

# The Puzzle of Why the Status of Women is Higher in Taiwan than Chile

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## Abstract

This paper compares the status of women in Chile and Taiwan in order to examine two research questions: First, what can explain Taiwan's considerably better record in enhancing the status of women? Second, what are the implications for the ongoing debate among global feminists about the effects of globalization on the status of women? Case studies of the two countries suggest that they are fairly similar in terms of progress on women's education and health but that Taiwan has a very significant advantage in terms of women's employment status and political representation. Taiwan's better performance in these areas reflects its distinctive development pattern and electoral institutions, while the implications of the case studies for the nature of globalization's effects on the status of women are more complex and nuanced.

**Keywords:** Chile, economic development, globalization, status of women, Taiwan

## The Puzzle of Why the Status of Women is Higher in Taiwan than Chile

The economic, social, and political status of women is considerably higher in Taiwan than Chile. For example, Chile now ranks 40<sup>th</sup> out of 177 countries on the UN's Gender-Related Development Index which compares women to men in terms of life expectancy, literacy, school enrollment, and real income,<sup>1</sup> while a recent calculation by Taiwan's government found that Taiwan would rank 4<sup>th</sup> if it were included in UN data.<sup>2</sup> In some ways this is puzzling because the profiles of the two countries in regard to women are fairly similar. Both have highly patriarchal cultures,<sup>3</sup> but women in both have achieved general educational parity with men and have been quite active in political and voluntary groups. In a broader structural sense, moreover, both have participated quite extensively in the growing globalization<sup>4</sup> of the world economy.<sup>5</sup>

Many feminist scholars and globalization theorists conclude that globalization produces gendered effects that impact the lives of women throughout both developed and developing

societies. However, there is little consensus about how globalization and neoliberal policies affect women. On the one hand, scholars such as Sassen<sup>6</sup> and Sen<sup>7</sup> argue that women benefit from the outside employment opportunities generated by globalization because they give women more resources and opportunities both inside and outside the home. In sharp contrast, other global feminists argue that global capitalism and especially the neoliberal policies that accompany them are harmful to women. While globalization has provided more work opportunities and has changed attitudes toward the role of women within the global economy, women often face insecure and often dangerous working conditions, declining welfare programs that provide support for their families, and increased workloads within both the private and public spheres.<sup>8</sup>

This paper examines two basic questions. First, what can explain Taiwan's considerably better record in enhancing the status of women? Second, what are the implications of a comparison of Chile and Taiwan for the ongoing debate about the effects of globalization on the status of women? The first two sections develop case studies, respectively, of Chile and Taiwan. We then apply the case studies to examine our basic research questions.

## **The Status of Women in Chile**

This assessment of the evolving status of women in Chile has two subsections. The first subsection presents quantitative data on how women have fared economically, socially, and politically; and the second is a qualitative discussion of women's participation in voluntary groups and politics. The latter helps explain the quantitative findings and, more importantly, gives a more nuanced picture of the contradictory forces that women face in the country.

### **Indicators of Women's Status**

Chilean national data on key indicators of women's status reveal a contradictory picture. Women in Chile have seen major improvements since the 1970s in key areas like education and health. However, unlike women in other regions of the world, Chilean women have not gained very significantly in the employment sector. Likewise, their political representation remains quite low, despite the election of Michelle Bachelet as President (2006-2010).

Education is a key resource for economic and social advancement; and here the data for Chilean women are quite good,

as demonstrated by Table 1. Women's enrollment in preschool, primary, and secondary schools has equaled that of men's since the 1970s; and while they were a clear minority at the post-secondary level until recently, that is no longer the case. Consequently, women benefitted from the tremendous expansion of secondary education over the last four decades (from 28% of the population in 1970 to 85% in 2007); and the illiteracy rates for women -- 12% in 1970 and 3% in 2010 -- are quite similar to the ones for men -- 10% and 3% in those two years.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 1 about here**

Women's health also represents another indicator of progress for Chilean women over the past 40 years. For example, the infant mortality rate plummeted from 118 to 8 per 1,000 live births between 1960 and 2005, while the drop in the maternal mortality rate from 16.8 to 1.6 per 100,000 live births was almost as spectacular. A major reason for this good record is that most women (99% since the mid-1990s) in Chile now have their children in hospitals.<sup>10</sup> Women's life expectancy rose by close to 50% from 56.8 to 81.5 between 1950-55 and 2008;<sup>11</sup> and as in developed nations, women live longer on average (by about five years) than men do. Finally, Chile has made major progress in bringing down its once high fertility rate which stood at 1.85 per family in 2005.<sup>12</sup>

Women have also made substantial economic gains. Chile's "Growth with Equity" programs that were implemented to reduce poverty in the post-Pinochet era have benefited the poorest of the Chilean population, women included.<sup>13</sup> Table 2 shows that the high poverty rate at the end of Pinochet's rule was almost cut in half between 1990 and 2000 as it fell from 38.6% to 20.6% and as extreme poverty dropped to less than 6% of the population. Declining poverty, though, was not associated with any noticeable reduction in the very high level of income inequality in Chile. For example, the Gini index of inequality has remained almost constant over the last two decades, being .56 in 1990 and .52 in 2012.<sup>14</sup> In gender terms, more importantly, women compared to men are not overrepresented in the impoverished and poor groups as they were within one percentage point of men throughout this period. Thus, the feminization of poverty does not appear to be a problem in Chile. Another positive note is that the ratio of average women's wages in relation to men's in urban areas improved considerably from 67% to 77% between 1995 and 2003.<sup>15</sup> However, women's catching up in wages before 1995 was not due to their earning more, but rather to men's falling wage levels.<sup>16</sup>

**Table 2 about here**

These encouraging statistics in the areas of education, health, and income, coupled with Chile's commitment to

globalization and neoliberalism, might be taken to suggest that Chile's economic strategy created expansive opportunities for women to enter that labor market and to gain the resources and opportunities posited by Sassen<sup>17</sup> and Sen.<sup>18</sup> Yet, this definitely turns out not to have been the case. While women's participation in formal employment increased from 30.6% in 1990 to 35.6% in 2004,<sup>19</sup> this is actually a much lower rate than is the case for women in several other regions of the world.<sup>20</sup> For example, in 2000 women's labor force participation in Chile was 37.6%, while a country having Chile's GDP per capita would be expected to have one of 52.6%.<sup>21</sup> Clearly, therefore, women are quite underrepresented in the formal economy. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the data in Table 3, employed women are segregated into certain types of professions and economic activities, primarily the service industries which tend to be marked by low wages and poor working conditions.<sup>22</sup>

**Table 3 about here**

Finally, the data on women's political representation in Chile indicate that it is somewhat low. With the election of Michelle Bachelet in 2006, women gained entry into the executive branch of government at the highest level; and Bachelet's administration was the first to appoint as many female cabinet members as men. However, women's political representation in other levels of government in Chile continues to be relatively

low. For example, Table 4 shows that women's representation in the national Congress only increased very slowly from 1% in the 1950s to 13% in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. For example Lu found that Chilean women's 10% representation rate in 2000 was only three-quarters of what would be expected of a nation at that level of affluence.<sup>23</sup>

**Table 4 about here**

Women's status in Chile is relatively high in certain areas. They are well educated and have access to adequate health and sanitation. Women are becoming more economically active in the formal economy and have benefited from anti-poverty programs which reduced their chances of being poor even when they are the sole wage earners for their families. However, their labor force participation is low, if not quite low, by international standards; and their employment is concentrated for the most part in undesirable sectors.

**Women's Activism: A Qualitative Overview**

Women's movements and activism have had a long history in Chile. Women successfully mobilized to gain suffrage in 1949 and to challenge human rights violations and to help bring down the oppressive Pinochet regime. Yet, current women's activism in Chile has struggled with the re-emergence of democracy.<sup>24</sup> Throughout the course of women's activism in Chile, the

discussions of women's empowerment and equality reflected various political, economic, and social interests. Early movements from the 1930s through the 1940s focused on traditional women's issues, such as suffrage and poverty.<sup>25</sup> However, once women gained the right to vote, women's rights discussions shifted to broader political movements where gender issues were ignored or were dominated by discussions of women's rights as mothers within the growing political and social turmoil. In the 1960's and 1970's women were very active in community projects, including the *Centros de Madres*, or mothers' centers, which focused on providing women with resources to support their families.<sup>26</sup>

Women were marginalized in formal politics even during the socialist era of the Salvador Allende government (1970-1973). Most political discourse was class based, and most policies that addressed women's inequalities continued to designate women in terms of their roles as mothers and housewives.<sup>27</sup> The inability of the Allende government to address women's issues and inequalities together with increasing economic factors affecting the poor enabled right-wing conservative groups to recruit military wives and middle and upper class women, as well as poor women, to form popular sectors and to become prominent members of the 1970-1973 anti-Allende movement.<sup>28</sup>

Movements of nationalist struggle and women's rights arose under the Pinochet dictatorship between 1973 and 1990. In response to dire living conditions, women's mobilization focused on human rights violations, looking for their missing relatives, and the promotion of a Chilean democracy. Ironically, Pinochet's definition of women exclusively as mothers enabled them to use this role in their resistance struggles. Indeed, because women initially protested as mothers, they were granted political activities denied to others, thereby making their protests vital to his overthrow.<sup>29</sup>

Noonan argues that these democratic movements enabled women to regain feminist and women's rights agendas. They justified women's nontraditional behaviors and allowed women to recognize the link between the state and family oppression.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, these women's movements, which began as human rights movements, were able to "politicize" women's daily lives and focus attention on issues such as poverty, domestic violence, and state violence against their families.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, Jaquette argues that although women played major roles in the anti-dictatorship struggles and often were granted political voices in Latin American countries' transitions to democracies, once democracy was established, women and gender issues were either co-opted and marginalized into political parties or excluded altogether.<sup>32</sup>

Dandavati finds that the Chilean women's movement played a vital role in the reconstruction of the democratic state (1988-1994) and in the transition.<sup>33</sup> It was able to push gender policy issues to the political agenda with the Plebiscite of 1988. Women's gains from these movements included the creation of *Servicio Nacional de la Mujer* (SERNAM), the state institution of women's affairs that oversees the other ministries' treatment of gender issues. The Intra-family Violence Law of 1994 to protect women from domestic violence, the elimination of legitimacy of children from the Civil Code, the elimination of adultery from the Criminal Code, and the legalization of divorce in 2004 were major legislative victories.<sup>34</sup> However, despite mass mobilization in the late 1980s, in the 1990s divisions between women due to class and race/ethnic interests as well as divisions between groups over how to work with the state have fragmented the Chilean women's movement and threatened its future mobilization and effectiveness.<sup>35</sup>

Women during re-democratization, therefore, followed two paths: 1) working within political parties and formal structures and 2) functioning as autonomous groups.<sup>36</sup> Both types of movements faced similar problems. Women within political movements brought women's issues into the debates regarding reconstructions of Chile's democracy, and women's grassroots movements increased the recognition of the plight of the poor.

However, institutionalization of some of these women's groups into SERNAM, an organ of the government, caused fragmentation among the various movements, making unified gendered agendas difficult to create. All groups were deficient in producing clear leaders who could represent women's issues in state building. Therefore, while both types of groups shared common goals, they did not create a course of action that crossed class and racial/ethnic lines.<sup>37</sup>

Overall unfortunately, although political and legal gains were made by women's organizations, Chilean women faced many political and social obstacles to gender empowerment. Much of the recent literature on women in Chile has focused on women's marginalization in the elected democratic governments since 1988 and on the decline of women's activism since the emergence of democracy. Women obtained less representation in the government than before Pinochet's era; and many felt alienated, disillusioned, and abandoned.<sup>38</sup>

Most global feminists argue that women are not passive victims to the inequalities they face under neoliberal policies in their local communities.<sup>39</sup> Women in Chile conform to these expectations as they have been quite active in Chilean politics and society. They heroically led the opposition to Pinochet; and grassroots organizations are now representing and helping women who have been traditionally marginalized, supporting

Rakowski's contention that women are empowered by these activities in a variety of ways.<sup>40</sup> Yet, the effects of their activism have been limited by two unfortunate factors. First, Chilean politics have been dominated by such issues as fighting dictatorial repression and class-based cleavages, so that feminist and women's issues are often marginalized. Second, women's groups are often divided along class and racial lines, which obviously undermines their effectiveness. These unfortunate limitations point toward the need to develop a feminist consensus in Chile.

### **The Status of Women in Taiwan**

Similarly to our case study of Chile, this section discusses the women in Taiwan in two parts. The first examines a set of indicators on women's social, economic, and political status; and the second is a more qualitative discussion of women's activism. In both sections, we will compare the situation in Taiwan to our previous findings about Chile.

#### **Indicators of Women's Status**

Taiwan's much higher ranking on the gender-related development index than Chile's suggests that it should have a better record on the

quantitative indicators examined here than Chile does. In general, this supposition is supported. Like Chile, women in Taiwan have made considerable progress in terms of health, education, and income. In contrast, they are appreciably better off in terms of their financial situation, employment status, and political representation. Overall, therefore, the status of women does indeed appear to be higher in Taiwan than in Chile.

Taiwan's record for improving women's educational opportunities and resources and moving toward gender equality in education is fairly comparable to Chile's. As demonstrated by the data in Table 5, Chile reached equality in women's and men's enrollment rates beyond primary school about a decade earlier (1970 versus 1980), but Taiwan expanded its secondary and post-secondary education faster. In addition, after 1990 proportionately more women than men attended secondary and post-secondary schools. Until the last two decades, Chile's record on literacy was slightly better than Taiwan's. In the early 1970, for example, the illiteracy rate was 17% in Taiwan<sup>41</sup> versus only 11% in Chile, although by the early 1990s both countries had attained close to 95% literacy. Unlike Chile, the literacy rate has always been a little higher for women than men in Taiwan due to the fact that universal schooling did not start until the early 1950s. Now, literacy is almost universal in Taiwan for those under 60.<sup>42</sup>

**Table 5 about here**

Like Chile, Taiwan has made extremely impressive progress in terms of health statistics regarding women; and Taiwan's women are fairly similar to their Chilean counterparts on these

indicators. For example, the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births fell from 30.5 in 1960 to 4.7 in 2007; and the maternal mortality rate per 1,000 live births dropped from 14.1 in 1984 to 6.8 in 2007.<sup>43</sup> Compared to Chile, then, Taiwan is somewhat better on infant mortality and somewhat worse on maternal mortality. Women's life expectancy increased from 70 in 1965 to 82 in 2008; and women in Taiwan live about five years longer than men.<sup>44</sup> Taiwan has been especially successful in reducing its fertility, which is strongly correlated with improving the status of women.<sup>45</sup> Among Taiwanese women, the fertility rate fell dramatically from 5.8 per woman in 1960 to 2.5 in 1980 to 1.03 in 2009.<sup>46</sup>

Taiwanese women (as well as men, of course) benefit from the much lower levels of poverty and inequality in their society compared to Chile's. For the past fifteen years, for example, the poverty rate in Taiwan has averaged 1%-2%, while the one in Chile has averaged 15%.<sup>47</sup> The difference is, if anything, even more profound in the area of income inequality. In contrast to the high inequality in Chile, Taiwan achieved levels that were low by even the standards of the developed world by the 1970s due to radical land reform and rapid industrialization.<sup>48</sup> Since then, as is generally the case among the developed nations, its level of income inequality has increased significantly from a Gini of .29 in 1970 to one of .34 in 2011.<sup>49</sup> Still, this is far,

far better than Chile's current Gini Coefficient of over .50. In terms of gender comparisons, Taiwan, like Chile, has made very significant progress in reducing the inequality between the average wages and salaries of men and women, as women's wages in relation to men's rose from 64% in 1981 to 74% in 2000 to 80% in 2009.<sup>50</sup>

The data on employment demonstrate that women in Taiwan are much better off than women in Chile in this regard. First, women in Taiwan are much more likely to have formal employment outside the home. Their labor market participation rate increased from 36% in 1961 to 45% in 1990 to 50% in 2010,<sup>51</sup> which has been between a third and a half higher than women's employment ratios in Chile since 1990. Still, women in Taiwan are slightly below the international norm on this indicator. For example, over the last two decades the international average for women's participation in the labor force has remained stable at about 52%; and in 2000, Taiwan's rate of 46% was four percentage points lower than the 50% that would be predicted for a nation at its GDP per capita.<sup>52</sup>

The employment structure for women in Taiwan, moreover, has changed fairly dramatically over the last three decades, with at least some of the change being clearly beneficial. In 1980, as described in Table 6, about 40% of employed women worked in manufacturing and another 20% in agriculture, which was fairly

similar to men's employment pattern. By 2010, in stark contrast, the percentage of women employed in these two sectors had plummeted by two-thirds; and manufacturing had become dominated by men. Taiwanese women, thus, had to migrate into new occupations. The proportion of women who were in clerical and service jobs jumped from 28% to 44%. While these occupations are generally considered an improvement from agriculture, they would only be a lateral move from many industrial positions. In contrast, women made more dramatic gains in the more desirable professional and technician occupations, tripling their representation here from 11% to 32%. This image of upward mobility is also confirmed by Table 7. Between 1980 and 2010, for example, women's share of all administrative and managerial positions doubled from 9% to 21%; and their share of professional and technical positions also increased significantly from 36% to 47%.

**Tables 6 and 7 about here**

Finally, Taiwan has a good record as well in increasing women's political representation. Table 8 shows that women held about 10% of the seats in the national parliament or Legislative Yuan from the 1960s until the early 1990s. Then their representation jumped dramatically to 19% in 1998 and 30% in 2008. In addition, women made similar progress in all the other elective assemblies in Taiwan; and generally their increased

representation occurred earlier in lower levels of government.<sup>53</sup> A major factor stimulating women's political representation in Taiwan was a constitutional provision that "reserved" seats in multi-member assembly districts for women. Since even during its long authoritarian era (the 1950s through the 1980s) Taiwan was marked by intense electoral competition among local factions, there were strong incentives to develop and recruit women candidates who then developed the skills to be competitive on their own.<sup>54</sup> For example, women consistently exceeded their reserved quotas in Legislative Yuan elections after 1980 and won 30% of the seats in 2008 after the reserved-seats system had been abolished for national elections (see Table 8).

**Table 8 about here**

### **Women's Activism: A Qualitative Overview**

Before Taiwan's democratization in the early 1990s, the activities of women's groups in the country were fairly limited. During the period of "hard authoritarianism" from the late 1940s through the middle of 1970s,<sup>55</sup> two kinds of women's organizations existed in Taiwan. The first type of women's organization was supported by the government and stressed traditional women's roles, duties to their families, and dedication to the country. The second type of women's groups included fairly conservative social and professional organizations that were closely tied to

government-affiliated women's organizations. In general, during this period, women's organizations and groups were controlled or monitored by the regime. They highly supported the status quo and kept themselves from challenging Taiwan's patriarchal culture.<sup>56</sup>

Taiwanese feminism emerged in the 1970s but it was something of a "one woman whirlwind" in large part because of the open hostility from the authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) regime. Hsiu-lien Annette Lu launched Taiwan's Feminist Movement with a speech on International Women's Day in 1972 and with the publication in 1974 of *New Feminism*, which described western feminism. While Lu quite consciously limited her arguments and analysis to moderate issues, the regime quickly concluded that her brand of feminism constituted a challenge to the island's "social order" by undermining its Confucian patriarchal traditions.<sup>57</sup>

Taiwan's democratic transition from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s,<sup>58</sup> however, opened up more space for feminist activities and the formation of independent women's groups. In the mid-1980s, a variety of women's organizations formed and sought to improve women's lives. For example, the Taipei Women Development Center focused on the re-employment of minority women and the elderly; the Warm Life Association for Women assisted divorced women and women on the verge of divorce; the

Women's Research Program in the Population Center of National Taiwan University worked on gender and women's studies; the Rainbow Project, which was supported by the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan, helped aboriginal teen girls; and Pink Collar Solidarity supported women against the still prevalent patriarchal norms in Taiwan. Subsequently, an intricate network was created among such organizations. Within this network, if any group seized a particularly compelling issue, the others immediately stepped up to help win the attention and support of the public.<sup>59</sup>

These new women's associations began to focus on gender concerns from different perspectives. While some of them provided women practical services and professional assistance, others actively took part in political and social movements to urge the modification or enactment of laws and to supervise the government's execution of public policies to improve women's status in Taiwan's society. Most significantly, in contrast to feminists' prior need to compromise with conservatives, these activists threw off their self-censorship after the revocation of martial law, as women's groups based on social feminism and radical feminism began to emerge in the mid-1990s.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, in 2001, the National Alliance of Taiwan Women's Associations (NATWA), an umbrella organization, was established to coordinate the country's more than 70 gender-related NGOs.<sup>61</sup>

Directly challenging traditional beliefs and patriarchal culture, these autonomous women's groups in Taiwan have been working hard to improve women's situation in various fields, including women's right to reproductive choice, the prevention of domestic violence and sexual assault, environmental protection, gender equality in employment opportunities, the civil rights of same-sex couples, and the advancement of women into leadership roles in the political arena. In particular, the women's movement had a significant impact on women's daily lives through its success in obtaining legal reforms for gender equality. The achievements in legislative reforms between 1984 and 2011 include legalizing abortion, revising the Civil Code to protect women's rights, preventing children and teenagers from becoming prostitutes, prohibiting different forms of violence against women, eliminating gender biases in the education system, and securing women's equal access to employment opportunities.<sup>62</sup>

In contrast to women's political representation where Taiwan is clearly superior to Chile, a comparison between the two countries on women's activism is more complex. In the 1970s and 1980s, women were clearly more active in Chile than Taiwan due to a highly idiosyncratic response of their authoritarian regimes to the prevailing culture of patriarchy. In Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s, the KMT government resisted feminism

and independent women's groups as a challenge to cultural, social, and political status quo, while in Chile Pinochet was less repressive toward women because of his stereotype of them as mothers. Once the two countries democratized about 1990, authoritarian controls over political and economic organizations generally subsided; and many feminist and women's became quite active in both polities. In both countries, though, the effectiveness of this activism has been limited because women's issues are only marginal to the central political cleavage: the national identity debate in Taiwan<sup>63</sup> and the class and racial divide in Chile.

### **Implications**

Our first research question was to explain why the status of women is higher in Taiwan than Chile. The case studies in the last two sections found that the major differences between the two countries existed in the areas of employment and political representation. The explanation for the greater representation of Taiwanese women in elective offices is easy to discern: the Reserved Seats system jump-started their office seeking; and they used the skills and resources that they developed to become competitive on the hustings in their own

right. The reason for women's greater success in the formal economy is more indirect. Taiwan used its active participation in the world economy to follow the normal pattern of development from agriculture to light industry to high tech production to advanced services<sup>64</sup> by providing government support for "infant industries" and, once they were established, forcing them to become internationally competitive and, in many cases, to be export-oriented given the country's small domestic market.<sup>65</sup> In Chile, in sharp contrast, a commitment to globalization did not produce a surge of industrial exports which never reached even a fifth of total exports<sup>66</sup> compared to Taiwan's where industrial goods has exceeded 90% since 1980.<sup>67</sup>

Economic and industrial upgrading occurred to a much greater extent in Taiwan than in Chile, thereby creating a substantial expansion of professional and managerial jobs.<sup>68</sup> Through their educational attainments, women in both countries had the skills and resources to fill such positions, but the structural changes in Taiwan gave women there a much greater opportunity. This calls to mind Sen's concept of development as the freedom of individuals to develop their capabilities and to utilize those capabilities.<sup>69</sup> In these terms, both countries have provided many women the opportunity to develop their capabilities, but Taiwan has created much better conditions for utilizing them.

The second research question examined the implications of the experiences of Chile and Taiwan for the ongoing debate among global feminist theorists about whether globalization and neoliberalism have a positive or negative impact upon the status of women in developing nations. One conclusion that jumps out from a comparison of the two nations is that globalization and neoliberalism should not be conflated. While both participated quite actively in globalization, Chile's neoliberalism contrasted sharply with Taiwan's more statist economic policy, which produced a much more advanced and well rounded development pattern<sup>70</sup> that created much better conditions for facilitating women's development and utilization of their inherent capabilities. Probably the reason for these divergent political economies is that the traditional land-based elites have maintained economic power in Chile preventing the type of development that occurred in Taiwan,<sup>71</sup> which is consistent with the arguments of the skeptics of globalization.

Turning to the explicit impact of globalization upon the status of women in these two countries, our findings demonstrate that both sides are correct in certain situations because the effects of globalization vary widely within a society. In Taiwan, more educated, younger, and middle class women tended to benefit from the country's development pattern, while other women did not and even saw their traditional status undercut.<sup>72</sup>

Similarly, globalization in Chile has opened more opportunities for women with more education and higher class status but created more burdens for and threats to women who do not possess these advantages.<sup>73</sup> Finally, the arguments of those who see globalization as creating jobs that provide broader opportunities for women need to recognize that these benefits can be quite variable. For example, while young unmarried Taiwanese women who left their homes to work in low-skill manufacturing during the 1960s and 1970s did increase their independence and status somewhat,<sup>74</sup> such effects were much less than women's large-scale movement into managerial and professional jobs over the last several decades. Again, class-based differences seem to be quite important.

**Table 1**  
**Education Female Enrollment by Level of Education, 1970-2007**  
**(Percentages)**

Year	Preschool		Primary		Secondary		Post Secondary	
	Total Pop.	Percent of Women*	Total Pop.	Percent of Women	Total Pop.	Percent of Women	Total Pop.	Percent of Women
1970	---	52	90.2	50	28.0	53	9.0	38
1975	---	----	94.0	49	33.4	53	14.0	42
1990	---	49	87.7	49	55.0	51	20.7	---
2007	---	---	94.4	49	85.3	51	52.1	51

Sources: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC), <http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/bases/default.asp?idioma=IN>, 2009; Teresa Valdes and Enrique Gomariz (coords.), "Latin American Women: Comparative Figures" (Santiago: Instituto de la Mujer, 1995).

**Table 2**  
**Sex Distribution of Population by Chilean Poverty Line, 1990-2000**  
**(Percentages)**

Year and Sex	Impoverished	Poor but Not Impoverished	Not Poor	Total
<b>1990</b>	<b>12.9</b>	<b>25.7</b>	<b>61.4</b>	<b>100</b>
Men	12.6	25.3	62.1	100
Women	13.2	26.1	60.7	100
<b>1996</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>100</b>
Men	5.7	17.2	77.1	100
Women	5.8	17.7	76.5	100
<b>2000</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>79.4</b>	<b>100</b>
Men	5.5	14.9	79.6	100
Women	5.8	15.0	79.2	100

Source: Teresa E. Valdés, Ana María B. Muñoz, and Alina O. Donoso (coords.), *Have Women Progressed? Latin American Index of Fulfilled Commitment* (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales FLASCO, 2005).

**Table 3**  
**Employed Urban Population, By Sex, According to Economic Activity 2006**  
**(Percentages)**

<b>Occupational Category</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Percent of Women in Occupation</b>
Agriculture and Horticulture	8.2	3.9	10.5
Mining and Quarry	2.7	0.3	3.2
Industrial Manufacturing	16.5	10.8	26.5
Utilities	0.8	0.2	12.3
Construction	15.5	1.3	3.0
Commerce	17.5	26.6	46.4
Transportation, Storage and Communication	11.3	3.6	11.9
Financial Institutions	8.5	7.2	38.0
Community, Social and Personal Services	17.9	45.0	56.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Sources: UN ECLAC (SEE TABLE 1); Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM), *Statistics Database on Various Measures of Women in Chile*, [http://www.sernam.cl/estudios/web/fus\\_index.php?sec=2](http://www.sernam.cl/estudios/web/fus_index.php?sec=2), 2010.

**Table 4**  
**Composition by Sex of National Congress 1950-2010**

<b>Legislature</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Percent held by Women</b>
1951-1953	1	192	0.5
1953-1957	2	192	1.0
1957-1961	3	192	1.6
1961-1965	5	192	2.6
1965-1969	14	192	7.3
1969-1973	10	200	5.0
1973	15	200	7.5
1990-1993	10	158	6.3
1994-1997	12	158	7.6
1998-2002	16	158	10.1

2002-2005	17	158	10.8
2006-2010	20	158	12.7

Source: SERNAM (see Table 3).

**Table 5**  
**Percentage Attending School in Taiwan, by Age Group and Sex, 1976-2009**

Year	Age 6-11 (Elementary school)		Age 12-14 (Junior high school)		Age 15-17 (Senior high school)		Age 18-21 (Post-secondary)	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
1976	97.59	97.49	72.82	81.60	40.11	46.08	8.73	11.15
1980	97.70	97.43	82.03	84.73	49.06	50.25	10.25	11.86
1985	96.31	96.29	86.86	87.18	62.86	61.80	13.49	14.24
1990	97.87	98.21	90.59	90.05	76.85	69.36	20.44	18.33
1995	99.10	99.01	94.47	93.83	82.65	75.84	29.78	25.88
2000	98.79	98.77	94.11	93.83	89.39	84.90	42.11	35.47
2005	98.44	98.49	96.51	96.50	89.85	87.32	61.06	54.00
2009	97.91	98.09	97.43	97.54	93.15	91.61	68.93	61.34

Source: Ministry of Education, *Educational Statistics* (Taipei: Ministry of Education, various years).

**Table 6**  
**Occupational Distribution by Gender, 1978-2010**  
**(Percentages)**

Year	Legislators, government administrators, business execs and managers	Professionals	Technicians and associate professionals	Clerks	Service, shop, market, sales workers	Ag, animal husbandry, forestry and fishing workers	Production, machine operators and related workers
<b>Female</b>							
1978	1.12	4.68	6.54	9.86	15.61	22.34	39.85
1980	1.05	4.79	7.44	11.00	16.70	17.98	41.03
1990	1.90	6.56	12.96	14.08	19.65	10.10	34.76
2000	1.54	7.98	16.82	20.64	24.20	5.28	23.54
2010	1.95	9.67	22.25	20.56	23.89	3.38	18.30
<b>Male</b>							
1978	4.06	3.25	6.69	4.04	13.20	25.65	43.10
1980	5.07	3.40	7.69	4.00	13.80	19.79	46.25
1990	6.41	4.31	10.82	4.33	14.91	14.32	44.90
2000	6.23	5.38	16.74	4.20	13.88	9.26	44.32
2010	5.94	8.08	19.78	4.46	14.86	6.43	40.46

Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), *Statistical Yearbook, 2010* (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, [www.eng.dgbas.gov.tw](http://www.eng.dgbas.gov.tw), 2010).

**Table 7**  
**Distribution of Ratio of Female and Male Workers to Total Employed in Administrative and Managerial, Professional, and Technical Occupations**

	Share of administrative and managerial workers (%)		Share of professional and technical-related workers (%)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
1980	90.6	9.4	64.3	35.7
1990	84.9	15.1	56.3	43.7
2000	85.7	14.3	56.9	43.1
2010	79.5	20.5	52.7	47.3

Source: DGBAS (see Table 6).

**Table 8**  
**Women's Representation in National Legislative Bodies in Taiwan**

Year	Candidates			Seats				
	Total	Women	% Women	Total	Reserved for Women	% Reserved for Women	Women	% Women
<b>Legislative Yuan</b>								
1969	25	4	16.0	11	0	0	1	9.1
1972	55	6	10.9	36	3	8.3	4	11.1
1975	61	4	6.6	37	3	10.8	4	10.8
1980	218	17	7.8	70	5	7.1	8	11.4
1983	171	22	12.9	71	5	7.0	8	11.3
1986	137	12	8.8	73	6	6.0	7	9.6
1989	302	26	8.6	101	7	6.9	13	12.9
1992	403	46	11.4	161	10	6.2	17	10.6
1995	397	50	12.6	164	NA	NA	23	14.0
1998	498	86	17.3	225	NA	NA	43	19.1
2001	584	110	18.8	225	NA	NA	50	22.2
2004	492	95	19.3	225	NA	NA	47	20.9
2008	423	121	28.6	113	0	0	34	30.1

Source: Phyllis Mei-lien Lu, *The Changing Status of Women In Taiwan: 1948-2010* (Auburn, AL: PhD Dissertation, Auburn University, 2012) p. 193.



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