Manufacturing Majoritarian Democracy through Electoral Reform in East Asia

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Abstract
Since transitioning to democracy, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have now undergone major reforms of parliamentary election law. This paper seeks to assess whether reformers crafted foreseeable outcomes. This is addressed on three levels of consequence; regime, party system, and particular reform parties. To measure and assess these consequences, we first establish conditions under which reform became a salient issue for parties; their rationale for proposing reforms; and how reform unfolded. Next, we assess the structural outcomes by comparing pre and post-reform elections on the basis of 1) seat bonuses and electoral proportionality; 2) effective number of elective and parliamentary parties; and 3) the presence of post-election single party or coalition governments. We find that previously consensual characteristics of East Asia’s democratic regimes have become more majoritarian in nature; party systems now approach two party systems or less; and that reformers appear to have understood the structural consequences of reform, although miscalculated their own party’s long-term prospects.

Keywords: elections, reform, East Asia, democracy, parties, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan

Prepared for presentation at the American Association for Chinese Studies, Oct. 12-14, 2012 2012 Annual Conference, Atlanta, Georgia.
Since transitioning to democracy, each of East Asia’s most enduring democracies have now undergone major reforms of parliamentary election law. Japan and Taiwan moved from single non-transferable vote to parallel, mixed member majoritarian (MMM) systems in 1993 and 2005, respectively. Having conducted elections under a modified plurality since 1988, South Korea also moved to a parallel MMM system in 2003. Such reforms promised to induce marked shifts to less proportional outcomes in Japan and Taiwan, moderate disproportionality in Korea, and an overall trend toward more majoritarian forms of democracy. While the change to parallel systems in each instance was likely to offer some protection for minor parties, the introduction of large single member district tiers was engineered to protect and empower the largest parties. The consequence of the reforms has indeed been a decrease in electoral proportionality, compression of party systems, and persistent single party majorities.

This paper presents summaries of the rationale of reformers in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan and how consequences of the reforms align. These consequences can be understood on three levels. First, at the regime level, outcomes have altered the previously consensual or majoritarian arrangements of democracy. Secondly, at the party system level, outcomes have reduced the effective number of parties in the system. Third, there are outcomes that vary in benefit for particular parties.

To measure and assess these outcomes, we first establish the basic conditions under which major reform became a salient issue for parties; their rationale for proposing the reforms they did; and how reform unfolded. Next, we assess the structural outcomes by comparing pre and post-reform elections on the basis of 1) seat bonuses and electoral proportionality; 2) effective number of elective and parliamentary parties; and 3) the presence of single party or coalition legislative majorities.
The move to MMM electoral rules in these three democracies both parallels and runs counter to global trends. Reform in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea reflect the increasing decision among reforming states to choose mixed systems (Clark & Wittrock 2005; Norris 2004; Reilly 2006; Shin 2008; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001). Soudriette and Ellis (2006) identify twenty-seven changes in electoral system type between 1993 and 2004, with fourteen previously plurality/majority systems choosing more proportional mixed member designs. Out of a total of nineteen democratic mixed member systems by 2004, eleven were MMM systems and eight were mixed member proportional (MMP). Such systems promote parliaments more reflective of their functional and/or regionally defined constituencies than under prior plurality/majority rules. If proportional, mixed systems encourage multi-party systems, small party representation, and power sharing through coalition in a more consensus-oriented democratic arrangement.

Yet, design elements of multi-member district emphasizing proportionality gave rise to instability in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in recent decades. Multi-member districts and small winning quotas exacerbated personalism, regionalism, and hampered the centralizing tendency of parties. Additionally, bare majority or coalition legislative majorities often prevented parties from claiming popular mandates and inhibited their pursuit of major campaign initiatives in parliament. Subsequently, parliamentary majorities were vulnerable to the relatively frequent party splinters and defections common in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.

As dominant as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had been in Japan, for example, it failed to win an outright majority of seats in the four Diet elections from 1993 to 2003. It lost government in 1993, and had to woo post-election partners or defectors to form majorities after 1995, until its dramatic victory in 2005. In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) also experienced a dramatic victory that unseated the LDP. After a long period of single party
dominance on Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lost its single party majority status in 2001 and operated in legislative coalition with fellow splinter parties. The KMT recaptured its dominance after the January 2008 polls and retained single party majority after the 2012 polls. South Korea was also no exception, with no single party majorities emerging out of its first four elections under democracy from 1988 – 2000. Ruling majorities were manufactured after elections, and often fragmented by mid-term. Since the move to a the parallel MMM system after 2000, single party majorities have led the Korean legislature. Thus, single party legislative majorities have consistently emerged from elections in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan since reforms.

The prior SNTV electoral systems in Japan and Taiwan, and to some extent South Korea, were criticized along several lines common to such systems (see for example Grofman et al, 1999; Norris, 2004; Lin, 2006). Most critique stems from the low vote quota required to win seats. Given that voters cast a single vote in a MMD, as the number of seats within a district increased, the percentage of votes to win decreased. Thus, the percentage of votes to win a seat could be as low as 5 - 10% in large districts.

Small winning quotas encouraged candidate, rather than party-based voting, as voters were called upon by candidates to vote largely for a personality, rather than party that would serve their particular interests as has been documented in Taiwan (Hsieh, 1999; Rigger, 1999; Yu, 2005) and South Korea (Hahm, 2008; Han, 1989; Stockton & Heo, 2004). Given the ability to target small constituencies, candidates often campaigned on sensational issues, avoiding policy-based campaigning. In other words, candidates articulated a radical message clearly with little regard to aggregating large numbers of voters, let alone median voters. In addition, MMDs often pitted party members against each other, especially if the party over-nominated candidates
for a district. Degrees of contention largely depended on the parties effectively assigning the number of candidates and vote allocation strategies (Cox, 1996; Cox and Niou, 1994).

**Three Cases of Electoral Reform**

As presented below, an overarching goal of reform was to promote governance at the expense of proportionality, third parties, and power sharing. Key words that come to the fore are control, stability, and predictability. One is reminded of Przeworski’s early expression that 
"[d]emocratization is an act of subjecting all interests to competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty" (1991:14). Majoritarian systems increase the certainty of large parties to dominate elections, given the new rules of the electoral game. Conversely, small parties experience an increasing certainty of electoral defeat.

The change to SMD plurality rules favors large parties most capable of aggregating sufficient votes at the district level to win pluralities (Lijphart, 1994; Powell, 2000). By implication, should the largest party (defined by votes) hold cross-national appeal, then it will capture the most district tier seats. In combination with list seats, a single party legislative majority is a likely result. Due to the “winner take all” nature of SMD elections, mixed member majoritarian systems reduce the proportionality of elections and the effective number of legislative parties. The first-past-the-post condition at the district level favors the largest vote aggregator at the expense of all other parties competing in the district, creating the possibility of large, unrepresented minorities and overrepresented pluralities. Under SNTV’s semi-proportionality, small parties could capture seats with a relatively small percentage of votes.

Despite the presence of PR list seats, the district and list outcomes of the new parallel, MMM systems are independent and list seat wins by smaller parties are not likely to compensate for the “majoritarian boost” enjoyed by the largest parties at the district level (Shugart and
Wattenberg, 2001, 13). The total share of district seats to proportional list seats offers opportunity to insert more or less proportionality into the system. In the cases of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, list seats compose only 30%, 38%, and 18% of their respective total seats. Taken in tandem, these factors increase the prospects for the largest party to obtain majority parliamentary status and the weakening of third parties. With only 18% of South Korea’s National Assembly seats set aside for proportional list seats, one would expect this trend to be more pronounced. However, as discussed below, the continued phenomena of regional voting and weak party institutionalization appear to moderate this outcome.

Reform in Japan

In the latest wave of reform, Japan was the first extant Asian democracy to dramatically reform its electoral system. In 1994, under the first post-World War II non-LDP government, the country moved from its former SNTV system to a parallel system with a single member district tier and a closed party list tier chosen from eleven regional constituencies. Since the 1996 Diet election, single member district races have been decided by plurality rule. Out of a total of 480 Diet seats, 300 seats are single member districts with the remaining 180 seats coming from a proportionally determined list tier (38% of the total seats). District candidates are also allowed to run on the party list, thus giving rise to the term “zombie candidates” to describe those having lost in their district race, but winning a seat through the list allocation.

Electoral reform in Japan had been a topic of discussion within the LDP since 1956, when LDP president Ichiro Hatoyama, proposed a move from SNTV to that of a plurality SMD system. This move was intended to solidify the LDP’s largest party advantage, but also marketed to Japan’s other large party at the time, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) as a way to cement a two-party system (Hrebenar 2000; Reed & Theis, 2001; Reed & Shimizu 2009). The
JSP withdrew its initial support and in the face of popular repudiation of the plan, the LDP withdrew the proposal. Subsequent reform efforts were considered under LDP governments, with none gaining traction, until the debate peaked between 1991-1993. In December 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu arranged for the submission of his reform effort to parliament, but so lacked the support of a growing faction of LDP MPs and the opposition parties that it was quickly withdrawn. The “Kaifu Plan” proposed a change to a one-ballot, SMD system, with a single PR constituency composing nearly 36% of the Diet’s seats. In 1993, just after Kiichi Miyazawa replaced Kaifu as LDP president and prime minister, he proposed a pure SMD system of 500 seats. The opposition counter-proposed a German-style system that placed most seats in the PR tier. When the reform bill came before the Diet on June 17, LDP defections led to its defeat and a subsequent and successful vote of no confidence. Two LDP splinter parties formed out of these defections, the New Party Harbinger and the Renewal Party. Elections in July 1993 brought the first post-war non-LDP government, albeit as a fractious seven-party coalition.

The 1993 coalition government pushed initially for the German-style system of heightened proportionality that would reduce disproportionality and increase the likelihood of the LDP either not having sufficient seats to obtain formateur status or if so, would need to reach out to coalition partners. In the end, Prime Minister Hosokawa, needing to pass a reform bill, invited the LDP to the table and agreed with LDP president Kono to institute what was essentially the old Kaifu plan of 1991 (Reed & Theis 2001, 168). SMD won out, although a compromise included the separate party list tier.

While Japan’s reform ended the previous “1955 System” of LDP dominance under the SNTV system, the four post-reform elections under the mixed member system have introduced greater disproportionality and reduced the effective number of both electoral and parliamentary
parties. After the 2005 polls, the LDP was actually electorally and organizationally more dominant than at any point in the recent past (Kaihara 2007).

Reform in South Korea

Although utilizing a form of SNTV for National Assembly elections during its early authoritarian period, South Korea transitioned to various forms of modified plurality after 1963. In authoritarian South Korea, electoral design changed frequently to continue the façade of multi-party elections with built-in majorities for the ruling party. While elections became increasingly more free after democratization, this intention remained a driving force behind the electoral reform carried out between Ro Tae-Woo’s election to the presidency in 1987 and the first post-transition National Assembly election in 1988 (Ahn & Jaung 1999; Heo & Stockton 2005; Jaung 2000). In Korea’s first democratic National Assembly election in 1988, this strategy failed and Ro Tae Woo’s Democratic Justice Party was able to capture only 41.8% of seats with an abysmal showing of 34% at the polls. This seat total was inflated due to the provision that half of at–large seats be granted to the largest recipient of seats in district races. The allocation of PR seats actually exacerbated disproportionality, given that the party with the most district seats was guaranteed half the PR seats until the 15th Assembly election in 1996.

For democratic elections from 1988 to 2000, various versions of a modified plurality system were in place. Prior to the 13th National Assembly election (1988), the government party, Democratic Justice Party (DJP) under President Ro Tae-Woo entered negotiations with the largest opposition party, Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) led by Kim Young-Sam, and Kim Dae-Jung’s Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). The DJP initially pushed for MMD in urban districts and single seat constituencies in rural areas. This proposal would benefit the DJP
by playing on the divided opposition. Enjoying a regional stronghold in the Taegu-Kyongsang region, and the largest nation-wide electoral base, particularly in rural areas, the DJP felt such a system would help manufacture a legislative majority (Croissant 2002). This was based on the assumption that it could capture at least a plurality of district seats, and thus the majority of list seats to place it over the top. The RDP, was divided, but eventually pushed for MMD with magnitude of two to three seats for urban and rural areas. Seeking to usurp the RDP as the largest opposition party, the PPD pressed for single member districts in order to capitalize on its highly concentrated voter support in the southern Honnam region (Park 2002, 128).

By February 1988, the RDP and PPD briefly joined to push for an SMD system, and the DJP also proposed its own plan for SMD/PR list. The DJP pushed this version through the Assembly in March 1988. Croissant (2002) provides the rationalization for this change on the part of the DJP that revolved around 1) the DJP anticipating an increase in its vote share and 2) likely expectations that the negotiations between the RDP and PPD for a merger would fail.

Under this system, voters cast a single vote for single member district races. The national vote for each party was tabulated and the party with the most seats was granted half the at-large seats and remaining parties received seats in proportion to their percentage of district seats. For the 1996 and 2000 elections, the at-large seats were distributed based on proportional national vote, rather than seat share and the guarantee of half list seats was abolished. The at-large seat tier has ranged from 15 – 18%.

The consequences of the 2003 reform after the 17th National Assembly election (2004) marked a notable mechanical break from the previous electoral systems with the introduction of a parallel system with a single member district tier vote and a separate ballot for a national party list. Of 299 total seats, the percentage of list seats has typically been set at around 18% in pre
and post-2004 systems. Whether under the old or new system, list seats have failed to correct for disproportionality under SMD in National Assembly elections (Park 2002; Hahm 2008).

The latest reform took place in a climate of intense political flux under divided government. While Roh Moo-hyun was elected in 2002 as the left’s Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) candidate, he did not come from the Honam region or Kim Dae-jung’s inner circle. The resulting infighting in the run-up to the 2004 Assembly elections, led Roh to voice support for a newly formed progressive party, the “Open Our Party” (OOP or Uri Party). In turn, the MDP and conservative Grand National party (GNP) would lead the movement to impeach Roh for having violated election law. The MDP and GNP then entered a strange coalition against Ro and later, the short-lived Uri Party majority emerging from the 2004 election.

During the presidential campaign, Roh pledged to break the old system of “3 Kims” typified by strong personalities, factionalism, and regionalism (Kihl 2005; Lee 2004). In pursuit of stronger, national parties and a move away from traditional party alignments, one plank of this reform was to change the electoral system to a parallel system with separate party list ballot.

Significant consequences of electoral reform waited until the break from the modified plurality system and adoption of MMM. As illustrated below, the post-reform period has generated two elections with single party majorities; slightly better proportionality; and a slightly lower number of effective elective and parliamentary parties.

Reform in Taiwan

Having held legislative elections under SNTV since 1969, Taiwan’s electoral system was changed from SNTV to a parallel system similar to Japan in 2005. Voters cast a single ballot for a district candidate in multi-member districts. Over time, the number of seats in the legislature was altered, but stabilized around 225 seats after 1998. An at-large seat allocation was added in
the first full election for all legislators in 1992, based on the percentage of national vote. Of 225 seats, the percentage set aside for at-large members was approximately 18%. The first election held under the new system (2008) allowed for voters to cast one ballot for a district candidate in a single member district and a separate ballot for a candidate in an open party list tier.

At the National Development Conference, held in 1996, the then ruling KMT proposed to reform Taiwan’s single non-transferable vote system of legislative elections to a “mixed system.” This was supported by the then opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), although the DPP preferred more proportional versions of the mixed system. Real reform languished until 2004, when reform became an expedient campaign issue for upcoming elections. People were increasingly agitating against vote-buying, government inefficiency and a general perception existed that the legislature was simply “too large” for such a small population.

On August 23, 2004, the Legislative Yuan passed constitutional amendment proposals calling for considerable constitutional reforms. The reform proposals that were specific to the Public Officials Election and Recall Law were a reduction of legislative seats to 113 with four-year terms. Seventy-three members are elected from single member districts with at least one from each county and city and thirty-four members elected from a separate party list ballot with a five percent threshold. Six seats are reserved for the indigenous population. On May 14, 2005, an ad hoc National Assembly election was held to select the three hundred member assembly and the DPP and KMT splitting a dominant majority. On June 7, 2005, the National Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of the amendments.

In the case of Taiwan, reform was the result of collaboration between arch political rivals, the KMT and DPP under the auspices of more efficient, less corrupt, and streamlined governance. In 2000, the DPP captured the presidency and in 2001 became the largest
legislative party by capturing 33.8% of the popular vote and 38% of seats. In 2001 and again in 2004, the DPP enjoyed the slight seat bonuses from district disproportionality formerly enjoyed by the KMT. The rise of the DPP was, in part, due to its increased vote share from 1998, but also the incessant splintering of the previously dominant KMT. While still the largest party within the “blue camp” by 2001, the KMT seat share was reduced to 30% in 2001 from a high in 1998 of 55%. However, despite the plurality status of the DPP, the blue camp parties of the KMT, Chinese New Party, and joined in 2001 by the People First Party (PFP), maintained a coalition majority in the legislature.

With majoritarian-style reforms, the DPP gambled that if the blue camp remained divided and it could garner a few more percentage points of popular support, it could unseat the KMT-led majority in the legislature. This could be done without having to capture a majority of the popular vote. Conversely, the KMT may have supported the same reforms with the hope that unity within the blue camp could be re-established, thus returning to the KMT the status of largest party, and thus the rewards under MMM. Just as those supporting reform made for strange bedfellows, those opposing reform did as well, with the DPP and KMT allied parties voting against their larger partners in the deciding vote in now-abolished National Assembly. Taiwan’s smaller parties feared a diminished future under the new system.

The brief scenarios above reflect much of the consensus in the broader literature on the context and rationale for electoral reform (Boix 1999; Katz 2005; Norris 1995). First, governing parties are more prone to reform when changes in the electoral arena threaten their ability to retain majorities or when new winners seek to institutionalize the electoral conditions that allowed their ascendance. In Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (2003), reform was finally pushed by newly ascendant plurality or majority parliamentary parties at a time when previously
dominant parties were at low ebb. In each instance of reform, political parties obviously wanted new systems that would benefit them and limit the advantages gained by their competitors. In the case of the largest parties, the preference was for more majoritarian designs that would grant large seat bonuses and manufacture single party majorities. As Colomer (2003) writes, “the large prefer the small, and the small prefer the large (3).” Large parties prefer SMD and plurality conditions, while small parties prefer MMD and proportionality. Thus the push by Japan’s LDP, Korea’s DJP, and later the Uri Party, and the DPP-KMT coalition for single member districts as the largest tier of seats.

Secondly, new systems were largely the result of collaboration between the ascendant legislative plurality party (or coalition) and former dominant party. Excluding South Korea’s reform prior to the 1988 Assembly election, the remaining instances of reform were not the result of unilateral action. While these processes were driven by a conscious intention, Norris’ characterization of typical reform endeavors as “messy” certainly held true (Norris 1995, 4).

Finally, party system fluctuations also corresponded with the timing of reform. In Japan, the splintering of the LDP was an immediate trigger to the fall of the LDP and ability of the new government to make reform a domestic priority. Yet, the LDP remained strong enough to re-enter and sculpt the outcome more towards its preference. In Taiwan, the KMT also suffered party splinters while over a longer period of time. By 2003, KMT defectors had given form to three parties (NP, PFP, and the TSU). Here again, the largest party in the Legislative Yuan (DPP) had to collaborate with the former dominant party (KMT) to accomplish reform. In South Korea’s very loose party system, the issue has been induced by splinters, the “reformation” of extant parties after elections, and defections from coalition agreements.

Measuring the Consequences of Electoral Reform
As discussed above, large parties pushed for more majoritarian designs that would enhance their own electoral prospects and wagered that the move to SMD would increase disproportionality and thus pay off in higher seat bonuses. Thus, slight gains in electoral support would translate into even greater seat share, and thus the increased likelihood for single party government. The larger consequence for the party system would be a reduction in the effective number of elective and parliamentary parties. Perhaps also, another pay-off would be the disincentive for party splinters, more centralized party control over nominations and policy process, and the greater institutionalization of the party system. Did the gamble pay off?

Pre and post-reform elections in Japan (1983 – 2009), South Korea (1988 – 2012), and Taiwan (1992 – 2012) are assessed below. This sample includes all post-transition legislative elections in South Korea and Taiwan and Japan’s elections from 1983 - 2012. Results for Japanese elections from 1983 – 2000 are derived from Klein (2001). The two most recent Diet election data is drawn from Carr (2009). South Korean election data for 1988 – 2012 are drawn from the National Election Commission of the Republic of Korea (2012). Results for Taiwan’s legislative elections are drawn from the online data, “Elections for Public Offices in the Republic of China (Taiwan)” available through the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University.

We calculate three standard measures for the consequences of electoral system for each election, and provide averages for each electoral phase. Seat bonuses for the largest and second largest parties (the difference between percentage of seats over (or under) percentage of votes) is presented for illustration. Here we may also illustrate when a single party majority emerges from an election. The second measure, disproportionality, is measured using Gallagher’s (1991) least squares index (LSI). The LSI has the advantage of not only accounting for the total vote-seat
differences among parties, but also allowing us to weight greater disparities to a greater degree than, say multiple small disparities. Theoretically, perfect proportionality between votes and seats would result in a LSI of “0”. Our third measure is that of the effective number of elective and parliamentary parties. We use Laakso and Taagepera (1979) to measure the fragmentation of the party system by establishing the effective number of elective \( (N_v) \) and legislative parties \( (N_s) \). These measures are calculated by summing the squared proportion of each party’s votes or seat, and dividing by one. Here again, we seek to distinguish between district and at-large tiers and calculate the effective number of parties within the district tier and from the total seat shares.

**Seat Bonuses and Majority Parties**

As indicated on Table 1, the seat bonuses for the largest and second largest parties under MMD and SMD elections confirm expectations. The former MMD elections in Japan and Taiwan consistently reflect single digit seat bonuses for the party with the largest share of votes at the district level, and thus the more proportional nature of SNTV elections. On one hand, the use of MMDs allows second and third parties to captures seats in districts of higher magnitude and lower vote quotas. On the other hand, SNTV district races were determined by a plurality formula and this retained some slight degree of large party bonus. Second parties were much closer to proportionality in their returns.

While South Korea has experimented with various formulae for the division of district and at-large tier seats, as well as thresholds, the use of SMDs for all democratic Assembly elections has remained constant. A persistent influence on seat bonuses is present after the 13\textsuperscript{th} National Assembly election in 1988, with the largest party enjoying a seat bonus of ten percentage points or more while the second largest party has enjoyed a minor bonus. While the
percentage of vote for the largest party was nearly identical in 1988 and 1996, the seat bonus in 1996 was nearly three times greater than eight years earlier. One possibility for this is that three political parties were runners up to the DJP with each receiving greater than 15% of the popular vote in 1988. In 1996, four parties scored behind the New Korea Party with more than 10% of the aggregate district vote. Heavy competition between the non-NKP parties split this group of votes even more and allowed the NKP to win more seats than the same percentage of votes would have in 1988. It is important to note, though, that the vote and seat shares of Korea’s largest parties prior to reform were somewhat smaller than those in Japan and Taiwan.

When reviewing the data for post-reform elections, several trends have thus far emerged. First, the most striking change is that of the size of seat bonuses in Japan and Taiwan. The post-reform bonuses are considerably higher under SMD, as expected. South Korean elections do not produce a marked change in seat bonus between pre-and post-reform periods. A key difference in South Korea is that the vote share difference between the top two vote-getting parties has been smaller compared to more dominant parties in Japan and Taiwan. The bonus for Japan’s LDP averaged 6.9% under SNTV, and the five election average under the MMM system is 19.8%, peaking at 26.3% in 2009 for the DPJ. In Taiwan, the largest parties enjoyed bonuses averaging 5.6% under SNTV from 1992 – 2004. In 2008, this jumped to a bonus of 24.6 points. In 2012, the seat bonus for the KMT (as largest party) dropped to 12.15 but was still considerably higher than in the pre-reform period.

Seat bonuses appear to be blind to particular parties, as changes in largest party in South Korea and Japan has not correlated strongly with bonuses. While considerably less endowed than the long-dominant KMT, the DPP managed to enjoy similar benefits from its largest party status in the pre-reform 2001 and 2004 legislative elections.
Another aspect related to seat bonuses, disproportionality, and the change to MMM relates to any seat “penalty” suffered by the second largest party. During pre-reform periods, negative seat bonuses were less common in all three countries. In Japan, the seat bonus for the second party at the district level is negative in each of the three most recent elections. During the pre-reform period, a bonus was as likely as a penalty. In 2005, the DPJ won 36.4% of the vote in the district tier and 17.3% of the tier’s seats. While slightly smaller, the seat “penalty” for the LDP (as “second party”) in 2009 was also severe. Winning 38.7% of the district tier vote, the LDP only captured 21.3% of the tier’s seats.

The two most recent elections in Taiwan and the 2008 election in South Korea resulted in a change from near proportionality to negative bonuses for second parties. A stark example of this than can be found in Taiwan’s 2008 legislative election. Despite increasing its district vote share to an all-time high of 38.7%, the DPP won only 17.8% of district races. While still negative, the seat bonus for the DPP in 2012 declined to just over 7%.

In South Korea, a declining seat bonus in 2004 and 2008 for the second party was reversed in 2012 to the second highest positive bonus for a second party in all three cases over time. The Democratic United Party (DUP) captured the highest percentage of a second party in Korea since democratization. Barring regionalized variations in electoral support, one can conclude that the SMD system has, in fact, provided greater potential for large party dominance in the district tier across the board.

**Proportionality and Parties in Japan**

Under SNTV, Japan was a proportional multi-party system, albeit with a single party majority until 1993. The LDP emerged with natural parliamentary majorities from 1983 - 1990. When the defections of two LDP factions brought about a vote of no confidence against Prime
Minister Miyazawa in 1993, new elections handed the LDP their first electoral defeat. In the Japanese case, we see change in government and the party system prior to electoral reform, although issues related to electoral and campaign reform were leading reasons for the failure of the Miyazawa government and LDP electoral defeat. As presented on Table 2, from 1983 – 1990, the system indicators remained within a fairly tight range. The least squares index reveals (Table 2 about here) a fairly proportional SNTV system based solely on a single tier of district seats. Despite majority status for the LDP, SNTV allowed for multiple effective elective and parliamentary parties. Taken as a whole, the proportionality indicators for the system peaked after the 1993 election.

The post-reform period in Japan takes the character of a more disproportional two-party system with a single party majority. Although post-reform elections in Taiwan and South Korea evinced immediate changes in majority size, this did not occur in Japan until the fourth and fifth post-reform elections. The change to the mixed member system, combined with the LDP’s re-consolidation and fragmented opposition, created even better winning conditions for the LDP in district races from 1996 to 2005. While the party list provided alternative seat opportunities for second and third parties, the lion’s share of parliamentary seats (60%) were derived from the district tier. Thus, while the LDP’s percentage share of popular vote was slow to recover, the party was able to capitalize on the advantage that SMD elections grant the largest party. This is apparent in the first post-reform election. The Gallagher measure for proportionality in 1996 more than doubles in the district tier and this is paralleled by sharp declines in the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties (-26% and -44%, respectively). While the creation of a separate party list tier tempered disproportionality somewhat, the effective number of
parliamentary parties for all seats was still down 30% from 1993. This trend continues through the latest election in 2009.

When considering all seats, the party list initially compensated somewhat for opposition party weakness at the district level by inflating the effective number of parties by more than one-fifth. This systemic support has faltered in the past three elections due in part to 1) a ten percentage point increase in the LDP list vote share and 2) the increasing concentration of list votes in two, rather than multiple, parties. In 2005 and 2009, more than 69% of list votes were granted to the two largest parties.

A fairly clear pattern over the past five elections has indeed emerged. First, prior to 2009, with the exception of 1993, the LDP maintained its dominance in district races, yet its return to single party rule was gradual. This was is, in part, due to a second observation and that is the list tier tempered the party’s ability to parley its district dominance into elected majorities in the parliament until 2005. Third, based on the Gallagher index, the introduction of SMD brought about a clear demarcation between the more proportional “1955 System” under SNTV, and the more majoritarian nature of the current mixed member design. Fourth, negative changes in the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties in district and total seats gradually trended toward a more majoritarian arrangement until a larger incremental move in 2005 and again in 2009. The exaggerated nature of electoral outcomes survived a change in ruling party in Japan in 2009 with the emergence of the DJP as the largest party. The latest election demonstrated an even stronger compression of proportionality and the party system than under the period of LDP dominance.

Finally, while electoral reform can make new outcomes possible, Japan is a good reminder that understanding the nature and degree of such change is a complex undertaking.
Although in place since 1996, the SMD system’s large party seat bonus did not translate into a large LDP majority until 2005. For example, in 2003, the LDP received 44% of the district level vote and 56% of district seats (168 out of 300). Two years later, the LDP increased its district level vote share by only four percentage points to 48% and captured 73% of district seats (219 out of 300 seats). The closest comparison under SNTV is the 1986 election, in which the LDP won slightly over 50% of the popular vote and 59% of seats (304 out of 512 seats). While majorities have always been a part of Japan’s politics, such district level dominance would have been very unlikely without the transition to single member districts. Japan appears to be developing into a disproportional, dominant party system.

**Proportionality and Parties in Taiwan**

In a manner similar to Japan, SNTV in Taiwan allowed for a single party legislative majority (KMT) for the first three democratic elections from 1992 – 1998, as well as providing room for an expanding number of effective elective and parliamentary parties. Under SNTV from 1992 – 1998, Taiwan was a proportional multi-party system with a single party majority. This changed, however, in the last two pre-reform elections to a proportional multi-party system under coalition majority.

As presented on Table 3, district tier proportionality remained high through 2004, and was the highest in comparison to both Japan and South Korea. As in the case of Japan as well, electoral reform waited until the former dominant party had suffered its worst defeat at the polls. After the 2001 ballot, the KMT was reduced to less than one-third of legislative seats, with the DPP capturing about 39% of seats. Unlike the LDP, however, the KMT was able to form a legislative majority with its party splinters, the PFP and NP, and blue ally, the NPSU. One may
posit, though, that the KMT’s decline created a similar scenario as in Japan, with the party ascendant and party descendant seeing future electoral prospects bolstered by a move to SMD. From 1992 – 2004, we see signs of a fairly proportional, multi-party arrangement in Taiwan, although lacking consistently linear change over time. Here again, fluctuations in proportionality and the effective number of parties occur within the same electoral system, and due to several factors such as party re-alignments, regional voting, and the candidacy of party defectors as independents.

After two post-reform elections, Taiwan’s system is now a disproportional two-party system with single party majority. After a “hyper” adjustment in the 2008 election, the 2012 legislative election resulted in a turn to a slightly less disproportional and dominant party system. Declining support for the KMT and a modest rise of support for the DPP at the district level. The two parties combined, once again captured almost all district seats. While the KMT suffered an eighteen point drop in its district tier share as a consequence of a five percentage point decline in votes, it still emerged with nearly two out of three seats. The DPP, after increasing its vote share by only six percentage points at the district tier, more than doubled its share of district seats to a record high percentage from this tier. Nevertheless, the KMT remains a single party majority.

Few post-reform election consequences are as stark as those in Taiwan in 2008. Disproportionality jumped to 22.82, more than three times greater than at any point in Taiwan’s democratic history. The move to SMD favored the largest party, removing the benefit of lower vote quotas under MMD that second and third parties depended on for seats. Yet, by the final months of the January 2008 polls, the DPP was no longer that largest party, as it faced a blue camp once again unified under the KMT. With the implosion of the PFP and defection of most
of its incumbents to the KMT, the PFP failed even to register for the party list tier of seats. The party ran a candidate in a single district race, and one candidate in each of the two aboriginal constituencies; winning in only one race. The New Party ran only in the party list tier. Of the blue coalition partners, only the NPSU managed to win seats at the district level, winning two of the four district races in which it competed and one aboriginal seat. The district victories for the NPSU were largely the result of a KMT-NPSU agreement prior to the election to run cooperative nominations. We see this pre-election collapse in the party system reflected in the effective number of elective parties, with its drop from 3.79 to 2.3.

The decline in the number of elective parties was mirrored by the drop in the effective number of parties emerging out of the district tier. Whereas Taiwan’s previous multi-party arrangement allowed for as many as four effective parliamentary parties, the switch to SMD coincides with an election result that is atypical for most democracies. The effective number of parliamentary parties dropped below two. Any hopes that the separate party list tier would soften the damage of SMD to third parties were certainly not met. Only the KMT and DPP passed the five percent threshold required to win list seats, winning twenty and fourteen seats respectively. Although third parties suffered, the list tier seems to have benefitted the DPP’s parliamentary prospects as the DPP’s fourteen list seats surpassed its district share of thirteen seats. With no other parties having passed the threshold, the KMT and DPP each received approximately two more seats from the list tier than their share of vote would have allocated.

The party system has resumed the appearance of a dominant party arrangement.

Our indicators show some improvement in proportionality after 2012. District disproportionality improved to 8.68, although this is still nearly twenty percent higher than the worst score under the SNTV system. Small parties did much better on the list tier than in 2008,
with the TSU and PFP both capturing three and two list seats, respectively. Third parties won only one district tier seat (NPSU in Taichung) and two aboriginal seats. Thus, the majoritarian system remains a high barrier for third party competition and the effective number of effective parliamentary parties at the district level remains under two, at 1.97 and elective parties is at 2.32. As a result of the list tier, however, the total effective number of elective parties in Taiwan is 2.23, offering some small margin for third parties to move their agenda.

Having held only two post-reform elections, assessments related to trending are premature, yet there are four initial observations. First, in contrast to the LDP’s gradual return to dominant party status in 2005, the change in electoral system immediately corresponded with the KMT’s ascension to a level of legislative dominance unseen since 1986. Needless to say, few democratically elected parties can claim nearly 72% of legislative seats. After a one election adjustment, the KMT still retains a 56% majority.

Second, the separate list tier effect is subject to interpretation. On one hand, only two parties passed the 5% threshold in 2008, and thus the list tier failed to expand the number and type of parliamentary parties. On the other hand, in 2012, the list allowed the TSU and PFP to win enough seats to form party caucuses in the legislative yuan. The DPP’s inability to compete against the KMT at the district level, was somewhat offset by it appeal at the list stage, although the KMT outpolled the DPP in list votes in both elections.

Third, in addition to the reemergence of KMT majorities, the jump in disproportionality in 2008 was the most severe of the three cases studied here. The decline in disproportionality in 2012 places Taiwan back within a range more characteristic of democracies. As mentioned above, disproportionality in plurality democracies averages just above “12” by the least squares index. Taiwan’s score in the 2008 election was nearly “23”. The detrimental consequence for a
multi-party system in Taiwan is also apparent with the effective number of parliamentary parties for all tiers dropping from 3.27 in 2004 to 1.75 in 2008 and rising to just above two in 2012. The dominance of the KMT remains high at the district level, with the effective number of parties remaining under two. Taiwan appears to be evolving into a disproportional two-party system with a single party majority.

**Proportionality and Parties in South Korea**

Prior to electoral reform, South Korea was a disproportional multi-party system with coalition majorities. In South Korea, in particular, separating consequences of electoral system from those resulting from Korea's extremely fluid party system is difficult. While regionalism may be declining somewhat, it is also still a powerful force that distorts proportionality, given the historical absence of a truly “national” party. Temporary party mergers, and frequent defections, create changes in the number of parties at various times before and after elections. Whether electoral structures are “wagging” the political parties or vice versa continues to be questionable.

Across South Korea’s four pre-reform elections, no single party emerged with an outright legislative majority. Despite the plans of Ro Tae-woo and the DJP to introduce an electoral system in 1988 that would generate single party majorities, the combined plurality system actually propagated a tradition of legislative coalitions and divided government. On the other hand, the system did favor conservative majorities throughout, with a progressive majority waiting until the first post-reform election.

With regard to proportionality, the lsq index for Korea was consistently the highest of the three cases, and illustrating increasing disproportionality over time. By 2000, the lsq for Korea was at the upper end of average disproportionality for plurality systems in general. As discussed
above, however, this has been the consequence of combined factors of intense patterns of regional voting and plurality rules. There is little doubt that plurality rules under SMD have allowed for the electoral expression of regionally-influenced party preferences. Taiwan offers a bit of contrast, as the semi-proportional nature of SNTV offset the overall disproportionality that could have emerged from that country’s milder variant of north/south regionalism.

The diversity and divisions within Korea’s party system is illustrated in the effective number of elective and parliamentary parties. During the pre-reform period, the party system revolved around Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pihl (“the 3 Kims), and this is reflected at the district level and total number of effective parliamentary parties. However, the finding that the effective number of parties was actually higher in the district tier than in the total parliament was interesting. A likely explanation may be that this is an artifact of the relative disproportional nature of the so-called “PR” seat allocation that guaranteed half of the allocation to the party with a plurality of seats (later votes).

Over the course of post-reform elections, South Korea has taken on characteristics of a more proportional two-party system with single party majority. Elections in 2004, 2008, and 2012 illustrate some change under new rules, but to a much smaller extent than witnessed in Japan and Taiwan. First, single party majorities have emerged out of both elections in Korea, but remain bare majorities. In the first instance, the largest party driving reform and that competed in the 2004 election was the newly formed Uri Party. Although this majority was eventually lost to post-election defections, it marked the first “progressive” legislative majority under democratic rule.

While district tier proportionality remained near the pre-reform levels, it drops more than 20% in the most recent elections to 7.5 (2008) and 7.3 (2012). Despite retaining SMD and at a
ratio similar to pre-reform rules, the proportionality of votes to seats improved. Until 2008, the same effect can be seen in the increased number of elective and parliamentary parties over the previous two elections. This indicator increased in each instance by fully “half” a party. Compared to pre-reform elections where the effective number of electoral parties was considerably higher than three, the 2004 - 2012 elections showed a trend where less than three parties were major players.

The effective number of parliamentary parties at the district level and total parliamentary representation dropped back to a level approximating 2004. Essentially, proportionality is improving, but Korean voters are now casting larger majorities of their votes for the two largest parties at both district and list tiers. Korea appears to be on the track to being a proportional, two-party system.

Several cautious observations emerge from this analysis of South Korea. First, the rise of an elected majority party in the first post-reform election mirrors Taiwan, yet in its bare character mirrors that which we see in Japan until 2005. However, whereas previous dominant parties (LDP and KMT) retained legislative control, Korean majorities have alternated between the left-leaning Uri Party (2004) and the right-leaning GNP (2008) and NFP (2012). Loose party discipline, scandal, and the declining popularity of President Ro hampered the party during its first year of unified government. The Uri Party lost all six by-elections in April 2005 and its brief majority. In 2007, the Uri merged with the United New Democratic Party to create the Democratic Party. Such problems continue to be symptomatic of Korean politics regardless of electoral choice.

Second, the scope of change between old and new rules in Korea was less extreme than our other cases. SMD rules were retained, and this allowed for the continuation of moderate
disproportionality at the district level. The alteration of the PR tier to a separate ballot, first allows for a very small increase in disproportionality, but this is followed in 2008 by a marked improvement. The erosion of regional voting patterns may explain some of this, but we also witness a change in the party system in which no single third party captured more than 6% of the aggregate district vote. The independent vote exceeded 11%, the highest level since 1996.

This change is reflected in the decline in the effective number of parties in the post-reform system. This aligns with what Korea scholars have described as the trend in the party system toward “conservative-progressive” dichotomy. However, whereas the new system allowed the effective number of parliamentary parties to drop to an all-time democratic low in 2004, this rose to nearly “3” in 2008, a three-election high. This indicator drops to an all-time low again in 2012. The main conservative and progressive parties continue to monopolize district seats, but also a growing number of list seats as well. The future prospects for third parties in Korea are similarly pessimistic as in Japan and Taiwan.

**Conclusion**

Ideally, the new mixed systems were intended to correct the drawbacks of previous consensus dimensions of Japanese, Korean, and Taiwan’s electoral designs by facilitating the emergence of a political system variously termed majoritarian (Powell, 2000), efficient (Shugart and Carey, 1992), and adversarial (Finer, 1975; Norris, 2004). In each instance, these systems tend to favor the two largest parties (although not proportionally), majority government, greater disproportionality (Rose 1983; Massicotte and Blais, 1999), and a decline in the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties. Studies of post-reform Japan, Korea, and the Philippines have revealed that moves to mixed, parallel systems (all of which are MMM designs) have most of these outcomes, with some variation in degree.
The more majoritarian nature of these systems has reduced party diversity in parliaments, proportionality, and electoral prospects for third parties. Lin (2006) and Reilly (2007) find that the effective number of political parties has declined across Asia’s democracies. In Japan, this process has been referred to as the “Westminsterization” of the political process (see Estevez-Abe, 2006; Park, 2001; Reed and Thies, 2001). Croissant (2002) writes of a turn to “majoritarian democracy” in South Korea by the turn of the century.

Farrell (2001, 161) reports a range of the LSI for twenty-nine PR systems from 2.13 to 4.96. Nine plurality states averaged 12.28, and two majoritarian states averaged 15.84. Pre-reform averages under MMD plurality systems in Japan (1983 – 1993) and Taiwan (1992 – 2004) were 6.21 and 4.54 at the district level respectively. Under SMD plurality, South Korea (1988 – 2000) averaged 8.94 at the district level. Thus, all three cases examined here fell into the semi-proportional range of electoral systems. The move to SMD in Japan (1996 – 2009) and Taiwan (2008) increased average disproportionality to 16.21 and 22.82 respectively. South Korea’s retention of SMD under the two ballot system has resulted in a modest level of disproportionality, with a LSI of 7.34. Post-reform Japan and Taiwan are now clearly more akin to majoritarian systems with regard to disproportionality at the district level and rise of party majorities. Although less pronounced, we see a shift toward majoritarian character in South Korea.

This analysis confirms rather vividly the shared contexts, rationale, and consequences of electoral reform, most of which appear to have been imagined by reformers hoping to be on the receiving end of the benefits of more majoritarian elections. Prior to reform, the three cases examined here were fairly vibrant multi-party systems with high degrees of alignment between voter preferences and party seat shares. While a plus on the democratic dimension of
representation, this created turbulence with regard to governance. The move to majoritarian systems has clearly narrowed the range of parliamentary representation, and has given rise to single party majorities in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan with the increased potential to govern.

The outcome on Taiwan is extreme and has given rise to some concerns about the manner in which such a dominant party as the KMT would govern with little effective legislative opposition. Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party was able to capture its largest majority (62% of seats) in decades after the 2005 polls, only to lose to an even larger DPJ majority (64%) in 2009; effectively granting to the DPJ all of the “large party” benefits the LDP engineered for itself. In South Korea, the continued entrenchment of personalism and regionalism may continue to inhibit the emergence of stronger single party majorities despite the slight narrowing of disproportionality and reduction in the effective number of parties.

Thus far, have the reform gambles paid off for those largely responsible? Those seeking to manipulate electoral rules appeared to have a fair understanding of the connection between rules and structural outcomes. Where miscalculations seem to have occurred, they appear to have been of voter sentiment, rather than structural consequences. The previously dominant parties (without whom reform would not have been possible), or in the case of South Korea the conservative party successor, had all regained majority status in their respective national assemblies by 2008. Secondly, designs to streamline party systems have also met with success. However, this has not waited until after elections, and shifting party alignments continue to occur in between elections. Third, although touched upon very briefly here, there are early signs of reduction in the power of factions and/or regionalism. Changes in the electorate, rather than rules, as well as the quality of political leadership also play roles in such changes, however. Clearly, new electoral rules correlate with proportionality and party system changes. With more
variables than cases, however, making the causal connection, and in the proper direction, is an obstacle that this study, and others, faces.

The question now arises as to how these processes are interpreted in the larger context of democracy in the region. Is this a natural cycle of revision and reform that certainly takes place within democratic parameters or as an attitudinal shift among elites and even masses reverting to something akin to the “Asian model” preference for control, stability, and efficiency under dominant parties? In the context of contrasts, the continuation of the majoritarian trend will reduce the party system contrast in relation to Asia’s remaining one-party states. As Taiwan has long been held as a bellwether for democracy in the region, it is imperative that Taiwan’s democratic deepening continue under any electoral arrangement. Should the LDP continue its own dominance (an unlikely future as that country nears lower house elections in 2009), Japan will continue to be a “democracy with an asterisk.” Given the chaos of South Korea’s system, moves to a more manageable and persisting two or three party system should be conducive to governance.
References


Table 1. Votes, Seats, and Bonuses at District Tier

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