

**Wild Lilies and Sunflowers: Political Actors' Responses to Student Movements in
Taiwan**

Stephen Smith
Ching-hsin Yu

National Chengchi University
Taipei, Taiwan

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Introduction

In 1986, with the decision to end martial law and opening up to political opposition parties, Taiwan began the transition to democratization. Then-President Chiang Ching-kuo undoubtedly played a significant role during the periods of democratic opening. However, the idea that political reform, particularly democratization, comes solely from the “top” by reform-minded elites seems to be insufficient in the case of Taiwan. This would suggest that social movements have no capacity to affect political reform. A better explanation is that political change happens in the strategic interaction between societal forces, including political opposition and grassroots organizations, and key political actors within the ruling regime (Cheng, 1989; Cheng & Haggard, 1992). In the years leading up to the lifting of martial law, mounting pressures for political reform came from a variety of different sources. Pressure on the ruling regime came from elections, which had the effects of committing the KMT to democratic reform, educating and informing voters, and creating a democratic opposition (Rigger, 1999; Chao & Myer, 2000); from socioeconomic development and the resulting demand for representation (Tien, 1992); as well as from the outside, with international pressure on the regime to reform (Whitehead, 2007). Much of the demand for political reform in Taiwan has taken the form of popular protest (Wright, 1999; Lee, 2002).

This paper deals with how political elites in Taiwan have responded to these calls for reform. After the lifting of martial law greater freedom was given to civic associations and the organization of social movements in Taiwan became easier. While the years before 1986 have been described as a “fermentation” of popular dissatisfaction, the years from 1987-1992, the years immediately following the abolishment of authoritarian rule,

have been described as a “popular upsurge” in social movements (Ho, 2010). One of the most prominent social movements during this initial stage of democratic transition was the 1990 Wild Lily Movement, in which students staged a protest that would last for 6 days for reform of the National Assembly. The protest ended with President Lee Teng-hui acknowledging the demands of the students and promising political reform, which came the following year (Wright, 1999; Chen, 2006). The immediate response of the president and the resulting political reform was a success for the students of this early social movement. The Wild Lily Movement can be contrasted with the Sunflower Student Movement that began in 2014 as a response to a service-trade agreement signed between Taiwan and mainland China. The students of the Sunflower Movement occupied Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and would continue their sit-in for 24 days. The students involved in the Sunflower Movement received no direct response or concessions from the current president, Ma Ying-jeou (Hsiao, 2014). The difference in result for these two social movements can better help us understand the forces behind political reform during a time of democratic consolidation. Both movements were initially started by students, were aimed at political reform at the national level, and had wide support through society, but it was the Wild Lily Movement of 1990 that received a clear response from the president and immediately led to political reform. This result suggests that using an institutionalist perspective to analyze transition politics is not enough. Institutional change in new democracies is better understood by the interaction between social forces and the decisions made by political actors (Carnegie, 2009).

This paper will use the Wild Lily Movement and the Sunflower Movement to analyze the interaction between social forces and the decisions made in response by

political actors in Taiwan. By understanding the decisions made by political actors we can better understand the potential for political reform in response to social movements in the future.

Democratic Transitions

Following the lifting of martial law and subsequent political liberalization, Taiwan began the process of democratic consolidation and engaged in multiple phases of reforming institutions, much of which came in the years immediately following the end of authoritarian rule (Chen, 2006). Since Taiwan's transition to democracy was unique in that it did not involve the removal of the ruling party, the KMT continued in its role as ruling party but with its powers gradually inhibited, political institutions were not displaced and rebuilt but instead gradually reformed (Tien & Cheng, 1999). How these institutions, particularly the National Assembly, were to be reformed was a question that involved many different stakeholders with competing ideas. Reform was not the decision of a single actor but instead rested on the interaction between reformists within the KMT and hardliners that were opposed to change.

The interaction between political elites is well documented in the democratic transition literature, negotiation between opposing factions is needed for transitions to proceed relatively smoothly (O'Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, 1986). Important in this negotiation is the identity of the political actors that are involved in the reform, as individual actors have an impact on the makeup of the reformed institutions. Of course, different political actors prefer different institutional setups and within the course of negotiation it is important to remember that political actors are not a *tabula rasa* – each actor has their own preferences, based on their own experiences and political desires

(Kirchheimer, 1965). Although the individual desires of actors seems very intuitive, it is important to keep in mind when discussing political reform. This means that political change, even when pushed from the bottom by social movements, may best serve the interest of political elites (Pridham, 1990). At the very least, for demands for reform made at the grassroots level to make any meaningful change, those at the top must accept them. In this way, reform is very much dependent on the desires of elite actors. At the same time, elite actors are not one unified bloc. Factions emerge among contending blocs within the political elite and it is how these different blocs interact that shapes political reform.

Elite Divisions in the KMT

It is important to highlight the two major currents in the KMT that emerged after the transition to democratic rule: the “hard-liners” and the “reformists”. The division between the two factions centered on two issues: leadership succession and the pace of reform (Wright, 2001). The hard-liners did not support the ascension of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency. Lee’s Taiwanese roots as well as suspicions that he was sympathetic to the Taiwanese independence movement were a cause of consternation among the Mainland elite. The hard-liners were also concerned with potential social disorder that may arise from further political liberalization, those in entrenched positions in the government (including the unelected members of the National Assembly), and all those that feared reforms were being implemented too quickly.

Prominent hard-liners included Hau Pei-tsun, who was at the time Minister of National Defense, and Lee Huan, a prominent politician who would soon become the Premier of Taiwan. Hau, a mainlander, worried that political reforms were being

implemented too quickly. Lee Huan, also a mainlander, while considered a reformist in terms of policy-making, opposed the ascension of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency. Lee Huan was previously Lee Teng-hui's superior and had a large backing within the party. When Chiang Ching-kuo selected Lee Teng-hui to be his vice-president this was particularly aggravating to Lee Huan. The hard-liners took action in early 1990. Its members proposed the constitution be changed to replace the presidential system with a cabinet system (Wright, 2001). They also proposed a counter ticket of Lin Yang-kang and Chiang Wei-kuo to oppose the ticket of Lee Teng-hui and Lee Yuen-tsu, his selected vice-president (Wright, 2001). This brought the division of the hard-liners and the reformists into the public. The reformists within the KMT included Lee Deng-hui as well as newer, Taiwanese recruits that had risen through the party thanks to Lee's patronage.

While the divisions within the political leadership was quite prominent in the lead up to the Wild Lily Movement, the situation prior to the Sunflower Movement in 2014 was much different. Prior to the Sunflower Movement there was no prominent factional division in the party elite. There were, however, tensions among party elites. President Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng, long-time Speaker of the Legislature, have held a long-standing dispute. The dispute came to a head in September 2013 when Ma tried unsuccessfully to remove Wang from his position on account of influence-peddling (Chung, 2013). The dispute between the President and the Speaker dates back to 2005 when they fought for leadership of the KMT. The competition became even more strident on the role of the Legislative Yuan in monitoring agreements between Taiwan and China. The Speaker has made clear his desire for more legislative oversight over Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) (Turton, 2008). The tension between the two was

pushed into the public in 2014, particularly because Speaker Wang's preference for greater legislative oversight over cross-strait agreements was also one of the main demands of the Sunflower Movement. Unlike the situation in 1990, however, there was no clear division in leadership prior to the Sunflower Movement. Prior to the Wild Lily Movement there was a coalition of reformists, a group of elites that broke from the conservative faction in the KMT. Prior to the Sunflower Movement there was no such coalition.

Political Opportunity Structure and Student Behaviour

Student movements in Taiwan have been strongly influenced by the political opportunity structure, particularly the threat of government crackdown. A political opportunity structure is comprised of "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others" (Kitschelt, 1986). The repressive political environment that had characterized the martial law years began to thaw in late 1980s. Fewer restrictions on the press led to new publications as well as broader coverage in existing media outlets. New periodicals led to a rising political consciousness among students at universities across the island. In this environment new student organizations began to appear, including the NTU-based Student Publication Editing Research Group and the Democratic Student Alliance, which was comprised of students from universities across the island (Wright, 2001). The former concerned itself with reform of the National Assembly while the latter focused on education reform. Both would later participate in the Wild Lily Movement.

The increasingly liberal environment in Taiwan allowed students to publicly protest in large numbers. Students held a large protest in September 1989; 2,000 students marched from the Department of Education to the Legislative Yuan protesting university regulations. The protesters were allowed to march through the city, however, university officials interrogated many participants and several students received demerit points from their university (Wright, 2001). The political environment continued to thaw and the students targeted the National Assembly as their next cause for protest.

The political environment prior to the Sunflower Movement was much different than that of the Wild Lily Movement. Twenty-five years had elapsed between the two movements and during this time civil society in Taiwan went through a process of what Ho describes as upsurge (1987-92), institutionalization (1993-99), incorporation (2000-07), and finally to a period of resurgence (2008-10) (Ho, 2010). In short, civil society became very active during the post-authoritarian years, and then entered a phase of relative calm until the Million Voices Against Corruption movement in 2006 and the Wild Strawberries movement in 2008. Following another period of relative calm, civil society resurged once again in 2014 in response to the government's handling of cross-strait agreements.

In the lead up to both protests, the government was perceived as operating in an undemocratic way. In 1990, the election of the president by the National Assembly was seen as undemocratic; in 2014 the attempted passage of a cross-strait trade deal was committed in a way that was perceived as undemocratic. Protesting against these actions deemed as undemocratic gave the students a form of legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

It was within this environment of undemocratic action by the government that students began their protests.

1990 Wild Lily Movement

Lee Teng-hui came to power in 1988 during a time of rapid political change in Taiwan. The KMT was undergoing deep reforms, political opposition parties were recently legalized, and there was a growing “Taiwanization” of the leadership, including Lee himself, who was the first President of Taiwan to be born on the island. Many reforms happened very early in the Lee presidency. In the year after he came into office, Lee reduced the size of the military by nearly ten percent, allowed soldiers to join political parties other than the KMT, and granted 34 political amnesties, which included many leading DPP politicians (Roy, 2003). There were also pressures to reform the National Assembly, an aging body of 754 assembly members mainly elected before 1949 which have held their seats ever since. All throughout this period of change there were hard-liners within the party opposed to Lee’s reforms, especially reform of the National Assembly, which would remove their political influence. On February 19, 1990, the 8th plenary session of Taiwan’s National Assembly was convened.

During the 35-day session, the assembly’s 754 members were responsible for the election of the nation’s next president and vice-president to 6-year terms. Sensing the possibility of losing political clout, the elderly assembly members attempted to increase their influence within the political system as well as their remuneration. During the 8th plenary session the assembly pushed through four proposals to expand their influence (International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, 1990):

1. The National Assembly should meet once a year (instead of once every six years);

2. The attendance fee for members should be increased from NT\$52,000 to NT\$220,000;
3. The National Assembly should have the right to initiate legislation and veto bills passed by the Legislative Yuan; and
4. The term of office for Taiwan-elected members (elected in 1986) should be 9 years instead of 6, to coincide with the date of the reelection of the President.

These proposals highlighted the rivalry between the hard-liners within the party, who opposed the selection of Lee as president and naturally opposed reform that would reduce their influence, and reformists who saw recognized the need for democratic reform of the assembly. The Taiwanese public, wary of a conservative political shift espoused by the hard-liners, expressed their dissatisfaction with the unelected National Assembly. The assembly members' attempt to increase their political power was the spark for students to go to the streets on March 16th.

The Wild Lily Movement in the spring of 1990 began as a protest for the reform of the National Assembly and was the largest student movement in Taiwan's history. On March 16th, university students in Taipei started a demonstration that would last six days demanding political change. Students organized in Taipei's Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and staged a sit-in, with a few students participating in a hunger strike. The crowd would later grow to a few thousand - estimates vary between 4,000 and 30,000 (Roy, 2003). The primary reason for the demonstration was twofold: the anachronistic structure of the National Assembly as well as efforts by assembly members to expand their power and influence.

In addition to the students, the opposition party was also pressuring the ruling regime for similar political change. On April 2, President Lee met with then DPP chairman Huang Hsin-chieh for a discussion about reforms. Huang presented President Lee with a list of six proposals for constitutional reform, including the retirement of the

mainland-elected National Assembly members (International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, 1990).

Although the students and the DPP had very similar demands, in a bid to remain independent, the students did not align with the opposition DPP. The DPP was planning a rally on March 18th but the students declined to attend, they would continue their sit-in at Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. The students listed four demands (International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, 1990):

1. Dissolve the National Assembly;
2. Abolish the "Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of the Communist Rebellion;
3. Hold a national conference to discuss constitutional changes; and
4. Set a timetable for political and economic changes.

The student protests were very timely. They occurred just as there was a factional struggle ongoing within the ruling party, and the protest effectively tilted the balance of power in favor of reformists within the KMT (Ho, 2010)

Dialogue and Withdrawal

President Lee held a dialogue with the students on March 21st, the day he was re-elected President by the National Assembly. The protest had been ongoing for five days. President Lee invited a student delegation, fifty-three students in all, to the Presidential Office to hold talks. Lee told the students that he was sympathetic to their goals, and promised that the government would study their proposals for reform (Roy, 2003). While he said he was powerless to the first two demands, President Lee agreed to the last two demands, saying that he would organize a conference that would evaluate different avenues for political reform and would soon release a timetable for reform (Wright, 1999). With this promise the students were satisfied and agreed to end their protest the following morning. What grew out of this was the National Affairs Conference, which

was held in June 1990, and would bring together a wide range of politicians, academics, and prominent citizens to discuss reform. This would lead to major political reforms in Taiwan, including: the mandatory retirement of mainland-elected National Assembly members by the end of 1991, the abolition of the Temporary Provisions and the termination of the “Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion”, and constitutional amendments to provide elections for all parliamentary bodies by 1993 and direct popular election of the president by 1996 (Chen, 2006).

Actors in the Wild Lily Movement

Looking at the events of the Wild Lily Movement, three major actors were present in the political reform debate: President Lee, hard-liners within the KMT, and students. These three actors, although distinct in their motives and ability to affect change, were not necessarily distinct in their preferences. The division between President Lee and the KMT hardliners is quite clear, Lee wanted political reform in the form of a more inclusive government and the hard-liners did not. The students' discontent provided reformists with a bigger mandate for reform. President Lee could use the popular discontent transmitted by the students to advance his agenda. The response to the demands by the students, then, should be different by both the reformists and hard-liners according to each actor's preferences.

Students

As mentioned previously, the students had four demands: dissolution of the National Assembly, abolishment of the Temporary Provisions, commencement of a national conference to discuss changes, and a timetable for future political and economic

reforms. They were proposing a complete overhaul of the current government structure. The current structure did not allow for adequate representation in the political system, too much power was vested in unelected mainland officials. For adequate representation to occur a complete overhaul of the system was necessary. This involved changing the structure of political institutions (the National Assembly) to be more inclusive to the needs of Taiwanese.

President Lee

Lee rose to the presidency during a time when there were divisions in the ruling party. The older, mainland officials were sensitive to any action that appeared to be in support of Taiwan independence, and many assumed Lee would be a weak president. Hard-liners in the party were wary of his Taiwanese roots and suspicions that he was sympathetic to the Taiwanese independence movement (Roy, 2003; Copper, 1992). For Lee, the political system needed to be changed for his presidency to be successful. Although the Chiang rule was over, many of the political institutions still bore the mark of authoritarianism; this old order would not give Lee enough space to govern to his liking. He had faced dissent in the National Assembly during his election and would likely be constrained by the conservative faction in the future. Lee would use constitutional reforms as a stepping-stone to a new order, not as an extension of the old order (Chen, 2006). As the student demands for political reform matched quite closely with his own reformist ideas it is natural that he would respond to the students positively. Using public support to complement his ideas on reform would increase their likelihood of success. On March 21st, the day of his re-election as the eight-term president of the ROC, Lee immediately met with the students. His response was unambiguously positive,

he agreed that constitutional reform was required and agreed to call a National Affairs Conference, one of the key demands made by the students. Lee also met with Huang Hsin-chieh, chairman of the opposition DPP, on April 2nd to discuss issues related to constitutional reform and party politics (Chen, 2006). During the meeting Huang proposed seven proposals for constitutional reform (International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, 1990):

1. Termination of the "Period of Communist Rebellion" before 1 July 1990;
2. Retirement of all mainland-elected representatives in the three national-level legislative bodies before 1 September 1990;
3. Abolishment of the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" before 1 December 1990;
4. Holding general elections for all seats in the national-level legislative bodies before 31 December 1990;
5. Holding direct popular elections for the Provincial Governor before 30 June 1991;
6. Holding direct popular elections for the positions of mayor of Taipei and Kaohsiung before 30 June 1991; and
7. Holding direct presidential elections no later than 31 March 1993.

Lee stated that he would implement the first six proposals within the next two years but the direct election of the president would take more time. This meeting made clear that reform was on Lee's agenda.

KMT 'Hardliners'

In 1990, at the 8th plenary session of the National Assembly, the party was due to elect the next chairman of the party as well as the president and the vice-president of the ROC. There were previous hesitations about electing Lee as party chairman both because of his untested leadership and apparent sympathy with the opposition. A challenger to Lee was Lin Yang-kang, who teamed up with Wego Chiang to challenge Lee for the presidency, which further divided the KMT (Copper, 1992). Although Lee was the eventual nominee, the assembly members continued to fight legislation to reform the National Assembly. The KMT pushed a law through the legislature in 1989 asking for the

assembly members' voluntary retirement but this was resisted and the assembly continued to question the legality of forcing assembly members to retire (Copper, 1992). For the assembly members it was very natural to resist political reform. Any reform of the National Assembly to make it more democratic would naturally involve the loss of their position. Resisting reform to the National Assembly was in their self-interest. The actors involved in the 1990 Wild Lily Movement and their responses are listed below.

Student demands	President Lee	KMT hard-liners
1. Dissolution of the National Assembly; 2. Abolishment of the Temporary Provisions; 3. A national conference be held to discuss political reform; and 4. A timetable of future political reform.	Met with students 5 days after initial protest, positive response to student demands, agreed to implement student suggestions	Disagreed with students, opposed to reform of the National Assembly

2014 Sunflower Movement

On June 29, 2010, after months of negotiations, China and Taiwan signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). It is the most significant agreement signed between the two sides since the two sides split in 1949. The agreement involves economic cooperation, commodity and service trade, investment protection, intellectual property rights, trade defense measures and settlement mechanisms for business disputes. After a line-by-line review and approval in Taiwan's legislature the agreement came into force on September 12, 2010 (Shih & Chao, 2010). Following the conclusion of ECFA, both sides began talks on a service-trade agreement. The catalyst for the Sunflower Movement was to be this agreement.

On June 21, 2013 in Shanghai, Taiwan and China signed the CSSTA. Under the pact, 64 service industries in Taiwan will be opened for Chinese investment. The expected economic benefits of the CSSTA are skewed towards Taiwan – for the 64 service industries that will be opened to Chinese investors, 80 service industries in China will be opened for Taiwanese investors (Mo, 2013). Shortly after the agreement was brought back to Taiwan for review, the DPP and KMT reached an agreement stipulating that the CSSTA would be reviewed clause-by-clause in the Legislative Yuan (Cole, 2014). On September 25, the two parties agreed to hold 16 public hearings on the bill, 8 chaired by the KMT and 8 chaired by the DPP, to get input from business and social groups around Taiwan (Cole, 2014).

Around this time, a crisis emerged within the KMT leadership as President Ma Ying-jeou unsuccessfully tried to remove Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng from the party over allegations of influence peddling (Chung, 2013). The rift between two political leaders brought out into the public a split between the two political elites. Observers have suggested that Ma tried to strip Wang of his party membership as a warning to other party members not following the party line on bills such as the CSSTA (Chung, 2013). The review of CSSTA was full of difficulties; the KMT held their 8 review sessions of the bill within one week, while the DPP used legislative methods to stall the process of the bill through the legislature, ensuring the bill would not be passed before December. Efforts to pass the bill resumed in March, and following clashes in the legislature, on March 17th, KMT Legislator Chang Ching-chung declared that the 90-day review period had expired, the bill would be considered “reviewed” and sent for a direct vote later that week (Cole, 2014). This effectively skipped the clause-by-clause review that the KMT and DPP

planned to conduct in June. While both parties were publicly arguing about the bill, public dissatisfaction was starting to mount. On March 18th, the day after the bill was declared passed, 300 students entered the Legislative Yuan and began their occupation in protest of the undemocratic way in which CSSTA was passed (Cole, 2014).

By the next morning thousands of protesters were outside the Legislative Yuan waving banners, singing, and listening to speeches by fellow protesters, academics and student leaders. Over the next few days supporters continued to arrive in the streets surrounding the Legislative Yuan, bringing with them food, water, and equipment for the students inside the legislature, as well as setting up medical facilities. Opposition leaders who supported the students as well as civic groups were able to freely enter the chamber to show their support for the students. The students had four demands (Culpan, 2014):

1. That the legislature review and renegotiate the trade services pact;
2. That the legislature implement an oversight bill monitoring future cross-strait agreements;
3. That the legislature pass that oversight mechanism before the services deal is reviewed; and
4. That the government hold a citizens' constitutional assembly.

It should be noted that the first demand was originally to reject the trade services pact altogether, but was later amended to a renegotiation of the pact in the legislature. Also, the second demand was not new; the opposition DPP proposed similar oversight bills multiple times in previous years. The second demand was the most important for the students. In an interview on March 24th, student leader Chen Wei-ting, regarding a review of the CSSTA, commented: "Our demand has always been the same: the review should only be conducted after passing a bill to monitor cross-strait agreements, and only by doing so can we establish a model and standard for truly democratic review procedure" (Letters From Taiwan, 2014).

Dialogue and Withdrawal

Shortly after the start of the occupation Ma held a press conference regarding the protests in which he stated the willingness to provide a full review of the CSSTA but argued that, “since the agreement is signed it is unreasonable and impossible to make any changes to it at this time” (Letters From Taiwan, 2014). Seven days after the occupation started, Ma made an offer to meet with the students but was declined as earlier that day KMT legislators blocked the CSSTA from being returned to the Internal Administrative Committee (內政委員會) for review (Loa, 2014). On April 2, President Ma’s proposal to hold a national affairs conference on economics and trade was rejected by student leaders, who had proposed a citizens’ constitutional conference. The next day the Cabinet proposed an oversight mechanism and would submit the draft legislation “Statute for the Processing and Monitoring of Agreements between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”, however, the CCSTA would not be subject to this oversight (Mainland Affairs Council, 2014). This was not a sufficient response for the students, whose main demand was the re-review of the CSSTA.

On April 6, in a surprising turn, the President of the Legislature, Wang Jin-pyng, announced that further review of the CSSTA would be delayed until the legislature passes an oversight mechanism for future cross-strait deals, a concession to one of the students’ main demands. This was considered as a victory for the students and the following day the protesters announced they would be leaving the Legislative Yuan three days later, on April 10, bringing the 24 day occupation to an end.

Actors in the Sunflower Movement

We can identify three major actors during the Sunflower Movement: the students, President Ma, and the opposition to the President, which included both the DPP and factions within the KMT, notably Speaker Wang. Similar to the actors in the Wild Lily Movement, these three actors had different motives and abilities but not necessarily different outcome preferences. President Ma wanted the CSSTA to pass, which would help him achieve his goals of more integrated cross-strait economic ties. The DPP were opposed to the CSSTA, mainly due to way the deal was negotiated. The DPP and dissenting factions within the KMT could use the popular discontent transmitted by the students to stall the passage of the bill. The response to the demands by the students, then, should be different by both the President and those opposed to the President according to each actor's preferences.

Students

The students occupying the Legislative Yuan were represented by two individuals, Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting. As said above, the students had four demands: review and renegotiate the trade services pact in the legislature; implement an oversight bill; pass that oversight mechanism before the services deal is reviewed; and hold a citizens' constitutional assembly. Of these, the oversight bill was seen as the most important goal of the movement (Culpan, 2014). The reason behind this is as soon as the Sunflower Movement ends, an oversight bill would ensure that the Movement's main concerns would continue to be met and supervision of the legislature could continue.

As the protest went on there appeared to be two different views held by the student protesters. Some students, including protest leaders Lin and Chen, maintained that they were protesting against the undemocratic handling of the bill, the so-called

“black-box” that the trade deal was being negotiated in. Lin, in an interview on March 28, said, “We feel that the content of the agreement was developed in 'black box' negotiations (Brown and Li, 2014).” Reiterating that they were not fundamentally against the trade deal, Chen said, “We are not completely against the services trade pact, but we want to first establish a bill to ensure that members of the parliament can directly review the trade pact and the people can directly participate in its process, and conduct the review afterwards (Turton, 2014).” The “anti-black box” group, much like the student demonstrators of the past generation, was aiming to strengthen the democratic process in Taiwan’s legislature.

As the protests dragged on, there was another group that held the view that CSSTA must be revoked. For this group, contention lied not only with the “black-box” in which the bill was passed, but also the bill itself. This “anti-CSSTA” group appeared to be more ideological and seemed to oppose the trade pact either due to feelings of animosity towards President Ma and the KMT, or a wariness of any agreement with China. Indeed a poll carried out by Chinese-language magazine *Business Week* showed that while 81% of respondents do not have sufficient knowledge about the pact, 56% opposed CSSTA (Hsu, 2014). The views of the anti-CSSTA group, that the bill be revoked, did not line up with the interests of President Ma.

President Ma

For the first few days of the protests the President did not have any public reaction. Initially rejecting a dialogue with students who were occupying the legislature, Ma eventually proposed a meeting on March 26th but was rejected by the students due to his party’s blocking of the CSSTA being returned for review. Ma’s number two, Premier

Jiang, met with students but the meeting was unproductive as Premier Jiang was not willing to concede to any of the demands made by the students. On March 28th, Premier Jiang said the administration was “open” to the proposal of drafting a cross-strait agreement monitoring bill and a line-by-line review of the CSSTA but would not subject the CSSTA to the new oversight mechanism (Chen, 2014). The next day, President Ma repeated his support for a monitoring bill, putting the Mainland Affairs Council in charge of drafting a new bill, although he rejected the students’ demand that the review of the CSSTA be halted until a new oversight bill was passed (Huang, 2014). The main interest of President Ma was making sure the CSSTA was passed. Throughout the 24-day protest, President Ma did not meet with the students or accede to their main demand that a cross-strait mechanism monitoring future cross-strait deals be passed and the CSSTA be re-reviewed subject to this mechanism. He made clear his opposition to the students, even giving interviews to the foreign press expressing his dissatisfaction.

Opposition – DPP, Speaker Wang

The DPP has made clear their opposition to the CSSTA, reasons include the non-transparent way the bill was negotiated and the lack of review on the effects of the agreement (Department of Foreign Affairs DPP, 2014). From the beginning of the talks on the CSSTA the DPP has used various tactics to slow the passage of bill through the legislature (Cole, 2014). The DPP, then, naturally responded positively to the students who were protesting the lack of transparency in the cross-strait agreement. Plenty of DPP politicians were active in their support for the students, including former chairwoman Tsai Ying-wen (Ping, 2014). Certainly, the DPP was fearful that if the KMT’s China policy was successful it would endanger their hope of returning to power.

Wang Jin-pyng, an elder of the KMT, has been the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan since 1999. During the protests Wang was seen as a conciliatory figure working in between party hard-liners and the students. Early in the movement Wang declined a meeting with Ma to discuss the occupation of the legislature, informing the president that the protests were not a matter for the head of state to intervene in. On March 24th, Wang held cross-party talks regarding the service pact; the talks broke down as lawmakers could not agree on a compromise. On the 20th day of the protests Wang entered the Legislative Yuan and conceded to the students; as Legislative Speaker he would ensure that a mechanism to monitor cross-strait deals would be passed before he would allow the resumption of talks on the CSSTA. The rest of the party was surprised by his concession; Alex Fai, the KMT caucus deputy secretary, commented that the party felt betrayed as Wang, “did not communicate with the party caucus before releasing the statement and made us who stood beside him appear to blindly endorse his views” (Hsiao, 2014). For Speaker Wang, the President’s reluctance to respond to the students may have provided him with an opportunity to resolve the students’ complaints while adding to his image as a politician capable of compromise. Promising to pass a bill monitoring cross-strait agreements before the CSSTA is reviewed was also a slight to President Ma who did not plan on this concession.

The actors involved in the 2014 Sunflower Student Movement and their responses are listed below.

Student demands	President Ma	DPP/Speaker Wang
1. Review and renegotiate the trade services pact in the legislature; 2. Implement an oversight bill; 3. Pass that oversight mechanism	Disagreed with students, Did not agree to re-review of the CSSTA,	Agreed with students, Speaker Wang responded positively, provided

before the services deal is reviewed; and 4. Hold a citizens' constitutional assembly.	Did not meet with students during the 24 day protest	concessions to students to end the protest
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Comparison of Movements

After the Wild Lily Movement began it took 3 days for the government to officially respond to the students, 5 days until a deal was reached, and the protests ended after 6 days; during the Sunflower Movement it took 5 days for the government to respond, 19 days until a deal was reached, and the protests lasted 23 days. When comparing the two student movements side-by-side it is clear that government response was swifter, a deal was made quicker, and thus the protests ended sooner in 1990. What made the situation different and why was a deal so much harder to be agreed upon in 2014? When analyzing the prospects for demands of a student movement to be realized it is important to note in whose interest the demands line up with. The demands of the Wild Lily Movement, reform of the National Assembly and abolishment of the Temporary Provisions, were also in the interest of then-President Lee. The demands of the Sunflower Movement, implementation of an oversight mechanism for cross-agreements and a re-review of the CSSTA, were not in the interest of President Ma. The shared interest in political reform may be an important indicator of whether a social movement will be successful or not. If demands espoused by social movements are in line with the interest of elite political actors they may be more likely to be met. If demands by social movements do not line up with the interests of elite actors, those actors will do what they can to stall political reform. This seems very intuitive, but it is important when discussing the prospects for political reform. Taiwan has a history of social movements demanding

political change. What made most of these movements unsuccessful was that the political opportunity structure, the opportunity for social change in society, was very small in Taiwan due to the repressive government at the time. Since martial law was abolished and many political freedoms were given back to Taiwanese citizens, the room opportunity for social change has grown much larger. Political reform, however, especially at the national level, is a complicated process with many different actors with many different preferences. It is these elite actors that drive political reform. To drive reform in their interest political actors use all means available to them, and grassroots pressure is an especially powerful force. If grassroots movements serve the interest of elites they will be used in this way. President Lee, already eyeing political reform, used the student protests of 1990 as a sort of validation for his plans. The dissatisfaction expressed by students towards the unelected mainland officials helped to strengthen his hand. If, on the other hand, grassroots movements are not in the interest of political elites then they will be ignored or at the very least only partially accepted. President Ma not responding to the demands of the Sunflower Movement exemplifies this type of situation. The students' demands, re-review of the CSSTA and future cross-strait deal monitoring mechanism, was not in the interest of Ma, so he ignored them.

A question that must be asked is if political reform is so dependent on the will of political elites, how much capacity do social movements have for change? Although a major source of political change comes from political elites it is important to remember that political reform is a result of the strategic interaction between societal forces, including political opposition and grassroots organizations, and key political actors within the ruling regime. Although some political actors have a greater ability to enact

reforms (in Taiwan, the president) other actors can have an influencing effect. President Ma did not endorse the demands proposed by the students during the Sunflower Movement, but Speaker Wang took them up when a rift occurred in the party. Even though one political faction does not endorse demands others within the polity may endorse them.

Why was the response of the president to these two movements different? In 1990, the demands of the students were similar to the desire of the president, while in 2014, the students held a position against the President. If political change happens in the strategic interaction between societal forces, including political opposition and grassroots organizations, and key political actors within the ruling regime, we expect grassroots movements to reach their goals quicker if their demands line up with key political elites.

Conclusion and Legacies

The 1990 Wild Lily Student Movement and the 2014 Sunflower Student Movement were two major student movements in Taiwan's recent history. In both cases students were disappointed with the lack of participation they were capable of in national policy making. For the students of 1990, they demanded the mainland-elected officials of the National Assembly step down. The National Assembly members were too old, out of touch with Taiwanese needs, and they were holding onto their well-remunerated positions undemocratically. For the students of 2014, they demanded that the legislature pass a monitoring mechanism for all future cross-strait deals and re-review the CSSTA within this framework. They believed the CSSTA was passed too hastily and in a non-transparent manner. What were the legacies, if any, of the two movements?

For the students of the 1990 Wild Lily Movement tangible outcomes came very quickly. In June 1990 a National Affairs Conference was held to discuss political changes. In May 1991 Lee announced the end of the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellion”. Finally, members of the National Assembly were required to retire by December 31, 1991. The Wild Lily Movement achieved their stated goals and in the process facilitated the consolidation of Lee’s power. It was a win-win situation for both parties.

The students of the 2014 Sunflower Movement did not get a meeting with the President; moreover, it was a rival party member, not the President, which gave a concession to them (albeit short of what they initially wanted). Although the Sunflower Movement cannot claim the concrete successes that the Wild Lily Movement claimed, they undoubtedly had an effect on policy. The legislature was unable to pass CSSTA during the 2014 legislative session and will have to wait until 2015 to restart the negotiation process. A cross-strait monitoring bill will also be negotiated that will affect future relations with China. Perhaps the most important legacy of the Sunflower Movement will be the demand for more transparency from the government. The stress that protesters placed on “black-box” negotiations will certainly put future cross-strait negotiations under more intense scrutiny. This legacy would help strengthen the democratic process in Taiwan and can certainly be considered a major victory of the student movement.

Future Implications for Contentious Politics in Taiwan

As Taiwan has gone down the path towards democratic consolidation numerous problems have arisen in the process. When problems have arisen social movements have

been there to request change. How the government responds to these social movements can have a large impact on the future of state-society relations. Student movements have arisen in Taiwan due to an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the policy of the ruling party. The dissatisfaction that students have felt over government policy has also been shared by a large segment of Taiwanese society. The public support that the students received during the Sunflower Movement showed the vast dissatisfaction with current government performance in Taiwan. What repercussions will this latest student movement have for Taiwan?

Revival of Civil Society

If the ruling party does not adequately implement reforms that the students wanted, particularly a more transparent government, the possibility of more frequent protests is possible. Sunflower leader Lin Fei-fan has already lent his hand to several other protests since the movement ended in April. Civil society in Taiwan has been relatively quiet in recent years. The Sunflower Movement was the first major political protest since 2006, when citizens protested the corruption of then-President Chen Shui-bian. The Sunflower Movement politicized students across many different campuses. It also brought regular citizens from all over the island into the movement. As many more citizens have become politicized this movement may lead to a revival of Taiwanese civil society.

More transparency

The fundamental issue that the Sunflower Movement of 2014 brought forward was the lack of transparency in political decision making in Taiwan. Bringing negotiations out of the “black-box” is a goal that has resonated with many Taiwanese.

The success of the movement in bringing the issue of transparency into the forefront of the minds of regular Taiwanese may have an effect of opening up the “black-box” and allowing more transparency in cross-strait negotiations. The opposition DPP may transform the students’ demands into an overall demand for a more transparent policy-making process, especially in the field of cross-strait relations. In other words, the DPP can speak out for democratic reform, which has a higher value than the “Agreement” issue.

Cross-strait negotiations more difficult

The Sunflower Movement put the government’s China policy in sharp focus. The “anti-CSSTA” view of many of the protesters resonated with a large part of the Taiwanese public that is wary of closer ties to China. Most worrying is Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on China, which could have implications for national security. In the future, agreements between Taiwan and China will likely be subject to increased scrutiny and the passage of cross-strait agreements will be more difficult. The fallout from the Sunflower Movement will make broad agreements between the Taiwan and China more difficult to negotiate and likely dampen the possibility of large-scale economic liberalization between the two sides.

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