
JU Yu-En²				Titus C. Chen³

¹ Mountain Zhinan (指南山) is located at suburb in the southeast of Taipei City, sitting National Chengchi University (政治大學) Institute of International Relations which was a major institution working on scholar diplomacy toward US during the mid-Cold War era.
² JU Yu-En is a graduate student in Political Science in National Sun Yat-sen University of Republic of China (Taiwan), Kaohsiung. He can be reached at MO26020010@student.nsysu.edu.tw.
³ Titus C. Chen is an Associate Professor in National Sun Yat-sen University of Republic of China (Taiwan) where his research focus on International Norms and International Regime, International Relations History, International Relations Theory, International Organization, China Communist Foreign Policy, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Security and Political Economics in East Asian, History of Diplomacy. He is also a Deputy Director at Center for Southeast Asian Studies in National Sun Yat-sen University. He can be reached at tituschen@mail.nsysu.edu.tw.
Abstract

When considering the United States policy toward China, the role of Taiwan has been a controversial issue. Since the Cold War days there have been numerous pro-ROC voices all over the United States. Why did American policy elites and opinion leaders continue to care about Taiwan even after the influences of the so-called “China Lobby group” had faded away during 1960s-1970s? Why have so many prestigious American scholars who are famous for studying the China Communist Party, constantly choose to go to the Sino-American Conferences dealing with Mainland China which were held in Taipei since 1970s? What was the connection between recovering mainland China and the ROC’s diplomacy towards the United States? How did the leadership in the Kuomintang (KMT) see the normalization of relations between the PRC and the United States and how did it deal with it?

This paper employs declassified top secret files, internal documents of the government and KMT, policy papers and memoirs, in which it tries to put together various historic fragments, around the decision-making process which the government of the ROC made around international events of that time to gain insight into how the ROC perceived and managed the relationship between the US and ROC. This research emphasizes the dynamic diplomatic process as well as insights into the thoughts of higher rank officials within the government.
I. Recovering mainland China and Diplomacy toward United States

In early 1960s, the Government of the Republic of China (ROC) took the “Recovering Mainland China” as its fundamental goal. The Secretary of the Kuomintang (KMT) Tang Tzung (唐縱) specified it in the 9th National Convention: Currently, the party’s fundamental mission is to reconquer the country, and the grand strategy for the mission is the integration of revolution from within the mainland and military actions from Taiwan. All of our efforts must originate from this grand strategy. In order to advance and enlarge the anti-communist warfare, we are of the mind that our party has to observe the President’s (Chiang Kai-shek) instruction, i.e., 70% of the anti-communist campaign is of the political character and 30% is of the military nature, and the party shall formally shoulder the task of political warfare against the communist bandits.⁴

Although there was a huge gap between the ROC and the PRC in the size of territory, the scale of armed force, and the abundance of resources, the determination of the KMT leadership never wavered in this goal. Counterattacking Chinese Communist politically had been seen the best way to achieve the goal by leaderships within KMT. An example can be seen in the statement which was prepared by the Central Propaganda and Diplomacy Integrated Steering Panel (總統府宣傳外交指導小組) of Office of the President:

An examination of Chinese and foreign histories of different times finds quite a few cases of an army defeating a numerically superior enemy, and such a victory is obtained because of two truthful observations: the benevolent is invincible, and tyranny is doomed to fail. Now those regular people, communist cadres and armed

service members who mobilized uprisings and resistances in the mainland are Maoist communism’s enemies. They are not obstacles to our military campaign, and will be our reserved forces.⁵

How did they think that the political warfare would contribute to their attacking to mainland China? According to the estimate by the National Security Bureau of the ROC in 1961: there were two elements that must be accomplished before launching a large scale attack. The One was in international aspect, the other was in mainland aspect. The former depended on the success of diplomacy and propaganda toward international community, especially toward US, the later was on the breakdown of the Chinese Communists and their incapability of ruling peoples.⁶ The KMT further described it on the 8th Central Committee’s 4th plenary session (第八屆四中全會) in 1961:

We shall continue to strengthen mutual assistance and collaboration between the Republic of China and the United States, so much so that the two countries reach identical understandings on the common goals and common interests. We are the founding member states of the United Nations, and we have been working ceaselessly for protecting it. From now on we shall continue to be the UN’s apologist, fighting against the communist clique.⁷

The KMT’s reliance on international support was not only caused by the limitations of objective conditions, but also had a direct correlation within the context of the Cold War. Due to this, the Chinese Representation (ChiRep) in the UN

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mattered to the KMT China. For the KMT, ChiRep was the synonym of getting approval from the international community for its claim toward the whole of Chinese territories, and it was so dependent on support from the US that they couldn’t attach themselves to US. The reason that the US had been kept side by side with ROC in the UN was due to the consideration of its Containment strategy which aimed at fighting off the expansion of Soviet Communists since 1950 when the outbreak of the Korean War started.

On the issue of ChiRep, the Governments of the US had been siding with the KMT and had not budged until 1964 which corresponded with one thing: the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France.

In January 1964, US Secretary Dean Rusk expressed his concern to Tingfu Tsiang (蔣廷黻) who was the ambassador of the ROC:

_That USG regards de Gaulle’s action in this matter almost intolerable for many reasons, but particularly in light of Chicom involvement South Vietnam where US troops incur almost daily casualties. It is true that 42 UN nations recognize Peking._

_But France is a special case—if this hole is made in the dam the prospect is that the water will flood through._

Furthermore, the PRC’s first nuclear test in October worsened the situation, and many higher rank officials in the Government of the US proposed that they should expand its contacts to Chinese Communist. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland wrote a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk on November 5, in which he said:

_Canada, Italy and many others are impatient to get on some new track that is not vulnerable to the political charge they are “ignoring” the world’s most populous

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nation. If the line up of power in the Far East remains about the way it is, and we do not change our UN tactics, we face a serious defeat on the issue in the 20th General Assembly.\textsuperscript{9}

Such concern can also be seen from a memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff which he wrote to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs on November 23:

\textit{But we can no longer tell ourselves with any conviction that trying to ostracize Red China is the best way to protect Taiwan. To the contrary, the longer we insist on an “either-or” choice, the more we will force the wrong choice from our point of view.}\textsuperscript{10}

China’s nuclear test had the US convinced that the ROC would lose their campaign in the UN in foreseeable future if they keeping sticking to their rigid policy towards China. The result would impair their global prestige severely, especially when Washington was still fighting with the Vietnamese Communists. So the US hoped to control the development, so to make it look like a result they already expected if not welcomed. For Taipei, the move to welcome \textit{Mao Zedong}'s China entering into UN would impede their pursuit for the recovering of mainland China.

\section*{II. ROC Diplomatic Propaganda Campaign Toward the United States}

The adherence to the recovering mainland China policy and the peculiarity of the triangular relations between Washington, Taipei and Beijing, illustrated why the government of the ROC was so sensitive to any subtle changes in US policy towards China and the issue of Chinese Representation in the UN. To prevent “two China” policy from further expanding in the US, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC

\textsuperscript{9} FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XXX, No.64.
\textsuperscript{10} FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XXX, No.68.
drew up a public diplomacy policy toward the US which was named “guang an” (廣案) from November 1955. It was the combination of international propaganda and diplomacy, designed to maintain the support from the US by appealing to the American people’s favorable impression toward the ROC. The people in America whom “guang an” tried to reach would not necessarily be limited to government officials, it could be any people who could have some influence in the US. It consisted of the following major items:

1. Inviting prestigious non-official Chinese to join forums and banquets through our Ambassador to the US, and have them to contact some specific American figures.
2. Contact to a new generation of overseas Chinese, offering them convenient opportunities for coming back to visit their country.
3. Dispatching well-known religious figures and scholars to deliver speeches, as well as attending any important gatherings in all walks of life in the US.
4. Choosing some financial pundits who were already known in the US in order to contact some American political, financial, and economic leaders who held the prejudiced viewpoint against Taiwan, such as George Eumphrey.
5. Managing to offer jobs to students studying in America after they came back.

To avoid being seen as activities solely related to a China lobby, “guang an” suggested that they should operate in a way not only abiding by the laws and regulations of the country, but also in a manner acceptable to the general American people, such as providing materials and statistical data which were favorable to the ROC or which portrayed the miserable situation in mainland China. Also recruiting talents to organize speech groups and dispatching them to schools, scholar groups or

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12 Ibid.
clubs, and inviting American figures to come to visit Taiwan and encouraging them to write books, film movies on topics of the ROC’s positive traits comparable to the situation on mainland China.\(^\text{13}\)

In addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government Information Office had also made up several plans on propaganda as follows:

1. Filming video clips and presenting them to major TV stations in America through our Office in New York.

2. Disseminating articles and photos to introduce the progress of our nation through King's Feature Syndicate, Planned Communication Service.

3. Collecting and editing critiques towards the US or UN written or spoken by ChiCom, and having them published throughout American public clubs.

4. Publishing “Free China weekly”, “China’s Yearbook” in an English version and also a “Free China Review”, then giving them as presents to libraries, congressman and press.

5. Inviting American press figures or scholars to visit Free China.

6. Encouraging scholars traveling in the US and the American people who were in favor of Taiwan to refute openly opinions unfavorable to Taiwan.

7. Releasing news in the name of Chinese News Service (CNS) to the public, or to the Associated Press, International News Service through the Presswire Service.\(^\text{14}\)

In addition to the above-mentioned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made up another project “chiang an” (強案) in 1965, to enhance international propaganda work, such as contacting officials and press in New York and Washington, setting up

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

new branches in San Francisco and advertising the ROC traditional arts, music, dance, and sporting activities in America.\footnote{15}

The government of the ROC strengthened their efforts in approaching American scholars and intellectuals from 1965. On March 1st, the KMT dispatched the vice director of Central Committee 6th Panel Li Bai Hung (李白虹) to the US and had him pay a visit to 9 major cities, 12 Communist-studying institutions in universities, and 4 psychological operation organizations. He also referenced an opinion poll conducted by the University of Michigan which pointed out that 60 percent of respondents who took the opposite position on recovering mainland China were intellectuals\footnote{16}. He concluded the 3-month journey in US with the following:

1. The government of the US entrusted the expertise of professors in conducting research as their decision making basis.
2. American scholars often gathered discussing current events and have formed the mainstream of public opinion.
3. The opinion calling for concession with ChiCom and refusing to support our military operations were uprising sharply.\footnote{17}

The conclusions were accepted by Taipei and had the KMT Central Committee 6th Panel to work it out.\footnote{18}

\section*{III. ROC’s Concerns about American Appeasement}

Since 1966, government of ROC were not just concerned actions of American scholars who favored in contacting China Communist, they also refute them publicly, and, furthermore, tried to contact scholars who supported ROC’s position or took

\footnote{15}{Ibid.}
\footnote{16}{Reinforcement of Propaganda toward United States(加強對美宣傳), 1966, Institute of Modern History, Academia SINICA, Republic of China. File Number: 11-07-02-03-02-003.}
\footnote{17}{Ibid.}
\footnote{18}{Ibid.}
fare position at least. They hoped viewpoints of American scholar toward China would benefits Taipei instead of Beijing, and believed it could be accomplished by acquainting them of the “truth” about China Communist and providing them reference data. It was a serious hearing held in the US Congress in early 1966 had caused Taipei’s serious concern, and led them to launch more aggressive and a larger scale of propaganda campaign towards the American people, especially those scholars, whose expertise was on studying china policy or international communism. The presidents of the Examination Yuan Cheng Tian-Fang (程天放) expressed his concern on April 29:

> All the seats in the Senate were occupied during hearings. It also wiled great influence upon American peoples through TVs, radios and broadcasts.\(^{19}\)

Also, the Propaganda and Diplomacy Integrated Steering Panel (總統府宣傳外交指導小組) specified the situation on May:

> The so-called Liberalism in United States accelerating the process of reviewing China policy on March this. There were seven hearings held on US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations one after another. The situation was, except Walter Judd and David Rowe, all others were proposing making concession to ChiCom. Especially, Doak Barnett’s testimonies including instigating containment without isolation and having both China become member of UN were fudging and obfuscating.\(^{20}\)

On May 19, the Office of the President of the ROC summoned higher ranking officials to set up the International Scholar and Cultural Activities Studying Group(國際學術文化活動研究小組) to study and coordinate international

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\(^{19}\) Shiau Tz-Cheng(蕭自誠), Seminar on US reviewing its China Policy(“美國檢討對華政策問題”學術座談會), Issues&Studies 5th Collection, (1966), 565-567.

propaganda, civil diplomacy, and international scholastic and cultural activities for the ROC. Members included the dean of Academia Sinica, comrades of the Central Committee, vice president of the Executive Yuan, foreign minister, director of Information Office, director of the Central Committee 4th panel, councilor of Executive Yuan. Furthermore, Ambassador to the US Jou Shu-Kai (周書楷) held the 4th consulates general meeting in the US on May 28th and made the 1967 working plan of “chiang an” (強案), suggesting a simplification of the procedure of affairs concerning nationals living abroad and consular affairs, as well as editing more propaganda materials. Ambassador Jou also made the 1967 annual working plan on expanding propaganda toward America and named it “kuo an” (擴案) which was preparing for holding academic seminars in the east, middle, and west of the US. With these three major plans, Taipei organized all branches of government and the party and tried to alter the US’s policy course towards China.

IV. The Great Cultural Revolution and ROC Public Diplomacy toward the US.

The chaos which happened in mainland China in August 1966 was called “the Great Cultural Revolution” (GCR), and had Taipei launching a propaganda campaign towards American scholars quickly. For the leadership in the KMT, the GCR was the result of an accumulation of anti-oppression and anti-tyranny from the past seventeen years. At early stages of the chaos, the Investigation Bureau of the ROC judged:

The chaos would topple Communist’s ruling base and lead them to total disintegration. At the same time, the forces of anti-Communism within and outside

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
the Communist party would converge in and creating the favorable circumstances for our goal of returning to the mainland.\textsuperscript{24}

Although the chaos gave Taipei hope and Chiang Ching-kuo tried to share it with Washington, but when he told the Ambassador to the ROC Walter McNaughy that now is the time for action to destroy Peiping regime, the response he got was:

\textit{The basic US policy has been not to use force against the mainland regime, and said I knew of no change in this policy.}\textsuperscript{25}

In view of the passive attitude of Washington, Ambassador to the US Jou Shu-Kai made suggestions to the director of the KMT Central Commission 4\textsuperscript{th} Shie Ran-Jr(謝然之):

\textit{American expertise being confused by the development of the situation which happened in mainland China recently. It is time to invite our comrades Ya Shiang-Jr (葉翔之)\textsuperscript{26} and Chen Jian-Jung (陳建中)\textsuperscript{27} to the US to acquaint American people with the essence of ChiCom.}\textsuperscript{28}

The suggestions were approved, then Ya and Chen spent one month in the US exchanging views on mainland China with American experts from November 16th to December 16th, after which they had to hand in a report to the leadership in the KMT.\textsuperscript{29} They said:

\textsuperscript{26} Ya Shiang-Jr was director of Intelligence Bureau of Department of Defense of ROC.
\textsuperscript{27} Chen Jian-Jung was director of KMT Central Committee 6\textsuperscript{th} Panel which was in charge of collecting and studying enemy’s materials, and psychological warfare, political warfare and counterintelligence. Missions of each KMT Central Committee Panel refer to Lin Yang-Jr(林養志), \textit{Collection of Resolutions of KMT 7\textsuperscript{th} to 9\textsuperscript{th} Central Committee in National Convention Part 2} (中國國民黨七至九屆歷次中全會重要決議案彙編（下）), (Taipei: Office of KMT, 1991), 12.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Gu Feng-Shiang No.215 Report}, 1966, KMT Archives(國民黨史館). File Number: President Ratified 55/0115.
\textsuperscript{29} KMT Central Committee Ya Shiang-Jr and Chen Jian-Jung Suggestions of Propaganda toward United States(國民黨中央委員葉翔之陳建中對美宣傳建議), 1967, Academia Historica of Republic of China.
1. We should enhance our connection to American communist studies experts and our visit has created an opportunity.

2. We should building relationship between both the US and ROC’s academic research.

3. We should improve our supply of materials and have our enemy-analysis meet the standard of foreign academic community. The suggestions were approved by President Chiang Kai-shek in January 1967, and he determined that the responsibilities of influencing American expertise would fall on the Institute of International Relations of ROC.

Another year came, no one knew which direction the chaos would take, and it seemed that the Great Cultural Revolution wasn’t producing the desired effect on the issue of Chinese Representation in the UN as the KMT had expected before.

Although the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reported on May 1967:

*The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has already done immense damage to the top leadership and the party and altered the internal power structure and unsettled the Chinese society and unleashed new forces of instability. All of this contributing to China’s growing isolation in the world.*

The fact is, the chaos happened in China had little effect on the ChiRep in the UN. If we refer to the statistic of voting rate on the ChiRep in the UN during 1965 to 1967, the percentage of supporting the ROC on “the important question” and “Albanian Resolution” are 48%, 55%, 57% and 40%, 47%, 48% separately, no significant proportional growth can be seen. For Chiang Kai-shek, he would rather

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
33 Gau Lang (高朗), *The Changing of Diplomatic Relations of ROC* (中華民國外交關係之演變,
withdrawing from the UN than accepting “two China” or “one China, one Taiwan”, if necessary. Under the circumstances that his country didn’t have enough capabilities to attack mainland China; and also disappointed at United Nations, Chiang Kai-shek paid more attention to the construction of his temporal base Taiwan, hoping that his claim on mainland China would be maintained by contrasting his promisingly advanced and orderly ‘free China’ to the totalitarian, underdeveloped, out-of-order Communist China, and through this vivid comparison, earn the support from international community eventually. Due to this, Chiang Kai-shek set up the National Security Council of the ROC, whose first secretary was Huang Shau-Gu (黃少谷) to promote overall construction and increase administrative efficiency. From now on, the goal was to counterattack mainland China politically or “seventy percent on politics, thirty percent on military,” and a change to launch reforms in each aspect of society in Taiwan. Changes in leadership’s perspective toward the future of Taiwan had been perceived by Washington, and Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff mentioned it in a memorandum to the president's special assistant Walt Rostow:

*There are increasing indications that Chiang Kai-shek has reassessed his own role in history, that he has possibly accepted the unlikelihood of his return to the mainland, and that he is turning his energies toward showing how Chinese can come to grips with the 20th Century in a way in which he realized he could not have shown on the mainland.*

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V. The Establishment of the Institute of International Relations (IIR) of the ROC

The IIR was established in April of 1953, it was belonging to the tz liau tzu (material group, 資料組) of the Office of the President at first, aiming at conducting research on the international and mainland China affairs and handing in results to top leaders in the KMT. It was incorporated into the National Security Bureau which was reorganized on the bases of tz liau tzu in 1955. The Chairman of the IIR Bu Dau-Ming (卜道明) had recalled the process:

*Every comrade started to reflect on two major questions after our government moved to Taiwan in 1949. The first is why we lost mainland China, the second is how to recover it? Shau Yu-Lin (邵毓麟), Ma Shing-Ya (馬星野), Bau Jing-An (鮑靜安), Wang Chang-Wu (王常五) and I decided to conduct systematic research and hold forums regularly to exchange our point of view and had them as references to the leader’s decision making. The idea was approved by President Jiang in 1953.*[^37]

Chiang Ching-kuo instructed that the goals of the IIR at an early stage should adhere to the principles such as: studying basic questions, collecting opinions from each aspect, abstracting and translating contents of publications, cultivating the talented persons.[^38] He then specified the direction of future research of IIR:

*We have to find out our enemy’s weakness, no matter in politics, economics, diplomacy, military or society, then come up with countermeasures. As for our researching work, we need to put emphasize on how to defeat Mao Zedong and doing our research work all along with it.*[^39]

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[^37]: Records of Conference on the Establishment of Institute of International Relations(國際關係研究會成立大會紀錄), February 1958, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.

[^38]: Instruction to Our Institute from Mr. Chiang - From 1953 to 1967(蔣先生對本所工作指示摘要─民國四十二年至五十六年), December 1968, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.

[^39]: Ibid.
Then Chiang Ching-kuo said that President Chiang instructed that they should publish a special and powerful periodical on May. In order to enhance qualities of research in the IIR, it registered it to the Ministry of the Interior of the ROC established formally in 1957. Vice chairman of IIR Bau Jing-An(鮑靜安) recalled:

*Although dozens of our comrades often get together to discuss questions on international relations and mainland affairs, we were never satisfied with it. What we did were appreciated by our comrades, President Chiang even encourage our works. That’s why we published first volume of Issues&Studies(In Chinese) which was only provided to top leader as reference at first on April 1956. Now we feel that we need to recruit more talented persons to expand our research work, this is why we established IIR formally.*

After Issues&Studies(In Chinese) published, Chiang Ching-kuo further suggested that it should be published openly, and enriching its content, having it come with a little of academic features. Then Issues&Studies(In Chinese) became a reading material open to most people in Taiwan in October 1961, not just limited to very higher rank officials. Chiang Ching-kuo made the following comment on the accomplishment:

*We have forged a center of anti-Communist theory in the past eleven years, we can say it is also a major materials supplying agency of the Communist group studying.*

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40 Ibid.  
41 Records of Conference on the Establishment of Institute of International Relations(國際關係研究會成立大會紀錄), February 1958, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.  
42 Instruction to IIR from Mr. Chiang- From 1953 to 1967(蔣先生對本所工作指示摘要—民國四十二年至五十六年), December 1968, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.  
44 Instruction to Our Institute from Mr. Chiang- From 1953 to 1967(蔣先生對本所工作指示摘要—民國四十二年至五十六年), December 1968, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.
5.1 Mission of IIR

Gaining supporting from international society was one of mission of IIR since it had been established. Vice chairman of IIR Bau Jing-An (鮑靜安) pointed it out at the convention in IIR in 1958:

*In our opinion at that time (1949), we need to do our work toward two directions, one was trying to have our people knowing the whole international situations, the other was managed to have international society to understand and to support our country, then to promote cooperation between democratic countries to work on anti-Communist campaign.*

What the IIR did to gain support from the international society at this stage was mainly focus on exchanging materials with foreign institutes studying Communist studies to improve quality of research. Chiang Ching-kuo said on December 1953:

*The more materials we get, the better qualities our research would have, and the wider influence it would produce. So we can exchange materials with prestigious universities abroad, especially in US, Japan, Korea, South east.*

The exchange activities was confirmed by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1961, and then later decided to expand the scope of it. To improve the contact of professors, expertise, scholars and enlarging analysis of enemies, Chiang Ching-kuo instructed that the IIR should be registered to the Ministry of Education to reach out in the name of the Institute of International Relations, but still belong to the National

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45 Records of Conference on the Establishment of Institute of International Relations(國際關係研究會成立大會紀錄), February 1958, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.

46 Instruction to IIR from Mr. Chiang- From 1953 to 1967(蔣先生對本所工作指示摘要—民國四十二年至五十六年), December 1968, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.

47 Ibid.
Security Bureau in fact. Chiang Ching-kuo specified the direction in April 1964:

Now that we are being a major materials supplying agency, providing materials for foreign institutes, we should go beyond domestic. I hope everybody, under the leadership of Director Wu, would working together and creating opportunities for our country in international community.

Then, director of IIR Wu Chen-tsai (吳俊才) pointed out the direction at the stage on July:

I hope we could make us a truly think tank to our President and superiors in National Security Bureau, and providing most truly, timely analysis of enemies and international affairs, also expanding our material-exchanging work with foreign institutes to enhance our position in foreign academic community.

Then, Wu Chen-tsai enlarged the Analysis of Current Chinese Communist Affairs monthly and changed its title to Issues and Studies, and released it at the price 0.5$ per copy in October 1964. He also built up relationships with The Hoover Institution (Stanford University), Institute of International Studies (University of South Carolina) and Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies (The George Washington University) on exchanging of researchers and materials.

In addition, Wu Chen-tsai tried to appeal to the language and cultural barrier to promote academic cooperation between the ROC and the US, and hoped those china communist-related materials kept by government could be truly appreciated by American scholars to help them better understanding the situation of the ROC, and

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48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
51 Wu Chen-tsaï, Foreword. Issues & Studies 1, 1(1964).
52 Establishment of Material Supplying Center and Enemy Analysis Center 1967-1968(五十六、七年成立資料供應中心及匪情研究中心), 1968, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.
to accept its claim on mainland China eventually.\textsuperscript{53} To make sure that those classified materials only be used by the institution or personnel which was taking favorable position toward the ROC, Wu Chen-tsai emphasized that the best way for cooperate is to build the relationship between agencies or personnel which were trusted or recognized by the government of the ROC.\textsuperscript{54} To further promote publications of the IIR, he pointed out that the new monthly was not an English edition of the Issues & Studies in Chinese, it would be the timely, objective, systematic and discriminative analysis of the Chinese Communists and also international problems based only on facts and firsthand information.\textsuperscript{55} He also hoped that scholars overseas and at home would share the IIR’s interests of communist studies and making it a public forum in the world-wide struggle against Communism.\textsuperscript{56} By 1966, the businesses which the IIR were running for included: holding seminars, receiving foreign scholars on average of three persons per week, translating communist materials and publishing them.\textsuperscript{57} In the meanwhile, the IIR kept strengthening circulation of Communist-related materials between each of the domestic intelligence agencies, and upgrading facilities for the convenience of foreign guests.

After thirteen years of efforts, the IIR had become a full-fledged research agency which was devoted to studying international and Chinese communist problems, communicating with foreign agencies and publishing high-quality publications. Then, serious events happened in 1966: the hearings held in the American congress and the Great Cultural Revolution both, made it the top agency running the works mentioned above and performing scholarly diplomacy for the government of the

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\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Working Report In IIR 1957-1966(四十六年至五十五年本室業務會報), 1966, NCCU Institute of International Relations, File Number: Unavailable.
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5.2 The Origin of Sino American Conference on Mainland China

On August 1966, Wu Chen-tsai accompanied James Chester Cheng from the University of California to meet President Chiang to discuss the timing of inviting foreign prestigious scholars to come to Taiwan and hold international conferences on China issues. After he was approved, Wu Chen-tsai submitted a preliminary plan naming the conference “Conference on Mainland China” which was supported by the KMT central committee 2nd panel, 6th panel, Intelligence Bureau, Investigation Bureau, Intelligence Advisor Office, 4th Office of National Security Bureau, aiming at: (1) exchanging thoughts, promoting mutual understanding between scholars from the ROC and the US, (2) providing iconic dissertations to have their perspective accepted, (3) providing authentic data to influence foreign scholars, (4) having the progress in free China been widely known. The plan was approved by Chiang Ching-kuo on September. Soon after that, Ya Shiang-Jr (葉翔之) and Chen Jian-Jung (陳建中) who were went to the US by the KMT to visit American communist studies institutions and psychological warfare agencies, returned to Taipei and submitted a report which urged the necessity of holding these kinds of similar conferences in the future. President Chiang gave it a green light and instructed the following points on January 1967, through the Propaganda and Diplomacy Integrated Steering Panel (總統府宣傳外交指導小組):
1. Each unit in government and party should support IIR for holding international

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59 Ibid.
conference on mainland China.

2. Establishing the enemy-analysis material supplying center on the bases of IIR.

3. Having IIR become the enemy-studying center.

4. Instructing National Chengchi University (政治大學) establishing mainland China problem studying institution\textsuperscript{61} through Ministry of Education to have enemy analysis turn into academic research.\textsuperscript{62}

VI. Conclusion

By the early 1960s, the ultimate goal of “recovering mainland China” by the KMT had shifted its focus to political and psychological aspects, the reason behind this were limitations of military capabilities and insistence of Chiang Kai-shek. By 1966, Chiang’s disappointment at the United Nations and voices of the relaxing relationship between the US and the PRC spread all over the government of the US, much to Taipei’s concern, making them pay more attention to maintaining the relationship with the United States. Meanwhile, after “recovering mainland China” had been refused time to time from 1950s, leadership in the KMT thought it was caused by, those “amateur” China studies experts and scholars who were affected by Communist propaganda materials. Under these circumstances, Taipei hoped they could stop the wheels of the normalization process between the PRC and the US by influencing American people’s opinions which led to the prominence of the IIR to keep growing. By 1966, all these international factors, historical legacy, evolution of institutions in the IIR converged, and had the IIR taking the great responsibility of swaying American opinion leaders, which then laid the foundation for the

\textsuperscript{61} It was established in 1968 in the name of NCCU Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies(東亞研究所) in Taipei whose first director was Wu Chen-tsai. Instruction of NCCU Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, 24 August 2017 available at http://eastasia.nccu.edu.tw/intro/pages.php?ID=intro1.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
engagement of scholars between the ROC and the USA in the following decades.