

**The Parties' Strategic Entry in Hong Kong's Legislative Council Elections under the  
Largest Remainder Proportional Representation**

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## **Abstract**

This paper aims at exploring how Hong Kong's political parties try to maximize their seats strategically under the largest remainder proportional representation (LRPR) electoral system in four Legislative Council (LegCo) direct elections since 2000. Sometimes parties of the same camp cooperate to merge their lists, and sometimes each of them put forward multiple lists in order to win more seats. This paper will analyze how the political cleavages or intra-party competition may influence political parties to merge or split in LegCo direct elections. According to Pachon and Shugart's (2010) research in Colombia's pre-reform system before 2006, the effect of proportional representation resembles that of single nontransferable vote (SNTV) when there are multiple lists under the same party label. In this sense, the effect of PR system in Hong Kong is similar to that in Colombia's pre-reform system whenever there are multiple lists under the same party labels. After comparing the hypothetical allocation in one list with the actual allocation, I discover that multiple lists do not necessarily help parties to win more seats than single list if parties do not allocate votes evenly among their lists. In addition to the effect of LRPR, patron-client relation is important in Legislative Council elections. The human affection (ren-ch'ing) and personal relations (Guanxi) are the characteristics of the patron-client networks and the constituency services can strengthen and consolidate the patron-client network and the network thus can cultivate supports in the Legislative Council elections.

This article explores the strategic entry of political parties under the largest remainder proportional representation electoral system in four LegCo direct elections in Hong Kong after handover in 1997<sup>1</sup>. The design of proportional representation after handover can be traced back to the result of Legislative Council elections in 1991 and 1995. Beijing and pro-China camp thought that the Single Member Plurality (SMP) system benefited Democratic Party (DP) and disadvantaged the pro-China party DAB(Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong), and it is true in 1995. The PR system is considered a fair system for both the pro-China camp and the pro-democracy camp-to bring about a balanced outcome in the direct election. Therefore, the PR system is simply designed for the pro-China camp, especially for DAB (Lei, 1998). The DAB does survive and benefit from the PR system after handover. Certainly, Beijing is satisfied with the results of the elections after handover.

[Table 1 about Here]

In order to maximize seats, parties in the same camp cooperate to have one list (ex. DAB and Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (HKPA) in Hong Kong Island district in 2000) in each district or one party can have two lists in one district (DAB in Kowloon East district in 2000). I would like to demonstrate whether results of their strategic entries are consistent with their expectation-to maximize their seats. When there are multiple lists under the same party label, the effect of proportional representation resembles that of single nontransferable vote (SNTV)(Cox and Shugart, 1995, 1996; Cox, 1997; Pachon

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<sup>1</sup> According to the Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), the Legislative Council is composed of 60 members. Not all of them are elected by direct election. Some of them are elected by election committee, some are elected by functional constituency, and the other are by geographical constituencies through direct election. The composition of Legislative Council is different throughout the time. This paper focuses on the geographical constituencies only. Please see table 1 to figure out the composition of Legislative Council.

and Shugart, 2010). In other words, I will explore whether they committed errors of undernomination (it could have won more seats by nominating more candidates or lists) or misallocation (it has too many candidates or lists and it spreads its votes among them and has fewer seats as a result)(Cox and Shugart, 1995). I am going to analyze how political cleavages (pro-China vs. pro-democracy) and intra-party struggles/factions influence strategic entries of political parties. In addition to the effect of electoral system, I will also analyze how patron-client relations affect LegCo elections in Hong Kong since it is said that patron-client politics helps candidates to cultivate supports from voters (Kwong, 2010).

This article is going to proceed as follows. First, I will review the literature of electoral systems, especially the effect of largest remainder proportional representation. I will discuss Colombia's pre-reform system of proportional representation in particular since the situation in Colombia is similar to that in Hong Kong. As mentioned by Cox and Shugart, multiple lists under one party label resemble that of SNTV. Second, I will analyze the political cleavages and intra-party struggles/factions among Hong Kong's political parties. The main political cleavage in Hong Kong is pro-China v.s. pro-democracy. Intra-party struggles/factions can possibly an attribute of multiple lists under one party label. Survey datasets will be used to analyze the political/social cleavages. Third, I will analyze the strategic entry of political parties in four direct elections (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012) after 1997. I am going to substantiate whether multiple lists under one party label can win more seats than single list. Fourth, I will discuss the impact of the LRPR. I will contend that multiple lists in LRPR under one party label produce the same effect as that of SNTV and lead to patron-client politics in

Hong Kong. Politicians strengthen their patron-client networks to cultivate support from clients in order to obtain votes during direct elections. The constituency service is the main way for them to establish patron-client relationship. Fifth is conclusion.

### **The Effects of the Largest Remainder Proportional Representation**

The approach of rational choice institutionalism has made an important contribution to the understanding of electoral politics. Most of the literature centers on the influence the electoral system on the number of political parties. Duverger (1954) is the pioneer of this research. He contends that single member plurality (SMP) fosters two-party system and proportional representation (PR) facilitates multi-party system. From his point of view, voters usually abandon their favorite candidates if the probability of winning the seat is low for the candidates. Instead of casting votes for the candidates with the least chance of winning, voters will choose the one he/she favors more than the other between the top two candidates on the ranking to prevent the one he favors the least from winning. The act of voting for one candidate to prevent the least favorite one from winning is called strategic voting. According to Duverger, the strategic voting of voters can discourage the chance of third party and lead to the two party system. He also argues that strategic voting does not appear under PR system since there is no constraint on the number of parties (Cox and Shugart, 1996).

However, some scholars have different point of view from Duverger and claim that strategic voting may take place in PR when the magnitude is five or below (Cox, 1997:112). The reason is that the effect of PR with low district magnitude is similar to that of SMP since it is difficult to allocate seats proportionally (Leys, 1959; Sartori, 1968; Cox and Shugart, 1996). Under SNTV or LRPR, voters are more likely to give up

hopeless candidates or lists and cast votes for viable candidates/lists strategically than desert strong candidates/lists which have too many votes (Cox and Shugart, 1996:317).

Later on, Cox's(1997) uses rational choice institutionalism approach to analyze how parties, candidates, and voters act strategically in different electoral systems. There are three independent variables in his analysis: electoral institutions (the coordination game that elites and voters must play), political motivations (the preference of the elite and mass actor who must coordinate), and public expectations (equilibrium analysis based on market-clearing expectation: citizen: election = consumer: market). He not only includes SMD and PR systems but also take the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system into consideration. He concludes that all electoral systems discussed in his book follow the M+1 rule (M refers to the district magnitude) which "only imposes an upper bound on the effective number of competitors that will appear in equilibrium (p.139)." In this vein, Cox has made an important contribution that electoral systems do have influences on the number of parties and all kinds of electoral system follow the M+1 formula by using formal modeling (p.12). He establishes a general law which fits all electoral systems appropriately.

Cox and Shugart(1995) explore further the effect of LRPR. According to their case study of Colombia's pre-reform PR system prior to 2006, they discover that PR system is similar to SNTV in Japan when there are multiple lists under the same party label. The absence of vote pooling in SNTV, just as multiple lists under Colombia's PR system, makes it more difficult for a party to control their candidates. Parties may commit strategic errors of undernomination or misallocation. In this sense, the absence of vote pooling had contributed to personalized electoral machines for election since the

competition is among the head of each list (Cox and Shugart, 1995: 444-446; Cox, 1997:111; Pachon and Shugart, 2010: 649-650). Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen(2005) also argue that personal vote-earning attributes(PVEA)<sup>2</sup> is useful in open-list PR system because candidates have to face intra-party competition. In contrast, PVEA is less useful in close-list PR system. Although they do not mention the PVEA effect of SNTV or multiple lists under the same party label in LRPR, I think PVEA is important under LRPR as well since candidates have to cultivate personal reputation to solicit personal votes (p.439).

In sum, multiple lists under the same party label in the LRPR system increase personalization of the lists and intra-party competition as is evident in SNTV. The situation is quite similar in Hong Kong's LegCo direct election. In order to maximize seats in one district, parties may cooperate to have one list or one party can have two lists. PVEA is more important than party label under such personalized campaign. This paper intends to analyze whether the strategic entry of political parties helps them to win more seats.

### **Methodology**

There are two main methods applied in my research. First, I am going to use survey datasets for statistical analyses. Statistical analyses are mainly used to explore the political/social cleavages of the electorate. The dataset is from East Asian Barometer (the second wave in 2006). Second, in-depth political elite interviews which were done during my MA thesis fieldwork in 2000 are used.

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<sup>2</sup> Personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) refer to social backgrounds, occupations, local roots, and previous electoral experiences, and other attributes of candidates (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, 2005: 438).

### **Political/Social Cleavages in the Electorate**

The main political cleavage in Hong Kong is pro-China vs. pro-democracy. The development of the cleavage can be attributed to the special political background and development of Hong Kong. In this sense, it is important to know the evolution of political parties which is highly associated with the political cleavages.

#### The Origin of Political Cleavages in Hong Kong Before 1997

The evolution of political party in HKSAR can be traced back to the emergence of some interest and pressure groups in late 1970. The appearance is associated with the negotiation about HK's future between China and British, the development of representative politics, and the discussion of public policies. Later, the "June Fourth Incident" stimulated the pro-democracy camp to merge into "Hong Kong Democratic Union" (Ian Scott, 1992 : 17-8), and they won most of the seats in geographical constituencies in the 1991 Legislative Council Election. However, candidates from the pro-China camp were almost defeated in geographical constituencies. Beijing was so nervous about the result and urged the pro-china camp to establish "Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong"(DAB), which always devotes efforts to grassroots' service, in 1992. In addition to the development of these two camps, Liberal Party-a conservative and pro-business party was founded in 1993.

Consequently, "Hong Kong Democratic Union" and "Meet Point" merged into "Democratic Party"(DP) in the end of 1994. In addition to DP, Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL), founded in 1986, focused on the interest of lower-class people. ADPL regards herself as a party serving for the lower-class people. However, they split because they had a serious conflict on whether they should

participate in the provisional Legislative Council or not. In addition to DAB, some pro-China parties were established, such as “New Hong Kong Alliance”, “Liberal Democratic Federation (LDF)”<sup>3</sup>, and “Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (HKPA)”. These new parties participated in the District Board election in 1994, Urban Council election and Legislative Council election in 1995. Although the “June Fourth Incident” still had an influence on those elections and the situation was still beneficial to the pro-democracy camp, the pro-china camp got more seats and the vote share had increased. As a result, the party politics in Hong Kong can be distinguished with two main camps-pro-democracy camp and pro-China camp.

As 1997 approaches, China thinks that the political reform project of Chris Patten (the last governor of HK before 97) violated the Basic Law of HK. China rejected to accept the project of “through train” of the Legislative Council and began to “set up the new stove”. That means all legislators elected in 1995 should resign in July 1, 1997, and there would be a provisional legislative council instead before the first Legislative Council Election in May, 1998. Democratic Party rejected to join in the provisional Legislative Council because it is regarded as democratic retrogression. Therefore, the provisional Legislative Council consists of pro-China parties, the Liberal Party, and ADPL, which have a better relationship with Beijing than other pro-democracy parties. However, the participation of ADPL had aroused conflicts among her members and then leads to split.

Before 1997, there were two new parties founded and two parties merging into a new party. The newly-established parties are “The Frontier” and “Citizen Party”.

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<sup>3</sup> Liberal Democratic Federation (LDF) has merged into Hong Kong Progressive Alliance(HKPA) thirty-five days shortly before handover on Jul. 1, 1997.

Both of them belong to pro-democracy camp. The Frontier, founded in 1996, has a simple and small organization<sup>4</sup>. The ideology is more radical than that of the Democratic Party (Yang, 1997).

All in all, parties in HK form two main camps-pro-democracy and pro-China camp before 1997. ADPL's split could be attributed to their conflict on the participation in provisional legislative council. Besides ADPL, the formation of "The Frontier", "Citizen Party", and "Civic Party"(formed in 2006) has made the pro-democracy parties more ideologically divided than those in pro-China camp. In contrast, the pro-China parties are less divided and more cooperative. In addition to the merge of two pro-China parties before the handover, HKPA, which is more inclined towards business interests usually cooperate with DAB in the Legislative Council elections. They mainly run for committee election and functional constituency seats instead of geographical constituencies to avoid competing with DAB. Moreover, it seems that the Liberal Party has a quite narrow space between two camps.

#### The Social and Political Cleavages after 1997

The victory of pro-democracy camp in 1998 Legco election resulted from people's dissatisfaction with the provisional Legislative Council and sympathy for pro-democracy parties. On the other hand, since HK had been returned back to China, many people has accepted the situation and believed that "one nation, two systems" has been put into practice in HK. In addition to the political situation that benefits DAB, DAB's efforts of community services successfully cultivate support and increase their vote share in 1998 LegCo election. Although it seems that pro-democracy parties are the biggest winners in this campaign, pro-China camp (especially DAB) cannot be regarded as losers.

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<sup>4</sup> The Frontier has merged into the Democratic Party in 2008.

However, the vote share of the Democratic Party declined in 2000 Legco election. The decline of Democratic Party's popular vote could be attributed to several reasons according to my in-depth interviews. The first reason is the problem of factional struggle. Many scholars and political elites consider it the important factor accounting for the decline of the DP. The rise of the so-called "Young Turks" faction within the party, and their feud with the "mainstream" faction of the Democratic Party is definitely one of the most important reasons explaining the DP's decline in popularity in 2000. A wide range of factors can account for the factional struggle: ideological differences, dissatisfaction of lower party echelons against the party leaders, personal rivalry, the change in the electoral system, the abolition of the municipal councils, etc (Ma Ngok, 2000). As a result, factional struggle has undermined DP's image. The second reason is that DP has gradually deviated from public opinions since 1997. Before handover, DP's victory in elections depended on the June Fourth Incident and people's fear for 1997. However, people's worry after 1997 does not exist. DP keeps struggling for ideological disputes and ignores what people really demand. People are getting more and more disappointed with the DP. The third reason is that they do not devote themselves much to community services, even the DP officials admit that they really do not focus on this a lot.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 is the order logit of party identification in Hong Kong<sup>5</sup>. It shows that gender, trust in government, and satisfaction with the democracy in Hong Kong are associated with party identification<sup>6</sup>. Men are still more likely to support the pro-China camp.

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<sup>5</sup> This dataset is from the second wave survey data of East Asian Barometer conducted in 2006.

<sup>6</sup> There are 537(63.25%) respondents (total 849) who allege that they do not feel close to any political

People who trust in government and are satisfied with the democracy in Hong Kong tend to support the pro-China camp. In contrast, people who do not trust in government and are not satisfied with the democracy are more likely to support the pro-democracy camp. In sum, the special political background in HKSAR has shaped its political cleavage and the evolution of political parties since the Legislative election in 1991. The China factor remains the most important political cleavage in Hong Kong after the handover.

### **The Strategic Entry of the Parties in Legislative Council Elections**

The direct election in Hong Kong Legislative Council election uses closed party-list proportional representation with the largest remainder method and Hare Quota. Both the DP and DAB try to have two lists in one district in order to win more seats. I will explore whether their strategy (multiple seats) commits errors of undernomination or misallocation. In other words, I will compare the hypothetical allocation if a party had run one list with the actual results. The hypothetical and actual results of allocations in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 are as follows.

[Table 3 about here]

In 2000 LegCo election, the DP was the only party which had multiple lists in New Territory East and New Territory West. As mentioned above, DP's factional struggle contributed to intra-party competition (main stream vs. the Young Turks). There are five types of intra-party competition: a) competing for better ranking on the candidate list; b) struggling for list-splitting; c) scrambling for "vote-responsibility-zone"; d) hostile campaign competition; and the worst is e) withdrawing from the party and running as independent in the election. In this sense, multiple lists are results of factional struggles

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party. I regard it as a baseline category. Those who identify with the DP and the parties of the Democratic camp are coded 1; the DAB and pro-China party identifiers are coded -1.

(Ivan C. K. Choy, 2000). Table 3 shows the comparison between the hypothetical allocation in one list and actual allocation in multiple lists. The DP in New Territories East can only win one seats if it runs in one list; however, the result remains the same in New Territories West if it runs in one list. The senior incumbent Lee defeated in the election accidentally and he admitted that he did not do a good job on community service. Although list-splitting results from the factional struggle, the DP officials claimed that list-splitting is feasible to win more seats in the future according to my in-depth interviews.

In contrast to the pro-democracy camp, the pro-China camp is more cooperative. The HKPA mainly runs for the seats of committee election and functional constituency instead of geographical constituency to avoid competing with DAB. Actually they joined the list of DAB. In 2000, Yuen Han Chan in Kowloon East intended to run under the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions label from the DAB. The DAB official dissuaded her to do so and she eventually gave up doing so, but she alleged she would do so definitely in 2004 (Ibid.).

[Table 4 about here]

In 2004, both the DP and DAB have multiple lists. DAB have two lists in Kowloon East as their political elites predict this and the DP have two lists in New Territories West. The DP does not have multiple list in New Territories East and they cooperated with the Frontier and Article 45 Concern Group (the predecessor of the Civic Party) to have one list. Table 4 shows the comparisons. There is no difference when DAB and DP run in one list.

[Table 5 about here]

In 2008, only the DP has multiple lists in three districts-Kowloon East, New Territories East, and New Territories West. Table 5 shows that the effects are the same when DP runs in one list in each district.

In 2012, the DAB has multiple lists in three districts (Hong Kong Island, New Territories East, and New Territories West) and the DP has multiple lists in two districts only (New Territories East and New Territories West). Table 6 and 7 are comparisons of the two parties.

[Table 6 about here]

The DAB has two lists and wins two seats in Hong Kong Island district. If it has single list, they can only get one seat. However, there is no difference between one list and two lists in Territories East. Three lists in New Territories West is a success again. If the DAB runs only one list, they can only get two seats.

[Table 7 about here]

The DP in New Territories East has three lists and they get only one seat there. There is no difference if they run for one list. Probably two lists can help them to win one additional seat since the votes of the last seat won by the remainder is 28,621. It is evident that the DP commits an error of misallocation in New Territories East. In New Territories West, they have two lists but do not get any seat. They could win one seat if they had run one list only. They commit an error of misallocation in New Territories again.

It seems that multiple lists under the same party label do not always help the DP or the DAB win more seats if it runs one list only. The DP's list-splitting strategy only works fine in New Territories East in 2000. The DAB's strategy succeeds in Hong

Kong Island and New Territories West in 2012 only.

### **Conclusion: The Impact of Multiple Lists Under One Party Label**

The pre-reform electoral system (multiple lists under one party label in LRPR) in Colombia resembles SNTV system. Under such system, competition is among the head of the lists and candidates rely on personal electoral machine rather than political parties. Personal vote-earning attributes thus become very important for candidates to cultivate support from voters. As a result, clientelism is frequently used and favored by politicians to exchange targeted benefits with votes in Colombia.

The special political background has an influence on the political cleavage in Hong Kong and thus the political cleavage shapes the evolution of political parties-the formation of pro-democracy and pro-China camp. The China factor always has important influences on politics in Hong Kong, especially after the handover. The situation after handover benefit pro-China camp since Beijing adapts united front electoral strategies (Lo, Yu, Kwong, Wong, 2005; Cheng, 2010). The LRPR is designed to prevent the growth of pro-democracy camp and promote the pro-China camp, especially the DAB. In addition to electoral system, the pro-China parties cooperate with each other to avoid compete with each other and maximize votes and seats although they begin to have multiple lists since 2004. In particular, the DAB devotes herself to constituency service and thus increases DAB's popularities. In contrast, the DP's factional struggle results in the list-splitting. The DP's multiple list does not work well except in 2000 and that causes hostile campaign competition. The intra-competition of the DP is deleterious to their party image and electoral fortune. Moreover, they lack a common and well-defined party platform (Cheng, 2010). It seems that the problems of

the DP have not been resolved yet since 2000.

Multiple lists in one party label do not work effectively if votes are not evenly allocated. Except the DP in New Territories East in 2000 and the DAB in Hong Kong Island and New Territories West in 2012, there is no difference between multiple lists and one list. Sometimes multiple lists can even win fewer seats than single list such as the DP in New Territories East and New Territories West in 2012. In other words, multiple lists under one party label does not necessary help parties to win more seats if they commit an error of misallocation.

In addition to multiple lists under one party label in LRPR, there is one mutual characteristic between pre-reform Colombia and Hong Kong is the clientelism. In Hong Kong, the human affection (*ren-ch'ing*) and personal relations (*Guanxi*) features the patron-client networks. The constituency services (ex. jobs, meetings, dinner gatherings, etc.) can strengthen and consolidate patron-client network and the network thus can cultivate supports in the elections (Kwong, 2010:79-85). However, the patron-client politics may have several disadvantages as is evident in Latin America. First, the patron-client politics has deepened the gap between the rulers and the ruled and protests and demonstrations take place often. Second, it may lead to corruption if tolerated for a long time (Ibid., 115-6). However, the impact of patron-client politics deserves further exploration.

In all, multiple lists under one party label in LRPR occasionally win more seats as expected, but it does not often work well in Hong Kong LegCo elections. It can work well if parties allocate votes evenly among their lists. Despite this, the demerits of multiple lists (such as personal campaign machine, intra-party competition, weak party

control, clietelism, etc.) are still more than the merits per se.

### Tables

Table 1 The Composition of Legislative Council After 1997

Composition	The First (1998-2000)	The Second (2000-2004)	The Third (2004-2008)
Functional Constituencies	30	30	30
Geographical Constituencies	20	24	30
The Election Committee	10	6	0

Adapted from the Basic Law of HKSAR(The composition of the fourth term 2008-2012 is the same as the third term according to the decision of Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 2004)

Table 2 The Ordered Logit Model of Party Identification in Hong Kong (2006)

Variables	Ordered Logit Coefficient (SE)	Predicted Probability (SE)
Gender	-.419(.178)*	-.065(.027)
Age	-.109(.075)	
Education	-.110(.172)	
Household monthly income	.047(.074)	
Trust in government	-.341(.156)*	-.173(.083)
Satisfaction with the democracy	-.430(.173)*	-.216(.091)
N of obs	571	571
Log Likelihood	-478.56259	-478.56259
LR chi2	26.61	26.61
Prob>chi2	.0002	.0002
Pseudo R2	.027	.027

\*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\*p<.001

Table 3 The Actual and Hypothetical Results of the Democratic Parties in 2000

<b>Hypothetical Allocation in One List</b>							
Actual Allocation <sup>7</sup>	Votes	Seats won	Votes	Seats by Quota	Remainder	Seats by Remainder	Total Seats
<b>New Territories East</b> (District Magnitude:5, Total Votes:307, 835, Quota: 61,567)							
List 1 Wong	25, 971	1					
List 2 Foo	49,242	1					
<b>Total</b>	<b>75,213</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>75,213</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>13, 646</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>New Territories West</b> (District Magnitude: 6, Total Votes: 343,594, Quota:57,265)							
List 1 Chan	43,613	1					
List 2 Ho	38,472	1					
List 3 Lee	35,648	0					
<b>Total</b>	<b>117,733</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>117,733</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3,203</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>

<sup>7</sup> The name of candidate is the first one on the list.

Table 4 The Actual and Hypothetical Results of the DAB and DP in 2004

<b>Hypothetical Allocation in One List</b>							
Actual Allocation	Votes	Seats won	Votes	Seats by Quota	Remainder	Seats by Remainder	Total Seats
<b>DAB in Kowloon East</b> (District Magnitude:5, Total Votes: 293,986, Quota: 58,797)							
List 1 Chan K	55,306	1					
List 2 Chan Y	52,564	1					
Total	107,870	2	107,870	1	49,073	1	2
<b>DP in New Territories West</b> (District Magnitude: 8, Total Votes: 463,408, Quota:57,926)							
List 1 Lee	62,500	1					
List 2 Ho	62,342	1					
Total	124,842	2	124,842	2	8,990	0	2

Table 5 The Actual and Hypothetical Results of the DP in 2008 (I)

<b>Hypothetical Allocation in One List</b>							
Actual Allocation	Votes	Seats won	Votes	Seats by Quota	Remainder	Seats by Remainder	Total Seats
<b>DP in Kowloon East</b> (District Magnitude:4, Total Votes: 236,245, Quota: 59,061)							
List 1 Wu	16,365	0					
List 2 Li	48,124	1					
Total	64,489	1	64,489	1	5,428	0	1
<b>DP in New Territories East</b> (District Magnitude: 7, Total Votes: 360,930, Quota:51,561)							
List 1 Wong	44,174	1					
List 2 Foo	41,931	1					
Total	86,105	2	86,105	1	34,544	1	2
<b>DP in New Territories West</b> (District Magnitude:8, Total Votes:398,292, Quota:49,787)							
List 1 Ho	36,764	1					
List 2 Chang	10,069	0					
List 3 Lee	45,767	1					
Total	92,600	2	92,600	1	42,813	1	2

Table 6 The Actual and Hypothetical Results of the DAB in 2012

<b>Hypothetical Allocation in One List</b>							
Actual Allocation	Votes	Seats won	Votes	Seats by Quota	Remainder	Seats by Remainder	Total Seats
<b>DAB in Hong Kong Island</b> (District Magnitude: 7, Total Votes:330,766 , Quota:47,253 )							
List 1 Chung	33,901	1					
List 2 Tsang	36,517	1					
Total	70,418	2	70,418	1	23,165	0	1
<b>DAB in New Territories East</b> (District Magnitude:9, Total Votes:464,745,Quota:51,639)							
List 1 Quat	46,139	1					
List 2 Chen	40,977	1					
Total	87,116	2	87,116	1	35,477	1	2
<b>DAB in New Territories West</b> (District Magnitude:9, Total Votes:498,610,Quota:55,402)							
List 1 Leung	33,777	1					
List 2 Chen	36,555	1					
List 3 Tam	43,496	1					
Total	113,828	3	113,828	2	3,024	0	2

Table 7 The Actual and Hypothetical Results of the DP in 2012

<b>Hypothetical Allocation in One List</b>							
Actual Allocation	Votes	Seats won	Votes	Seats by Quota	Remainder	Seats by Remainder	Total Seats
<b>DP in New Territories East</b> (District Magnitude:9, Total Votes:464,745, Quota:51,639)							
List 1 Lau	37,039	1					
List 2 Tsoi	10,028	0					
List 3 Huang	21,118	0					
Total	68,185	1	68,185	1	16,546	0	1
<b>DP in New Territories West</b> (District Magnitude:9, Total Votes:498,610, Quota:55,402)							
List 1 Chan	25,892	0					
List 2 Lee	32,792	0					
Total	58,684	0	58,684	1	3,282	0	1

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