The would-be butterfly effect after Sunflower Movement: A perspective from two-level game theory

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Abstract

With the presumption of power asymmetry in cross-strait relations, the author takes civil society as the domestic factor and then designs an analytic framework. In a democratic regime with direct elections, policy preferences of voters must be primary for a governed party as well as its competitors. That is why dynamics of civil society will affect government’s policy-making in a competitively electoral system.

In the part of practical exemplification, the famous Sunflower Movement will be treated as the beginning that triggers process of power rebalances. The author infers that domestic resettlement of power causes a butterfly effect after the Sunflower Movement: the dynamic of civil society over the years (i.e., 2008-2016) gradually expanded its influence to impact Taiwan’s foreign policies, the relative ones with China in particular, under a concrete structure of interactions between two republics. Conversely, China will adjust its cross-strait strategies according to Taiwan’s policy-making results if we assume that Taiwan makes the first move in a negotiation game.

Keywords: Sunflower Movement, two-level game, civil society, vote maximization, power asymmetry, collective action problem.

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1. Preface

In 2008, the Kuomintang (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Yingjeou won a sweeping victory in the twelfth presidential election of Taiwan. At the same time, KMT also secured their majority in the Congress (the Legislative Yuan), thus achieving a so-called “unified government” (Wánquán zhízhèng) in Taiwanese politics. In the inaugural speech, President Ma reaffirmed that his administration would admit 1992 consensus (Jiǔ’èr gòngshì) and focus on the economic development in the coming future. To fulfill his promise, Ma and his advisors planned to reopen the negotiation with China via two non-official representatives: the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taiwan, and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in China. Until October 2011, the chairman of either institute had met at least five times and signed 16 agreements covering amounts of essential subjects, including the Economic Cooperation Frame Agreement (ECFA). From Ma’s perspective, ECFA was not only the strategic move to avoid marginalization in East Asia but also an olive branch for reaching the broader Chinese domestic market (Hong, 2011). However, these agreements did not bring promised benefits to the Taiwanese people while economic prospect and social wealth distribution further worsen. Moreover, there are widespread rumors of a Chinese social-economic infiltration circulating among the Taiwanese public. However, one of the sub-agreements of ECFA called Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) was still to be officially signed in July 2014. CSSTA was a turning point to make two potential concerns, national sovereignty cum economic autonomy, blow out in Taiwan.

On March 17, 2014, the KMT legislator Zhang Qingzhong abruptly declared that the CSSTA had passed the review procedure during a meeting held by the Internal Administration Committee of the Legislative Yuan. This decision instantly triggered a series of unrests. On the next day, a group of students sneaked into the Legislative Yuan complex then occupied the assembly hall. Since then, the so-called “Sunflower Movement” started. Although the protest peacefully ended in mid-April, it aftermath jus begin to kick in. The KMT suffered a major defeat during the local election at the end of 2014, losing 13 out of 22 total mayoral seats to its rival, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Furthermore, KMT failed to keep its hold on the capital city of Taipei, letting Ko Wenje, a traumatology expert and political novice, taking the post with ease. As a final blow to KMT, DPP and its presidential candidate Tsai Ingwen beat the KMT in the 2016 presidential election, making the third peaceful transition of power.

In retrospect, this paper wants to answer several intuitive questions, listed as follows. Why does a dominant party in Taiwan fail to hold on its advantage, even after its leaders chose to lay aside the sensitive issue of cross-strait relations? Why is the executive unable to win their supporters’ hearts and minds even though they played the
economy card, which usually serves as a trump card to gain legitimacy to some extent? In this paper, the author argues that the Sunflower Movement is a vital factor that results in KMT's devastating defeat in 2014 and 2016. As a significant signal from the Taiwanese society, Sunflower Movement is accomplished by citizen groups as well as active individuals jointly. In other words, the continuous movement accumulates social capitals incrementally, and thus allows potential protestors to overcome the collective action problem in the end.

In next section, we trace back to the theories of analytic level in the field of international relations and then deduces our analytic frame with the help of two-level game theory.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Theories of international relations: level analyses and structural factor

In the field of international relations, researchers must face the problem of level of analysis. According to Waltz’s three dimensions of international studies, we may divide our perspectives into three levels: the international level, the domestic level, and the individual level. The international level is used to explain the position of one country in a global structure. On the other hand, the domestic level can be taken as the lens to see through the differences between states, including their societies, cultures, and political institutions. The last one is the individual level, which focuses on the personality of the leader, and how these figures impact the final policy outcome during the decision-making process. In Waltz’s view, the state should be treated as a unitary actor following logic and ration at the international level, and it is better not to be interfered by elements coming from the other two analytic levels (Waltz, 1979).

Several scholars argue about the theoretical principle mentioned by Waltz. For instance, Keohane (1986) gives his positive judgment on Waltz’s structural theory, yet he emphasizes that analysts should take contextual factors into account so that they can capture the real meaning of decision made by the state. Furthermore, he thinks that national interest should be measured by synthetic standards combining international, domestic, and individual elements. Another example is Cox (1986), who criticizes the theories of international relations should stand on the perpetual fluctuations of historical experiences. To sum up, Waltz’s approach helps us to overcome the observational restrictions; that is, we do not need to pay too much attention to the specifics of each country. By contrast, we take general structure as an exogenous factor and separate it from the endogenous causes, such as political institutions. Nonetheless, the theory of international structure is unable to explain how the countries with asymmetrical powers make their final decisions under the original structural presumptions. We all know that
interactions between or among multiple state actors are rarely equal, especially in the case of negotiation between large and small states. Such situation just corresponds to the de facto cross-strait relations.

2.2 Interpreting cross-strait relations: power asymmetry theory and mechanism of vote maximization.

The concept of “asymmetry” can be traced back to the discussions of the asymmetrical warfare in the field of security studies. The so-called “asymmetric relationship” occurs when a small country cannot defeat a large country directly yet it still has enough power to defend itself from a potential invasion of its strong opponent (Womack, 2006). By analogizing cross-strait relations as power-asymmetric interaction, we may predict the rational choices made by either China or Taiwan. Wu (1999; 2009) points out that there are two objective imperatives in the relationship of the two republics. One is the gap of economic development between China as well as Taiwan. The other one is the support from Western countries, particularly the United States. If we take China’s attitude as a consistent constant for now, Taiwan has only two options: “balancing,” which means a direct armed conflict with China, or “bandwagoning,” which indicates that Taiwan accepts a peaceful settlement and becomes China’s faithful vassal. Following this, Wu offers two significant variables in Taiwan’s decision-making. The first is the structural restrictions resulting from the power-asymmetrical relation between China and Taiwan. The second is the pursuit of vote maximization in elections, which means that political parties in Taiwan would change their preferences on cross-strait policies in accordance with the mainstream opinions in Taiwanese society. On the international level, the limitation of power asymmetry results in economic co-dependence with simultaneous identity alienation. On the domestic level, the two dominant parties (i.e., KMT and DPP) always stand on opposite sides of the economy-identity spectrum, leaving barely any room for consensus. The consequence is that two competitors do their best to attract supporters, and during this process making the “economic co-dependence cum identity alienation” tenser than ever (Wu, 1999; 2009).

As the comparative analysis of the external refinement of structural theory, power asymmetry shapes the core values of the two parties. However, such argument is still not far from "structural determinism," which does not accurately capture the fact that internal social dynamics in Taiwan may influence the preferences of political parties. Through the discussions above, we can deduce our first proposition as follows:

**Proposition 1:** Power asymmetry is the international factor of cross-strait relations. At the same time, the domestic factors can also impact the cross-strait policies of
Taiwanese parties through the mechanism of vote maximization.

2.3 Multilevel analysis: two-level game

The domestic factor is a residual variable for most of the scholars who take the analysis of the international structure as granted. Although they admit that local politics is one of the independent variables in international studies, the explanations from international level are superior to the domestic ones. On the contrary, theorists who support the “second-image-reversed” approach assume that domestic politics are more than a transmission belt of international pressure. Furthermore, political coalitions and social status are possible impediments to international cooperation.

Putnam (1988) brings domestic politics into the analysis of negotiations between nations with his “two-level game” theory. According to Putnam, we should treat “state” as an aggregated noun, which means the state is composed by many central decision-makers representing their own country during negotiations. Moreover, they stay in the middle of international and domestic levels (Putnam, 1988). Evans (1993) regards two-level game is an integrative approach, which combines both the variation of domestic politics and the benefits of international negotiations. He is also an advocate for taking the impact of legislative ratification into consideration (Evans, 1993).

Milner (1997) assumes that domestic actors can be approximately divided into the executive, the legislature, and social interest groups. The executive is in charge of negotiation, and it must stand in the front to deal with foreign affairs. Contrarily, the legislature has veto power, and the outcome of negotiations should be sent to them for ratification. Finally, social interest groups would reflect the instant preferences of citizens. Aside from this, Milner points out that there are three factors in domestic politics in the interactive model: interest¹, institution, and information. First, the consistent extent of interest among domestic actors will decide the role of negotiator. Second, the institution will determine the power distribution between the executive and the legislature; that is to say, the institutional change may affect high-level negotiations. Last but not least, interest groups can offer professional information to the legislature with low cost, although the problem of information asymmetry is inevitable. Milner concludes the possibility of cooperation between countries will decline if the executive is forced to share more power with the legislature². It could be even worse when the preferences of domestic actors are divergent. From this, we can deduce our second proposition:

¹ According to Milner’s interpretation, interests are unchangeable constants. On the contrary, preferences are rather fluctuating variables.
² That means it will be more challenging to gain the ratification from the legislature. What is more, the executive will be forced to adjust their negotiation strategies in accordance with the legislature’s preferences.
Proposition 2: the homogeneity of local preferences may entail institutional change of power distribution. The new power distribution will decide the role of negotiator, and thus will bring uncertainty to international cooperation.

Milner’s model can help researchers to clarify the specifics and relations among domestic actors. However, in reality, the members of parliament belong to different parties. There is an “elective relation” between parties and voters. In short, under the presumption of constituent-driven politics, the decisions of the legislature may adjust in accordance with the preference of the majority of voters. Now we have the third proposition:

Proposition 3: each member of the legislature belongs to the different party. The preferences of individual can influence parties through the mechanism of vote maximization to some extent, and then make the aggregate preference of the legislature changed.

2.4 Domestic politics: social capital and civil society

In accordance with the statement from Putnam (1993), self-interest is relative to interests of others. This is why we have to admit that everyone has the same rights as well as obligations: self-interest should be put in the context of public demands so that every individual in the society must establish mutual reciprocities with one another to produce public goods. As time passes on, the society with civic spirit will be formed (Putnam, 1993). Ideally, the formation of social associations must be based on self-discipline and accepted public values. Nevertheless, individuals seldom directly participate in public affairs, as they more often consider their daily matters and families as their priorities. Fukuyama (2001) says the solution to this is to participate in the civic associations. Conversely, these public groups also need to be shaped by its members and collective behaviors. Thus, this could create some positive spill-over effects to the society. With the similar logic, White (1994) defines the term “civil society” as follows: “(Civil society) is that of an intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values.” (White, 1994: 379) Moreover, he connects the forms of civil society with the social-economic relations and institutions: “of a transmission from a previous political situation characterized by state dominance and ‘traditional’ social relations to an emergent or established situation in which new forms of civil society, reflecting a new pattern of social-economic relations and institutions, serve to transform the state and their relations with it.” (1994: 388) With the inspiration from these master theorists, we can hereby deduce our fourth proposition:
Proposition 4: In a democratic country, the dynamic of civil society reflects the members’ values and interests. In the meantime, the members of civil society can express their preferences on public affairs through participation in collective actions advocated by civic associations.

Now we can go deeper into the interaction among domestic actors. On the one side, an organization in the realm of civil society is an autonomous interest group, which is constituted by multiple individuals. On the other side, a person will be gradually used to cooperating with others through constant interactions. By participating in public life, “social capital” would be accumulated (Putnam, 1993). If we define social capital as informal forms that produce cooperation, it can be pinned as a product of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games. That is to say, there is an opportunity to make actors deviate from Nash Equilibrium in a PD game if players can interact with each other iteratively. In the end, they will develop a mutual dependence and trust (Fukuyama, 2001). To sum up, interest groups in a civil society get the chance to cumulate their social capital, and this process of accumulation will reinforce the intentions of participating in public affairs in reverse. Such active loop is the key to cross the threshold of “collective action problem”\(^3\) (Tucker, 2007). With this in mind, we can state our last proposition:

Proposition 5: The implementation of mass movement in a civil society depends on whether there is sufficient social capital accumulated through the interactions between civil associations and social members. If so, civil associations can accomplish mass mobilizations at certain critical junctures; if not, a “collective action problem” emerges instead.

2.5 Analytic frame and the conditional assumptions

According to Milner’s model, there are two analytic levels: international level (stage I) and domestic level (stage II). The actors on the stage I are the states which participate in the particular negotiation, and there are three domestic actors on stage II: the executive in charge of bargaining, the legislature responsible for ratification, and interest groups. Aside from this, interest groups will do their best to make the other domestic actors change their preferences by offering information or staging effective advocacy campaigns. Regarding the strategy of vote maximization, the KMT and DPP are the main competitors in Taiwanese elections. If one of them dominates the regime through elections, the other one will become the most influential opposition party. So we can take the rival party (KMT or DPP) into the domestic stage. As for those who

\(^3\) That is to say, an individual will not join in certain collective action if he/she believes that the costs of participation are more than the possible benefits he/she can get once targets of action are reached. (Tucker, 2007)
have the right for voting in a democratic regime, we treat them as a fourth aggregated domestic actor due to the strategy of vote maximization. Ultimately, there are many civic organizations which are separate from the state. They aim to protect public values through social movements and advocacies outside of the system. So we isolate them as a fifth aggregated actor. With these in mind, we can construct an analytic structure of power-asymmetric negotiation as shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1** Two-Level Game Framework of Power-Asymmetric Negotiation

The time series of this paper is locked in the period from May 2008 to Jan. 2016. Furthermore, we address three conditional assumptions as below:

a. **In a cross-strait negotiation, China is a unitary state actor.** On the contrary, Taiwanese representatives have potential competitors internally.

b. **The attitude of China is going to be given as a constant during this period.** That is to say, Taiwan makes the first move in the negotiation game.

c. **The power asymmetry is given as an exogenous factor in cross-strait relations,** and we assume that it results in economic co-dependence as well as identity alienation in Taiwan.

Next, we test our five propositions with the history of ECFA negotiation and the process of Sunflower Movement.
3. Retrospect: ECFA and Sunflower Protest

3.1 Economic epoch: “opening market” and “diplomatic ceasefire.”

On March 31, 2008, the KMT candidate Ma Yingjieou won the 12th presidential election with a 58.44% vote share⁴. Two months later, Ma addressed his blueprint of cross-strait relations clearly in his inauguration speech⁵. To respond Ma’s goodwill, Hu Jingtao, then president of China, gave a public lecture titled “Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.” (Xiéshòu tuídòng liàng’àn guānxì hépǐng fāzhǎn, tóngxīn shíxiàn zhōnghuà mínzú wěidà fūxīng), in which Hu claimed that he respects the opinions of Taiwanese compatriots. Moreover, he will adopt reasonable policies and ensure Taiwanese does not bear any loss. With the six protocols on dealing with Taiwanese problems (Hu’s six points; Hú liù diǎn), Hu said there would be a cornerstone for building political mutual trust if China and Taiwan had formed a common understanding and consistent stance on the issue of the one-China framework⁶.

Negotiations between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) soon started after these signs of mutual goodwill. On February 22, 2009, the Minister of Economic Affairs announced the project of cross-strait cooperation framework during a public press conference. Following this event, President Ma admitted during a media interview that the government was about to engage in negotiations of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China. There were three formal negotiation sessions during the period from January to June 2010. On June 29, ECFA was signed by two leading semi-official figures: Jiang Bingkuen, who was the chairman of SEF, and Chen Yunling, who was the principal of ARATS. Almost as soon as the signing was announced, opposition began to mount. A civic association named “Cross-Strait Agreement Watch Alliance” (CSAWA) was established the next day, composing of no less 30 smaller civil groups, which included NGOs and student organizations. CSAWA was the first single-issue association that specifically monitored the cross-strait negotiations.

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⁴ The total number of votes is 7959014.
⁵ The following dialogue is what President Ma addressed on the inaugural celebration in 2008: “Under the principle of "no unification, no independence and no use of force," as Taiwan's mainstream public opinion holds it, and under the framework of the ROC Constitution, we will maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. …Based on the "1992 Consensus," negotiations should resume at the earliest time possible. …The normalization of economic and cultural relations is the first step to a win-win solution.”
⁶ In the speech, Hu addressed: “The two sides of the Straits may sign a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement to this end and establish a mechanism for economic cooperation which defers to the characteristics of both sides, so as to maximize the synergy of respective advantages and mutual benefits.”
In order to better understand the potential economic impact of ECFA, the Ministry of Economic Affairs authorized the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), an independent think tank, to conduct an evaluation. The results indicated that the potential impact brought by ECFA was positive on a macro level, but it did not mean that every industry could benefit from the agreement. Moreover, CIER estimated that job opportunities might incline, and the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) would be about 8.9 billion US dollars (Tung, 2011). Supported by confident expectations, the early-harvest project of ECFA began from January 1, 2011. At the same time, Taiwanese government started to implement the four early-harvest items of services and formed the Committee of Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation (CCSEC). CCSEC instantly held its first meeting with China on February 22, and negotiations revolving around the four follow-up agreements, which tackles with trading of services, trading of goods, customs cooperation, and dispute settlement respectively, started right after that meeting. So far the cross-strait economic negotiations seemed to be peaceful and smooth.

On June 21, 2013, the ninth high-level dialogue between SEF and ARATS took place in Shanghai and ended with signing the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). On the day before the signing of the trade agreement, a former national policy adviser named Hao Mingyi suddenly posted a personal announcement titled “We only have less than 24 hours” (Wǒmen shèng bù dào 24 xiǎoshíliǎo) on his Facebook and pointed out that CSSTA was about to be signed next day. The post triggered a series of critiques (Watchout, 2014). Most of them doubted the transparency of the process of CSSTA negotiations and instantly acted upon their sense of insecurity. For instance, a coordinated protest was organized on the same day of signing (June 21). Five days later, numerous media and culture celebrities signed a joint proclamation for opposing the “the black box of CSSTA”(Fú mào hēixiāng). Under the pressure of public outcry, the party groups of Legislative Yuan negotiated and reached consensus on CSSTA: the clauses of CSSTA would be reviewed and voted article by article (Zhú tiáo shènc'hâ, zhú tiáo biǎojùé). Most important of all, the whole project was not supposed to be implemented until the Legislative Yuan passed it.

An incident took place in the July of 2013. Cheng Hsiuling, an economics professor from National Taiwan University, presented her essay titled “The Analysis on the Impact of Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement” during a conference organized by the Public Economic Policy Research Center at National Taiwan University on the 25th of July. Based on Joseph Stiglitz’s three dimensions on the free trade agreement, Cheng pointed out the relatively economic scale between Taiwan and China is asymmetric so that the ongoing negotiation is not a resolution but a leash for Taiwanese economy (Cheng, 2014). Bolstered by Cheng’s claim, two civic associations concerning about the issue, “the Anti-Blackout-Service-Agreement Democratic Front” (Fàn hēixiāng fǔ
mào mínzhù zhènxiàn), and “the Youth Front of Black Island Nation” (Hēisè dāoguó qīngnián zhènxiàn), were established on the following days. Both of them claimed that the Taiwanese government should reject CSSTA and then re-inspect it with greater scrutiny. Meanwhile, local civic groups such as the Association of Taiwanese Professors launched a sequence of open protests in which to surround Legislative Yuan to add pressure to the legislators (Cheng and Li, 2013).

3.2 The blast of Sunflower Movement

On September 25, 2013, another round of negotiation among parties took place in the Legislative Yuan. The final consensus was that it was necessary to hold at least 16 public hearings in the proceeding months, and KMT and DPP were required to organize eight hearings each. In one week, KMT legislator Zhang Qingzhong had set all the dates of hearings up\(^7\). On March 10, 2013, after the last hearing, Zhang said CSSTA was supposed to come into effect earlier according to Article 61 of the Legislative Power Act\(^8\). The turning point was on March 17. On the day, Zhang announced that CSSTA had passed the review in a mess of quarrels during the meeting of the Internal Administration Committee, and immediately adjourned the review session. Right after the adjournment, KMT party whip Lin Hongchi, representing all KMT legislators, expressed his appreciation for Zhang’s “hard work.” In the meantime, Sun Lijun, the spokesperson of the Executive Yuan, said the Executive Yuan would respect decisions made by the legislators and thanked the committee as well as Zhang.

At the night of March 18, students and members of civic associations suddenly broke into and occupied the assembly hall of the Legislative Yuan. The police attempted to crack down the occupation, yet failed. This bold move caused widespread public attention in merely one night. Lots of people rushed to the side after they learned about the break-in, including several leading figures of DPP; they sat on the stairs, street corners, and roads around Legislative Yuan to backup for the people occupying the building. The students in the hall organized a public press conference next day. During the interview, they publicly demanded the government to turn back CSSTA. Besides, they also drafted a tentative document on supervising cross-strait agreements, in a move to force the Legislative Yuan to suspend the cross-strait agreements, especially CSSTA, before any institutional supervision was in place (Lin, 2014a).

On March 22, the incumbent Premier Jiang Ihua arrived at the Legislative Yuan and held discussions with the protestors, yet no consensus was reached during the event.

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\(^7\) There are three hearings on September 30, three on October 2, and two on October 3.

\(^8\) According to Article 61 of Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power, the review of administrative orders shall be completed within three months of the review of the meeting. If not, it shall be deemed to be reviewed.
President Ma also took place a public press conference, emphasizing that Taiwan would encounter substantial obstacles accessing multilateral negotiation of international trade in the future if CSSTA could not be passed. Ma agreed that the articles of CSSTA should be reviewed and voted article by article, and he promised CSSTA would not cause any threat to domestic service industries.

Contrary to his wishes, Ma’s statement backfired. In the night of March 23, a group of protestors tried to break in the Executive Yuan. They wanted to replicate their successful occupation days before. This time, the police did not treat them well: protestors were brutally beaten with baton and fists, causing numerous to be injured and even arrested on site. This violent response from the executive did not quell the crisis, but rather further poured the oil on the fire of fierce. In response, a joint committee in Legislative Yuan held an emergency meeting, deciding to nullify decision made during the chaotic meeting of March 17. Furthermore, the committee urged the Executive Yuan to turn back CSSTA and then renegotiate with China. President Ma rejected both of options publicly on March 26.

The climax of protest soon ensued. On March 30, a large-scale mass protest was held in front of the presidential palace with approximately 50 thousand citizens attending. Lin Feifan, the nominal leader of the movement, stood on the main stage and proclaimed four demands which go as follows. Firstly, the government must turn back the agreement. Secondly, the executive and the legislature should figure out a mechanism to supervise cross-strait arrangements. About this supervising mechanism, the lawmakers had to take the non-governmental version of the draft into account during the legislative procedure. The last was the most active one: Lin urged the president to assemble a civil constitution conference. Three days later, President Ma accepted the first two requests in a press interview, yet still maintained his bottom line as usual: the government refused to turn back CSSTA.

Nevertheless, there was a different voice appearing to balance the antagonism between the executive elites and the protestors. On April 6, Speaker Wang Jinping finally broke silence. In Wang’s statement, he backed the ideas of Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act (CSASA), and promised that there would not be any form of party group negotiation (Dǎngtuán xiēshāng), a frequently criticized political practice in Taiwan, held before finishing the legislation. With the protest seemingly to complete its mission, the students evacuated from the Legislative Yuan in the evening of April 10 and inspired all participants with the slogan “to spread the seeds out of barrier” (Chū guān bōzhòng) in front of thousands of protestors (Lin, 2014b). To many, the famous Sunflower Movement just ended up, yet its ripple effect of collective action had just started.
3.3 The butterfly effect after Sunflower Protest

Sunflower Movement, a collective action against a trade cooperation between Taiwan and China, forced Ma’s administration to accept several unexpected consequences. The executive failed to secure the ratification from the legislature, albeit KMT was the de facto dominant party in the Legislative Yuan. In addition to this, the protest sparked public concern and suspicion toward CSSTA, and this only got worse. The last and probably the most crucial among these consequences is its impact on future negotiations between Taiwan and China. That is, no further negotiations could be initiated unless the Congress ratified CSSTA. In essence, every detail would be scrutinized by the public from then on, and that is why China and Taiwan rarely reached consensus on the issues such as opening market as well as tax reduction in the meetings following the protest. In short, negotiations were caught in a deadlock, and the Sunflower Movement was the absolute turning point that made public voice percolate up to national level.

Not only did this collective action trigger continuous ripples, but its effect also spilled over to the coming elections in 2014 and 2016. The “nine-in-one” local elections held on November 29, for instance, DPP candidates of DPP won 13 out of 22 mayoral seats. The most surprising electee was Ko Wenje, a traumatologist by profession, who defeated his KMT rival by a landslide in Taipei City, the capital of Taiwan. What made this surprising is that Ko was a complete political amateur, and he did not represent any party either. One year after the local elections, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ingwen won another massive victory by a 3-million-vote margin over her KMT nominator in the 2016 national election. DPP also obtained 68 seats in the Legislative Yuan, compared to KMT’s mere 35. That was the first time in history for DPP achieving unified government.

Chart 1 shows the wax and wane of the party identification of Taiwanese from 1992 to December 2016. Since this survey updates annually each December, it is possible to identify changes in individual attitudes before and after the Sunflower Movement. According to the chart, the support rates of KMT and DPP started to cross in December 2013. Popular support for KMT plummeted until 2014, and the protest and the local election in 2014 are undoubted catalysts for the apparent gap between the two parties at the end of the year. In 2015 and 2016, KMT keeps losing support, while DPP has a relatively positive slope.
Chart 1 Changes in the Party Identification of Taiwanese (1992-2016)

Source: the Election Study Center, NCCU

Chart 2 Changes in the Unification-Independence Stances of Taiwanese (1994-2016)

Source: the Election Study Center, NCCU
Chart 2 shows the trend of changes in the unification-independent stances of Taiwanese. Support for maintaining status quo stays relatively stable since 2008, and the whole picture of trends has not changed too much since 2008 on the other side. This means the aggregate preference of identity in 2016 is somewhat similar to that of 2008.

In accordance with our conditional assumptions, economic and identity issues are separated, and either one is independent of the other; in other words, the winning point for KMT and DPP is economic issues if the macro trend of identity remains unchanged. Sunflower Movement can thus be seen as the critical factor that impacted the results of following elections under the logic of vote maximization.

3.4 Brief Summary

In the paragraph above we posted two questions. The first is how an economic policy caused a mass protest, and the second one is why the protest partly resulted in a major defeat on KMT in the following elections. By looking back on the history of CSSTA negotiation, we can connect economic factors with political reality; that is, the public consensus stirred up by the Sunflower Movement, forced party elites who were motivated by political benefits (vote maximization) in mind to choose sides. Aside from this short-term effect, the movement caused a spill-over effect in the long run as well. It changed not only the power redistribution in crucial elections but also governing policies on cross-strait issues through party rotation in 2016.

We can now verify our five propositions through with facts. First, there are the civic groups concerning about ECFA before the outbreak of protest. Those groups with other local groups and then launched a series of collective actions. On the other hand, the information spread by Ho and Cheng balanced the official statement that signing ECFA will bring more benefits than costs, and this corresponds the research conclusion from Holleyer et al. (2015), which proves that the more transparent the information is, the easier mass protest breaks out. Another evidence is the mass protest held on March 30. At least 500 thousand people gathered together to show their will in action. By this, we are able to prove the fifth proposition to be true.

Second, the appeals of Sunflower Movement are clear and definite, and almost 50 percent of protestors appear by their own free wills (Chen and Huang, 2015). If we admit that people are possible to join in the protest willingly, then the appeals above represent the explicit aggregate preferences. According to the statement, we say that the fourth proposition is tested.

The third is the party as well as the legislature. DPP, the leading opposition party, proclaimed their support for the occupation at the beginning of the protest. Furthermore, DPP criticized the executive for not listening to the people. Later on, the members of the joint committee in the Legislative Yuan changed their minds, abolishing their
decision made on March 17. Besides, they promised to draft a specific law codifying a mechanism to supervise cross-strait agreement. This means the institutional change is possible. The last blow for the executive came from the Congress Speaker’s statement. From then on, the executive and the legislature were in effect divided, and the Ma administration could not get the Congress to ratify the agreement anymore. Now the second and third proposition are verified.

Finally, KMT had the upper hand on both the international and domestic stage before the Sunflower Movement, yet the protest was a virtual game changer: KMT suffered sequent defeats and internal power struggles even after the movement. By contrast, DPP got golden opportunities to regain reputation and popular support. Last but not least, the movement brought about vast amount of information as well as conversation, which in turns enhanced Taiwanese capacities on media literacy and political autonomy. This culminated in DPP’s presidential victory in 2016. As long as Tsai and her party took charge, Taiwanese foreign policy on cross-strait issues changed immediately. Following Taiwan’s change of stance in terms of cross-strait relations, China soon tore down its friendly façade. So far, we claim the first proposition is true. Since all propositions are proved by facts, we can put them into the analytic frame to take a bird’s eye view on the figure 2 in the end.

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9 The conflict between President Ma and Speaker Wang were turning white-hot during the protest.
10 The part of texts Tsai addressed in her speech on National Day of 2016 is as follows: “Although cross-strait relations have seen certain ups and downs in the past months, our position remains consistent and firm. Our pledges will not change, and our goodwill will not change. But we will not bow to pressure, and we will of course not revert to the old path of confrontation….I call upon the authorities of mainland China to face up to the reality that the Republic of China exists, and that the people of Taiwan have an unshakable faith in the democratic system.” However, Tsai has never mentioned “1992 Consensus” since her inauguration in May 2016.
11 After Tsai’s inauguration, China starts to stress Taiwan on the participation of international organizations. In September 2016, Taiwan was refused to join in the annual conference of International Civil Aviation Organization. Another example was in November 2016, Taiwanese delegates were also rejected to participate the annual meeting of International Criminal Police Organization. On November 30, Ma Xiaoguang, the spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said “Taiwan’s new administration refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus stressing the one-China principle, shaking the political foundation upon which peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait lays” at a regular press conference in Beijing. So we can assert that China’s attitude on cross-strait relations is more and more antagonistic.
4. Conclusion

This paper starts from a classical argument in the field of international relations studies and then complements the deficiency of systematic theory with the concept of the two-level game, which connects international and domestic factors. What is more, we deduced five propositions with the help of literature review, cumulating them into a prototype of negotiation model. Finally, the theory of civil society helps us not merely point out the potential actors clearly but also clarify the causal sequence under specific restrictions. Through the review of ECFA negotiation and the Sunflower Movement, we test the analytic framework and prove its internal validity in the end. In brief, we argue that the major domestic factor which influences the executive’s negotiation strategy is the interaction between civic associations and individuals. Now we bring the element of power asymmetry back in so that we are able to deduce the decision-making logic of the two Taiwanese parties, KMT and DPP, as follows.

Figure 3 shows the decision logic of cross-strait policy formation. Either international or domestic factor impacts the final decision through the mechanism of vote maximization. Preferences of decision-makers, both the legislature and the executive, are in flux, depending on the most influent factor at the time. Of course, international and domestic factor usually intertwine with each other in a realistic setting, and we can barely distinguish them as simple as the ideal model.
If it can be demonstrated that the aforementioned phenomenon can be found in a policy area where there is a decreased likelihood, we can make some tentative generalizations about the argument on which factor is more influential than the other with greater confidence. However, with the experience of Sunflower Movement, we acknowledge that public outcry triggered by civic advocacies has made something different in Taiwan, and it cannot be defined simply as an accident or even a populist parade. After all, people need to take matter into their own hands.


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