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Territories of “Greater China” and the Chinese Cultural Governance of Hong Kong

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Abstract:

Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy from China, especially in its political and judicial systems. Much of the existing political research on China's governance of Hong Kong focuses on conflicts between China's government and Hong Kong's grassroots requirement on political reform, often casting China's government as monolithic and inflexible. However, those interested in Chinese territoriality have yet to adequately address how China holds together a diversity of cultural, political, and territorial systems. Without a better understanding of Chinese cultural governance, we are left with an inadequate analysis of how China manages its exotic array of heterogeneous territories like Hong Kong. This project addresses this gap by studying the ways in which China deploys cultural governance initiatives to incorporate Hong Kong into "Greater China" and organizes it as a territory under the "One Country, Two Systems" policy. Specifically, this project studies cultural governance techniques such as the sponsorship of historical films celebrating cultural difference unified by the state, textbooks highlighting continuities between the PRC and the SAR, and the recent slogan of "China Dream" to construct a national Chinese culture in Hong Kong which the PRC claims to represent as a legitimate nation-state.

Governing Hong Kong Culture

After being a British colony for more than a hundred years, Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997. This long colonial history left Hong Kong in a very different cultural and social situation than mainland China. The British set up Hong Kong's Basic Law, legal system, parliamentary system, and introduced European understandings of freedom and democracy, enforcing English language education too. To address these differences between Hong Kong and mainland China, Deng Xiaoping questioned the revered territorial policy of "absolute sovereignty" to the idea that there is only one country China, but Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan were different enough that they could not be changed to conform to mainland China. Deng decided that these special regions could keep their capitalist economic and political systems without leaving China's communist system. The goal of this "One Country, Two Systems" policy plan was to have a peaceful reunification of territories and at the same time Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan keep the conditions which let them become prosperous and

stable. For the Chinese government, one country is the premise and basis of the two systems. For example, Hong Kong's Basic Law states that "a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be established in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, and that under the principle of 'one country, two systems,' the socialist system and policies will not be practiced in Hong Kong."¹ Because China recognizes differences between economic systems, but not differences between the people of China, it has created projects of cultural governance which try to make nations in diverse territorial assemblages. One of the most successful strategies China has come up with is the idea of "Greater China."

Even though Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy especially its political and judicial systems operate independently from those of mainland China. A lot of the literature on Hong Kong focuses on the conflicts between China's government and Hong Kong's government. When assessing China's power, these studies look at things like the ability to recruit, monitor, and hold accountable government officials.² However, looking at official governmental kinds of power only gives us a partial understanding of state capacity. A more complete explanation of China's power in Hong Kong should look at Chinese governance initiatives. Foucault gives a good explanation of the typical way Europeans think of government and governmental authority:

the practices of government are, on the one hand, multifarious and concern many kinds of people: the head of a family, the superior of a convent, the teacher or tutor of a child or pupil; so that there are several forms of government among which the prince's relation to his state is only one particular mode; while on the other hand, all these other kinds of government are internal to the state or society....Thus we find at once a plurality of forms of government and their immanence to the state; the

¹ "Basic Law Full Text - Preamble.html," accessed December 31, 2014, <http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/preamble.html>.

² Lily L. Tsai, *Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

multiplicity and immanence of these activities distinguishes them radically from the transcendent singularity of Machiavelli's prince.³

Governance is a much better way to think about Chinese territorial assemblages. Governance includes government, but also includes the administration of things outside formal government. Shapiro gives a good definition of governance which applies to the concept of "Greater China" and to Deleuze's way of thinking about assemblages. In *Methods and Nations*, Shapiro approaches "governance not as the management of a people who belong by dint of character or other distinguishing attributes within a discrete territory, but rather as a historical process in which boundaries are imposed, and peoples are accorded varying degrees of cultural coherence and political intelligibility—not on the basis of national divisions, but as a result of the exercise of power."⁴ In terms of Chinese territorial assemblages, this is a useful approach for studying how the Chinese state creates a Chinese nation which it can claim to represent. The concept of "Greater China" is a useful strategy for spreading Chinese nationalism, but it is also used to organize and create a territory which China can manage. William Callahan points out that "Shapiro's semiotic approach to politics both deconstructs the power of international regimes and nation-states, and then looks to indigenous and minority writers, artists and scholars to recover different ways of thinking, feeling and being" which avoids romanticizing the non-Westerners.⁵ In other words, by beginning with the assumption that nations are not natural, but are the product of processes like cultural governance, we can see how China makes its nations as part of its way to produce territories. Callahan points out that with Hong Kong "The formula is the opposite of the Westphalian system: one system, many countries" and is therefore full of

³ Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 1 edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1991), 91.

⁴ Michael J. Shapiro, *Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject*, New Ed edition (New York: Routledge, 2004), 49.

⁵ William Callahan, *Cultural Governance and Resistance in Pacific Asia*, 1 edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 16.

possible alternatives which China sometimes manages and sometimes cannot.⁶ Callahan studies how “Greater China has been framed as a ‘crisis’ that has produced both economic opportunities (Confucian capitalism) and dangers (the China threat),”⁷ but my study is more interested in how Greater China is a strategy of cultural governance used to create and organize Chinese territorial assemblages.

Greater China

Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and any other territory which is not administered by the Chinese government can still be managed as Chinese territorial assemblages. Even if Taiwan, for example, is a de facto sovereign state, the concept of Greater China is useful for making it a Chinese territory, even if that territory only exists in the future as China hopes to someday make Taiwan into its 23rd province. Greater China (“Dazhongguo” in Chinese) does not have a very clear definition or meaning, although basically it can be referred to “the phenomenon of growing interactions and interdependencies within the constituent parts of China existed.”⁸ However, different analysts can explain this term in different ways either economically, politically, geographically or culturally. Chinese politics experts like Harry Harding thinks that the term of Greater China contains “three relatively distinct themes: economic integration, cultural interaction and political reunification within the international Chinese community. Each of these variants of Greater China has different boundaries, has different capitals or centers of activity,

⁶ William A Callahan, *Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 141.

⁷ *Ibid.*, xxix.

⁸ David Shambaugh, “Introduction: The Emergence of ‘Greater China,’” *The China Quarterly*, no. 136 (December 1, 1993): 654.

and takes different institutional forms.”⁹ Regarding economic integration, Chinese economies have been integrated as trade between Hong Kong and mainland China, and trade between Taiwan and mainland China has been rapidly increased since the implementation of the Reform and Opening Up policies. The cultural interaction mainly refers to the increasing contact between mainland Chinese and people in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Political reunification is the incorporation of the Chinese state after hundreds of years of migration from mainland China and following the PRC’s takeover of mainland China. Harding argues that those three aspects are interrelated and says that “a common cultural identity provides a catalyst for economic ties, and economic interdependence may lay the foundation for political unification. In theory, therefore, the three aspects of Greater China could merge into a single integrated entity.”¹⁰ This is also a good explanation of the ultimate goal of the Chinese government, which is to realize a great revival of what it argues is a homogeneous Chinese nation. Hong Kong, as a former British colony, is an example which China often uses to show how it can solve conflicts over its territoriality and national sovereignty. The concept of Great China came about as a conceptual solution to include Hong Kong as part of the One Country, Two Systems policy, but it has also become a crisis of territoriality which China tries to manage using cultural governance.

The Chinese government also “devote[s] considerable attention and energy to the exercise of symbolic power as a means to affirm its right to rule. It does so, moreover, in ways which creatively blend ‘culturalist’ and ‘nationalist’ claims.”¹¹ China’s leaders are very clear to put attention on cultural governance and even put it on official political agendas. For example,

⁹ Harry Harding, “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations and Reservations,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 136 (December 1, 1993): 661.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 684.

¹¹ Elizabeth J. Perry, “Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: ‘Re-Orienting’ Party Propaganda,” *Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Papers, Harvard*, 2013, 5, <http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/11386987>.

when former Chinese President Hu Jintao made his report to the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he spent 10 minutes talking about how important it is to develop a strong “socialist culture” in China. He argued that “Culture is the lifeblood of a nation, and it gives the people a sense of belonging,”¹² and added that “the strength and international competitiveness of Chinese culture are an important indicator of China’s power and prosperity and the renewal of the Chinese nation.”¹³ Later, the new Chinese President Xi Jinping continued this theme by recently saying “our responsibility now is to rally and lead the entire Party and the people of all ethnic groups in China in taking over the relay baton passed on to us by history, and in making continued efforts to achieve the great renewal of the Chinese nation.”¹⁴ This is not just rhetoric. Hong Kong has become a major place for cultural governance initiatives which hope to solidify Chinese identity among those in Hong Kong and also an important part of China’s management of territorial assemblages.

For the British, Hong Kong is a recent territory which was established as part of an effort to civilize the barbarians. Nayan Chanda summarizes the British attitude towards colonial territories as “the truth is that colonialism at its best, and Hong Kong was an outstanding example, is an attempt to export a system of superior political, economic, and often cultural ethics to societies which have been denied them.”¹⁵ However, for China, Hong Kong is a historical problem and in China’s context, Hong Kong represents a legacy of national shame at the inability to prevent colonization. Hong Kong’s Basic Law stipulates that “Hong Kong has been part of the territory of China since ancient times; it was occupied by Britain after the Opium

¹² “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress - Xinhua | English.news.cn,” accessed December 31, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_7.htm.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ “Xi Jinping’s Remarks to the Press,” accessed December 31, 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27130032.htm.

¹⁵ Nayan Chanda, *Hong Kong: A New Beginning* (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1997), 8.

War in 1840.”¹⁶ This history makes Hong Kong an especially important territory since it can be a place where China can test its sovereignty against European might. One way it does this is by proving that Hong Kong culture is actually part of Chinese culture or, to explain it using Deleuze and Guattari, by reterritorializing the people there as Chinese.

Deterritorializing and Reterritorializing Hong Kong National Culture

China’s crisis of national humiliation and patriotic education serves as a very good tool to govern Hong Kong. The CCP launched a patriotic education campaign in 1991 which was directed at “reestablishing Chinese people’s political beliefs, loyalty to the communist state, and morality among the populace.”¹⁷ At the same time, the national-humiliation theme was used to create support for the idea of Greater China to strengthen its claims on Hong Kong. William Callahan gives the best description of this process by arguing that “Since China lost face by losing territory to Western powers and Japan before 1945, now it must make sure not to lose face again by losing territory to its Southeast Asian neighbors.”¹⁸ A Chinese book published just after the Transfer of Sovereignty makes this obvious by arguing “The history of the century of humiliation of the Chinese race continually tells us: foreign races invade us via the sea. Experience repeatedly reminds us: gunboats emerge from the Pacific Ocean; the motherland is not yet completely unified; the struggle over sovereignty of the Spratlys, Diaoyudao and the Sino-Indian boundary still continues..... We must build a strong navy to guard territorial

¹⁶ “Basic Law Full Text - Preamble.html.”

¹⁷ Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*, 1 edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 223.

¹⁸ William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29, no. 2 (March 1, 2004): 211, doi:10.1177/030437540402900204.

integrity, and to protect national maritime rights and privileges.”¹⁹ The need to overcome the “humiliation of the Chinese race” has become a guiding policy of Chinese cultural governance. One way this is addressed is in the museums, textbooks, history books, films, exhibitions, TV shows, and music which is massively produced in China as part of nation-building projects in which China tries to “establish the stories of China’s sovereign territoriality in the context of modern international politics — particularly colonialism.”²⁰ This also anchors what geographer Thongchai Winichakul calls the “national geobody” which is “a component of the life of a nation. It is a source of pride, loyalty, love, passion, bias, hatred, reason, unreason.”²¹ There are several examples of how China tries to reterritorialize Hong Kong by arguing that overcoming national humiliation requires people suppress cultural difference in China.

In the ceremony of the Handover of Hong Kong, then China President Jiang Zemin said that “the occupation of Hong Kong is an epitome of the humiliation China suffered in modern history,” and argued that “the return of Hong Kong marks an end to the 100-year national humiliation of leaving Hong Kong under foreign occupation and has opened a new era of common development of Hong Kong and the mainland. It also symbolizes an important step in the great cause of achieving national reunification and new contribution of the Chinese people to world peace, development and progress.”²² In 1997, a book celebrating the return of Hong Kong a book titled *The Ending of a Century of Humiliating History: The Introduction of Hong Kong*

¹⁹ Chunguang Wu, *Taipingyangshangde Jiaoliang: Dangdai Zhongguo de Yaiyang Zhanlue Wenti (The Fighting in Pacific: Contemporary China’s Maritime Strategy)* (Beijing: China Welfare Press, 1998), 128.

²⁰ William A. Callahan, “The Cartography of National Humiliation and the Emergence of China’s Geobody,” *Public Culture* 21, no. 1 (December 21, 2009): 142.

²¹ Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 17.

²² “President Jiang Zemin’s Speech to Celebrate HK’s Return,” accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t24926.shtml.

*Issue*²³ makes Hong Kong part of the narrative which sees overcoming national humiliation a reason for suppressing cultural difference in China. The Hong Kong Museum of History joined with Beijing's Revolutionary History Museum to organize several huge exhibitions titled "Rise of Modern China: A Century of Self-determination," "The Great Wall: Gems of Cultural Relics of the Nomadic Tribes," and "War and Peace: Treasures of the Qin and Han Dynasties."²⁴ The purpose of these exhibitions were to encourage people in Hong Kong to look at history as a way to prove they are part of Chinese culture and that Greater China is threatened by claims that Hong Kong is its own culture.

Deterritorialization is an important part of Chinese cultural governance too. The PRC-run newspaper *Ta Kung Pao*, for example, published an article which argued teachers and professors in Hong Kong "lack a sense of nationhood, and have blindly inculcated the young with Western ideas like universal values and democracy, textbooks have failed to shoulder the duty of propaganda."²⁵ Showing that Hong Kong has no legitimate sense of nationhood justifies China's decision to capture Hong Kong territories and peoples. Once they are deterritorialized, China then tries to territorialize Hong Kong by showing how Hong Kongese are really Chinese. In 2007, President Hu Jintao came to Hong Kong to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Transfer of Sovereignty. In a speech, he urged the Hong Kong government to "foster a strong sense of national identity among the young people in Hong Kong and promote exchanges between them and the young people of the mainland so that they will carry forward the Hong Kong people's

²³ Hou Li, *Bainian Qurushi de Zhongjie-Xianggang Wenti Shimo* (The Ending of a Century of Humiliating History: The Introduction of Hong Kong Issue) (Fujian People's Press, 1997).

²⁴ "Hong Kong Museum of History," accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.lcsd.gov.hk/CE/Museum/History/en_US/web/mh/exhibition/past.html.

²⁵ Simon Denyer, "Hong Kong Protests Spur Renewed Debate over 'patriotic' Education," *The Washington Post*, November 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/hong-kong-protests-spur-renewed-debate-over-patriotic-education/2014/11/20/41a736e6-6e69-11e4-a2c2-478179fd0489_story.html.

great tradition of loving the motherland and loving Hong Kong.”²⁶ The “One Country, Two Systems” policy sets up the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) which “exercises a high degree of autonomy, and fully exercises its administrative, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.”²⁷ However, China uses soft power to encourage the HKSAR government to adopt patriotic curricula for students with the name of “national education.” The new curriculum is similar to the patriotic education in mainland China. The materials, “including a handbook titled ‘The China Model,’ describe the Communist Party as ‘progressive, selfless and united’ and criticize multiparty systems, even though Hong Kong has multiple political parties’.”²⁸ This patriotic education curriculum was scheduled to be introduced in elementary schools in September 2012 and then become mandatory for all public schools by 2015. However, the national education program has received huge criticisms from the public in Hong Kong and in academia, and many protests of the policy eventually caused the HKSAR government to move the implementation deadlines.

Another strategy of cultural governance China uses which is not often pretested is to sponsor movies with Hong Kong. Many of these movies are about the greatness of China or justifications of the rightness of the Communist Party’s rule in China, and they become popular in China and in Hong Kong. The most famous of these two are *Ying xiong (Hero)*²⁹ directed by Yimou Zhang and *Jian dang wei ye (Beginning of the Great Revival)* or sometimes translated as

²⁶ “Hu Jintao Speech,” accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/30/content_5424310.htm.

²⁷ “Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong,” *South China Morning Post*, accessed January 1, 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-text-practice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special>.

²⁸ Joyce Lau, “Protests Over China’s Curriculum Plans for Hong Kong,” *The New York Times*, July 29, 2012, sec. World / Asia Pacific, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/world/asia/thousands-protest-chinas-curriculum-plans-for-hong-kong-schools.html>.

²⁹ Yimou Zhang, *Hero*, Action, Adventure, Drama, (2004).

*The Founding of the Party*³⁰ in China) directed by Shiping Han. Both of these two movies star some of the most famous actors from mainland China and Hong Kong. *Hero* is set during the Warring States period and is about the unification of China by the Emperor Qin. A hero (Jet Li) originally plans to assassinate the Emperor, but in a series of debates about the good way to govern, the Emperor Qin successfully persuaded the hero that unifying China under his absolute power is necessary for the future of the country and for the *Tianxia* (everyone under the Heaven). The message that the movie is clearly “an ideological justification for absolute power, for tyranny as a necessary means to a peaceful end”³¹ and some critics have argued that “the ulterior meaning of the film was the triumph of security and stability over liberty analogous to the ‘Asian Values’ concept that gained brief popularity in the 1990s.”³² By making a popular film, with famous actors from both Hong Kong and China, the hope is that people in both places will think of themselves as part of the nation which the Qin Emperor founded. *The Beginning of the Great Revival* features stars from mainland China and Chinese-speaking actors from diaspora communities. It is set just after the 1911 revolution which overthrew the Qing dynasty and is focused on the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921. The movie gives the story of the birth of the Communist Party of China, which it represents as a great revival of the Chinese nation, and portrays the Young Mao Zedong as a most important figure of the national renaissance. *Beginning of the Great Revival* is more about the renewal of China against European powers which colonized its former territories and is about showing how Chinese culture can overcome this national humiliation. Both of these movies are shown in Hong Kong and China, and both are

³⁰ Sanping Han and Jianxin Huang, *Beginning of the Great Revival*, Drama, History, (2011).

³¹ Shelly Kraicer, “Absence as Spectacle: Zhang Yimou’s *Hero*,” accessed January 1, 2015, <http://www.chinesecinemas.org/hero.html>.

³² Roger Ebert, “*Hero*,” August 27, 2004, <http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040826/REVIEWS/408260304/1023>.

supported for by the Chinese government, as a way to create a shared culture between the two places which China can say it represents as a nation-state.

Helping Hong Kong Share the Chinese Dream

More recently, the idea of Greater China as a cultural governance strategy has become part of a new narrative which General Secretary Xi Jinping has been promoting as the “China Dream.” The slogan relies again on the idea that the Chinese nation needs to be revitalized. Xi, for example, called the China Dream a project of “national rejuvenation” which can happen with the “construction of a better society and military strengthening.”³³ I think China Dream is a good example of Sassen’s idea of “capacities” which can be developed in one place and then become part of the territorial assemblage somewhere else. “China Dream” is a capacity which was used in the United States as part of projects to make Americans a nation united by their shared belief in the “American Dream” after WWII and to encourage them to support capitalism over communism. The CCP’s journal *Qiushi* also talks about China dream as a way to build national glory for cultural revitalization, but it also describe China Dream as a revitalization of the “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” idea to explain China’s decision to create “special economic zones” during the 1980s.³⁴ The special economic zones were places where venture capitalists were allowed to build factories and banking centers, but after the 1997 Transfer of Sovereignty, Hong Kong has also been granted the status as the special economic zone. China Dream is about getting Greater China to support socialism with Chinese characteristics just like

³³ Quoted in Evan Osnos, “Can China Deliver the China Dream(s)?,” *The New Yorker*, March 26, 2013, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/can-china-deliver-the-china-dreams>.

³⁴ Yuzhi Shi, “Zhongguo Meng Qubie Yu Meiguomeng de Qida Tezheng (Seven Reasons Why the Chinese Dream Is Different from the American Dream),” accessed January 3, 2015, http://www.qstheory.cn/zz/zgtsshzyll/201305/t20130520_232259.htm.

the American Dream was about getting people in the U.S. to support capitalism with American characteristics. The American Dream, like the China Dream, is now also talked about as an idea which can revitalize the nation after economic policies have made upward social mobility harder in the U.S.,³⁵ but China is using a capability developed in the U.S. to encourage Chinese nationhood and justify Chinese military expansions.

Xi sometimes talks about his “strong-army dream” and the Chinese army gave soldiers a pamphlet which said the “strong-nation dream of a great revival of the Chinese people” was really a “strong-army dream.”³⁶ Some people argue that China Dream is about cultural exports. The New York Times interviewed the editor of Umiwi.com, which is a popular website for young Chinese readers, named Ge which summarizes the cultural view of China Dream pretty well. Ge said “We have all the material things here that America has, like iPhones... We can get the best of all their goods, so that’s not an issue. But we can’t do what they do culturally: produce things like Tom and Jerry cartoons, ‘Transformers,’ ‘Avatar,’ ‘Inception,’ iPhones, Barbies. America has things we really, really like, on a cultural level.”³⁷ I think China Dream is about making a homogeneous Chinese nation, unified by the same dream of economic mobility, but it is also about surpassing the U.S. The national humiliation is still a big part of this new cultural governance strategy since it also encourages the people of Greater China to imagine a time in the near future when China will have more sovereign power over economics, military, and culture which will prevent the United States or any other country from being involved in domestic Chinese politics. I think with China Dream, Greater China becomes something like

³⁵ Heather Digby Parton, “‘American Dream’ Is Now a Myth: How Bad Policies and Worse Ideology Ruined Us,” *AlterNet*, September 27, 2014, <http://www.alternet.org/economy/american-dream-now-myth-how-bad-policies-and-worse-ideology-ruined-us>.

³⁶ “Chasing the Chinese Dream,” *The Economist*, May 4, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-quick-consolidate-his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his>.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

“China Greater than the U.S.” and is going to be a useful tool for cultural governance. Liu Yunshan, who is the head of CCP’s propaganda department, has recently ordered that China Dream be put into school textbooks so the idea will “enter students’ brains.”³⁸ In her study of CCP propaganda, Elizabeth Perry argued that “The imaginative application of cultural appeals to augment the Communist Party’s moral and political authority by presenting itself as the savior of the nation has played a crucial – albeit ever changing – role from the very inception of the Party.”³⁹

However, in Hong Kong, Xi’s discussion of the China Dream and the CCP’s plan to reform Hong Kong electoral system caused a huge protest and a new crisis. The CCP said the Occupy Central with Love and Peace protest movement was sponsored by western countries and the people who organized the Sunflower Student Movement in Taiwan.⁴⁰ The CCP-sponsored *People’s Daily* published an article designed around Greater China titled “Nobody cares about Hong Kong’s destiny more than all Chinese nationals” which said Hong Kong could not have a revolution because “Hong Kong is not a country.”⁴¹ After almost three months, the protests ended on December 24, 2015, but the proposal to change the Hong Kong electoral system is still scheduled to happen, so it seems likely there will be more protests when the next elections take place. How China manages Hong Kong may have to change, but for now the One Country, Two Systems policy and the cultural governance project of Greater China is still a key part of the Hong Kong territorial assemblage.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Perry, “Cultural Governance in Contemporary China,” 34.

⁴⁰ “Zhongguo Guaizui Taiwan Taiyanghua xueun(China Blames Sunflower Student Movement for Occupy Central),” September 30, 2014, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/1118976>.

⁴¹ “Meiyoun Bi Quanzhongguoren Geng Guanxin Xianggang de Qiantu Mingyun (Nobody Cares about Hong Kong’s Destiny More than All Chinese Nationals),” *The People’s Daily*, September 29, 2014, <http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0929/c1003-25761887.html>.

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