

**Elite Configuration and the Survival of Leninist Party:  
A Comparative Study of the CCP and KMT**

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## **Introduction**

As the largest non-democracy in the world, China's political landscape has caught attentions of both academia and policy makers. Today, China ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still presents its political stability despite having experienced long-term economic transition. "Why China has not democratized, or in other words, "how the CCP can maintain its ruling and survival" is a crucial issue for scholars and analysts of China Studies.

The paper focuses on *how and why the CCP remains stable today*. There are at least three ways to approach China's political development in literature.<sup>1</sup> The first is modernization theory. This paradigm argues that socio-economic development can improve people's living standard and thus shape individual self-consciousness. Accordingly, people's needs for political power and rights would rise, and urge the change of political regime (Pye, 1989: 3-19; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Welzel et al., 2003). In the case of China, modernization paradigm seems not to be appropriate based on the coexistence of long-term rapid economic development and stable one-party dictatorship (at least up to now). The current political environment controlled by the CCP also does not allow any grassroots organization to express people's voice.

Second, cultural determinism emphasizes the concept of "congruence", indicating that stable political systems should have culture and institutions that are compatible with one another (Dalton and Shin 2006, 5). By applying the cultural theory to Post-communist countries, scholars have considered the crash of official ideology and the renaissance of traditional culture, e.g. Poland and Hungary (De Palma, 1991; Wu, 1998: 17-25). Some scholars also have noticed how Chinese traditional culture (Confucianism) would probably hinder China from becoming democratic (Huntington, 1991; Pye, 1985; Shi and Lu, 2010). However, the fundamental fault of the explanation lies in its postulate of cultural continuity and gradualism (Eckstein 1988, 790-793). These assumptions lead to explaining political change difficult. Finally, institutional explanation believes there exist several inherent defects in communist regimes and institutions, such as the dilemma of "Development"

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<sup>1</sup> Here we mainly discuss domestic factors. Additionally, international factors also have been noted, especially the Soviet Union intervention. However, this international cause does not exist for the current China. Moreover, It can be expected that China's political future are determined by more domestic factors than international effects because of its rising status in international politics.

vs. “Utopia” (Lowenthal, 1970), problems of political succession (Kou, 2010), and ambiguities of power and duties in the State Organ (Kou, 2006). From the perspective, all of these internal institutional defects result in political disorder, and as a result political transition in communist regimes would happen inevitably. However, the institutional explanation also cannot work out for the current China. During the reform era, China’s rapid economic development, peaceful political succession, step-by-step political institutionalization highlight that communist regimes are not necessary to crash due to institutional troubles. It is possible for the CCP to develop and complete itself, like what Nathan (2003) called “Authoritarian resilience.” The above discussion presents that these existing approaches are considerably limited to China’s political landscape, that is, the current political stability under the CCP.

This paper focuses on political elites that held power. Political elites determine institutions, and vice versa. In elite studies, the pattern of elite recruitment and mobility reflects not only the channels to access political power in a country, but also the political values and policy orientations of the regime (Seligman, 1964; Putman, 1976: 45-60; Czudnowski, 1983: 243-255). The democratization literature also has elaborated how elite interaction, negotiation, and settlement can build consensus among national elites and urge democratic transition in a country (Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell, 1986; Higley and Burton, 1989; 2006). In fact, under the Leninist party-state system, elite condition in the ruling party is considerably important because of its monopoly on political power. By using the elite configuration model proposed by Higley and Lengyel (2000), this paper attempts to depict the elite condition in the CCP, so as to present why and how the CCP can maintain its rule today.

Also, this paper is designed as a comparative study—the CCP during the reform era and the KMT in the martial law period. The comparison between the two cases is particularly meaningful because several key factors are held constant: both were embedded in the same political culture, both sides shared the same political history regarding imperial rule, and more importantly, both parties were initially organized as Leninist parties (Dickson, 1997; Gilley and Diamond, 2008). However, they developments differed. The CCP’s rule still remains stable today. By contrast, the KMT suffered several internal splits over a few years since the early 1990, and finally lost its ruling in the 2000 presidential election. The comparison is appropriate to the purpose of this paper, presenting how important elite characteristics would be for the survival of Leninist parties.

By capturing related patterns of elite differentiation and elite unity for the KMT in the martial law period and the CCP during the reform era, this paper argues that elite condition would be crucial for the survivability of Leninist parties. The paper is

organized into five sections. Section one provides a theoretical overview of elite condition, especially the relationship between elite characteristics and regime types. We also identify the regime type in China under the CCP and Taiwan under the KMT and discuss their respective developments. Section two introduces the hypotheses and data this paper employs. Sections three and four are empirical analyses, including patterns of elite composition and trends of elite cohesion in the two parties. The final section concludes by summarizing research findings and addressing the theoretical implications for China's political future.

## **Elite Condition and the Survival of Leninist Parties**

This section deals with several key issues. First, we introduce a related model that theoretically connects elite configurations and regime types. By applying the model, we identify the regime type in China ruled by the CCP and Taiwan under the KMT, and discuss their respective developments.

### **1. Elite Configurations and Political Regimes: A Typology**

Early in the 19th century, issues about “political elites” were regarded as crucial. Famous political sociologists, Mosca and Pareto, constituted a paradigm from which a general theory of elites and politics might be derived.<sup>2</sup> Recently, scholars believed that the features of political institutions in a country can be enlightened by depicting its national elites, the way of which is known as the second generation of empirical elite studies (Czudnowski, 1983: 243-255). “Elite condition” accordingly can be regarded as a valid proxy measure that represents how political systems work (Engelstad and Gulbrandsen, 2006: 1-8).

From the perspective of elite theory, Higley and Lengyel (2000) proposed a related model and that is appropriate to probe elite condition in a country empirically. The model constitutes national elite conditions by two dimensions—elite unity and elite differentiation. In a nutshell, elite unity covers normative and interactive components. The former indicates to what degree elites can share beliefs and values, and the latter presents to what degree the decision-making center can widely include elite persons or groups. National elites are “strong unity” while they have a high degree of shared beliefs and values and are widely included and bound by the decision-making center, and vice versa. These patterns reflect how cohesive national elites would be. Elite differentiation means the degree to which elite groups are socially heterogeneous, organizationally diverse, and relatively autonomous from the state and each other. Specifically, national elites with wide differentiation might be

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<sup>2</sup> In the literature, the early work focused on external and internal characteristics of elite groups, such as demographic backgrounds and values that they held (Putnam, 1976: 68-70).

manifested by their various social backgrounds and functionally distinct sectors. Constituted by the two above dimensions, a typology of elite configurations is listed in Table 1.

[Table 1 goes here]

Higley and Lengyel (2000: 3-4) suggested that these elite configurations can considerably reflect the different types of political regime. First of all, consolidated democracies might be based upon well-understood rules about democratic procedures and principles, all of which are recognized and respected by elite persons and groups, such as civic and political rights, rule of law, periodic and competitive election, and so on. Also, a democratic decision-making center would involve diverse elite persons and groups in policy processes as many as possible. National elites under these situations are regarded as strong unity. Moreover, since all social groups under the Constitution are eligible to engage freely in political competition, elite composition should be more heterogeneous in democracies than in non-democracies. Accordingly, strong unity and wide differentiation make up the elite configuration in consolidated democracies, identified as “consensus elite”.

Second, national elites in immature democracies have not reached a consensus about democratic rules and norms, even though they are elected by popular vote. The extent of shared beliefs and values among elites is substantially different between consolidated and unconsolidated democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 5; Diamond, 1999: 69). As a result, although national elites become more heterogeneous, their unity is still relatively weak. The elite configuration composed of weak unity and wide differentiation in unconsolidated democracies also is known as “fragmented elite.”

The other two conditions lie in non-democracies. In authoritarian regimes, a very few people who have similar backgrounds hold political power, and they usually do not share specific beliefs and values with each other. Political authority in the regime type usually originates from more traditional characteristics or personal charisma but less formal institutions. In this sense, weak unity and narrow differentiation constitute the elite condition in authoritarian regimes. “Divided elite” means national elites are usually at the risk of splitting because of their weak cohesion. As for totalitarian regime like communist countries, official ideology can shape shared beliefs and values among intra-party elites, so they might have strong unity. Also, political power in these countries is totally monopolized by the ruling party, and its cadres generally have the common socio-economic background, such as soldiers, peasants, and members of the lower middle class in China (Li and White, 1988: 373). The lack of

open elite circulation leads to a low level of elite differentiation. In this sense, strong unity and narrow differentiation constitutes the elite configuration in totalitarian (and post-totalitarian) regimes, recognized as ideocratic elite.

The related model theoretically distinguishes and relates patterns of elite unity and differentiation based upon types of political regime. By applying this model, this paper attempts to clarify elite conditions in the CCP and KMT. Before doing this, we will identify the type of political regime ruled by the two parties, and introduce their respective developments.

## **2. CCP&KMT: Regime Type and Their Developments**

In literature, “Leninist Party” is usually used to describe the CPP and the KMT. According to Satori (1984: 42-47), “Leninist Party” is the main ruling type under Communism and Fascism, in which the ruling party asserts its exclusive link to the state, believes itself as the only representative of the people, and creates a party-state system. Within the system, a Leninist party is predisposed to steer the course of political change based upon its high organizational capacity, dominant ideology, and deep penetration of society (Cheng, 1989: 472).

The CCP would be a typical case of the Leninist Party. The party was founded in 1921 and then won the Chinese civil war by the assistance of the Soviet Union. After the nationwide victory, the CCP accomplished the ruling under Leninist party-state system. The party extended the party branches throughout all levels of governments and social organizations, stuck to the principle of “the party commands the gun”, and realized the socialist transformation and industrialization. All these measures accorded with the features of the Soviet Union-style political regime (Kornai, 1992: 33-48). In a word, what the CCP built up was a typical Leninist party-state system (Lu, 2008). In terms of regime type, Leninist party-state systems are usually categorized as “totalitarian regime.” (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Linz, 2000).

With regarding to its development, the CCP in Mao’s period had been lying in the plight of class struggle since 1949 (Dittmer, 1987). After Cultural Revolution and power struggle within the party, the CCP under Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) aegis decided to abandon the doctrine of class struggle and to pursue a policy of economic modernization and openness. The economic reform led to numerous profound changes in China. Even so, the CCP still keeps the Leninist party structure and its comprehensive control over the state. China ruled by the CCP during the reform era combines the continuity of political autocracy and the change of economic modernization. Some labeled the Chinese system as “Authoritarianism,” highlighting both the political monopoly and the economic transition (Pye, 1990; Guo, 2000; Nathan, 2003); while others referred to “post-totalitarianism” or “degenerative

totalitarianism” and emphasized the effects of the communist legacy in institutions and history (Johnson, 1970; Linz, 2000: 247-261; Lin and Hsu, 2004: 11-30).<sup>3</sup>

As for the KMT, many scholars referred Taiwan under the KMT’s rule during the martial law period to an authoritarian regime (Huntington and Moore, 1970; Domes, 1981; Gold, 1986; Johnson, 1987). In fact, in terms of party structure and party-state relationship, the regime also was a Leninist one. While the KMT moved to Taiwan, the leader Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石, CKS) initiated a thorough political reform in 1951 by which the party apparatus increased the degree of organizational capacity and strengthened corporatist structure. The KMT subscribed to the official ideology, purged factional leaders within its own ranks, built a commissar system in the army, extended the party branches to the government, penetrated the party cells to social organizations, socialized party cadres as revolutionary vanguards, and achieved decision making within the party by democratic centralism, and so on (Chou and Nathan, 1987; Cheng, 1989: 475-480).<sup>4</sup> However, there were still some structural features that distinguished the KMT from typical Leninist regimes. Some scholars used the terms like “quasi” or “soft” Leninist regime to describe the KMT’s regime features that resembled Leninist systems (Cheng, 1989; Lu, 2008).

Unlike the CCP, the KMT’s rule in Taiwan had a substantial adjustment during the martial law period. Upon its arrival in Taiwan, the KMT strategically positioned the indigenous elites (Taiwanese) in the party-state machinery and permitted direct local elections at the country, so as to legitimize its ruling in Taiwan. After then, Taiwan experienced the considerable economic and social change.<sup>5</sup> While economic and social change created a more sophisticated public, Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation also got great international pressure to the ruling party.<sup>6</sup> Under growing domestic and international pressure, the KMT abolished the martial law in 1987. As a result, Taiwan’s political system was on the way of liberalization and then entered a democratization process. After the early 1990s, the KMT experienced several internal splits over a few years and finally its candidate lost the 2000 presidential election. In sum, Taiwan under the KMT rule in Taiwan presents how the ruling party gradually

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<sup>3</sup> As Johnson mentioned (1970: 3), the fundamental change in communist countries included: (1) from a single strong leader toward collective leadership; (2) from a high reliance on terror to a median or low reliance; (3) from a centralized command economy to a semi-centralized managerial system and toward market socialism; (4) from a client state of the USSR toward independence as a national communist state.

<sup>4</sup> Such as KMT’s ideology about democracy via tutelage, permitting political participation at the local level, and pursuing capitalist economy.

<sup>5</sup> Between 1960 and 1980, Taiwan’s gross national product increased at an annual rate of 9 percent; its exports expanded at around 20 percent a year; and income became more equitably distributed (Cheng, 1989: 481)

<sup>6</sup> Taiwan suffered several diplomatic defeats since the 1970s, including its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, de-recognition by Japan in 1972, and the breaking of formal diplomatic relations by the United States in 1979.

loosened political controls, changing from “quasi“ or “soft” Leninist regime into the process of democratic transition. If the related model connecting elite condition with regime type is valid, then it can be expected to find a substantial change of elite condition in the KMT during the martial law period. As for the CCP, its elite configurations would not fundamentally change due to its consistently comprehensive control over the state and society.

## **Research Design**

The sake of this paper is to demonstrate the theoretical link between elite configurations and regime types, by examining the cases of the CCP and the KMT. As discussed, elite unity and elite differentiation in the CCP and those in the KMT should display their own patterns, all of which should correspond with the developments of the two regimes respectively. This section proposes two hypotheses on elite configurations of the two Leninist parties and introduces empirical data that this paper uses. First, elite condition in the CCP during the reform era is as below:

*Hypothesis 1: Based upon features of Leninist party-state system, elite configuration in the CCP would be ideocratic elite, presenting narrow differentiation and strong unity.*

Despite the dramatic economic improvement, the party-state relationship under the CCP does not substantially change during the reform era. According to the related model in Table 1, this paper suggests that “ideocratic elite” combining strong unity and narrow differentiation would be the main pattern in the CCP. In terms of the differentiation dimension, it can be expected to see a stable pattern among the CCP’s elites regarding political credentials. In empirical elite studies, the age for joining the party is an important indicator measuring political credentials to elite selection in communist countries like the CCP (Li and Walder, 2001; Zang, 2004; 2006). Cadres who joined the party at young age represent that they were purposely cultivated and had passed the political screening by the party. Second, based upon the unchanged party-state structure, most of CCP top leaders also would be as heads of state organs. That reflects the stuck principle of “the party leads the state.” With regard to elite unity, this paper anticipates that the CCP elites would demonstrate a high level of unity. The normative element that involves shared beliefs and values comes from the CCP’s ideological line, which highly binds and guides intra-party elites. The interactive element derives from the mode of collective leadership after Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), meaning its decision-making centers can be accessed by more elite groups.

*Hypothesis 2: KMT's elite configuration would substantially change from ideocratic to fragmented during the martial law period, including changing trends toward more social heterogeneity, organizational autonomy, and less cohesion.*

This paper proposes that KMT's elite configuration would substantially change during the martial law period. The related model suggests that there would be an essential difference between political regimes regarding elite unity and differentiation. Considering the quasi Leninist party-state characteristics, KMT's elite configuration would show related features of ideocratic elite as it moved to Taiwan, including narrow differentiation and strong unity. However, unlike the CCP, elite condition of the KMT would turn into more diversity and less cohesion over time, patterns of which corresponded to the direction of regime development. First, we expect to see a significant increase of the Taiwanese and elected politicians in the KMT. The reason is that the KMT continued to strengthen its political legitimacy in Taiwan. Regarding the unity dimension, this paper also believes that the extent of shared beliefs and values that KMT's elites held would decrease over time, including its ideology and political goal. If the two proposed trends are confirmed, then we can provide empirical results for the theoretical link between elite condition and regime type. In this regard, elite configuration might be regarded as an important determinant to the survival of Leninist Party.

In order to examine the above hypotheses, this study collected a longitudinal database on the CCP and KMT top elites. The CCP dataset was built on the Politburo members from the 11<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> National Party Congress (1977-2012), and the KMT data came from the Central Standing Committee (CSC) members from the 7<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> Party Congress (from 1952 to 1993). The two databases were created based upon two concerns. First, the two groups were similar with each other in terms of size and leading status within the two respective parties. They usually constituted the apex (leaders of state organs) in Taiwan and China and the immediately adjacent echelons in the two political systems. Second, this paper focuses on the KMT under martial law and the CCP during the reform era. Choosing these two periods is useful to completely depict the change or continuity of elite condition in the KMT and the CCP. Besides, under the Leninist party-state system, official ideology plays an important role in binding and guiding elite actions and beliefs, and the mode of leadership reflects to what degree the decision-making center would be widely inclusive. In order to examine the hypotheses on the unity dimension, we also introduce developments of official ideology and leadership mode in the two parties respectively.

## **Patterns of Elite differentiation: CCP & KMT**

This section depicts patterns of elite differentiations in the CCP and the KMT by focusing on their respective compositions over time. We provide several longitudinal trends for the KMT CSC and the CCP Politburo, including size and turnover scale, demographic characteristics, and distributions of governmental positions. These results describe the developments of elite recruitment and party-state relationship of the two Leninist parties.

To begin with, patterns of elite composition of the CCP during the reform era (from 1977 to 2012) are listed in Table 2. Exploring one elite group is based on understanding its size and turnover scale. In regard to its size, the CCP Politburo was ranging from 18 to 28 during this period. Specifically, the Politburo size was expanded in 1982 and reduced in 1987, respectively. The former might derive from Deng Xiaoping's (鄧小平) initiation of cadres "four tendencies", by which both old veterans and young guard were included at the 12<sup>th</sup> Politburo; the latter probably came from the repressive political atmosphere, in which the CCP tended to recentralize on the core of power. Besides, the size held constant as 25 since the 16<sup>th</sup> National Party Congress, greatly reflecting the trend of political institutionalization (Miller, 2010).<sup>7</sup> In terms of turnover scale, it was obvious that higher turnover rates of rates (namely, lower rates of incumbent members) occurred in moments when successive leaders took power, such as the 14<sup>th</sup> Party Congress (40.9 percent), the 14<sup>th</sup> Party Congress (44.0 percent), and the 18<sup>th</sup> Party Congress (40.0 percent). It probably because the party intentionally made room for the new successors, and the successors as a result could appoint their friendly entrants to consolidate the top leadership (Huang, 2013).

In regard to elite differentiation, there were several noticeable trends over time. First, the average age decreased slightly from 65.8 in 1977 to 62.6 in 2012, and the standard deviation greatly reduced, ranging from 9.0 to 5.2. These results highlighted CCP's policies of cadre rejuvenation and echelon in the reform era. Second, compared to the decreasing trend of age, the pattern of the age for party entry was relatively stable, about 22.1 to 25.8. Based upon the meaning of political credentials, this pattern suggested that the CCP still recruited cadres who obtained the Party membership in early adulthood all the time, so as to confirm their loyalty to the party. Speaking of educational level, the results of Table 2 showed that the professional degree in the Politburo had a considerably increase during the reform era. In 1977, only about 30 percent of the Politburo members had two-year college education level (and above); after the mid-1980, less than a half did not have college-level education; and in 2012, the Politburo members who had college-level education reached 92 percent, and even over 60 percent of them hold post-graduate level degrees. This evidence clearly

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<sup>7</sup> More details about CCP's institutionalization, please see Kou (2010) and Huang (2013).

indicated the accomplishment of CCP's policies of making cadres better-educated and specialized after the early 1980s.

[Table 2 goes here]

Additionally, analyzing governmental positions of the CCP Politburo members is helpful to capture the party-state relationship over time, especially how the party could control the state. First, the revolutionary generation leaders who mostly had military backgrounds did not retire from leading positions until the 13<sup>th</sup> National Party congress.<sup>8</sup> That was why the percentages of "Military and Security" item reached about 30 percent in 1977 and 1982. While these veteran leaders left, this item turned into stable, the percentage of which decreased to about 10 percent. In addition, Qiao Shi's (喬石) retirement in 1997 was the first time when the age limit extended up to the top leader level positions, reflecting institutional constraint had extended to the top leadership. After then, there was a stable and balance representation of major institutional constituencies on the Politburo, covering the party apparatus, organs of state, and the provinces, and the military.<sup>9</sup> These distributions represented that the party-state relationship under CCP rule greatly stable, especially based upon the trend of institutionalization. Totally speaking, the CCP Politburo manifested several features of elite differentiation during the reform era: (1) in terms of elite composition, those were better-education, slightly younger in average age, joining the party mostly in their early adulthood; (2) the higher turnover rates in the moment of power transition; (3) a stable and balance representation of major institutional constituencies

Related patterns of elite composition in the KMT were quite differently from those in the CCP. Regarding the size, Table 3 showed that there were only 10 CSC members of at the 7<sup>th</sup> Party Congress. After the KMT moved to Taiwan, that was the first personnel reshuffle by which CKS sought to recentralize political authority.<sup>10</sup> After then, the number of members increased over time, such as 21 and 24 members at the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, respectively. The CSC expansion implied KMT's needs for ruling Taiwan. For example, the KMT increasingly adopted military and

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<sup>8</sup> The revolutionary generation leaders included Ye Jianying (葉劍英), Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), and Nie rongzhen (聶榮臻), and so on.

<sup>9</sup> Party apparatus covered heads of departments, institutions, and committees of the CCP. Organs of state included central executive, National People's Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Specifically, central executives were heads of ministries and commissions of State Council, while NPC&CPPC could be regarded as people's representative bodies. The provinces mean the stable regional representatives in the Politburo. After the late 1990s, regional representatives were constantly secretaries of four municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Tianjin), Guangdong, and Shinjang.

<sup>10</sup> The paper counted the numbers of Central Standing Committee members based upon the first plenary session of party congress. More details about the KMT Central Standing Committee, please see Lee (2001: 57-254).

Taiwanese leaders into the committee in 1970s, so as to strengthen the party's adaptability under the domestic and international situations (Kaohsiung incident and diplomatic isolation in particular, Taylor, 2000: 365-389). Also, the numbers increased to 39 in 1981 and held about 30 after 1987 when the martial law was abolished.

In terms of its turnover, turnover rates of the CSC held about 50 percent in the period. There were two significant implications. First, the situation that many incumbents remained in power occurred in moments when successive leaders took power, such as the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Party Congress when Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國, CCK) took over the Executive Yuan (62.5 percent and 64.0 percent), and the 13<sup>th</sup> Party Congress while Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) succeeded Chiang as President (61.3 percent). The turnover pattern of the KMT was opposite that of the CCP, meaning that the party considered power continuity and political stability in the transitional moments. Besides, the lowest rate of incumbent members occurred in 1993 after the first direct legislative election in Taiwan, reflecting the rise of political elites who had popular base during the democratization period.

Patterns of demographic backgrounds were also meaningful. First, there was no local (Taiwanese) elite involved in the core of power at the KMT's first personnel reshuffle in Taiwan. All of the CSC members were mainland Chinese. In Fact, 7<sup>th</sup> CSC members were mostly those of the Central Reform Committee (CRC) members and had a great loyalty to CKS. The CRC helped him to firm up his control and to reorganize the party (Hood, 1997: 21-41). Second, the percentage of Taiwanese elites increased over time and even exceeded a half after the mid-1980s. Chiang's son CCK in the early 1970s stepped up his effort to co-opt young, well-educated Taiwanese to chair the party's local committees (Hu, 2005: 32-33). At the 11<sup>th</sup> Party congress in 1976, famous Taiwanese KMT elites such as Lin Yang-kang (林洋港), Chiu Chuang-huan (邱創煥), and Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) were promoted to the CSC.

Regarding the trend of age, the results showed that the average age remained stable (about 50 to 60 over time), but the standard deviation greatly increased. Based upon the increasing size of the CSC, the age pattern revealed the coexistence of new entrants and old hands in the CSC. The trend of educational level also showed that the KMT elites were generally well-educated in the martial law period. The members who had two-year college or university level education (and above) were about from 70 to 80 percent all the time. The pattern of educational level in the KMT was greatly different from that in the CCP. The decreasing trend of the CSC members with military-school background highlighted the process of establishing civilian control in Taiwan. After the late 1980s, the CSC members who had military background were only a few. Hau pei-tsun (郝柏村) and Hsu Li-nung (許歷農) may be examples of that.

[Table 3 goes here]

We then turn to distributions of governmental positions that the CSC members held over time. As noted, the 7<sup>th</sup> CSC was a special case because most of the members came from the CRC. They probably did not hold important governmental positions but were involved in the reform commission. Accordingly, over 80 percent of the 7<sup>th</sup> CSC members were in charge of either party apparatus or central executive. After then, the two percentages were stable over time.<sup>11</sup> Specifically, the CSC members who only hold party positions were relatively a few because these positions mostly played an advisory role, such as the party secretary-general. This result also implied the feature of KMT's "soft" or "quasi" Leninist regime in the martial law period. Also, the central executive positions were those main policy makers and implementers in Taiwan. About 40 to 50 percent of the CSC members were central executives. Specifically, the secretary-general of the president, ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, the Interior, Education, Transportation and Communications, and Finance usually belonged to the CSC after the 1970s, and this trend reflected the KMT's practice of "Party led the government" during the period.

Trends of legislators and local representatives were considerably important.<sup>12</sup> The two percentages gradually increased in the period, from 7.7 to 17.1 percent, respectively. Regarding legislators, heads of Legislative Yuan and National Assembly under martial law were those senior leaders who came from mainland and were not re-elected.<sup>13</sup> After the mid-1980s, heads of KMT group in Legislative Yuan began to advance to the CSC. The reason was that Legislative Yuan became more autonomous along with the Supplementary Elections, so the Party had to adopt them at the committee. Also, regarding local representatives, the Chair of Taipei City Council and that of Taiwan Provincial Council (Lin Ting-sheng 林挺生 and Tsai Hong-wen 蔡鴻文, Taiwan-born elites) were selected to the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> CSC.<sup>14</sup> These results reflected that the KMT paid much more attention to local governance and integrated the different voices and needs in the Legislative Yuan.

Finally, regarding social groups and businesses, some media holders began to be recruited to the committee after the late 1970s, reflecting that CCK tried to seek

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<sup>11</sup> Party apparatus positions were heads of departments, institutions, and committees of KMT, and central executive covered minister in charge of ministries and commissions under the Executive Yuan and the Presidential Office.

<sup>12</sup> Legislators covered heads of Legislative Yuan and National Assembly (was suspended in 2004), and local representatives included governors of province (Taiwan) and municipalities (Taipei and Kaohsiung) and chairs of these councils.

<sup>13</sup> Those were Chang Tao-fan (張道藩), Ni Wen-ya (倪文亞), and Ku Cheng-kang (谷正綱).

<sup>14</sup> By contrast, mayors of Taipei city and Kaohsiung city were not recruited until after the 1980s.

political propaganda against the opposite force, called as “dangwai” (黨外) in the martial law period.<sup>15</sup> This category also included some enterprisers and social group leaders who were friendly to the KMT.<sup>16</sup> It can be concluded that the CSC of the KMT revealed several features regarding elite differentiation over time: (1) the consistent well-education and more Taiwanese elites concerning its demographic backgrounds; (2) the lower turnover rates in moments of power transition; (3) the increase of organizational autonomy—the KMT adopted more legislators and local representatives into the CSC to improve local governance and integrate the different voices and needs.

Results of this section demonstrate the hypotheses on KMT and CCP’s patterns regarding the differentiation dimension. For the CCP, in despite of the obvious trend toward professionalism and specialization, the Politburo members still were those who joined the party mostly in early adulthood, reflecting that they were purposely cultivated and had passed the political screening by the party. Also, under the trend of institutionalization, the Politburo continues to keep a stable and balance representation of major institutions, implying the CCP’s hard party-state structure. In this regard, elite differentiation in the CCP keeps its essential feature rather than substantially changes during the reform era. As for the KMT, however, this paper clearly showed that the elite differentiation would have an essential change, including a significant increase in the indigenous (Taiwanese) elites and elected politicians (legislators and local representatives). Also, the central and local governments would become more autonomous over time because more popular-elected legislators and local representatives could express their own interests in the CSC. Unlike the CCP elites, KMT elites should become more widely differentiated during the marital law period.

### **Trends of elite unity: CCP & KMT**

National elite cohesion is vital for political stability in either democracy or non-democracy (Huntington, 1965).<sup>17</sup> As a proxy measure of this indicator, the unity dimension as mentioned can be identified by normative and interactive components. Concerning the nature of Leninist party-state system, we specifically focus on the developments of official ideology and leadership model, so as to evaluate the two hypotheses on the unity dimension.

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<sup>15</sup> Those were Wang Ti-wu (王惕吾) from United Daily News, Yu Ji-zhong (余紀忠) from China Times, and Cao Sheng-fen (曹聖芬) from Central Daily News.

<sup>16</sup> For example, Gu Zhenfu(辜振甫) and Gao Qing-yuan (高清愿) were business owners, and Xie Shen-shan (謝深山) was labor representative from Taiwan Railways Administration.

<sup>17</sup> Democratic consolidation cannot be ascertained only if the related norms and rules are shared and supported universally by national elites; even in non-democracies, political order still can be instituted once elite actions are strongly bound and guided by a single doctrine or their leadership.

We begin by introducing trends of elite unity in the CCP. As a typical Leninist system, CCP's ideology remains very important and has a dominant influence on elite actions and beliefs all the time (Kornai, 1992: 360-379). Regarding the ideological development, Marxism-Leninism was the basic doctrine and applied as the CCP's political and military guideline. After it took power in China, the CCP leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) asserted that class struggle should continue for removing capitalist, traditional and cultural elements from Chinese society. Mao's continuous revolution became the party's core ideology and led to several large-scale mass movements, including anti-rightist movement (1957), the Great Leap (1958-60), and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). As a result, formal institutions, political and social orders were not established in this period.

In 1978, the successor Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) adjusted the party line toward economic modernization and openness. In the entire 1980s, despite the existence of dispute between Deng and Chen Yun (陳雲) in terms of economic thought, the still cadres allied around the ideological line, that is, one central task (economic development) and two basic points (four cardinal principles & reform and openness). In 1992, Deng made his famous southern tour and stressed the importance of economic reform and openness in China. Relying on the support from military leaders and propaganda of media, Deng's line got the final victory. From that moment until now, sharp ideological struggle has rarely resurfaced within the CCP. The current ideological line, "upholding the CCP's leading" and "establishing socialist market economy" is firmly confirmed and recognized by the intra-party elites. Even although the successors proposed their own political advocacies, such as Jiang Zemin's (江澤民) "Three Represents" and Hu Jintao's (胡錦濤) "Harmonious Society", all the party cadres still ally around official ideological line. In a nutshell, the content of CCP's ideological line probably was adjusted during the reform era, but its dominant influence did not substantially change, especially the extent to binding and guiding elite actions in the party.

Meanwhile, the mode of leadership in the CCP had an important change during the reform era, from strongman to collective leadership in particular. First, CCP leaders' power bases have considerably changed from informal power to institutional power (Dittmer, 1978). Historically significant leaders like Mao and Deng are leaders who had great personal and influence, namely, informal power. They usually remain dominant in Chinese politics even after they have retired from their official posts, such as Mao's leading and Deng's southern tour as we discussed. By contrast, the successors after Deng, including Jiang Zemin (江澤民), Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), and Xi Jinping (習近平) after the mid-1990s are identified as leaders who mainly relied on institutional power. They might be the "first among equals" in the party according to

their official positions, but they who lack the charisma and revolutionary credentials to overwhelm their comrades in the party. As a result, the leaders with only institutional power have to learn how to build political coalitions and reach political compromises with other colleagues. Second, the current development of institutionalization cannot easily be reversed. When Deng took power, he placed more emphasis on power routinization and political institutionalization (Bachman, 1992; Wu, 1997). Due to their lack of personal and informal influence, the successive leaders cannot easily change the direction of institutionalization but would be deeply constrained by the related norms and rules. Factors of institutional power and the trend toward political institutionalization have led the mode of CCP leadership to turn into collective decision-making, meaning elite interaction, compromise, and negotiation would considerably increase within the party.

As for the KMT, the party with Leninist features had its own ideology and political line, but the importance gradually decreased during its ruling in Taiwan. Under its ideology, Sun's Three Principles of the People (三民主義), the KMT justified itself as a moral and technocratic vanguard capable of guiding national construction and gradually introducing full constitutional democracy rather than a leading role in class struggle (Chou and Nathan, 1987: 278). After its defeat in Mainland China, the KMT still kept with the ideological line and its leader CKS also claimed to develop Taiwan as a model province under Sun's ideas. He continued to claim the ROC sovereignty over all of China and to prepare to take back mainland China. For doing this, Chiang suspended national election and greatly enhanced executive powers by declaring "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion." Despite the democratic constitution, the government under Chiang consisted almost completely of mainland Chinese. Accordingly, "unifying China with the Three Principles of the Peoples" (三民主義統一中國) was the core ideological line and political goal guiding the KMT's elites under CKS ruling (Taylor, 2000: 211-216).

Unlike CCP's development, KMT's ideology and political goal became weakened over time for at least three reasons. First, KMT's ideology that advocated democracy via tutelage clearly indicates its temporary role in monopolizing political power. Its ideology lacked what Johnson (1970) called a "goal culture" in Leninist parties elsewhere—that is, a pronounced commitment to an explicit program of political and social transformation. In this vein, KMT's ideology essentially was not as strong as other Leninist parties' in binding and guiding elite actions and beliefs. Second, KMT's political goal on retaking mainland China lost its justification and feasibility, especially without the United States support. From 1950 to the first half of the 1960s, Taiwan's security rested mainly on the military and economic aid provided

by the United States, and CKS also developed the army to prepare for an invasion of the mainland. However, in order to confront and block the Soviet Union, the United States sought to improve the relationship with the People Republic of China, and clearly expressed its disapproval of CKS's intention (Hu, 2005: 29-31). Accordingly, KMT's goal of retaking mainland China became obscured. For example, while visiting the U.S. in 1965, the Defense Minister CCK also noted that the KMT government had to keep its stability by urging the goal of retaking mainland China. In other words, political goal on the "unifying China" issue had become a political slogan or rhetoric but not an explicit and attainable target. In 1987, the KMT secretary-general Lee Huan (李煥) clearly declared that the KMT's goal was no longer to replace the CCP ruling mainland China, but rather to push for democracy, freedom of the press, and an open economy in the mainland (Hu, 2005: 43). Finally, related measures about political localization also weakened the importance of ideology. After the mid-1960s, CCK pushed the constitutional amendment that allowed a supplementary election was held in Taiwan to add a number of new legislative seats. As discussed, CCK also intentionally appointed younger and better educated Taiwanese to central leadership. These measures reflect that the KMT began to take concrete measures to building a more representative government. Therefore, the KMT ruling approach became more pragmatic but less ideological in this period (Chang, 2010).

In addition to the gradually weakened normative component, that is, KMT's ideology and political goal, the trend of KMT leadership would be also relevant to its elite unity. First, despite its defeat in the Chinese civil war, the KMT quickly relocated the ROC regime in Taiwan and build up a strongman leadership based upon the 1950-52 party reform. From the event and the organized effort to resist Communism known as the "White Terror", CKS excluded his political rivals and opposite factions from the core of power.<sup>18</sup> Under the Temporary Provisions, CKS bypassed term limits to be reelected as president four times and ruled Taiwan for almost 25 years. He also was eager to give more responsibilities to his son CCK and appointed him as Premier for succeeding before his passing. When he died in 1975, CCK succeeded to the leadership of the Kuomintang, and then was officially elected as president in 1978. Like his father, CCK's leading also presented a strongman leadership based upon the Temporary Provisions and his "Prince" background.

However, the KMT went through a severe power struggle after CCK died. Unlike the CCP, the KMT did not establish the related norms and institutions beneficial to intra-party elite negotiation and compromises. In his second term as

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<sup>18</sup> For example, Wu Kuo-chen (吳國禎) and Sun Li-jen (孫立人), who were educated at America and well respected by the United States, were removed from political and military posts, respectively.

president, CCK nominated the Taiwanese elite Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) as vice president. While CCK died in 1988, Lee also became the first Taiwanese president. Unlike CKS and CCK, Lee Teng-hui's authority was not enough to overwhelm others within the party—he was born in Taiwan, joined the party later in 1970, and did not have any military bases and experience. Accordingly, many of his colleagues were deeply distrustful of him, like conservative mainlanders headed by Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) and Yu Kuo-hwa (俞國華), and senior Taiwanese Lin Yang-kang (林洋港) and Chiu Chuang-huan (邱創煥). During the early years of his presidency, Lee allowed his rivals within the party to occupy positions of influence, which seemed to compromise with them. However, after the 1990s, Lee attempted to consolidate his power, by seeking support outside the party and launching political reform, including the elimination of the Temporary Provisions, a new election for all legislative seats, and direct election of president and vice president. These measures gradually lead Lee's political rivals to be excluded from the core of power and leave the KMT even. In this regard, the extent of elite interaction and compromises in the KMT would greatly go to decrease. Based upon the discussion above, the trend of elite unity for the KMT should become weaker over time, regardless of normative component or interactive component

Table 4 presents the identified trends of elite unity in the CCP and KMT over time. In terms of the normative component, the two parties with Leninist features subscribed to their respective ideologies. The CCP from Mao, Deng to the post-revolutionary leaders still stuck the ideological line despite the adjustment of the content. In this vein, ideology remains still important in guiding and binding elite actions and beliefs in the CCP. However, KMT's ideological goal in Taiwan, "unifying China with the Three Principles of the Peoples," would become weakened considerably since the mid-1970s. Regarding the interactive component, the two parties presented the similar strongman leadership for a certain period—from Mao to Deng in the CCP and from CKS to CCK in the KMT. However, the two parties developed differently regarding the mode of leadership. For CCP, the revolutionary generation leader resolved the ideological dispute and established the direction of institutionalization. The successors cannot easily reverse these and have to learn how to build political coalitions and reach political compromises with other elites. In this sense, elite interaction and compromises in the CCP should greatly increase after Deng's period. By contrast, the KMT went through a severe power struggle while CCK died. His successor Lee Teng-hui excluded his competitors from the core of power and even led them to leave the Party, but not shared the political power. The extent of elite interaction and compromises in the KMT would greatly go to decrease, especially the period after CCK's passing. In sum, the discussion of this section

manifests the hypotheses on elite unity in the CCP and KMT—the CCP can have a strong level in terms of elite unity and cohesion, but the KMT cannot but go to be less cohesive.

[Table 4 goes here]

### **Conclusion: Elite Condition and Leninist Party's Survivability**

This article compares the CCP and the KMT regarding elite condition. Theoretically, elite condition, composed of elite differentiation and elite unity, can reflect regime type in a country. Based on the similar regime type but the different developments, we probe trends of elite configurations in the CCP during the reform era and the KMT in the martial law period.

For the CCP, we find that the Politburo members became better educated and slightly younger, and meanwhile they consistently joined the party in their early adulthood during the reform era. Under the trend of institutionalization, the Politburo also showed a stable and balance representation of major institutional constituencies. Regarding elite unity, official ideology of the CCP remains dominant to guiding elite actions and beliefs today; also, the development of collective leadership also increases and improves elite interaction and negotiation within the party. Accordingly, we can say that elite configuration of the CCP remains ideocratic, composed of narrow differentiation and strong unity. These related patterns should derive from the nature of the Leninist party-state system in which the CCP still entirely controls the state today. By contrast, patterns of elite configuration in the KMT substantially changed in the martial law period. We find that the CSC of the KMT recruited more Taiwanese elites and elected politicians over time, reflecting the elite group became more socially diverse and organizationally autonomous. Besides, its official ideology became gradually weakened based upon international and domestic factors. Without related norms and institutions beneficial to elite interaction and compromises, the KMT leader Lee Teng-hui consolidated his power by excluding his rivals from the core of power rather than settled with them. In this regard, elite configurations of the KMT became gradually differentiated since 1970s when CCK adopted the policy of appointing Taiwanese, and then turned into fragmented when its political goal had been weakened and the strongman CCK died.

Our above findings are useful to evaluate the survivability of Leninist parties. Under the Leninist party-state system, elite condition of the ruling party is a dominant factor that determines its survival since the party usually monopolizes the political power. Accordingly, the more homogenous and higher cohesive the party elites are, the more likely they would be to keep united and as a result the party can have a high

survivability for maintain its rule. On the contrary, if the party elites become more diverse and less cohesive, then the likelihood that intra-party conflict emerges would increase considerably. Today, China ruled by the CCP still presents the sociopolitical stability, reflecting the CCP's high survivability. Its related patterns of elite condition that this paper demonstrates are consistent with this fact. As for the KMT as we know, it experienced several internal splits since the early 1990, including the new party and the People First Party, all of which were formed out of splits from the KMT.<sup>19</sup> Thanks to these splits, the Democratic Progressive Party won the 2000 presidential election with 39.3 percent of the vote. In this case, KMT split would hand the DPP the presidential victory.<sup>20</sup> This paper also presents the change of KMT elite condition that turned into more diverse and less cohesive, namely, from ideocratic to fragmented. Based upon the clarification of KMT elite condition in the marital law period, we can explain the fundamental reason why intra-party conflicts emerge from the 1990s.

Based up the development of elite condition, KMT's experience may enlighten us on CCP's political prospects. From the perspective of elite theory, the risk of internal conflict in a political party would increase while its members become more diverse and less cohesive. However, according to our findings, both of these two aspects may not trouble the current CCP in the near future—the party not only selects core members based upon the measure of political screening, but also binds and unites them by the related norms and rules laid down by the revolutionary generation leaders. Due to the lack of inform power and personal authority, the current leaders cannot easily reverse the direction of ideological and institutional development, but should be sharply confined by these given rules and norms. Recently, some studies believe that collective leadership naturally makes factional politics and the current CCP leadership is structured around at least two informal coalitions, which means the potential for intra-party conflict (Li, 2012: 609). From the theoretic perspective adopted by this paper, however, we suggest that the potential is relatively low. In this vein, it is reasonable to predict that the CCP will continue to develop on the current track for a not short period.

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<sup>19</sup> The new party was established in 1993, formed by members of old guard as well as young urban professional mainland Chinese; Also, the People First Party was founded by James Soong (former Taiwan Provincial Governor and ex-KMT secretary-general), who was a popular politician despite his mainlander background and left the party to independently run for president in 2000.

<sup>20</sup> In fact, the pan-KMT votes in this election (Soong and Lein) still reached about 60 percent.

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**Table 1 Elite Configuration and Regime Type: A Related Model**

		Elite Unity	
		Strong	Weak
Elite Differentiation	Wide	Consensual Elite (consolidated democracy)	Fragmented Elite (unconsolidated democracy)
	Narrow	Ideocratic Elite (totalitarian or post- totalitarian regime)	Divided Elite (authoritarian or sultanistic regime)

Source: Higley and Lengyel (2000: 3)

**Table 2 Patterns of Elite Differentiation: the CCP, 1977-2012**

	11 <sup>th</sup> (1977)	12 <sup>th</sup> (1982)	13 <sup>th</sup> (1987)	14 <sup>th</sup> (1992)	15 <sup>th</sup> (1997)	16 <sup>th</sup> (2002)	17 <sup>th</sup> (2007)	18 <sup>th</sup> (2012)
Totals	26	28	18	22	24	25	25	25
<u>Incumbents</u>								
Number	22	22	12	9	18	11	16	10
Rates	84.6%	78.6%	66.7%	40.9%	75.0%	44.0%	64.0%	40.0%
<u>Age</u>								
Average	65.8	72.4	65.6	63.6	64.3	62.3	63.3	62.6
S.D.	9.0	7.7	7.7	6.5	5.5	3.3	4.3	5.2
<u>Age for party entry</u>								
Average	22.1	20.3	21.1	20.8	21.8	25.8	25.3	24.3
S.D.	6.4	3.7	3.4	3.5	3.7	5.0	4.5	4.5
<u>Educational level</u>								
Middle school and below	50.0%	39.3%	22.2%	9.0%	8.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Two-year college or university level (and above)	23.1%	39.3%	33.3%	18.2%	20.8%	12.0%	8.0%	8.0%
University	11.5%	7.1%	38.9%	63.6%	62.5%	72.0%	56.0%	28.0%
Postgraduate (Ph.D./M.S./M.A.)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	8.3%	16.0%	36.0%	64.0%
<u>Governmental Positions</u>								
Party apparatus	11.5%	25.0%	27.8%	18.2%	12.5%	28.0%	28.0%	28.0%
Central Executives	23.1%	21.4%	33.3%	27.3%	33.3%	24.0%	24.0%	24.0%
NPC & CPPCC	23.1%	14.3%	5.6%	22.7%	25.0%	12.0%	12.0%	12.0%
Military & security	30.8%	28.6%	11.1%	9.1%	12.5%	12.0%	12.0%	12.0%
Local representatives	11.5%	10.7%	22.2%	22.7%	16.7%	24.0%	24.0%	24.0%

Source: Data accumulated and tabulated by the author.

Note: "Military & security" were the Politburo members with military positions as well as Political and Legislative Affairs Committee (政法委)

**Table 3 Patterns of Elite Differentiation: the KMT, 1952-1993**

	7 <sup>th</sup> (1952)	8 <sup>th</sup> (1957)	9 <sup>th</sup> (1963)	10 <sup>th</sup> (1969)	11 <sup>th</sup> (1976)	12 <sup>th</sup> (1981)	13 <sup>th</sup> (1988)	14 <sup>th</sup> (1993)
Totals	13	21	24	25	34	39	31	35
<u>Incumbents</u>								
Number	0	10	15	16	17	21	19	14
Rates	0.0%	47.6%	62.5%	64.0%	50.0%	53.8%	61.3%	40.0%
<u>Birthplace</u>								
Mainland	100.0%	95.2%	87.5%	88.0%	73.5%	61.5%	48.4%	37.2%
Taiwan	0.0%	4.8%	12.5%	12.0%	26.5%	38.5%	51.6%	62.9%
<u>Age</u>								
Average	51.5	55.5	59.3	62.4	66.1	64.4	63.0	60.3
S.D.	4.1	5.4	4.1	4.8	5.9	9.1	10.6	9.2
<u>Educational level</u>								
Two-year college or university level (and above)	76.9%	71.4%	70.8%	76.0%	76.5%	76.9%	83.9%	80.0%
Middle school and below	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	2.6%	3.2%	14.3%
Military schools	23.1%	28.6%	29.2%	24.0%	20.6%	20.5%	12.9%	5.7%
<u>Governmental Positions</u>								
Party apparatus	46.2%	9.5%	16.7%	8.0%	2.9%	0.0%	6.5%	8.6%
Central Executives	38.5%	47.6%	37.5%	56.0%	55.9%	41.0%	45.2%	40.0%
Legislators	7.7%	9.5%	12.5%	12.0%	5.9%	10.3%	16.1%	17.1%
Military	0.0%	23.8%	16.7%	16.0%	11.8%	12.8%	9.7%	5.7%
Local representatives	7.7%	9.5%	8.3%	8.0%	14.7%	18.0%	16.1%	17.1%
Social groups and businesses	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	5.9%	10.3%	0.0%	11.4%
Others	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	7.7%	6.5%	0.0%

Source: Data accumulated and tabulated by the author.

Note: Others were those who did not belong to these positions, such as judicial officers. The percentage was relatively low.

**Table 4 Trends of Elite Unity: A Comparison between KMT and CCP**

	KMT	CCP
Normative component	“Unifying China with the Three Principles of the Peoples” and its being weakened	Maoism, Deng’s “one central task and two basic points” and its consistently dominant influence
Interactive component	From Strongman leadership (CKS and CCK) to elite conflicts (after CCK), without elite interaction and negotiation	From Strongman leadership (Mao and Deng) to collective leadership (After Deng), with an increase of elite interaction and negotiation

Source: Data tabulated by the author.