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After the People's Republic of China was established, there have been a series of either bilateral, or multilateral political and military crises when the interests of both the US and China were heavily threatened. The result and the aftermath of the crisis can heavily affect not only the overall Sino-US relationship, but also the stability and the prosperity in the relevant region. Despite difference in political system, the bilateral communication channel can promote understanding on each other's policy and thus can minimize the chance of policy failure. Notably, after WWII, Korean Peninsular has been a noticeable hot spot in the Sino-US relations. During the Korean War, the two countries, unwillingly, engaged with each other due to a series of policy failures. In this case, we find that the lack of proper coordination and communication between not only decision-making circles of both countries, but also military officials led to policy failure during the war. Since the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the two countries, a series of communication channels as well as crisis-mechanisms were established. However, according to many sources, those measures did not directly lead to the final resolutions to the crisis happened after 1979. In a nutshell, to maintain the peace and prosperity in the region and the stable relationship among powers, we not only need a consistent and effective communication between the two countries but also need to seek areas with mutual benefits to ensure that the both sides value the importance of the bilateral relationship.

In this paper, through understanding the basic concept of military and security

crisis and the crisis-management mechanisms in both China and the US, we find that a constant communication can help the decision-makers to take proper actions and promote the functionality of the decision-making circle. The policy failure in the face of Chinese intervention during the Korean War was partly due to the lack of coordination at the top level, which was resulted the lack of and the poor practice of bilateral communication. After 1979, a series of the communication channels were established. However, according to a number of authors, it was not those channels that led to the resolution of the crisis happened between 1995 and 2001. Currently, modern technology and the complexity of the bilateral relationship have been affecting the traditional crisis-management process. To properly deal with crises and to contribute to a robust relationship, we also need to promote the confidence-building through coordinating among voices at the decision-making circle and seeking areas of mutual benefit.

In general, according to Michael Swaine and Jisi Wang, an international political and military crisis occurs when: First, the significant interest of countries and order (international or regional or global) got threatened; Second, there is a sense of urgency; Third, there is tendency towards a military conflict (Swaine and Wang, 2006). First, the escalation in confrontation can lead to deterioration in international relationship and will cause significant challenge to regional and global order. Second, according to Charles F. Hermann, a sudden escalation in confrontation can surprise the decision-making circle and cause a sense of urgency (Hermann, 1969). Third, according to Jonathan Wilkenfeld, when the confrontation between nations escalates,

including verbally and substantially, the military conflict is likely to happen (Wilkenfeld, 2006). When major powers engage in a crisis, they are usually reluctant to make significant concession to ease the tension.

In terms of the Sino-US relationship, according to Jisi Wang, the tendency towards military and security crises usually took place either between the establishment of PRC (1949) and Henry Kissinger's visit to China (1971) or after the end of the Cold War (1989) (Wang and Xu, 2004). There are three basic features of a Sino-US crisis.

First, despite the lack of direct communication channel and other mutual crisis management mechanisms, the two sides have been able to achieve tacit agreement through their distinguished strategic considerations (Wang and Xu, 2004). For example, during the Korean War, the two sides were able to, though with heavy cost in the process due to the lack of communication, limit the conflict within the Korean Peninsula, without threatening the surviving of any of the two.

Second, the Sino-US crises usually involve a relevant third party, despite the air-crash in 2001. Richard Ned Lebow sets up three categories of international crisis, including the justification of hostility crisis, the spin-off crisis, and brinkmanship crisis (Lebow, 1981). The Sino-US Crises usually fall in the category of the spin-off crisis, which is usually resulted from the proactive action by one side but is not expected by the initiator. In the three historical military stand-offs in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan was the trigger of the crises. During the bombing of the embassy in 1999, the third party was the former Yugoslavia.

Third, from the historical experience, neither side of the two seems to have the intention to use military forces to engage another country (Wang and Xu, 2004). Instead, both tended to use exhibition of forces or direct force to limit the scale of the crisis and conflict. During the Missile Crisis in 1995, US carrier groups deployed to the East Asia were ordered not to directly engage with PLA forces and PLA rocket force was ordered not to target US forces. Similarly, during the Korean War in 1950, despite the outdated resources and equipment, Beijing finally decided to send troops across the Yalu River after the UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel to ensure the security of its border and its industrial system in the Northeast China.

Forth, the enemy image is affecting the decision-making process in both the US and China. Specifically, according to Kenneth Boulding, the policies can be traced back to the decision-making process and this process can be traced back to the ideology of the decision-makers (Boulding, 1993). According to Richard Hermann, during the Cold War, countries participated tended to possess enemy image of countries with the opposite ideology (Hermann and Fischerkeller, 1995). It had led to a fixed and distorted ideology towards other countries and it had affected the foreign policy-making during the Cold War period. During the Korean War, both sides considered each other as not only geo-political enemy, but also ideological rivalry. This led to an overestimation on the correspondence in policies between China and the USSR since both of them were ruled by communist regimes. In fact, in terms of geopolitics, China possessed its own strategic thinking in terms of the Korean affairs. Similarly, in the NSC 68, the strategic objective of the US was not only to balance-off

the USSR through strengthening its nuclear as well as conventional arsenal, but also to go against the spread of communism (US Military, DOD, and JCS, 2013). Recently, according to Yukon Huang, in the US, the favorability towards China has dropped significantly (over 10 percent) in the last decade (Huang, 2017). This is partly due to the effect of the reviving China on the economic and political order established by the US decades ago. As China will keep its growth for some years despite its growth is slowing down, we are likely to see the continuing deterioration in how the two countries view each other and it will no doubt affect the policy-making. Since as the relative gap between the two nations is decreasing, neither side is willing to back down in the face of significant crisis. Thus, the direct communication between the two leaderships is essential to fully understand each other's intention. Also, given the historical experience that neither side possesses obvious intention to threaten the surviving of each other, it is crucial for the both sides to maintain communication to minimize the possibility of spinoff crisis.

US and China each have their own systems to deal with crisis and they possess their unique features. In US, the President and the National Security Council are responsible for the making of foreign policy. In terms of crisis management, they are able to make policy in response to crisis. As the head of the state, the POTUS can decide how to functionalize the decision-making group. This suggests the variation in the style of how president make policies. While JFK preferred to personally debate with other NSC members, Richard Nixon preferred to discuss the policy with the NSA Henry Kissinger, bypassing the Secretary of State. In China, key policies are usually

discussed within the Politburo Standing Committee. However, similar with the US, the specific style of decision-making also varies. According to David Lampton, While Deng Xiaoping did not rely on think tanks and only listened to those he trusted, Jiang Zemin relied on his advisors to make the call (Lampton, 2014).

When there is a crisis, US prefers to bargain within a non-zero-sum-game basis. Specifically, based on a thorough analysis on the distinguished interests and the comparative powers of the relevant parties involved in the crisis, the decision-maker uses a collection of persuasion, coercion, and concession to urge the opponent to change its will and behavior under acceptable condition, so that the decision-maker can finally achieve his policy objectives. The key to this process is the bargaining power reflected by the relative political power and resolution. Specifically, with sufficient information and intelligence at hand, through public statement, private negotiation, and other measures, decision-maker can show the level and the irreversibility of his determination and force the opponent to follow his idea. In practice, US policy makers also seek to provide legal basis for their stands. The legal basis includes international and domestic laws, traditions and principles, and long-time status quo. This measure can obtain different outcomes, based on the relative power comparison between the US and other nations involved and the domestic condition in the US (Wang and Xu, 2004). During the nuclear deal in 1994, because the republicans in the house were not willing to enforce the deal made between President Clinton and Kim Jong-II while pressuring DPRK to dismantle the nuclear facility, the US was unwilling to help constructing the reactors in DPRK for civilian

use. Also, currently, according to Oriana Skylar Mastro, since China has been modernizing its military forces and expanding hard power, it is less willingly to make significant concession in the confrontation with the US, and thus, at this stage, we are unlikely to see a peaceful outcome resulted from concessions on the Korean Issue which all relevant parties can accept (Mastro, 2018).

Since it is increasingly hard for either side to comply completely with each other, it is crucial to understand each other's interest and policy options and to seek common ground. A way to maintain situation awareness on policy and political interest is through maintaining constant communication and coordination between the leaders.

Since its establishment, the Chinese Communist Party has encountered a series of crises which not only affected its policies, but also threatened its survival. However, according to Jisi Wang, it still lacks theories and principles on crisis behavior and management. Thus, we may cite from those Chinese strategic ideas or conclude the principles from actual decision-making process during those crises. First, the key principles used during the crises are “despise the enemies strategically but uphold your enemies tactically” (战略上藐视敌人，战术上重视敌人) and “with logic, for benefit, and with manner” (有理，有利，有节). The first focuses on maintaining the bottom line on strategic level and taking a collection of flexible measures on tactical level. The bottom line is usually related to national sovereignty or moral standard. For example, on the territorial disputes, China has been hardliner (strategically) in defending its territory in public statement. However, in practice, it seeks to use negotiation (with Russia under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization) and dialogue (with Philippine in the aftermath of the arbitration in 2016). The second principle focuses on the practical measures used in the reaction process once the crisis occurs. At the first stage of a crisis, China will seek to capture the moral high ground to justify its action. In comparison to US, China in the past mostly used universal justice and national sovereignty to justify its action. During the conflict with Vietnam in 1979, China defined its action as “counterattack in self-defense” in response to Vietnam’s action along the border. This provided the moral basis for the subsequent military action. During the air-crash in 2001, China defined the crash as “US spy plane violating China’s sovereignty”. In comparison, the technical issues in the crash were not specifically emphasized. Second, China seeks to focus on maintaining the stability of the international relationship even as the cost of losing short-term interest. In the missile crisis in 1995-96, despite need to react against US issuing Lee Teng-Hui the visa to the US, President Jiang Zemin still tried to maintain the crisis at a controllable level even when he needed to demonstrate the determination of the Chinese government. He ordered the 2nd Artillery force not to target inland objectives and US forces near the area. In the bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, despite public calling to take actions against the US (according to Horizon Research, 52.3% of the respondents reported that their attitudes towards the US has heavily affected by the bombing and 33.4% of the respondents demanded NATO’s apology), to maintain the diplomatic relationship with the US, the government used state media and public lecture to settle down the angry students. Third, when the moral basis is established and the condition to maintain long-term

stability and to propaganda is met, the Chinese government will take gradual step to downgrade the crisis. In the embassy bombing in 1999, after the US government handed the official accident report to the Chinese (though not accepted) and provided reparation, the Chinese also provided reparation for the damage caused during the student and civilian protests to the US property in China (Wang and Xu, 2004).

In the history, though Chinese leadership made policies based on maintaining long-term regional stability, it has been willing to use military forces to achieve that goal. The negotiation and communication can reduce the chance of military conflict. During the Missile Crisis in 1995, despite the halt of communication between military forces, China and the US remained full diplomatic relationship. Though the communication during the crisis was full of diplomatic rhetoric, it more or less contributed to the final peaceful resolution of the military confrontation.

During the Korean War, both the US and China make their policies based on their own calculations, without considering how each other viewed the situation. According to Allen Whiting, the lack of direct communication complicated the situation. (Whiting, 2006)

In the US, the outbreak of the war was a surprise and it caused a sense of urgency for the decision-makers. After the USSR tested its first nuclear weapon and many reports suggested that the ROK forces were ready to defend the South Korea, DPRK invaded the South Korea and the ROK forces were not as tough as expected. At that time, only a part of the 8th Army without heavy equipment was stationed in the peninsula. With domestic republicans calling President Truman to act tough in Asia,

Truman decided to launch a “police operation” to hold off the DPRK’s aggression. He planned to use limited force to finish off the conflict on the peninsula to avoid direct face-off with the USSR in the East Asia and to ensure most of the military resources could be allocate to the forces in the Europe. However, the change in frontline was too rapid to predict. In September 1950, General MacArthur launched an amphibious landing in Incheon. Despite the landslide win, there was no coup de grace and part of the Korea People’s Army escape. Then the question became if the UN forces should pursue them and cross the 38th Parallel. This led to an indefinite conflict and a discoordination between the decision-makers. The JCS would like to apply a wait-and-see option, whether to maintain the status quo or to reunify the peninsula. Similarly, Truman was concern about the possibility of Chinese or Soviet’s intervention. In the later Wake Island Conference, based on his independent judgement, MacArthur persuaded the President that the Chinese was unlikely to intervene, and they could be easily defeated using naval and air forces. People in JCS, notably General Omar Bradley, doubted MacArthur’s idea, but they lacked specific evidence to refute his proposal. Without knowing the determination of Beijing and their own independent strategic thinking, those who underestimate the chance of PLA’s intervention failed to predict the encounter with Chinese forces and the defeat of some of the UN forces (US Military, DOD, and JCS, 2013).

At the same time, Beijing was also concerned about the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Right after the breakout of the War, Beijing only called the objection to the presence of the US 7th fleet in the Taiwan Strait. It feared that the US might take a

holistic approach in Asia by connecting the Taiwan issue with the Korean affairs and it might threaten the new-born republic. Besides, despite the winning of the KPA against the ROK forces, leadership in Beijing, including Premier Zhou Enlai, worried the possibility and the scale of the US intervention. What's more, not only the leadership, but also the generals (Peng Dehuai who later led the Chinese forces in the War) worried about the confrontation between China and the US. They were confident that PLA could easily defeat the ROK forces. However, they were unsure about the conflict with the US. After the amphibious landing in Incheon, Beijing received calls from both Mosco and Pyongyang to send forces to assist the KPA. Despite the uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict, Mao Zedong decided to send the forces based on a series of reasons: First, Mosco had agreed to assist in arming the PLA forces. Second, US needed to concentrate its resource in Europe. Third, China needed to show its determination to the US. Based on those reasons, he successfully convinced other generals that military intervention was needed. However, this final decision was partly based on the lack of communication with Washington. The lack of awareness of Washington's uncertainty about Beijing's intention left Mao and his generals no choice but to assume that the UN forces would subsequently target China (Zhang, 2005).

In this process, for the US, a few factors led to the failure to use effective measures to both hold off communist aggression in Asia and to avoid USSR and China's direct involvement.

First, the intelligence communities did not properly coordinate with the executive

branch and it failed to estimate the possibility of China's involvement. The failure was due to the improper allocation of resources and the bureaucratic environment. First, before the war in 1949, the USSR successfully launched its first nuclear bomb test. In the subsequent proposal of NSC 68, it suggested that the US should largely increase its nuclear and conventional capability in response to the communist aggression. Coordinately, a huge proportion of the intelligence community resource was allocated to the front in the Europe. Consequently, there were limited resources to be used to evaluate the situation in the East Asia. Before the war, there was only a 500-people team to train the local ROK forces and the reports suggested that the local forces are capable of deterring aggression from the DPRK. With such information at hand, the US was even planning to retreat the US forces in the area and relocate them to the Europe. This suggests a lack of awareness of the situation and the strategic significance of the ROK due to the lack of resources at hand. Second, the bureaucratic environment in East Asia did not ensure the intelligence community to serve its function. During the WWII, General Douglas MacArthur had a bad reputation in coordinating with the OSS. Later before the Korean War, MacArthur was limiting access to the CIA. Consequently, both the CIA and the Army made the argument that the ROK forces was capable of deterring aggression from the North and China was unlikely to intervene through direct force deployment. Further, some sources suggest that only reports which were parallel to MacArthur's expectation were sent to his desk (US Military, DOD, and JCS, 2013).

Both the lack of intelligence resources suggests a lack of coordination among

difference sections of decision-making, which was resulted from the lack of communication among nations. After the test of the Soviet's first nuclear bomb, most of the military resources, intelligence resources included, were allocated to forces in the Europe to deter and balance the increasing capability of the Red Army. This led to lack of intelligence resources in the East Asia and lack of objective observation on the situation in the East Asia. It forced the intelligence community and the military commander to make the call on their own finding. The intelligence could only gather information through aerial reconnaissance and interrogation of captured enemy soldiers. Those measures led to incorrect judgement about the situation. For example, after Chinese forces entered the peninsular, judging from the interrogation of captured Chinese soldiers, CIA believed that there were 1.5 to 2 Chinese divisions in the peninsular. However, in fact, there were more than 9 divisions. Before the war, most reports suggested that the ROK forces could deter the aggression from the North. After the breakout of the war, many reports lacked awareness of China's interest and policy options (US Military, DOD, and JCS, 2013). The incorrect judgement could lead to policy failure. After the landing in Incheon, such observation forced the administration to take a wait-and-see policy and give commander at the frontline authority to pursue the defeated enemies. This policy stance was based on the assumption that both underestimate the determination and willingness of Beijing and overestimate the coordination between China's and USSR's foreign policies. It presupposed that China, under the leadership of a communist regime, would follow the steps of the USSR. Instead, it was China's own consideration that led to its

decision to enter the war.

The lack of direct communication with Washington led to incomprehensive understanding about Washington's intention in China. This is partly due to the ideological conflict with the US and it led to lack of willingness to directly speak to the US. From China's perspective, the military operation and force deployment on the Korean Peninsula could threaten the stability and the security of the new-born PRC. Historically, according to Baijia Zhang, the military conflicts between China and Japan began with Japanese intervention in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the Chinese government, on the one hand, was sensitive to military interaction on the peninsula. The situation on the peninsula could affect the security of China, given the fact that there were rebellions within the Mainland China and the KMT forces were still in Taiwan and prepared to counterstrike (Zhang, 2005). On the other hand, the US was supporting the KMT forces during the Civil War from 1946 to 1949. The lack of trust as well as the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism led to lack of willingness to take to the US. With the lack of coordination with the US, the leadership in Beijing could only decide to make policy based on the force deployment on the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, with the lack of awareness of Washington's intention, to ensure its security, Beijing decided to send in its army divisions when the UN forces crosses the 38th Parallel. The lack of awareness of US intention resulted from lacking bilateral communication led to China's intervention and a relative peaceful result had gone nowhere.

During this process, despite the lack of formal diplomatic relationship, the two

countries had a few chances to deliver message to each other, but those channels were inefficient and unsuccessful. First, after the landing operation in Incheon, Premier Zhou Enlai sent his warning about China's intervention through the Indian Ambassador to China, K. M. Panikkar. However, Ambassador Panikkar was not considered as trustworthy in Washington and the warning that he delivered was largely ignored. Second, in November 1950, Premier Zhou claimed that China would answer UN security council's call through sending delegate to New York and to discuss the Korean issue. However, the delegate arrived on Nov 24, the same that MacArthur decided to launch the strike to enforce the defense along the Yalu River. The discussion later could not affect the decision-making process (Whiting, 2006).

After US and China established formal diplomatic relationship in 1979, there have been a series of factors affecting the communication channel, especially during the decision-making process on military and security crisis. First, the channel between military officers has been affected by the crisis itself and security-related issues. Second, the change geopolitical power distribution and relative power is affecting the political calculus on if a consistent communication channel is necessary.

First of all, the consistency of the communication channel, especially between the military department, has been affected by tensions and security-related affairs and has been vulnerable. According to David Finkelstein, there are people in both Washington and Beijing who believe that using the military communication channel as a pressure-relief valve is not a bad thing. Their belief is based on the assumptions that: First, switching-off the channel in the history has not threaten the national interest; Second,

the military cooperation in an isolated dimension in the US-China relationship and it does not have much spinoff effect on other dimensions; Third, the essence of the US-China security cooperation has not primarily been the purview of military officials. Historically, such idea led to several stops in the Sino-US military communication channel. Since the day when US and China build diplomatic relationship, a series of political as well as security and military affairs have been affecting the communication channel between the Pentagon and the PLA (now the Central Military Committee CMC). From 1979 to 2011, the political crisis in 1989, the arm sale to Taiwan (1992&2000s), the bombing of Chinese Embassy in 1999, and the air crash near the Hainan Island in 2001 have led to temporary halt of the channel between senior military officials and policy-makers from both countries. However, such assumption can barely stand in a series of current affairs. Scholarly, there are scholars who propose that Washington should responsively link various policy issues together in case the two sides cannot come to an agreement on a single issue. Politically, after Donald Trump came to office, he has, for several times, linked the Korean affairs (security-related) with trading issue (trading-related). In the future, military coordination may no longer be an isolated dimension of the US-China relationship. To avoid the spinoff effect, the two countries need to maintain constant communication between the defense department to build trust and to promote confidence-building (Finkelstein, 2012).

Second, based on its the strategic calculation and domestic constraints, the decision-maker may decide to take unilateral action and neglect the need of

maintaining communication on security affairs. On the one hand, China as a reviving great power is eager to fit in the regional as well as global order and to use its increasing power to defend its national interests. However, given its unique political system and lack of transparency (how big will it be), existing powers including the US concern about China's intention. In the cost-benefit analysis, Beijing may consider the cost resulted from unilateral action as minimal and is sometimes overconfident in regional hot spots. According to Michael McDevitt, twenty years ago during the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait, People's Liberation Navy (PLAN) could hardly locate the two Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) sent to the area (CSIS, 2016). Also, at that time, PLAN was lacking proper countermeasures against or to deter the USN operation in the Taiwan Strait. This gave Beijing relative few military options to bargain with US and it led to Beijing's willingness to make concession at the end of crisis and it gave Beijing significant incentive to reform its outdated military to counter future challenges. In contrast, in current era, PLAN is capable of detect and locate the US carrier once it enters the West Pacific and can use proper measures (ALCM and ASBM included) to deter US carriers operating in the areas relevant. The improving military power gives Beijing confidence in handling regional affairs. However, the lack of coordination with other relevant stakeholders may lead to ignorance of other countries' interests and determination. On the other hand, the decision-making process is becoming more transparent and is increasingly affected by the domestic environment. According to Jiang Zhan at Beijing Foreign Studies University, Weibo (Chinese Microblog) "represents a political information

revolution... a huge shift in the relationship between Chinese politics and the media". Despite the media control, the public is increasingly aware of the political affairs and is having its effect on the actual policy. According to David Lampton, during the Earthquake in 2008, the images of the disaster motivated Premier Wen Jiabao to immediately fly to the area to bring comfort (Lampton, 2014). In the future, with the rise of nationalism in China and more people have the access to the internet, we are likely to see the foreign policy being affected by the public opinion. However, the public does not have to consider the effect of a specific policy. Thus, the decision-makers should not be pushed by the public opinion. Instead, they should make the decision based on a careful calculation including concerning the interests of other nations through communicating with other relevant countries including the US.

In short, the decision-making processes on crisis-management differ in China and the US. However, they all require fully understanding each other's policy and options to make practical judgment. In the Korean War, for the US, the lack of awareness on China's determination and interest led to underestimation of possibility on China's intervention and Washington was unable to achieve its policy objective in the Korean War. For China, due to the ideological conflict with the US, its lack of awareness of Truman's intention to maintain the war at a controllable level led to its preemptive strike after the UN forces crosses the 38th Parallel and it later missed the chance to build a constructive relationship with the US. The few communications during the war failed because they were untrustworthy and not consistent. After the two countries build diplomatic relationship, due to the increasing effect on the policy-

making by the public opinion and the linkage among policy affairs, there is an urgent need to hold consistent communication between the decision-making circles and the defense department.

However, even when the bilateral conversation can be constructive in crisis management, in the end, it was the recognition of the importance of the bilateral relationship and the need for the other that led to the resolution of the crisis. Also, exchanges have not always led to positive outcome. The lack of coordination and proper implementation of leadership within the administration the mishandling of the conflict between the domestic politics and the crisis management can counteract the outcome of the conversation and lead to mistrust.

First of all, in the past cases, it was not the bilateral conversation itself that led to the downgrade of the crises. Instead, the final resolutions and the downgrades were mostly from mutual comprehensive understanding on the ballast of the bilateral relationship. In the past, when there were crises between the US and China on issues including the war in Vietnam, the missile crisis, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the air-crash in 2001, the two sides, though were eager to show the determination and to exhibit their relative interests, were willing to downgrade the situation for the sake of the general Sino-US relationship, which includes mutual business and strategic interest. In fact, many disputes revealed in the process of crisis management were not solved. Scholars in both countries seem to have an agreement on the point that the willingness to avoid direct engagement and to preserve the bilateral relationship led to the solutions to the crises in the history.

In the case of the missile crisis in 1995-1996, there were clues which suggest that all relevant parties, including PRC, US and other regional powers, hoped to maintain the Sino-US relationship and preferred not to see a military conflict between US and China and thus, exhibited and exercised restraint. According to Niu Jin, the goal of the military exercise conducted from 1995 to 1996, from China's perspective, was to use exercise as a tool to coerce and to prevent the standoff from becoming an international crisis (Niu, 2006). Thus, the PLA was not intended to either attack the Taiwan Island and the affiliated island or engage with the US forces in the region. This view is confirmed by Robert Suettinger, who mentioned that there was no encounter between the PLA forces and other parties. From the US perspective, he further suggested that all the vessels and aircrafts in the area were ordered not to enter the Taiwan Strait and interfere with PLA's exercise. Moreover, Suettinger suggested that the US government was receiving voices from other Asian countries calling to prevent the crisis from becoming a military conflict. Thus, as Suettinger mentioned, despite the diplomatic rhetoric, the US and the Chinese government, both realizing the tragical effect of the direct conflict, were able to take rational action and to prevent the crisis from becoming a direct conflict (Suettinger, 2006).

In the case of the embassy bombing in 1999, facing the conflict between the domestic politics and crisis management, the two sides finally came to the solution based on their recognition of preserving the Sino-US relationship. According to Wu Baiyi, to ease the anger of the public, the propaganda department of the CCP issued notice calling the media to refocus on the economic reform and stability (Wu, 2006).

This measure, to some extent, contribute to the downgrade of the tension between China and US. According to Kurt Campell, the former Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering, during his trip to Beijing after the crisis, emphasized that an attack on the Chinese embassy by the US was against the theory and the practice and was against President Clinton's personal belief. After Pickering's visit to Beijing, though unsatisfied with the explanation, according to Campell, the Chinese government halted public investigation to the bombing. Though Campell did not mention the direct cause to this change in attitude, combining with other sources, we may suppose that the Chinese government was willing to maintain the bilateral relationship. To sum up, as mentioned by Campell, the final solution of the crisis was based on the mutual recognition of the ballast of the bilateral relationship, including the decadelong mutual relationship, the commercial and business relationship, and the mutual strategic interest (Campell, 2006).

In the case of the air-crash in 2001, according to the scholars and people who witnessed the crisis, the realization of the importance of the bilateral relationship by both sides and the need for US support on China's entering the WTO contributed to the final solution. According to Zhang Tuosheng, on the US side, the Former Secretary of State Powell, in his letter to the Former Vice Premier Qian Qishen, exhibited the US willingness to work with China on the bilateral relationship. On the China's side, the Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin said the leaders of both countries needed to find a solution which benefited the bilateral relationship. Zhang Tuosheng himself also mentioned the need of US support in China bidding for the 2008

Olympics and joining the WTO (Zhang, 2006). According to Dennis Blair, the shift of China's policy on the issue, which contributed to the final solution, was based on China's recognition of the importance of the bilateral relationship (Blair, 2006).

However, those ballasts in the Sino-US relationship are challenged by the increasing disputes brought by the structural power shift. The relative security environment has been changing, with China as a rising power who seeks to articulate its own New Security Concept (新安全观) and US who seeks to defend its historical position and interest in the region. Also, what was considered by Kurt Campell as ballast of the Sino-US relationship, notably the business relationship, is currently in trouble as China is challenging US position in the world economy and innovative industry. The not-yet-well-established intellectual property regulation and the imbalance in bilateral trade led to a series of friction after President Trump entered the office. There are debates on both sides about reconsidering the bilateral relationship. The ballast is losing weight. When the core interests of both countries collide, both sides are less likely to back down and are more likely to push for unilateral action given their relative considerations. Under such circumstance, besides managing existing ballast, both sides will need to discover extra field available for mutual benefit.

Second of all, the lack of coordination among and within the administration (between the central and the local) and the mishandling of the domestic politics can further harm not only the crisis management but also the bilateral relationship.

On the one hand, there are different voices within the central (federal)

government in both country and without proper coordination and leadership exhibited, they can counteract the bilateral talk between the government. First, there is a variety of voices in both governments. On the US side, according to Suettinger, before the missile crisis in 1995-1996, there were voices either for or against issuing visa to Lee Teng-Hui (Suettinger, 2006). On the one side, there were people from the congress, notably Senator Newt Gingrich, who prompted the president to issue visa to Lee. On the other side, there were people in the NSC, including Winston Lord and Samuel Berger, who were familiar with China policy and opposed Lee's visit. According Kurt Campell, in the aftermath of the embassy bombing in 1999, the Pentagon was unenthusiastic about the trip to Beijing and no military officer was sent to Beijing as a part of the delegate (Campell, 2006). It might suggest difference in perception of the crisis. On the China's side, there is also increasing difference in conducting foreign policy. The author of this paper notices that, during his experience in Chinese thinktanks, many scholars who have connections with the administration reveals that currently there are voices which call for tougher policies towards and voices which call for policies accommodating the US and the established order. The author also notices that there is sometimes shocking difference within the academia. While some scholars believe that China should take a tougher stance against the US, others believe that China should hide its capacities and bide its time following Deng Xiaoping's policy. Such difference can be even more destructive in the future as the Chinese leadership system is becoming more decentralized. In the case of the South China Sea, despite the General Secretary Xi Jinping's public statement in 2015 that China

had no intention to militarize the South China Sea, there have been bombers patrolling the islands and construction of military. While such construction of the military facility is considered as need for self-defense, there are different voices on patrolling the island. Some believe that such patrolling is an exhibition of the determination and others believe those activities will contribute nothing towards a healthy Sino-US relationship. In the past, we have seen that the mixture of different voices in the US led to confusion on the Chinese side. In the future, the difference on one side can confuse the other side and complicate the issue. So, the leaders on both sides may need to find a way to balance different voices and exert proper leadership.

Specifically, after the military reform in 2015, as the current theater commands theoretically possess more autonomy, there is an urgent need in better coordination among all relevant sectors.

Thus, though many scholars still pointed out the importance of bilateral communication channel in the previous crisis management processes, they shared an agreement on the fact that the recognition of the importance on preserving the bilateral relationship and the need for the other on specific issues greatly contribute the solution to the final crisis. In the future, it will be needed to maintain and manage existing bilateral exchange as well as to seek extra areas with mutual interests. Also, to make the crisis management process more efficient, it's needed for the leaders participated in the process exert leadership and balance among the different voices.

In the future, from the Korean war to recent air-crash in 2001, maintaining an effective and efficient communication between the leaders has been and is still needed

for minimizing chance of misunderstanding and risks, as many scholars have pointed out the important of consistent communication. Also, to minimize the confusing on the other side and to make the conversation more productive and efficient, each side will need to balance among the different voices on its side. What's more, with limited role in finally solving the crises, the two sides need to seek to maintain traditional areas of mutual benefit as well as to discover new fields in need of joint coordination so that the two sides can still value the bilateral relationship and are willing to take steps to downgrade the crises.

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