with its full implications for the society yet to unfold while its anti-imperialist rhetoric highly appealing to Chinese intellectuals. A decision is to be made among the three routes of modernization: Anglo-American democratic market capitalism, Japanese-style authoritarian state capitalism, and Soviet-type totalitarian state socialism, all with comparable state political and economic control and thus durable.

Sun as the founder of the Kuomintang and the new Republic was interested in exploring all the three models. Originally he was inclined to follow the Anglo-American model and hoped that normal party politics could take root in China.[[9]](#footnote-9) In economic development Sun advocated a form of state capitalism cum mild socialism.[[10]](#footnote-10) He also wholly embraced the idea of opening to foreign investment.[[11]](#footnote-11) However there was an abrupt turn in Sun’s thoughts as the new Republic faced a series of crises (Yuan Shikai and his imperial ambition, Zhang Xun and the restoration of the Manchu Dynasty, warlordism and civil war) and seemed to be heading towards utter chaos. Sun realized that the Soviet-style party state was an effective instrument to achieve revolutionary goals, and Moscow could act as a counterweight against Western imperialism. This was the basis of his policy to “ally with Russia and incorporate the Communists.” In order to end warlordism, Sun advocated the idea of state building in three stages: military rule, tutelage, and constitutional rule, providing a blueprint for the KMT to forcefully eliminate opposition and build a party-state.[[12]](#footnote-12) Sun also followed the advice of the Soviets to build a party army indoctrinated with his thoughts. These moves suggest a dramatic turn of the KMT’s institutional preferences away from the Anglo-American model to the Soviet system. However, it should be noted that Sun had never though of building a Soviet totalitarian state in China. What he envisioned was to develop the KMT’s military force and use it to achiever national unification, and then educate the Chinese people in democracy under the tutelage of the KMT’s party rule. The party was to be a surrogate of the people in exercising their sovereign rights. The KMT’s monopoly of power was instrumental and temporary, to be terminated as soon as the people had demonstrated their ability of democratic rule in local governance. Sun’s thoughts on state building in stages thus can only provide a conditional and phased argument for the KMT’s party rule, which is quite different from under the totalitarian system in a communist country.

In Table 3 we locate Sun’s positions. Sun I shows the revolutionary leader’s early institutional preference of liberal democracy cum state capitalism, namely (1.0, 2.0). After the crises in the early years of the Republic, Sun listened to his Soviet advisors and shifted to higher political control, but not to the extent of Soviet totalitarianism, while maintaining his preference for state capitalism, hence a shift to (2.0, 2.0), or authoritarian state capitalism. The shift from Sun I to Sun II did not indicate a change of the ultimate ideal point, rather an adjustment of means to reach the same goal. There had never been any doubt in Sun’s mind that he would strive for a Western-style democracy in China, only that after painful experiment in the early years of the Republic he realized that such goal could only be achieved with strong state power wielded by a pro-democracy revolutionary party and only realized in stages. For the KMT Sun’s “instrumental authoritarianism” had a lasting impact, making it possible to shift to democracy at a later stage. This contrasts sharply with the doctrine of party dictatorship under Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.

**Table 3 Development Models in Contemporary China**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Market Capitalism 1.0 | State Capitalism 2.0 | State Socialism 3.0 |
| Totalitarianism 3.0 | Totalitarian Market Capitalismn/a | Totalitarian State Capitalism\* | Totalitarian State Socialism***PRC I*** |
| Modernizing Authoritarianism 2.0 | Authoritarian Market Capitalism\* | Authoritarian State Capitalism***Sun II******ROC I******ROC II******PRC II*** | Authoritarian State Socialismn/a |
| Liberal Democracy1.0 | Democratic Market Capitalism***ROC III*** | Democratic State Capitalism\****Sun I*** | Democratic State Socialismn/a |

*The ROC’s Development*

Before the completion of the Northern Expedition and unification, one finds no center of power and leadership in the new Republic. Yuan Shikai, Zhang Xun and the warlords put the nation in chaos and there was a lack of political authority to build institutions and grow the economy. With Chiang Kai-shek victorious in the civil war and formally unifying the nation after the Northern Expedition, the Nanking government was able to build the state in ways that were unprecedented in the ROC’s history. The “golden decade” (1927-1937) witnessed the buildup of a modern army and a defense industry, the launch of the ROC air force, the expansion of roads and bridges, the completion of the currency reform, the education of a generation of youth in modern Chinese nationalism, and the preparedness for the forthcoming war with the Japanese. During the decade of state building, the KMT practiced authoritarian state capitalism. No opposition was allowed to challenge the authority of the party, and the state was in full charge of developing the economy.[[13]](#footnote-13) The reach of the KMT state was limited, though, as local warlords sabotaged policies of the central government that had full authority over only several provinces in south and east China, the communists established their Soviet republic until Chiang led the fifth mop-up campaign that sent the rebels in their Long March to the peripheries of the country, the Japanese continued their encroachment on Chinese territories and rights, and the West insisted on its privileges under the “unequal treaties.” The ROC was thus not in full authoritarian state capitalism, as (2.0, 2.0) would suggest. We put it (ROC I) at (1.5, 1.5).

The anti-Japanese war changed China’s developmental route. As the Nationalist Government concentrated its resources on the front, it gradually lost control over the countryside, and the balance of power between the Nationalists and the Communists took a decisive turn in the latter’s favor (Johnson 1962). Corruption was rampant in the authoritarian system under the duress of war. Popular support for the KMT dwindled as people suffered in the wartime economy. When the war finally ended, the KMT was ill prepared for meeting the challenge of an all-out communist rebellion. After losing a string of decisive battles in the civil war, the Nationalist Government fled to Taiwan, attempting to rebuild a state based on 1/266 of the mainland’s territory and 1/66 of its population.

The KMT’s soul-searching of 1950-1952 (*gaizao*) concluded that the main cause of the fiasco on the mainland was lack of political control and economic malaise. As a result, Chiang strengthened the KMT’s grip on the society, intensified its thought control, and stifled local opposition (Wu Yu-Shan, 1994, 143). Because theoretically the ROC had moved into constitutional rule with the promulgation of the 1947 Constitution, the gap between political reality and the promise of liberal democracy was tremendously widened. A martial law system was erected in the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. Even under those circumstances, however, Sun’s Thoughts, American influence, and limited state capacity militated against the KMT grasping total political control in Taiwan. What transpired was the emergence of a strengthened authoritarian system under Chiang Kai-shek’s personal dictatorship.[[14]](#footnote-14) On the other hand, the KMT acutely realized the importance of economic development and treated it as the base for the ROC’s survival on the island. It took over the Japanese corporations and distributed the land among tillers, fulfilling promises that it failed to deliver on the mainland. A series of four-year plans were successfully implemented. From the 1950’s to the 1980’s the ROC strengthened its authoritarian state capitalist system. In a stable political environment the paramount leader delegated power to economic bureaucrats who were not bound by Western thoughts on economic development. The state used unorthodox methods to support private enterprises, but retained leverages to channel resources to industries designated strategic.[[15]](#footnote-15) In terms of property rights, the KMT government encouraged the development of private ownership, while occupying commanding heights to exercise state control. A virtual command economy that the Nationalist Government inherited from Japan was gradually turned into a state capitalist system (Wu Yu-Shan, 1994: ch. 5). A whole generation of entrepreneurs grew under favorable mercantilist environment. For it’s part, the KMT gained regime legitimacy with Taiwan’s rapid economic growth. Through a series of import substitution and export expansion, Taiwan became one of the four dragons in the 1970’s, succeeding Japan as a leading exemplar of East Asian development model (Johnson, 1985).[[16]](#footnote-16) When compared with ROC I, the post-1949 ROC II significantly strengthened its political and economic control, thus reaching the status of a full authoritarian state capitalist system (2.0, 2.0).

There are natural limits to the sustenance of the East Asian model. Although the state maintains strong control of the society, the high growth that it successfully propelled brought about rapid social change that ultimately challenged the political authority. In part this was caused by the maturing of the society, differentiation of interests, spreading of education and knowledge, growth of the middle class, and increasing influence from abroad. More important was sustained economic growth raised popular expectations to beyond material betterment. Political equality became the priority.[[17]](#footnote-17) The East Asian authoritarian states found themselves riding a tiger with the economic miracle that they worked so hard to bring about posing the most serious challenge to their political survival. Among them South Korea and Taiwan have made democratic transition, the People’s Action Party in Singapore is under increasingly greater political challenge from the opposition as it finds its social support in steady decline[[18]](#footnote-18), and the democrats in Hong Kong exerting persistent pressure on the Beijing-appointed administration and proving its vitality, albeit as a part of a post-totalitarian system.[[19]](#footnote-19) Generally speaking, an authoritarian system in a rapidly growing economy cannot successfully resist social pressure for political liberalization for long. It has to compromise one way or another. Taiwan is a typical case.

At the turn of the decade from the 1980’s to the 1990’s, Taiwan began its political transition into liberal democracy. The passing away of Chiang Ching-kuo undoubtedly played a significant role, and so did international and domestic pressure. Martial law was lifted and the Mobilization Period terminated. Party ban and press ban were removed. The ROC shifted into the third stage of its politico-economic development (ROC III), just as the modernization paradigm and the end of ideology theory predict. Besides political transition, Taiwan’s economy experienced structural change. The state capitalism that had proved highly conducive to rapid growth could no longer be sustained, a development closely related to democratization of the political system. For a developmental state to succeed four conditions have to be met. First, the state needs to be autonomous from society. Second, the elite need to share a consensus on development as the national priority. Third, the state can penetrate deeply into the society. Fourth, economic bureaucrats have to design and implement industrial policy that maximizes factor endowment of the economy and conforms to world market. From the 1960’s to the 1980’s, Taiwan did satisfy the above four conditions. The KMT’s authoritarian rule with its martial law and party ban shielded the state from social pressure. The elite shared the notion that high growth was a must to rebuild regime legitimacy and sustain the survival of the party state. The KMT was able to penetrate into all professional associations, business groups, trade unions, and other social groups to mobilize support and preempt opposition. Finally economic bureaucrats were fully authorized to design industrial policy aimed at world market to maximize Taiwan’s growth potential. Such policy built export-processing zones, provided land for enterprises; designed educational policy aimed at providing qualitied labor for industry, suppressed unions and maintained low wage; directed resources to strategic industries with control of the financial sector and directional lending, preferential loans, and tax brakes; launched research institutes, recruited talents from abroad, facilitated technological transfers to industry; built overseas network, and provided market information to enterprises. With the help of the industrial policy Taiwan upgraded its industrial development from agricultural reprocessing, textiles, heavy industries, to high electronics in waves of import substitution and export expansion (Wu Yu-Shan, 1997).

ROC II could sustain the challenge from two oil crises and the rapid appreciation of the NT Dollar that the U.S. imposed on Taiwan. However it was unable to survive democratization.[[20]](#footnote-20) Since the early 1990’s, the state autonomy was considerably weakened and the parliamentary pressure on the government intensified.[[21]](#footnote-21) Under the KMT’s authoritarian rule economic development was the paramount base of regime legitimacy. After Lee Teng-hui assumed power, however, democracy and nativization became the prominent legitimacy appeal. Environmentalism also rose in influence after the power turnover in 2000. The KMT became entangled with local factions and government polices reflected such tendency, a situation sustained under the Democratic Progressive Party’s eight-year rule (2000-2008). Developmental bureaucrats were gradually tamed by elected politicians. State penetration also weakened with democratization. Mass media escaped state control and turned on the government. Special security agencies that used to spy on opposition figures and citizens were abolished. The state simply lost control of the society.[[22]](#footnote-22) Finally, designating strategic industry was an easy task in the early stage of Taiwan’s economic development, for there was an abundance of preceding cases to refer to. However, with the catch-up phase completed, designating became more difficult, and the role of the technocrats much reduced.[[23]](#footnote-23) Compared with the state, enterprises and interest groups saw their influence surge. Market has assumed the role as the main coordinating mechanism. Taiwan has decisively broken away from authoritarian state capitalism (Wu Yu-Shan, 2007).

After democratization the ROC has transitioned into liberal democracy and lost the ability to manipulate the market. The degree of state political and economic control has been lowered. A decisive shift was made from authoritarian state capitalism (2.0, 2.0) to democratic market capitalism (1.0, 1.0) (see Table 3). This double scale-down is inevitable for lower political control cannot buttress higher economic control. Political democratization has shaken the one-party rule and deprived economic bureaucrats of its most reliable political ally. They have to bow to the authority of the elected politicians.[[24]](#footnote-24) The ROC is a typical example of authoritarianism giving way to democratic and market in East Asia.[[25]](#footnote-25)

*The PRC’s Development*

Mainland China took the third road to modernization, that of totalitarian state socialism. After an initial restoration period the CCP began pushing for Soviet-style draft industrialization in the early 1950’s. However, owning to serious lack of capital and gradual economic slow-down, Mao began emphasizing spiritual mobilization in mass production campaigns as the main engine of growth and upgrading in China (people’s communes, Three Red Flags, Great Leap Forward). In the following twenty years, China suffered as ultra-leftist Maoists dueled with revisionists for the control of power. Line struggle and factional strife seriously retarded growth in the mainland. Although Mao espoused a system that was not exactly the same as the Soviet model, both were vehemently against private property and the market. They were thus variants on the same theme of state socialism. In terms of personality cult, rule of terror, thought control, and other aspects of totalitarianism, the China model bore similarities with its Soviet counterpart, and where they were different, Mao’s version tended to be more destructive.[[26]](#footnote-26) It is clear that in the first thirty years of the PRC’s history, the country was ruled by totalitarian state socialism (3.0, 3.0).

When Mao passed away in 1976, the mainland economy was on the brink of collapse (Wu Jinglian, 2010a). As the flaws of the Maoist model were obvious for everyone to see, the ultra-leftists soon saw their power curtailed and themselves purged. The bureaucratic reformers argued for a restoration of the Soviet and East European model, but the market reformers advocated a more radical reform line. They were the two main rival factions that competed for supremacy in the early 1980’s, bringing about wide swings of policy lines and caused great instability.[[27]](#footnote-27) The reform centered on the notion of “market socialism” with only creeping privatization for private ownership was still an anathema to socialism at this early stage. In the late 1980’s, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev advocated *glasnost’* and *demokratizatsia* as means to whip up social pressure against his conservative opponents in the party. Even though Gorbachev attempted to save and regenerate the Soviet system (*perestroika*), he ended up creating democratic movement everywhere in the communist world that proved more than the system could handle. A Pandora’s Box was opened and long-suppressed political, social, and particularly ethnic grievances were unleashed. The Soviet Union collapsed under the weight of multiple crises.[[28]](#footnote-28) Gone with the Soviet Union were the East European communist regimes that had close links with the Kremlin, bringing about the height of the third wave of democratization. Influenced by the development in the communist world and reflective of the disturbances and opportunities of the domestic reform, democracy became the goal for students and the political reformers in the CCP. Pressure built up until it exploded into the mass demonstrations at Tiananmen and the regime cracked down. The Chinese communists saved their political fate by ruthlessly suppressing the young democrats and purging their ranks of liberal-minded cadres, including their Secretary General Zhao Ziyang.

To the CCP leadership the reform in the 1980’s proved too liberal on the political front and yet not thorough enough on the economic front. They would need to tighten political control and deepen economic reform, so as to render bigger sticks and more carrots. For the former, the CCP further penetrated into the society, cracked down on dissent, and tightly controlled media (including internet). For the latter, Deng relaunched economic reform against the resistance of the conservatives in the early 1990’s with his famous “southern tour” in the winter of 1991-92. This new wave of reform burst asunder the insistence on public ownership in the 1980’s and boldly moved into the realm of state-sponsored capitalism. Twenty years later, the property rights structure in China has undergone a fundamental change. The state would only maintain the commanding heights (such as finance), while letting private capital expand into all the other realms. Foreign capital was also introduced on a scale larger than in the 1980’s. The country has decisively shifted from market socialism into state capitalism.

More specifically, the CCP first introduced market as a complementary allocation mechanism, and then gradually expanded its realm against state plan. Then the reform moved into the realm of ownership, starting with legalization of small individual enterprises and experiments with contract responsibility system, and ending with full recognition of the necessity and legitimacy of large private firms. In 1982, the Twelfth Party Congress of the CCP stressed the auxiliary but necessary role of market vis-à-vis plan. This was followed by the “planned commodity economy” at the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee in 1984. Three years later, the Thirteenth Party Congress adopted the formula of “the state regulates the market, the market guides the enterprises,” integrating plan and market in an organic way. In 1992, “socialist market economy” became the catchword at the Fourteenth Party Congress. Five years later, the Fifteen Party Congress stressed “public ownership as the main part of the economy plus multiple ownerships developing together” (*gongyouzhi wei zhuti, duozhong suoyouzhi gongtong fazhan*). Finally in 2002 equal weight was given to both public and private ownership in “consolidate and develop public economy unswervingly” and “encourage, support and guide non-public economy unswervingly” (*haobu dongyao de gonggu han fazhan gongyouzhi jingji, haobu dongyao de guli, zhichi han yindao feigongyouzhi jingji*) at the Sixteenth Party Congress. During the whole process, the CCP gradually abandoned its insistence on public ownership by allowing the emergence of various forms of private enterprises, and the *de facto* privatization in agriculture and township enterprises. However, the CCP has never abandoned its guiding role in developing national economy. The state aggressively set parameters to guide enterprises enter designated strategic industries. It also designed and implemented ambitious industrial policy by providing factors of production, building infrastructure, and offering incentives in profit distribution. With the incessant growth of the private sector, and implementation of the state industrial policy, mainland China has moved increasingly closer the East Asian development model that contrasts sharply with the market socialism of the 1980’s (Wu Yu-shan, 1996: ch. 3; 2011).[[29]](#footnote-29)

On the political front, the CCP party-state remains robust, exercising firm control over the Chinese society. The fundamentals of the system are still what the Chinese communists learned from their Soviet comrades decades ago. However, political reforms thus far have regulated elite competition, normalized political succession, and increased the degree of political institutionalization in the CCP. One witnesses professionalism, mobility and stability in the party-state which helped it a lot in weathering through the turmoil of the 1980’s (Kou, 2005). The reformed system does not mobilize the society forcefully into political, economic or ideological campaigns, thus quite different from the erstwhile totalitarianism. However, the new model is more capable of penetrating and controlling the society, hence different from ordinary authoritarian regimes. It falls into the “post-totalitarian” category, similar to the post-Stalinist development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It is characterized by political institutionalization, technocratic rule, and consumerism as opposed to the rule of terror, ideology in command, and utopianism characteristic of high totalitarianism. Post-totalitarianism makes public policy more expectable and science-based. It also satisfies popular needs for material betterment and sustains regime legitimacy. Compared with authoritarianism, post-totalitarianism has far superior ability to penetrate into the depth of society. Given the inevitable pluralizing tendencies in a rapidly growing society, post-totalitarian state still firmly controls mass media, shifts and manipulates public opinions, keeps an all-embracing party network, penetrates into the emerging forms of social groups and organizations, and effectively suppresses dissent. It is a system that lies between high totalitarianism and traditional authoritarianism, exerting social control far more successfully than the latter (Wu Yu-Shan, 2011).

In Table 3, the current party-state in China presents political control between totalitarianism (3.0) and authoritarianism (2.0), and economic control on the level of state capitalism (2.0). We locate it at (2.5, 2.0). It is a post-totalitarian state capitalist system, or post-totalitarian capitalist developmental state. It is a rare hybrid, found only in Vietnam outside the Chinese borders. It shows the biggest communist party ruling the most populous nation into the second, and expectably the largest capitalist economy in the world. This system shows a higher degree of political than economic control, thus proves quite stable and resilient.

*Discussion of the China Model*

The rapid and sustained growth of the Chinese economy in the past three decades has propelled it to the second place in the global economic competition. That mainland China’s economic size will overtake that of the U.S. in early 21st century is a bygone conclusion. The only question remains is exactly when. Since the launch of economic reform in the end of the 1970’s, the Chinese economy has successfully weathered through Tiananmen Incident, the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis and the 2008-2009 international financial tsunami. It proves to be highly adaptive to rapid changes in external environment and in absorbing shocks. The successful story is called “the Chinese miracle” (Lin and Yao, 2006), and compared favorably with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that experienced economic transition roughly at the same period of time (Nolan, 1995). The China model has posed a serious threat to the traditional modernization paradigm (Zhao, 2009; Zhu, 2009). Small wonder the discussion of the China model and the “Beijing Consensus” is in vogue (Zhao and Wu, 2010; Zheng, 2010b; Pan, 2009; Jiang, 2007; Shen and Chen, 2007; Ding, 2011). Academics and policy makers are all eager to find out the reasons behind the rapid and sustained growth of the Chinese economy. The discussion and debate center on two aspects: endowment and strategy/institution. For the former culture, international environment and stage of economic development are most cited factors.[[30]](#footnote-30) For strategy/institution, discussion centers on the guiding principle (empiricism vs. rationalism), the speed of reform (gradual vs. shock therapy), the core concern of reform (technical-based vs. interest based), and institutional structure (authoritarian state capitalism vs. neo-classical capitalism)[[31]](#footnote-31) Because the huge difference in performance between the first and second thirty years of the PRC cannot be explained by changes in endowment[[32]](#footnote-32), the focus of the debate centers on strategies and institutions. Here one finds the essence of the China model, and Beijing Consensus.[[33]](#footnote-33)

Discussion of the China model is often conducted by scholar in China, or by overseas Chinese academics. Some raise doubts about the validity of the concept, thinking the Chinese experience has not crystallized into a model with wide applicability, or does not exist at all.[[34]](#footnote-34) The majority opinion however not only accepts the existence of the China model, but stresses its positive value.[[35]](#footnote-35) When discussing the content of the China model, emphasis is put on the institutional structure. Similar to the discussion of the East Asian model, authoritarian (post-totalitarian) political system is considered conducive to the sustained high-speed growth of the economy (Johnson, 1982; Xiao, 2010; Zheng, 2010a).[[36]](#footnote-36) However, it is also pointed out that the Chinese authoritarianism under the communist rule is more effective than traditional authoritarianism (Xiao, 2008a: 125). On the other hand, active state control of the economy is considered an indispensable element of the China model (Liu, 2010), again like in the discussion of the East Asian capitalist developmental state (Johnson, 1985). All this shows that the core of the China model is “post-totalitarian state capitalism,” a combination of the Soviet party-state and East Asian developmental model (Wu, 2007). Politically the China model resembles the post-Stalinist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (with of course improvements concerning political succession and political institutionalization), and economically it resembles the East Asian model (with lip service to socialism).[[37]](#footnote-37) This hybrid system is the result of the interaction of the institutional roots of the Chinese party-state and China’s cultural and geographical location. These two aspects of the China model (political and economic, Soviet and East Asian) are critical to a grasp of the reason behind thirty years of sustained high growth.

*Proximity and Convergence of Models*

After mapping Sun’s Thoughts, the ROC’s historical development, and the PRC’s trajectory, we are in a position to explore their relative locations and interconnections. In Figure 1 the horizontal axis is state political control and the vertical axis state economic control. We put Sun I at (1.0, 2.0), demonstrating his early thoughts of emulating Anglo-American political system and building state capitalism. Sun II shifts to (2.0, 2.0) where Sun realized the need to build a dictatorial party-state for democracy’s sake. He learned from the Russians and advocated political tutelage. There is a movement to the right from Sun I to Sun II. However, as Sun’s ultimate political ideal point is still liberal democracy, we draw a dotted line from Sun II back to Sun I, suggesting he intends to take a U turn when the conditions are ripe. No matter where Sun is located, his economic ideal point remains at state capitalism, and not market capitalism, for he has deep suspicion of the big capitalists and maintains strong confidence in the state playing a leading role in developing the economy and distributing wealth. There are three ROC points in Figure 1, representing the mainland period (particularly the Golden Decade, ROC I), authoritarian Taiwan (ROC II), and democratic Taiwan (ROC III). ROC I is based on Sun II. However, because of the limits on the KMT’s state power at the time, it is located at (1.5, 1.5) instead of (2.0, 2.0). ROC II is the rebuilt KMT state on Taiwan, with greater political control and more effective industrial policy cum land reform, hence the upper right shift from (1.5, 1.5) to (2.0, 2.0). ROC II stands at the typical location of East Asian developmental state. ROC III is Taiwan after democratization. Politically it abandoned one-party rule, practiced liberal democracy, and witnessed two power turnovers. Economically, it gave up many mechanisms of state control that were used effectively to grow the economy by the bureaucrats. Market has been deregulated, business conglomerates unleashed, finance liberated and internationalized, and economic bureaucrat tamed to respect elected politicians. As a result one finds a concurrent downgrading of state political and economic control from (2.0, 2.0) to (1.0, 1.0), namely from authoritarian state capitalism to democratic market capitalism. Although ROC III fulfills Sun’s ideal on the political front, its market capitalism does not on the economic front. Actually Taiwan demonstrates many defects that Sun detected and abhorred in Western societies of his time, which are still present in Western capitalism. Finally there are two PRC points in the figure, representing the first and second thirty years of politico-economic development on the Chinese mainland since 1949. PRC I suggests the stormy totalitarian state socialism under Mao Zedong (3.0, 3.0). After Deng’s political ascendancy, mainland China gradually introduced market, and then relaxed restrictions on private ownership, thus facilitating a shift to state capitalism. When the economy is being reformed, there was no corresponding political change, only those that increased the regime’s institutionalization. The party-state’s grip on the society remains robust. The way it deals with social dissent remains effective and flexible. This post-totalitarian regime adopted the institution and policies of state capitalism to form post-totalitarian state capitalism at (2.5, 2.0). From PRC I to PRC II one finds a lower left shift, only the downgrading of economic control is greater than the corresponding change in political control.

**Figure 1 Sun’s Thoughts and the Shifts in Development Models of Two Chinas**

State Political Control

State Economic Control

0

1

2

3

1

2

3

PRC 1

PRC 2

ROC 1

ROC 2

ROC 3

Sun 1

Sun 2

After marking the three trajectories, we can clearly see that among Sun II, ROC II and PRC II a cluster is formed. The distance among the three in the cluster is shorter than the distance between any other two points (see Figure 2). The cluster shows the proximity of Sun’s later thoughts, authoritarian Taiwan, and contemporary China in both political and economic dimensions. This observation comes as no surprise as all advocate party rule. However, Sun’s later thoughts and the ROC’s practice provide an exit from authoritarianism for it is endowed with only temporary and instrumental value, while no such exit exists in the PRC’s post-totalitarianism, hence a 0.5 difference between Sun II/ROC II and PRC II. On the economic front, the similarities among the three are even more striking. All reject laissez faire capitalism and favor strong state intervention into market to grow the economy and provide social welfare. Such control would not threaten the existence of private ownership which constitutes the backbone of the economy. All agree that state should hold commanding heights and regulate the market wherefrom. State should encourage and protect private business activities, and coordinate the public and private sectors. Among the three the PRC was the last to enter state capitalism with its ideology “socialist market economy” still lagging behind practice.

**Figure 2 Model Cluster and Convergence**

0

1

2

3

1

2

3

PRC 1

**PRC 2**

ROC 1

**ROC 2**

ROC 3

Sun 1

**Sun 2**

State Economic Control

State Political Control

Although the development experience in the Chinese mainland is unique, and is widely considered non-replicable in other countries in the world, the China model is geared toward the same direction as Sun pointed out for China in the early years of the Republic of China and as the KMT government practiced when it consolidated its rule in Taiwan. It also resembles the East Asian model that is prevalent in the region. What we see here is not mere coincidence, but the result of long-time trial and error, learning by doing. Mainland China has now walked into Taiwan’s past, and repeated its economic miracle on a scale ten times as large. It is showing to the world the power of its hybrid institution, one that has been hinted by Sun and practiced by the ROC on a smaller, and yet highly successful scale. The world is shaken to see the emergence of a model that rivals the West, challenging the exiting modernization paradigm with China’s hard and soft power.

 Would the Chinese mainland continue following the Taiwan model, to its democratic conclusion? If so then there would be institutional convergence not only between Taiwan’s past and the mainland’s present, but between the two sides in present tense. Its impact on cross-Strait relations would be enormous. However, the post-totalitarian system in China has shown its resilience, proven its ability to weather through the harshest of the challenges (Tiananmen, East Asian financial crisis, international financial tsunami). In history both pure post-totalitarian regimes in the Soviet bloc and pure state capitalist systems in East Asia by and large succumbed to social and international pressure and democratized their political structures. As a hybrid of the Soviet and the East Asian models would China repeat what those predecessors did, or would it walk its own way to become a unique case of a superpower with a post-totalitarian state capitalist system, challenging the West and demonstrating the value of the China model to the world? Although it is difficult to answer those questions, one may want to ponder on one issue, namely the relative rate of China’s institutional change and capability growth. If the softening of China’s post-totalitarian system lags behind the country’s capability growth, to the extent that China gains parity with the U.S. with its current political system, then post-totalitarian developmentalism would become a global paradigm (China model writ large, or Beijing Consensus), which would significantly increase its institutional legitimacy and reduce its malleability. If the opposite happens, namely institutional change overtakes capability growth (because of reduced supply of production factors, rise of international protectionism, etc., coupled with strong social and international political pressure), then post-totalitarianism will be weakened as development is dampened, and mainland China may follow the example of other East Asian countries in pluralizing its political system. It would then become not only the largest newly industrializing country, but the largest nascent democracy (White, 1993; Dickson, 1998). The relative rate of institutional change and capability growth would be the key to future development in China, a factor that would determine whether post-totalitarianism would continue hold sway in the most populous nation in the world, and whether there would be genuine cross-Strait institutional convergence (Wu Yu-Shan, 2007).

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1. Juan Linz and Alfred C. Stepan (1996) modify the traditional three-way regime classification scheme and add post-totalitarian and sultanistic regimes, thus coming up with five regime types. In this paper, post-totalitarianism is considered a special type of authoritarianism, and sultanistic regimes are not a developmental model, but a phenomenon that combines specific development pattern and a highly familial style of rule, as exemplified by Romania’s Nicolae Ceaușescu and his “Socialism in One Family.” Freedom House combines scores of political rights and civil liberties to rank countries into “free,” “partly free,” and “not-free” categories (Freedom House, 2011: 30). Such scheme of classification fails to catch the main features of different regime types. In this paper, we stick to the traditional three-way typology of political regime. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. There are subtypes in state socialism, such as command or centrally-planned economy, Maoist socialism, market socialism, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. It is true that any state would use macro economic policies to regulate the economy, especially when it follows the tenets of Keynesianism. However the industrial policy designed and implemented by the bureaucracy in a state capitalist system goes deep into specific industry and even into particular enterprise, to the effect of “picking the winner” which is abhorred by traditional macro economics that stresses the importance of fair competition on level ground. For an authoritative explanation of industrial policy under state capitalism, see Johnson (1982, 1985). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The nine combinations include democratic market capitalism (1.0, 1.0), democratic state capitalism (1.0, 2.0), democratic state socialism (1.0, 3.0), authoritarian market capitalism (2.0, 1.0), authoritarian state capitalism (2.0, 2.0), authoritarian state socialism (2.0, 3.0), totalitarian market capitalism (3.0, 1.0), totalitarian state capitalism (3.0, 2.0), and totalitarian state socialism (3.0, 3.0). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The position that liberal democracy is incompatible with state socialism is held in many classical writings in the study of political economy, the most famous of which is *The Road to Serfdom* by Friedrich Hayek (2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Here we can see that higher political control cum lower economic control is a more feasible institutional mix than lower political control cum higher economic control. This is because a certain degree of political control is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of economic control. Totalitarian market capitalism lacks empirical case primarily because high economic control is a defining element of totalitarianism. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Besides the lack of absolute dictator in prewar and wartime Japan, there was also a lack of discipline in the system with the military disobeying (and launching coups against) the civilian government, and middle ranking officers disobeying their superiors, all in the name of true loyalty to the Emperor, of course. This is not the kind of totalitarian system as defined by Friedrich and Brzezinski. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The need to have certain state political control in order to buttress comparable economic conrol is demonstrated in the case of Japan when we take a look at its development into democratic market capitalism after the 1980’s. The Japanese system was gradually democratized with elected politicians asserting themselves against the economic bureaucrats, and particularly with the change of guards in the early 1990’s. Assertive politicians and power change made it impossible for the bureaucrats to be shielded from social interests and in pursuit of developmental goals single-mindedly. In short, democratization undermined Japan’s state capitalism. The same can be said of many other East Asian developmental states, such as South Korea and Taiwan. See Johnson (1982)。 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Sun envisioned an ideal form of party politics in which competition is peaceful, policy-based, and non-partisan. Such civilized party politics proved non-existent in China when the new Republic was founded (Xu, 2000). For the heavy Anglo-American influence that Sun was under in his early political career, see Schiffrin (1970). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Sun’s economic policy is summed up in *Mingsheng Zhuyi* that aims at improving people’s livelihood. Although he mentioned several times that *Mingsheng Zhuyi* is socialism, or state socialism, what he actually meant was *Mingsheng Zhuyi* embodies the ideal of socialism that takes ordinary people’s livelihood into consideration instead of just benefiting a small group of capitalists. The gist of *Mingsheng Zhuyi* is to rapidly modernize China while guarding against the huge income gap and social inequalities that had engulfed Europe and the U.S. at the time by putting restrictions on the activities of private businesses. This way, Sun argued, China can reap the benefits of industrial revolution while minimizing its costs. In *Mingsheng Zhuyi*, the state plays the pivotal role to develop the economy and restrict private capital through various institutional and policy means. However, this does not mean that Sun was hostile to private capital: he was merely suspicious of conglomerates. Because China was in dire need of investment in its infrastructure, Sun ardently sought foreign private capital in building railroads and harbors. As he severely criticized Marx’s labor theory of value, class struggle, and historical materialism, there was no inherent hostility in Sun’s mind towards private property, and no moral condemnation of private employment (Huang and Lu, 1996: 68). Private property rights remain the basis of the economy, to be restricted only under specific circumstances. The bulk of Sun’s main policy suggestions, such as “land to the tiller,” “equalization of land rights,” and “capital restriction” are all based on private property. He merely sought to distribute it in a more equitable manner. With this in mind, Sun argued that the state should take commanding heights in the economy (such as railroad, harbor, finance), while developing and regulating private capital. This is state capitalism. The reason Sun admired Otto von Bismarck’s social policy and Vladimir Lenin’s New Economic Policy (a retreat from War Communism) was to be found in the state control of commanding heights and state guidance of the private economy that characterized the German and Soviet systems. When comparing *Mingsheng Zhuyi* and socialism, most Taiwan scholars emphasize their differences (Liao, 1969; Zhang, 1997; Chen, 1973; Ye, 1976; Niu, 1982; Li, 1974), while mainland scholars emphasize their similarities (Wei, 1991; Huang, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For Sun’s ardent advocacy of comprehensive utilization of foreign capital, see Xu (1963), and Wang (2011: 289-310). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. During the *Tongmenghui* period, Sun argued that revolution should progress in three steps: rule of the martial law, rule of the convention, and rule of the constitution. When the Republic of China was founded and *Tongmenghui* transformed to Kuomintang, Sun froze the three-stage theory in favor of direct constitutional rule. With Yuan Shikai dismantling the new Republic, Kuomintang reverted to a revolutionary organization, the Chinese Revolutionary Party (*Zhonghua Gemingdang*), and Sun raised the three-stage theory again. Three stages in the state building process was identified: military rule, tutelage, and constitutional rule. Previously Sun allotted time limit to the initial two stages, only to be abolished now. It was emphasized that starting with the building of the revolutionary army until the promulgation of the constitution, the party shall be in charge of state affairs. The party shall build the state and rule the nation. Sun adhered to the three-stage theory through the last years of his political career, as witnessed in his insistence on the theory in his *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* (*Jianguo Dagang*, 1924). Generally speaking, when the revolutionary prospect is bright, and when it looks possible that China would develop into a Western-style democracy, Sun would not mention the stage theory of state building, and would agree for the KMT to compete with other parties on an equal footing (*Guomindang* period). However, when there looms crisis of democratic rule, Sun would shift to the special role of the revolutionary party and assign unique missions to it (*Zhonghua Gemingdang* and *Zhongguo Guomindang* periods). Hence one finds close linkage between external environment, Sun’s doctrine, and the attributes of the KMT (Sun, 1984: ch. 4). However, there is no doubt that all the three stages of Sun’s state building process are geared towards democracy: the military rule if to overcome the obstacle to democratization, tutelage is to implement local democracy, and constitutional rule is to practice democracy on the national level (Chen, 1985: ch. 5). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The ROC formally entered into the period of political tutelage after the completion of the Northern Expedition. The Nationalist Government promulgated the Guidelines for Tutelage in October 1928, followed by the Convention for Tutelage in May 1931. Following Sun’s doctrine of state building, the tutelage period was to end in 1936, to be succeeded by the period of constitutional rule. The Japanese invasion in 1937 however halted the whole process that was restarted only after the protracted resistance war against Japan ended. From 1928 to 1948, China found itself under the KMT’s tutelage with the ruling party exercising sovereign power in lieu of the Chinese people. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Heavily influenced by Sun’s stage theory, the KMT in Taiwan actually retook its role in the period of political tutelage. The KMT froze national elections, and exercised de facto sovereign rights in lieu of the population (both the Taiwanese and an imaginary mainland one). At the same time, the KMT introduced local self governance and elections of local magistrates and representatives, laying the foundation for the ultimate return to democratic rule. Since *Gaizao* of the early 1950’s, the KMT characterized itself as a “revolutionary democratic party” (Lee, 1980: 616). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Concerning the influence of Taiwan’s economic bureaucrats, see Pang (1988, 1990) and Chu (2009). Chu characterizes those bureaucrats as “mandarin officials” (*ruguan*). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For characterizing Taiwan as a developmental state that successfully achieved high growth, see Amsten (1979). For a critique, see Wu Yongping (2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. An early presentation of this logic can be found in the “political modernization theory,” such as in Lipset (1981). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the logic is vividly represented in “the end of ideology” (Fukuyama, 1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The PAP has been steadily losing popular support, although Singapore’s unique group representation constituency system proved capable to sustain the PAP’s near monopoly in the parliament. In 2001 the PAP garnered 75.3 percent of popular vote. Ten years later that number plummeted to 60.1 percent, about the same level when the KMT began its democratization in the early 1990’s. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Since the June 4 Incident in 1989, Hong Kong’s democrats have kept constant pressure on the government of the Special Administrative Region, and on the central government in Beijing. This former British colony remained the most pluralist and democratic in its political competition and expression of public opinions inside the PRC. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. A precursor of Taiwan’s economic restructuring was the 1985 drive for “internationalization and liberalization.” That policy was mainly caused by the pressure from the U.S. and focused on the export sector. Its impact on the overall economic structure was limited. Real challenge and transformation followed democratization in the early 1990’s. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. For example the national insurance scheme was adopted in 1995 and it became obvious that the premiums collected would not be able to keep the system afloat. However, any attempt to raise the premium faced stiff bi-partisan opposition in the Legislative Yuan and proved impossible to pass. It was not until 2011 that a compromise scheme was passed, much to the disappointment to the health bureaucracy and budget officials. Other prominent examples are the 1992 banking reform and the 1988 security trading house reform both of which benefitted financial conglomerates despite the opposition of conservative financial bureaucrats. The deep penetration of business interests into the highest echelon of the government was also obvious in the second financial reform under the Chen Shui-bian administration. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. For example, both the KMT in the 1990’s and the DPP in the 2000’s attempted to check the massive investment by Taiwan businessmen on the Chinese mainland with policies such as “No Haste, Go Slow” (*jieji yongren*) and “active management, effective opening-up” (*jiji guanli, youxiao kaifang*), but to no avail. Taiwan’s outbound investment has been heavily concentrated on China, and so has been its export and overall trade. This shows the ineffectiveness of the government policies. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The Taiwan government has designated the biotech industry as the flagship strategic sector and committed tremendous resources onto it. However, biotech is characterized by long gestation time, high capital and knowledge intensity, and ferocious competition on the market crowded with forerunners. Whether it is a suitable strategic industry for Taiwan is highly doubtful. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Among Taiwan’s economic bureaucracies the only exception is the Central Bank that has been able to keep its independence and professionalism. This can be attributed to the institutional tradition that had been fully established in the authoritarian era, major trends in international academic and policy thinking, and the persistence of a series of highly able chairpersons. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. The waning of South Korea’s developmental state also coincided with the country’s democratization. Concerning the decline of developmentalism in Taiwan and South Korea as well as their comparison see Lin (2008), Minns (2001) and Lim (2009). For those who argue for the persistence and vitality of East Asian developmental state, see Weiss (2003) and Wong (2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. There are divergent views when it comes to a comparison between the Soviet and Chinese communist revolutions. Perry Anderson in his “Two Revolutions” argues that there is a sea difference between the Soviet and the Chinese revolutions (Anderson, 2011). The Chinese revolution laid the foundation of its economic prosperity and growth into the world’s second largest economy, while the Soviet Union that the October Revolution brought about has vanished, with its major successor the Russian Federation living on exporting raw materials and energy. Wu Yu-Shan (2011) on the other hand argues that there were striking similarities between the communist regimes that the two revolutions brought about, and where there were differences the Soviet model typically performed better than its Chinese counterpart. It is only when the two countries attempted to exist from socialism that the Chinese outperformed their Soviet comrades. The reason is the bitter experience with Mao’s utopian experiment and the reference to the East Asian development model. China proved able to move faster and deeper than the Soviet Union in economic reform. In sum the Soviets outperformed the Chinese in Socialist revolution, while the Chinese outperformed the Soviets in exiting the revolution. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. For a discussion of the mutual influence of policy line, factional struggle, and reform cycles, see Dittmer & Wu (1995), Wu Yu-Shan (1996: ch. 3). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. For the breakdown of the Soviet Union, see Wu Yu-Shan (1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Officially the Chinese economy is still characterized as a “socialist market economy,” following the concept approved at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992. It reflects the official insistence on the socialist nature of the economy which is a must for the CCP that has always based its legitimacy to rule on socialist ideals. Official insistence notwithstanding, the Chinese economy has witnessed a shifting balance between the public and private sector that favors the latter. On the other hand, the essence of “socialism” has changed to suggest the existence of conscious state guidance of the economy, i.e. there is a shift in the meaning of socialism from ownership to control. “Socialist market economy” in practice means “state capitalism under the guidance of a communist party.” See Liu (2010: 586). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. On the link between Confucian culture and economic performance, see Huang (1988), Liu and Lin (1988), Fan (1988). On the impact of international environment, see Wu Yu-Shan (1995, ch. 5; 1997: ch. 2). On the factor of the stage of economic development, see Wu Yu-Shan (1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. On the debate on empiricism (*mozhe shitou guohe*) vs. rationalism (theory-based, one-step solution or *yibu daowei*), see Murrell (1991), Sheng (1995). On the speed of reform, see Slay (1994), Wu Jinglian, et al. (1996), Wang (1998), Sachs and Woo (2000). On the core of transition, see Fischer and Gelb (1991), Fischer, et al. (1996), Fan (1995a, 1995b). On institutional structure, see Oi (1992), Wu Yu-Shan (1994: ch. 1), Wu Yu–Shan (1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Even the most changeable endowment factor, the international environment, does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the huge differences in performance. There were wild fluctuations in the relationship between Beijing and the West. From the initial olive branch extended to the newly founded People’s Republic by the West, to Beijing’s “one-sided tilt” toward the Soviet Union, the “dual adversary” policy against both the American imperialism and Soviet revisionism, to the forming of a “united front” with the U.S. against the Soviets in the 1970’s, the permutations in Beijing’s external relations could not account for the plight of the Chinese economy during those decades. What mattered was domestic development. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Compared with the China model, “Beijing Consensus” championed by Joshua Cooper Ramo is raised directly against Western theory of economic development and neo-classical economics. It is a bloated concept and subject to heavy criticism. For Beijing Consensus and its critiques, see Ramo (2004), Hsu, et al. (2011), Zhao (2011), Kennedy (2011), Dickson (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Thus Yu Keping argues that the task of modernization in China has not been completed, and the China model has not been formalized (Yu, 2010). Wu Jinglian thinks the forceful economic intervention by the Chinese government during the international financial crisis has made its exit more difficult than in Western economies, hence China hardly offers any model for others to follow (Wu Jinglian, 2010b). Xiao Gongqin points out the core of the China model is the market transition led by post-totalitarian state in a “strong state-weak society” milieu. This will bring about low-frequency, high-intensity conflicts that have to be addressed (Xiao, 2010). Xu Jilin maintains that China has risen only in the sense of wealth and power, but not in value, institutions, and civilization. This means the China model needs a proof of universal civilization (Xu, 2010). Janos Kornai thinks the Chinese experience is not duplicable, thus the model does not exist. Furthermore, it depends on an unprecedented high saving and investment rate, which brings about tremendous costs on freedom and poses a dilemma of choice (Kornai, 2010). Ding Xueliang points out the huge social costs in China’s high growth in the areas of justice, ecological degradation, and administrative costs. Hence the China model is difficult to be applied elsewhere (Ding, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Such as Zhang Weiwei thinks the China model represents the rise of a “civilization nation” that combines a five-thousand-year civilization and a modern nation (Zhang, 2010). Tung Shijun argues that the China model is a unique combination of national revival, modernization, and socialist revolution (Tung, 2010). Deng Zhenglai argues that the essence of the China model is in its “wisdom of survival” (Deng, 2010). Wang Shaoguang argues that China presents a model of “sovereignty in the people, governance by the able” (Wang, 2010). Song Luzheng maintains that the core of the China model is the combination of diligent people and strong government that brings about the greatest miracle in human history (Song, 2010). Zheng Yongnian suggests that the China model is a mixed system with a hybrid economy and a political regime that concentrates power in the party’s hands and yet opens to the society in its governance (Zheng, 2010a). Shi Zhengfu argues that China’s gradual reform rests on the trilateral governance structure in which local government plays a key role (Shi, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Xiao Gongqin characterizes contemporary Chinese political system as “post-totalitarian,” and develops a full set of theories on its background, process and impact. See Xiao (2008: 113-248). He notices the positive value of the system, and advocates neo-authoritarianism and neo-conservatism against “political romanticism” and “radicalism” that champion parliamentary democratic politics without social and economic foundations (Xiao, 1998; 2008b; 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. For the opinion that what China has adopted is the East Asian model, see Baek (2005). For an opposing opinion, see Lee, et al. (2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)