Three Models of Chinese Welfare: 
Confucian Values and Their Variable Application

Abstract

This paper presents three ideal-typical stances states may entertain in welfare provision, particularly in social assistance for indigent populations: 1) extend assistance to needy persons according to social citizenship rights—or, on the basis of the Confucian concept of the rite of benevolence; 2) grant benefits (education, health care) to enhance the productivity of the nation; or 3) offer subsidies to attain support or to pacify anger and silence demands on the part of the poor. The intended beneficiaries of these three types of projects are, respectively, individuals; society/the state writ large; and politicians. I use this categorization to discuss and distinguish official hand-outs in three historical times: state charity in imperial times; funds for the impoverished during the Republican era and the early PRC; and the current policy of aid for the poverty-stricken (the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee). I find that a notion of right to governmental protection adhered under dynastic rule according to the Confucian rite of benevolence, and Republican and early PRC leaders extended aid to strengthen the nation. But today’s political elite bestow financial assistance mainly to preempt disturbances and “instability.”

Much lore about doing good accorded with the two key pillars in the edifice built by Confucius and his followers: the value of humaneness and the concern for the well-being of the common people.”

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“Today the number of poor people in our nation can be said to have reached an extreme. When foreigners see this, how they must collapse in laughter!” Workhouses, therefore, could partially salvage China’s battered international reputation by alleviating “the nation’s poverty.”

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“At present four big unstable strata exist in society, three-withouts peasants, demobilized soldiers, college graduates who cannot find full employment and religious believers. If we use the following measures to alleviate contradictions with these groups, government expenditures to maintain their stability can temporarily be stopped.”

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Much has been made of the revival of Confucianism in the People’s Republic over the past decade or so, and of its renewed promotion by the country’s political leadership since the turn of the century. Among the chief teachings of that doctrine is the principle that the government has an unshakeable mission to “nourish the people,” as translated in Pierre Etienne-Will and R. Bin Wong’s 1991 tome of that title, a term designating what was one of the very most central precepts that the Master and his disciples set forth. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People again put “the people’s livelihood” in an honored position. And perhaps Mao Zedong’s injunction to “serve the people” was a successor of sorts to Confucius’s command.

But what about in the present, now that socialism-in-practice has slipped away, even as the Sage’s injunctions of showing compassion and inducing harmony hold sway? Does an official commitment to care for the needy still obtain? In this paper I explore the extent to which that foundational directive remains vital in the state today, through comparisons with a
few periods in the past, and with special reference to the regime’s stance toward its urban indigent. To accomplish this I draw mainly—but not only—on several works detailing delivery of welfare to the needy during the Ming and Qing dynasties, plus a recent volume on official treatment of the city poor in the Republican era.  

I will structure this exercise with reference to a set of three modal, and, I propose, universal, patterns of state-supplied sustenance that I have developed; these are best viewed as “ideal types,” or abstract constructions that emphasize central features of phenomena that belong to a given class of like phenomena, in the Max Weber tradition. To illustrate the current Chinese situation, I utilize data on the contemporary, so-called “dibao” program. This is a scheme whose full name is *zuidi shenghuo baozhang* [最低生活保障], which was instituted on a nationwide basis in September 1999 after its inception in Shanghai in 1993, and following trial implementation in many other cities as the 1990s wore on.

I begin with the set of three models that I devised while reading about welfare around the world. I then go on to fit findings from studies of different periods in Chinese history into this triple mold. I conclude with comments on the current *dibao* program, noting its transformations over the short time of its enforcement and, accordingly, the way in which it reflects a recent, fundamental shift in authoritative treatment of the poor in China today. My data is primarily secondary literature, with some use of recent statistics on that current program. My work here is also informed by my fieldwork interviews over the years 2007 to 2013 with urban poor people, and with several officials and scholars who either deal with them or who manage and study the policy, respectively.

**Three Relief Formats**
In my ambition to devise a format that is widely applicable and that cuts across factors typically used to categorize welfare policies (such as regime type, economic developmental level, geographical region), I take as my mode of differentiation the moral, conceptual, and motivational factors that I see as undergirding disparate types of state welfare effort. These factors are principally prevailing societal values and state goals that inspire, underlie and dictate the provision of assistance at given times. The framework, then, amounts to a heuristic typology consisting of three ideal typical models—or alternatively put, styles—of social relief, each of which, respectively, is organized around what I would label separate mentalities about the relationship between the indigent and the state.

My purpose is to illuminate ideational influences, rather than political or economic ones, that shape welfare, even though material factors may influence a regime’s capabilities and thus constrain its choices. Each such model is organized around its own rationale; has a different group whose interests are served by its workings; employs disparate modalities or tactics; and aims at goals of its own. I am chiefly concerned with relief for the very poor, not with all kinds of welfare.

A particular country may draw on elements of more than one model at a given juncture; there can also be emphases from one model that dominate over, if coexist with, elements from another one at any point in time; and different governments in the same state clearly have adopted differing models over time, as this paper on China suggests. Additionally, at any moment societies around the globe certainly subscribe to disparate models. These dissimilarities of time and place seem to indicate that, while foundational precepts—such as the Confucian mandate to care for the people—may never have been totally discarded in China, more is at play than either a people’s static culture or the influence of globally popular
notions. Here I cast the proximate roots of variation in dissimilar beliefs about the poor, about the government’s sense of responsibility to the poor, and in distinctions in the state’s sense of its mission toward its people across periods of Chinese governance.

The first of these three models I label the Rights-based one; it assumes that all people possess basic human rights to livelihood, social protection and security. This approach, which might be paternalistic (as in more authoritarian regimes) or rooted in notions of justice and egalitarianism (in democratic regimes), purports to work to realize these rights. Policies promulgated in line with this perspective generally take the individual as their target, as they have as their final goal the sustenance of persons, taken as ends in themselves. It is also the case, however, that rulers—like traditional Chinese emperors—guided by the norm of providing for “the people’s” welfare—aim at collective subsistence, not just at the preservation of the single person.

One more caveat: since the notion of “right” is almost consensually taken by scholars of China to be outside the Confucian tradition, I wish to put forth a correlative concept that could be viewed as having operated in a similar fashion, that of “rite.” Here I refer to my Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, in which one of the senses in which that word can be used is to mean “any customary observance or practice.” In that sense, a state norm of providing for the people’s livelihood could be said to have been applied in the form of a customary observance by officials who properly managed the populace under their charge. Both concepts—right, rite—are grounded in principles that enforce good treatment of people; both also are presumed, in their purest embodiment, to operate outside politics. Thus, for the Chinese story, I should modify my first model’s name from Rights-based to Rights/Rites-based.
The second model, the Responsive one, is represented by programs crafted in *response to voice*, that is, designed principally just in reaction to expressions of popular discontent (or from fear thereof), to demands that have been (or that conceivably could be) put forth by citizens who feel aggrieved, as expressed by them through their ballots. Put in other words, this model is either reactive or preemptive, or both. But, it needs to be emphasized, voice can be communicated not just through votes in democracies. It can also be potent when—either in democracies or as is sometimes the case in authoritarian states—it is raised by rioters and demonstrators, especially, but not only, if they are organized.

It is enough that leaders are apprehensive about domestic disorder or about their own dethronement (as in authoritarian regimes) or, as in democracies, about the failure to win or to hold onto an official post they desire or hope to retain) for them to install welfare remedies directed at defusing the tensions, satisfying the demands, or demobilizing the masses in the immediate or short term, in the wake of expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo. In these cases, one can sensibly claim that the plans devised are prepared and presented chiefly for the good of politicians.

In illustration of this model, Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward have noted that in the democratic U.S., state-disbursed hand-outs to the poor during the years of the Depression diminished markedly on several occasions not in reaction to outcomes at the polls—and, more pointedly, not because poor people’s situations had improved--but just because mass disturbances had died down.\(^\text{10}\) Documenting welfare in the mid-1930s, they note that, “with stability restored, the continued suffering of these millions had little political force,” ample evidence of the pull of politicians’ own interests.\(^\text{11}\) Similarly, when workers create havoc, wages might be increased just to get them back to the machines.
Another case of this mode is recounted by Geoffrey Garrett and others. Throughout many of the advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe, the presence of a democratic regime appears to have ensured that, so long as a left-wing-oriented government was in place, the voice of the people—typically articulated in their votes at election time, sometimes in the strikes and protests of workers and their unions—is sufficient to prod politicians to respond with generous welfare programs. Popular demands, thus, are seen as deserving of public response in this model of welfare outlay. The welfare program called Solidaridad, designed by former Mexican President Carlos Salinas in the 1980s and early 1990s, has been characterized as targeted particularly at regions where he needed to win votes, even though the country could not yet be called a democratic one.

The third model’s motivating impulse—or logic of sustenance supply—is to an urge to remove the impoverished (or, alternatively, what is perceived to be their disagreeable traits) from the public realm, on the grounds that they display features that public leaders and, often, the public at large, see either as innately offensive or else as ill-suited to the society in question and its contemporary goals. This one I call the Remold/Reject pattern.

Here is a pattern that potentially has both positive and negative perspectives, and, in turn, operates in both affirmative and derogatory modes. From a positive angle, the guiding aspiration is to remold or rehabilitate indigent persons, in the stated interest of integrating them into the mainstream, proper populace, and for rendering them better able to position themselves within and to contribute to the nation. From this more optimistic, inclusive, vantage point, recipients can be tutored or nourished—in other words, upgraded—on a hope of gaining their more permanent cooperation, and they are not, as in the second model (the Responsive one) simply to be temporarily placated and silenced.
But this renovation enterprise can also spring from a *negative* view and, accordingly, adopt an antagonistic approach, as in regulating, disciplining, repressing, surveilling, and, in the extreme case, altogether *excluding* the poor from the rest of the residents-at-large. Here the treatment works not to upgrade, but instead to *downgrade* the targets. In either of these cases connected with rejecting persons as they present themselves—whether inspired by positive or negative outlooks on these people—the subtext behind the policies and programs is to improve the *nation*. And so it is to the collectivity as a whole that the advantage is to accrue. The stimulus behind this approach — whether benign in instinct or battering and abusive in impact – is often revealed in platforms smacking more of reproach than of care. Thus, each of the three models rests upon a distinct *rationale*.

With each of these logics of succor there go distinctive *modalities or tactics*. Where the *individual* and his/her rights is critical (or where officials—usually paternalistic ones--operate on the basis of shared visions of appropriate “rites,”) in the Rights-based model, relevant treatment could be either private charity or governmental entitlements, despite that these concepts are sometimes presented as contradictory (charity being seen as belittling and unpredictable, even as it is proffered on the positive understanding that persons should be assisted to live, while entitlements may lend some dignity, since they are universally bestowed on all qualified subjects, and are institutionalized). Recently, for instance, some areas in India, along with Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, elsewhere in Latin America and South Africa, have initiated programs that offer outlays of direct cash to the impoverished (more on this below). These grants are a product of a new, post-Universal Declaration of Human Rights era which emerged in the “Global South” in the late 1990s, in line with a 1948 United Nations document that introduced the notion that people have a *right* not to be poor [italics added].
Secondly, when the dominant motive is to provide gains and benefits to politicians, as in the Responsive variety of aid, compensation or payoffs that are time-limited and conditional tend to be the mode of giving; alternatively, politicians may also pick off protesters’ leaders while palliating lesser participants, all in the service of deactivating demands. And third, when elevating and enhancing—perhaps so-styled “modernizing”—the nation is the guiding aspiration, in affirmative, Remolding assistance, the objects are apt to be treated beneficently, as by extending funds for education and health care to them for the purpose of forming human capital to heighten national productivity, if chiefly just for the sake of the state as a whole.

In both Japan and Korea, for instance, in the postwar decades, high growth goals for the nation meant that a pro-production (sometimes termed a “productivist”) public policy informed social protection rather than did either a notion of rights or a hope to respond to voice. As Leonard Schoppa has detailed, the Japanese government achieved this end for a number of decades through elaborate systems of regulations, import protections, tax benefits, and banking protections that incentivized state institutions and large firms to retain, train, and sustain their workforces.

Adding to the story of China’s neighbors, Stepan Haggard and Robert Kaufman point out that, while postwar East Asian states extended low levels of social insurance, some of them (notably, Korea and Japan) did put investment into education, thereby upgrading the skills and knowledge of those who were poor for lack of adequate training. To the extent that these governments propped up the agencies that dispersed the welfare, one of their objects was to rehabilitate and uplift the unfortunate so they could join in a national project, in line with the constructive side of the Remake/Remold pattern.
Contrariwise, from a negative impulse, when the inclination for national advancement is paired with a widespread belief that poor people—whether from deficiencies in education, morality or skills, for reasons of poor health or disability, or for unseemly appearance—hopelessly incapable of donating to the larger community, then refurbishing is less likely than is simply removing the persons from the public purview. This can be accompanied by stiff regulation or else by unshorn coercion, all in the interest of keeping the larger collectivity pure or up to par.

An extreme case of this model would be Barbara Harriss-White’s depiction of what she terms “the very poorest of the poor.” Her subjects, the casualties of accidents, addictions, natural and health-related disasters, and of the fallout from deep indebtedness, are rejected by and estranged from their society; this occurs as the general populace is actively hostile toward them. As Harriss-White explains, they are those who “have nothing (in terms of assets), ‘are’ nothing (in terms of political and social status) and contend with ferocious obstacles to the exercise of agency (i.e., can ‘do’ virtually nothing in terms of realizing their capabilities).”

She goes on to argue that, “destitute people are a social category which exists within the territorial boundaries of a society but from which society evidently wishes to rid itself.” Speaking of the fate of such unfortunates in both India and Peru, she does note that there are movements aiming at the restitution and empowerment of these people. These efforts, however, coexist with a “stripping of rights” from people held to be expendable, she documents, as she describes lice-infested storage places into which already miserable indigents may be tossed. It is obvious that these people are simply to be removed.

Three sets of state (and political leaders’) ideal-typical goals characterize the three models, respectively, each of which may involve an aspiration to bolster the legitimacy of the
regime and/or its leaders, whether domestically, externally or both, in the light of some prized value. These are (in the Rights/Rites pattern) to achieve universally-honored norms or to fulfil traditional ethical understandings about the claims and deserts of persons; (according to the Responsive model) to preserve or to bring about social harmony, domestic order and, especially, political stability; and (as the Remold/Reject logic would have it) to attain national development and “progress,” economic growth, and, often, what is held to amount to “modernity.” This schematic presentation portrays these distinctions:

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<tr>
<th>THREE IDEAL TYPICAL MODELS OF WELFARE PROVISION</th>
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<td><strong>Names of models/Features of models</strong></td>
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<td>Rationale</td>
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<td>Beneficiaries</td>
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Tactics

| Provide for livelihood, use charity or other private sources or instate entitlements | Defuse tensions, preempt or satisfy demands, demobilize through payoffs, compensation | Rehabilitate, remake by educational, health benefits OR discipline, exclude by means of coercion, expulsion |

Goals

| Assist persons as ends in themselves; fulfil universal or traditional norms | Order; attain or preserve political status for political elites | Gain contribution to nation, OR purify the nation; productivity |

**Three key issues, questions welfare programs confront**

A state instituting a welfare program also has answers to three key questions that confront welfare operations. These are: whether or not to set *conditions* for the allocation of benefits; how to determine who truly *deserves* relief; and what the appropriate *source of funding* ought to be. To begin with the first of these, welfare efforts differ as to whether or not *conditions* are set on the sanctioned *uses* of the funds that are allocated (such as that the funds can be expended only for furthering recipients’ human development), or that the beneficiaries must *work* in order to collect a grant. This is what I term the issue of *conditionality*.

As an example, in the past few decades, a number of Latin American countries have initiated conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, of which more than 100 million poor Latin Americans had become the beneficiaries as of 2011. The prototype for these, launched in Mexico in 1997, pits paternalism—and conditionality—with provision. Families collect money periodically, provided the mothers send their children to school, feed them adequately, and deliver them to doctors for check-ups on a regular basis. Other Latin American countries have adopted similar programs, which now exist in Chile, El Salvador, and Costa Rica, and elsewhere throughout the region.
While in some quarters (such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank), this innovation may be seen as a case of the Rights-based model, in these three particular countries the connection of care with rights seems weaker than does a tie to a statist project that is oriented toward demanding that recipients fulfil certain criteria. Juliana Martinez Franzoni and Koen Voorend argue that, at least in those countries that they cover, “The formation of CCTs was pretty much the business of poverty experts rather than grassroots organizations or the poor themselves.”

A second large issue is about deserts or so-called “worthiness.” Here the question is posed as to whether to differentiate the able-bodied (who, in theory, according to one perspective, ought to be employable), and/or those viewed as “undeserving,” or “unworthy” (such as people taking drugs or alcoholics; or such as tramps, vagabonds, and prostitutes) from those considered “deserving” or “worthy” (a concept that generally alludes to the chronically ill, the disabled, the mentally incompetent, orphans, widows and the aged). This issue can also be thought of as the question of whether assistance should be provided universally, or instead given only to those who are “targeted” according to certain criteria.

A 2006 African Union conference promulgated a “Livingstone Call for Action,” which decreed that each country on the continent should have social transfer programs that include both a social pension and social transfers to vulnerable children, older people and people with disabilities, i.e., to the “deserving.” Similarly, some of the states of India sponsor cash allowance schemes only for those usually known as the “deserving poor,” such as children, disabled individuals and the elderly. In 1995 India’s central government, moreover, introduced a nationwide arrangement called the National Social Assistance program, which promised that benefits would eventually be available to poor households upon the death or incapacity of their
heads or for pregnant women, another category of clientele often viewed as “worthy.” These outlays fall under the categories of national old-age pensions, family benefits, and maternity allowances.

And third is the issue of whether the source of financial assistance should be private (as, coming from employers and firms, family members, or voluntary organizations and charitable foundations) or public, that is, disbursed by the state. Robert Kaufman and Stepan Haggard explain that what citizens in Eastern Europe had come to expect from their governments after some four or more decades of socialist rule, i.e., an inclusive public sector, was the factor that had the biggest impact on the shape of the post-socialist welfare regime in states in that region. This statement from their book makes this point: “In Eastern Europe, publics expected governments to maintain an array of protections on a universal basis, at low or even no, cost…the public sector continued to play a large role in both the financing and provision of social insurance and services.” And so universalist provision and government financing continued after official socialism had died to obtain in the places on that part of the map into and after the 1990s.  

The governments of both Korea and Japan, on the other hand, developed social protection policies over the years that relied heavily upon private more than on public funding. In Korea, voluntary agencies and businesses were tasked with providing social protection. Indeed, in both countries the social safety net was more the responsibility of employers than it was of the state. As Taekyoon Kim et al. have argued, “For most of South Korea’s history, family support and occupational welfare had [sic] compensated for the lack of government-provided welfare.” This was because the state’s goal of fostering economic development overrode all other considerations and consequently activities that furthered that venture served as the
premier target for state investment. Despite a rights-based assistance program created in South Korea in 1999 and a doubling of public expenditure on welfare at the same time, coverage remained limited, and the proportion of the poor who received assistance probably equaled only a mere third of those who were eligible in these authors’ reckoning.\(^{26}\)

In Japan, as in South Korea, where the concept of the “deserving” poor still holds sway, conditionality obtains, as able-bodied people have been denied welfare. As Gregory Kasza explains, the official emphasis was for decades placed on helping people to remain at work through a system of incentives to firms.\(^{27}\) Historically, family support relieved the government of the need to help the needy.\(^{28}\) In the formulation of Leonard Schoppa, the Japanese government constructed a model of “convoy capitalism,” which helped the vulnerable to subsist, which they were able to do as the firms that employed them were charged with nurturing their employees and restricted in laying off workers. The firms were, accordingly, aided to remain in business by government subsidies and pro-productive policies.\(^{29}\)

In sum, a wide-ranging examination of multiple states’ efforts at executing social assistance, led me to delineate three separate modes—or models--of welfare. These models, however, cannot be simply and precisely superimposed upon three large issues confronting donation that this research also uncovered. I now turn to look at how an array of more or less Confucian states have fashioned their styles of succor and how they have grappled with these choices, including a comparatively close exploration of the current minimal livelihood scheme.

**Chinese Cases**

The central states governing China over the span of the four centuries from the late Ming until the present each in its own way honored (explicitly or implicitly) the ancient Confucian
exhortation to provide for the people. That fundamental charge, or at least its message, was never ignored (even if the Confucian heritage was expressly denigrated under Mao), though it was variously interpreted and executed over the centuries and years. There existed a range that stretched from the Late Ming’s dependence upon an alliance of local officials and gentry, chiefly activated by episodes of famine, to the mid-Qing construction and operation of a nationwide, centrally coordinated system of granary storage, to the Republican period’s public workhouses and private charities, and on to the early People’s Republic’s hand-outs to its “three-without” city dwellers (those with no ability to work, without a legal supporter, and without a source of income), and finally up to the current “dibao,” or minimal livelihood program.

Relying on research on earlier periods and on my own dibao work for the present, I proceed to compare approaches to welfare in these several epochs, highlighting where they each fit into my typology of welfare models, and also how they each responded to the three key queries I just reviewed that welfare programs address. For simplicity’s sake I collapse the Late Ming and the Qing dynasties into “Late Imperial China,” but I note distinctions within that long period when appropriate; combine the decades 1911-1949 into an era of Nationalist rule as a second period; and refer to the years after 1949 as the era of the People’s Republic, though I point to differences between earlier and recent years in that block of time.

Three Eras, the Models: Late imperial China

According to the account by Joanna Smith, “ancient political texts had counseled rulers to employ, feed, and clothe the dumb, the deaf, the crippled, and the lame, and to aid those who were widowed, orphaned, and socially isolated.” Similarly, speaking of both the late Ming
and Qing dynasties, Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong write that, “The paternalistic responsibility for the people was a Confucian obligation shared by all leaders, from the central bureaucracies to the local worthies.”33 While disadvantaged people were always the specific focus of the care dispensed, there was often a preference for the moral and “genteel poor,” though certainly in times of trouble anyone in need would be eligible.34 Thus, Late Imperial China’s efforts at helping the needy are probably best captured by the Rights/Rites-based model, seeped as its distributors of succor were in traditional norms (Buddhist, and Daoist, as well as Confucian) of benevolence35 for the person. A prominent—if not the sole--rationale behind the charitable actions of the state and its supporters was, then, to realize a right to sustenance, or, put differently, to observe a rite of caring for the needy.36 As Smith has written, “..rulers had supported charitable activities to fulfill the paternalistic obligations associated with political power.”37

At some times this sense of duty—or this enactment of a rite--was honored more rigorously by the central state than it was at others; it was especially honored in the early and High Qing, when both the state’s administrative capacity and its fiscal health permitted.38 Beyond the central administration, an allegiance to Confucian values (and rites) penetrated down into the localities, where gentry in their home counties, steeped in study of the creed from their preparation for the classically-based official examinations, carried out its instructions. These scholars and scholar-officials had been tutored in the notion that the state was meant to assist the impoverished and the hungry, which in so many words might be said to amount to a belief that the individual had a basic right to livelihood, or, at least, that the state and its servants (even in retirement) had an obligation to perform a sort of rite to help to ensure that those in situations of want might survive.39
The beneficiary of the efforts would often be a collectivity, since natural disaster, frequently the clarion call to philanthropic action, struck localities, not households, in the main. But nonetheless what was if nothing else at least the rhetorical justification for relief was always donation to the downtrodden, whether they be only temporarily victims of calamity of climate or instead long-term sufferers of poverty. In the Qing especially, the tactics used to help all such persons in need were the late imperial maintenance of granaries and the direct deliveries of food, clothing or other necessities of daily existence when called for. And, while both Smith and Will & Wong acknowledge the firm official belief in the bond between subsistence provision and political order, the immediate goal was, at a minimum, in part to enact traditional norms (even if doing so was seen as a firm basis for guaranteeing state viability).

*Three Eras, the Models: Republican Period*

Despite Sun Yatsen’s lofty promise in his party’s program of Three Principles, in Janet Chen’s telling of the final days of the Qing and through the era of Republican China—and also in Frederick Wakeman’s characterization of the guiding mentality of the government then as being a “Confucian Fascist” one—the poor were perceived by many, including politicians and intellectuals, as a sort of plague on the people, lazy parasites and social deviants who should be made to become self-reliant. This was true even despite some local regimes in Nationalist days perceiving ‘‘social relief’’ as part of their responsibility and as an essential component of national reconstruction.

How did this switch come about? In Chen’s telling, for many Chinese scholars and among some of the political elite, self-consciousness and a sense of ethnic inferiority before the
eyes of the world seem to have spurred a new sense of urgency, as novel notions of “progress,” “modernity” and “catching-up” with the advanced nations filtered into China, once contacts with the outside multiplied, and as China’s relative “backwardness” became both apparent to all and an embarrassment to its citizens.

Thus, people thought, only if indigent individuals could somehow be transformed—a deed to be accomplished through their involuntary detention and labor—could the civic body, struggling to enter the sphere of cosmopolitan modernity, make a place for them. Otherwise, they were best put away, out of sight. Janet Chen writes that, “Relief was just one component of these new institutions [workhouses and poorhouses], which simultaneously sought to contain the dangerous mobility of urban transients, increase individual self-sufficiency, and expand the productive base of the nation.”

In line with this reasoning, the poor were often pushed off the streets of cities back out to the countryside from which they might have come, or, more typically, thrown into workhouses. These people also sometimes received charity, offered out of a sense among private parties that even the impoverished should be granted the basic wherewithal of sustenance. But public welfare as a concept was not yet operative on any significant scale, and the “privilege” of living in a poorhouse depended upon working. For the leaders, the old Confucian notion of “rights” to subsistence for persons—or, alternatively put, even a notion of a duty to respect ancient rites—seems to have slipped away. Instead, officials reasoned that “the nation” would be harmed by permitting the ignorance and even the presence of those seen as misfits to stain the public. In this case, the operative model was the Remold/Rejection paradigm.

The impetus or rationale behind this style of management was a perception that those subsisting in penury, understood to be undeserving castoffs, stood as an obstacle to the
progress of society as a whole.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, the beneficiary of any program of relief was meant to be less the recipient as a person than it was to be the nation, and the tactics in use were, variously, either rehabilitation or discipline and coercion, but sometimes the two in tandem. The goal informing the effort was to purify the nation and enhance its productivity, the latter, as noted above, a motive in recent years in China’s East Asian neighbors, Japan and Korea as well. In both of those two nearby states, high growth aims \textit{for the nation} meant that for many years a “productivist” public policy informed social protection rather than a notion of rights (or even rites).\textsuperscript{47} Thus, while these states through the postwar decades extended only low levels of social insurance, they did put investment into education, thereby upgrading the skills and the knowledge of those who were poor due to lack of training.\textsuperscript{48} To the extent that these governments funded welfare, the object, then, was to upgrade the unfortunate, expressly so that they could join in a national project.

Somewhat differently, but still fitting into the Remolding pattern, an account of India tracing back to the first half of the twentieth century relates the exclusion of the poor there—much as in the China of the same period—to a vision the British fashioned of them as unstable, volatile and rootless as well as dangerous, all factors that, in their colonial overseers’ judgment, were quite likely to drive such vagrants to moral decay and social anomie; these traits were apt also to push these people on to foment political disorder, again in their governors’ estimation. This portrait seemed to justify treating them as targets for molding or else as objects to be rejected; which of these approaches was adopted hinged on issues of conditionality and worthiness in particular instances. As in Republican China, the impetus behind this style of management was a widespread impression that those subsisting in penury, understood to be undeserving public nuisances, stood as an obstacle to the progress of society as a whole.\textsuperscript{49}
Three Eras, the Models: the People’s Republic

In the cities of the early years of the People’s Republic, soon after the 1949 takeover, as Janet Chen records, “the poor,” particularly those prepared to labor to build up the New China, were celebrated as one of the motivating emblems of the revolution, on the understanding that places could be found for them in the industrializing economy. Even those who seemed useless, such as vagrants and beggars, were to be reshaped into producers. So at that time, according to the perspective of municipal officials, the new regime was disposed to make use of all the available hands around, provided they were not interloping peasants, who needed to be shipped back to the rural areas. But the program for the needy, the “three withouts” [sanwu, 三无], was reserved just for the extremely destitute. As Chen notes, there was no notion of political, civil or social rights behind these stances. Such a scheme had much in common with the pre-1949 project for the poor that had been based on a vision of building up the nation, and so is best categorized as a Remolding one.

But decades later, as the old socialist-style framework of urban rule ran out, a major transformation took place. In the mid-1990s, as laborers were discarded en masse if judged to be superfluous to a major surge to fully revamp and modernize the industrial sector, understandings shifted drastically. At that point, an unspoken but, in practice, potent precept emerged, according to which multitudes of once-workers were perceived to be best let go from their positions. A massive and sudden unemployment of tens of millions came about, gathering force after autumn 1997, along with an attendant institution of an incipient, but harshly exclusivist, labor market.
In the major cities in particular, in the late 1990s it soon became the case that only the young, skilled, and well-educated were considered suitable for the now suddenly upgraded slots in the job arena, while posts that called just for manual labor were in the main reserved for migrants entering the municipalities en masse from the countryside. Those who had been in manufacturing in the past, therefore, became unwelcome in the old workplaces—insofar as such sites were still standing and solvent—or elsewhere in the formal urban economy either, for that matter.

But in light of large and disturbing protests mounted by redundant workers in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the failure of an aborted “Reemployment Program” for so-labeled “laid-off workers [xiagang zhigong, 下岗职工],” the regime proclaimed on a nationwide basis a program for those who abruptly had been turned terribly impoverished, named the Basic Livelihood Guarantee (in Chinese, the dibao, as noted earlier). This initiative had been pioneered in Shanghai in 1993, and was then extended gradually throughout the country’s cities over the rest of the decade.

In 2002, the state decreed a huge increase in the number of the newly poor to be included in the project, primarily in order to cater to, and quiet down, the restive redundant. Whereas only 2.8 million people were being served by the dibao in 1999, by year-end 2002 (at the order of then-Premier Zhu Rongji) that figure had leapt up to 20.6 million. Indeed, at that moment when the post-layoff “reemployment rate” was trickling down into the teens after the turn of the century, the scheme seems to have been available to anyone who had lost his or her job.

In part, Zhu called for the substantial expansion of the program in 2002 on the grounds that the earlier effort, the Basic Livelihood Allowance for laid-off workers (one part of the
Reemployment Program), was not working effectively. In what may be evidence of this targeting, in 2002, the numbers of the unemployed plus the laid-off personnel [shiye, 失业, and xiagang renyuan, respectively] accounted for as much as 44 percent of the total dibao recipients nationwide, while those counted as the members of what was once the “three-withouts” poor amounted to just 4.45 percent of the whole.

As the years went by, however, perhaps because (and this was indeed the case) the dismissed turned out with time to be comparatively non-troublesome, the leadership appears to have demoted the status of the ordinary jobless among the dibao targets. For unlike what the newly cashiered had done in the late 1990s and early 2000s, by mid-decade problems issuing from their ranks of the poo (many of whom had once been laid-off workers) tended in the main to occur only on a small scale, usually in the form of occasional rowdy behavior by individuals.

As illustration of this changed official perspective on the danger posed by the impoverished, the willingness to toil was no longer a condition for state compensation, as it had been in China during the first half of the twentieth century; nor was there much state provision of employment, as there had been from 1949 into the 1980s. Instead, by the middle of the first decade of the new century, only the state of being weak and incapable rendered one truly worthy of officially-financed alms. This becomes clear in that in 2006, xiagang and shiye persons dropped down to amounting to only 35 percent of all recipients, a decline of almost 10 percent from just four years before, while the sanwu (the “three withouts”) stayed at around four percent of the total.

By 2009, xiagang, or “laid-off” was no longer even listed as a category among the dibao recipients, and the registered plus unregistered unemployed amounted to just 39 percent of the
total;\(^6\) this remained the case as of mid-2012. But meanwhile, the sanwu and disabled together had risen to as much as 11.7 percent of all dibao takers, and these two groups continued to account for 11 percent of all beneficiaries three years later.\(^6\) Granted, there could be some overlap between these two categories, but one would imagine that disabled people would have been one component of the earlier set of the sanwu back in 2002 and 2006 as well, when the total numbers of these most desperate amounted to just four percent of all beneficiaries.

One might conjecture that the drop in the percentage among total recipients occupied by the laid-off and unemployed was simply the result of an exogenous decline in the numbers of those who had lost their posts nationwide—due to their reaching the age for receiving their pensions, or because of finding some kind of paid labor—and that there were consequently just not so many people in need of social assistance on the grounds of being out of work.

But interviews reveal that the years since 2006 have seen a distinct tightening of the qualifications for the dibao, with those considered capable of doing labor—whether or not they are able to find a place that would hire them—progressively excluded from its benefits. Thus, localities labeled people able to labor as “employed” even when they were not able to secure work, attributing to their households the income such persons should have earned if at a job. This mode of operation (called counting a person as “notionally employed”), along with the excessive selectivity in the formal labor market, relegated the under-educated and those above age 30 to ongoing penury and occasional “flexible” work.

Another way of measuring the present regime’s attention to the new urban poor is to calculate what turn out to be plummeting percentages that the program represents
in respect to several metrics. As of September 2005, for instance, the mean *dibao* norm (or poverty line) across urban China represented 22.2 percent of the average monthly per capita disposable income in large cities. Two years later, that percentage had gone down to only 17.9 percent. In November 2011, just another four years on, the proportion stood at a mere 13.2 percent.

Besides, in 2007, *dibao* expenditures accounted for .113 percent of gross domestic product; in 2008, they were a bit higher, at .128 percent. In 2009, the figure climbed up, but just to .1439 percent, and in 2011, back down to .14. Last year, 2012, the percentage had plummeted down to just .108 percent. Finally, in 1998, the average *dibao* norm (or poverty line, a norm set by individual cities for their own residents) nationally was equal to 20.5 percent of the mean wage in the largest cities. But by 2007 that proportion had sunk down to 10.3 percent. In 2011, the norm amounted to a mere 7.8 percent of the mean wage in state firms.62

A harsh State Council directive calling for tightening up the management of the *dibao* program issued in September 2012 expressed an intentional restriction of the rewards of hardship just to those who are totally abject. Notably, one of its injunctions was to take “the old, under-age, seriously ill and seriously disabled” as its “keypoint assistance targets.” “Perfect the connection between the urban *dibao* and employment,” it also reads. “Encourage active employment,” it goes on; “increase the strength of support for the employment of those with labor ability.” And, “before applying for the *dibao*, the unemployed in cities who are within working age and have labor ability should first go to the local public employment service organs to register as unemployed, and these organs should supply timely employment service…”63 The extent to which these agencies truly help out, however, is not so clear. In
short, the Remolding project in welfare work that lived through nearly a century has, as of the
2000s, mutated into a Responsive one. This means that, given the new quietude of the
destitute, today’s social assistance amounts to a quite miserly venture, at best.

The Three Key Issues: Conditionality, Worthiness, Funding Sources

As noted above, in addition to three models of relief provision, there are also three key
welfare issues about which states take a stance, namely, conditionality (the conditions under
which funds will be granted to recipients), worthiness (whether to assist all people in financial
need versus aiding just those deemed truly decent and deserving); and whether the principal
source of donations should be public or private. States’ responses to these queries/choices are
not necessarily obvious just from observing which of the three models they adopt. Below, I
summarize how these issues were addressed and are being addressed in the three large epochs
of Chinese history I am examining.

Issues: Late Imperial China

In late imperial times, certainly the civilian poor were not required to use the alms they
acquired toward any specific end, such as the education or health care of their young; nor was
performing labor a condition of their right to a dispensation. Instead, provisioning was done in
the main as a matter of morality, and also to bolster peace among the populace. According to
Joanna Smith, emperors, informed by the paternalism inherent in Confucian teachings, aimed
to minister to the “poor, sick, disabled, and lonely,” even if it was just times of dearth that
mobilized them to action, and though they did not necessarily always attend to the quotidian
concerns of the unfortunate.64
Insofar as selectivity came into play, in at least one typical instance that Smith depicts in depth, discrimination worked in favor of those closest to starvation, and not in terms of their personal characteristics or their occupations. But debates also arose as to the precise criteria or boundary lines to be observed among categories of beneficiaries. Apparently, at least in principle during the late Ming, “doing good,” a “just distribution of resources,” and an “urgency” attached to “saving lives” – matters of rights or perhaps rites -- mandated looking to such issues as hunger and degree of impoverishment rather than to establishing qualifications on the basis of behavior.65

Still, there was a conception of “deserving” as opposed to “non-deserving.” In the Late Ming, for instance, there were sometimes disagreements among local elites as to whether the appropriate recipients should be the “genteel poor,” who might momentarily be too ashamed to accept alms publicly, or those who habitually “fell through the cracks.”66 And in Liang’s essay, a scholar from Zhejiang is quoted as having placed the priority upon the filial, the chaste, and the poor exhibiting moral behavior, while giving was not to benefit gamblers, drunkards, loiterers and parasites, or even the young and strong.67

Funding sources in those times were both public and private. In late Ming, local elite, scholars and former officials, and, increasingly, merchants became significant donors as well as the developers of charitable organizations.68 When the state had the requisite wealth and administrative capability, as in the High Qing, and when fiscal resources were not to be deployed for other purposes such as for furnishing armies,69 the central government took the lead in stocking what were termed the “ever-normal granaries” [changpingcang,常平仓]. But at the same time, local elite of means were expected to, and did, contribute to the upkeep of what were called “community granaries,” or shecang [社仓]. Thus, not only did the state offer
up its tax receipts and stores of reserves to the disposal of the needy; it also enjoined those able to afford to do so to divide their own inventories with their less endowed neighbors.\textsuperscript{70} In one place Smith judges that “the line between state welfare and nongovernmental charity…was blurred in late Ming times.”\textsuperscript{71}

In all, the practice of late imperial Chinese rule was to proffer provisions unconditionally, but with some reference to notions of “desert” and non-desert, and, though public and private wellsprings of giving had their separate sorts of institutions, the two forces frequently worked cooperatively.

\textit{Issues: Republican Period}

During the early years of the twentieth century, as China became more connected globally, a widespread sense arose among both scholars and the general public that the nation was in danger of being left far behind internationally--even in some way of collapsing--and that the “Chinese race” itself could be facing extinction as a people. Consequently, the poor were viewed as properly penalized and instructed, in the interest of elevating the general caliber of the populace. This mentality produced a regimen focused on detention and labor for the lowly, such that a new, heretofore untried \textit{conditionality} was placed upon receiving state charity, while distinctions between the deserving and those who were unworthy of assistance were officially and routinely grafted upon decisions about the dispensation of welfare.

Accordingly, where historically work relief had been voluntary, now \textit{worthiness} tempered the traditional concept that a \textit{right to subsistence} for the indigent (or that there ought to be a rite of sustaining such souls) was naturally the property of all persons. The idea was to overcome national weakness almost on a one-by-one basis, by using donations for the purpose of strengthening deficient individuals.\textsuperscript{72} Besides, clearer categories were conceived officially
for bestowing benefits upon the hungry. In the late 1920s, for instance, three categories divided up the institutions of assistance: relief homes for those incapable of working; workhouses for the able-bodied; and factories charged with employing those released from workhouses.  

The third issue, the one about the appropriate fount of funds for the indigent, was, as in late imperial times, to be solved by contributions from the private as well as the public realms. The Guomindang regime did fall into line with previous rulers who took assistance to the deprived as their responsibility, and it did establish social affairs bureaus and relief homes at the urban level to take on this chore. Still, there were also non-state forces energetically at play, even if they sometimes needed to make common cause with officialdom, as in the relief work undertaken by philanthropic groups and benevolent societies, especially during the wartime decades of the 1930s and ‘40s.  

So, in short, the twentieth century saw new goals for the government, along with previously untested popular understandings about how to perceive and cope with the indigent. A new, more rigid conditionality checked charity, and only those prepared to go to work were deemed to “deserve” welfare. But the marriage of (largely) merchant-supplied private contributions with state-delivered money harked back to previous modes of giving, if in somewhat altered forms.

Issues: The People’s Republic

The issues of conditionality, worthiness and the suitable source of funding for poverty-alleviation were dealt with differently over the course of Communist Party rule. Initially, in
the days when workers were celebrated as the “master” class, the virtue of labor was upgraded, such that emphasis was put upon it as the superior means of serving the state and sacrificing for the people. On this basis, those poor capable of doing so were urged to help themselves, even as the government, through its labor departments, assigned work to the able-bodied.\textsuperscript{75} As noted above, however, soon after its takeover of the nation, the Party constructed a category it labeled the “three withouts,” whose members were to be granted minimal beneficence on the grounds that they were totally unable to provide for themselves, and in addition lacked anyone or any agency legally responsible to do so for them. In these ways, conditions and worthiness went hand in hand. Given the state’s incorporation of private charities in the early 1950s, and its absorption of all non-state economic assets by the mid-1950s, there was—and only could be--just a public form of giving soon after Communist Party victory in 1949.\textsuperscript{76}

As for the past few years, however, the statistics cited above--with their changing proportions of the aid monies given to two sets of targets, the able-bodied poor and the helpless—and the late 2012 State Council document, when considered in the context of the current and recent labor market’s inhospitableness to those over 30 and to the under-skilled— together appear to announce that the pre-1990 honor attached to work is now gone. As against what was the situation in the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier decades of Communist Party rule, it would seem that labor, and performing labor, no longer serves as a condition for the receipt of state-furnished welfare.

Instead, the open market, whether it is possible to do so or not, is to absorb the impoverished of fit body, keeping state charity cheap and the numbers of its objects bounded. The worthiness of a target, then, is to be determined largely by the degree of his or her material
downtroddenness and helplessness. As for funding sources, one can only hope that private charity, quite negligible at present, will arise to address the gaps.\footnote{77}

**Conclusion**

This paper has argued that a vantage point perched on perspectives and moral arguments can be used to group approaches to welfare in terms of three models, or ideal types: systems that situate their schemes in a notion of *rights* (or *rites*); programs that are generated in *response to voice*; and policies aimed at *removing* from the public realm either persons or what is seen as their offensive or unfit behavior—a project to be accomplished either by *rejection*, or else by *rehabilitating* and/or *remolding* the persons or their behavior.

Governments then, at different times, appear to choose from a set of three models (or from elements of them), each of which has its own particular tactics for extending or denying benefits, or, put otherwise, for compensating or punishing beneficiaries or targets. States also have their ways of coping with and selecting replies to the three generic questions that welfare programs must confront: *conditionality*; the “*worthiness*” or “deserts” of recipients, as against their deemed “*unworthiness*”; and whether *funding should come from public sources* (the state) or from *private sources* (the family, the firm, charitable foundations, or other non-governmental voluntary agencies). Of course, any effort at assistance is in some way a response to an imperative to tend to the wretched. But clearly some attempts are more sympathetic with the biddings of the Sage than are others.

My framework enables comparison among three different epochs in China’s modern history, with reference to the degree to which each of them abided by (or currently abides by) Confucian values, and the varying manner in which they did (or do) so. Whereas a kind of
notion of right to governmental protection and state-supplied sustenance (or, probably better put, a sense of observing a rite of benevolence) adhered under late imperial rule (if, again, variably), and Republican leaders understood the help they provided as geared toward strengthening the nation, the current political elite bestows financial aid mainly in the hope of preempting disturbances and preventing “instability.”

Thus, in recent years, as resignation and noiselessness appear to be the norm among the poor, *dibao* funding has plummeted as a proportion of government domestic production, and in relation to average city workers’ wages, as well as to the average disposable urban income. Those considered fit to work, despite their being effectively unemployable in the current context, are more and more treated as outside the pale of the deserving impoverished, even as their present plight was handed to them by their own once-benevolent government.

True, the Sage’s mandate that the regime should serve an objective of succoring the distressed and the needy has not vanished altogether. But unlike what the Master seems to have intended, conditions have been imposed on who may receive aid, such that today the assistance is to go only to a very narrow slice of those once held to be worthy. And, even as the government offers little, private donors have not yet stepped in in force to take its place. It would seem that the state’s proclaimed Confucian pretensions may in this policy sector be just paper-thin at present.

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1 Thanks to Thomas Bernstein, Elizabeth Perry, Joanna Smith, and R. Bin Wong for noting where clarification was needed, and for helpful comments, insights and corrections.

2 Joanna Handlin Smith, *The Art of Doing Good: Charity in Late Ming China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009, 252, on the late Ming.)


6 The books that helped the most in formulating my ideas about pre-1949 China are: Smith, op. cit.; R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Chen, op. cit.


8 My thanks to Elizabeth Perry for pointing this out to me in a note on February 21, 2013. On the same date, Bin Wong made the same argument to me, also in a note. The work of William Theodore deBary stands as an outstanding exception to this consensus on the absence of a notion of “rights” in the Confucian heritage (for instance, see William Theodore deBary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).


11 Ibid., 45.


14 Loic Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009) spells out this means of dealing with the poor, especially through the use of the prison.

15 For instance, Joseph Hanlon, Armando Barrientos and David Hulme, Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2010), 27 speaks of direct cash transfers as “giving money to the poor directly, as an entitlement, not charity, and guaranteed for a period of time.” Also, Piven and Cloward, op. cit., 410, have this to say, contrasting pre- and post-1996 policies: “The aid people got from poor relief programs was necessarily discretionary and elaborately conditioned, presumably to determine the neediness and worthiness of particular supplicants. By contrast, the new policies are said to be characterized by vesting of social rights, often called citizenship entitlements, because they are rooted in law, embedded in bureaucracy and supported by mass opinion and class or interest group organizations and are shored up by institutionalized politics.”

16 Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme, op. cit., 19-20.
27 Kasza, *op. cit.*, 100, 105.
29 Schoppa, *op. cit.*, 2, 4.
30 Smith, *op. cit.*, 9 refers to charity as a “quasi-public affair.” Will & Wong, *op. cit.*, 13 describe the late Ming state as “suffer[ing] from limited bureaucratic abilities and weak central leadership.” Despite the varying energy behind assistance efforts in these dynasties, Confucian precepts, as well as Buddhist and Daoist norms, prodded actors in both cases.
31 Wong, *op. cit.*, 117 states that the Qing granary system at its height was “coordinated if not fully controlled by the central state through vertically integrated reporting procedures.”
33 Will & Wong, *op. cit.*, 14.
36 There were also ways in which relief in this era was Responsive, as in Smith’s remark in *op. cit.*, 202 that, “For a brief moment, the touring officials gave rural residents an opportunity to demand justice.” Wong, *op. cit.*, Chapter Nine, discusses food riots and grain seizures.
38 *Ibid.*, 310 and 317 notes that the Ming state sponsored poorhouses (or relief homes) and medical bureaus for the poor, sick, disabled, and lonely, and the Song had run orphanages. Liang, *op. cit.*, 136-67 tells of a relief policy toward the weak and old.
Smith, “Benevolent Societies,” 312, 330-31 notes that competition among local elites, as well as their desire for social harmony and their need to cooperate with merchants, also motivated their formation and sponsorship of benevolent societies.

Ibid., 9-10, 204; Wong, op. cit., 98. Will & Wong, op. cit., 2-3, explicating the Han-dynasty collection, the Guanzi, note that, “Social control is achieved through the guaranteeing of material security.”

Note from Wong, February 21, 2013.


Chen, op. cit.

Ibid., 110.


Kasza, op. cit., 115.

Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., 1, 9-10.

Gooptu, op. cit., 13-16; 420-23.

Chen, op. cit., 223-228.


Chen, op. cit., 228.


The term “laid-off,” used in the 1990s and into the early 2000s, referred to those who had been removed from their jobs but who, in theory, continued to possess “labor relations” with their prior firms. This meant—often in principle only—that the former enterprise was to go on contributing to the welfare benefits of the dismissed employee; often, this was not the case.

Dorothy J. Solinger, "The Urban Dibao: Guarantee for Minimum Livelihood Guarantee or for Minimal Turmoil?” in Fulong Wu and Chris Webster, ed., Marginalization in Urban China: Comparative Perspectives (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2010), Table Two.

The All-China Federation of Trade Unions reported, on the basis of local labor department statistics, that there was a trend of annual deterioration: in 1998, the re-employment rate was 50 per cent; in 1999, 42 per cent; and, in the first eleven months of 2000, down to a mere 16 per cent. See Quanguo zongtonghui baozhang gongzuobu [All-China General Trade Union Security Work Department], “Guanyu xiagang zhigong laodong guanxi chuli ji shehui baozhang jiexu wenti diaocha” [Investigation on Handling Laid-off Staff and Workers’ Labor Relations and Social Security Continuation], Zhongguo gongyun [Chinese labor movement], 5 (2001), 14.


This data comes from the 2010 Minzheng nianjian, [Civil Affairs Yearbook], online: http://annual.apabi.com/uc/yrsearch/yrtext.aspx?, accessed on December 21, 2012. The other 50 or percent fell into the categories at-work personnel, retired personnel, and “others” up through 2006. From 2007 onwards, the remaining recipients sorted into old people, at-work personnel, flexible employment, students in school, and others.
Interviews at a community, Xi’an, July 12, 2011; with a dibao recipient, Lanzhou 15, 2010; with a leading Chinese social welfare scholar from Central China Science and Technology University, Wuhan, August 3, 2011; and with a Chinese welfare researcher from Central China Normal University, Irvine, August 18, 2011.

2010 Minzheng nianjian [Civil Affairs Yearbook], online, from Apabi.

This data comes from the Ministry of Civil Affairs online, for August 2012.

These calculations come from data available at China Data Online and on the Ministry of Civil Affairs website.

Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin zuidi shenghuo baozhang gongcuo de yijian [State Council’s Opinions on Progressively Strengthening and Improving the Work on the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee], Guofa (2012) No. 45  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-09/26/content_2233209.htm.  There is a statement from the Ministry of Civil Affairs describing a new procedure for checking recipients’ assets, “Minzhengbu jiang jianli dibao jiating caichan hedui jizhi” [The Ministry of Civil Affairs will establish a mechanism for checking the figures on dibao households’ assets], written in the same spirit, at http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2012-9-27/ONJUxXzUzMDU0NA.html, both accessed on October 16, 2012.

Smith, The Art, 4.

Ibid., 175, 184, 248.

Smith, The Art, 183-84.

Liang, op. cit., 152.

Smith, “Benevolent Societies.”

See Will & Wong, op. cit., 4-10 on early state supply of grain specifically for the military.

Will & Wong, op cit., 8 says that, “Granaries fit within a larger fiscal context in which the state weighed its sources of revenues and competing expenditures.”See also ibid., 7-10 on types of granaries.

Smith, op. cit., 8. See also Will & Wong, op. cit., 504, which notes that, “The development of community granaries was contingent upon the actions of the gentry and the state, most crucially upon the relationship between them.”

This is a major thesis in Chen, op. cit. See, for instance, 2, 4, 14, 30, 31, 43-44.

Ibid., 98.


Chen, op. cit., 222-23.


And yet, as a recent paper by Beatriz Carrillo Garcia, “Local Economic Elites and Charitable Giving,” presented at Workshop on Local Elites in China, Dunhuang, Gansu, China, 2-7 September 2013, shows, most charity today is given in response to short-term natural disasters.